ISSN: 2158-7051 ==================== INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN STUDIES ==================== ISSUE NO. 12 ( 2023/1 ) |
RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS OUTCOMES
AYSE DIETRICH*
Summary
The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and ten-year war that followed were the result of long, historical interest in the country by Russia that dates back to the 19th century combined with the Soviet Union’s desire to protect and promote friendly communist regimes. The war failed to achieve the Soviet Union’s goals, and even contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, but even today the Russian Federation maintains an active interest in Afghanistan for many of the same reasons that its predecessor did.
Key Words: Soviet – Afghan War, Great Game, Soviet Strategy, Soviet Collapse.
Introduction For ages Afghanistan has
suffered numerous invasions from the Persians, Greeks, Scythians, Huns,
Mongolians, Arabs, Turks, British and Russians. The borders of Afghanistan many
times were subjected to change because of the raise and fall of Central Asian
Empires.That is, the faith of Afghanistan’s borders was in the hands of her
neighbours. Afghanistan does not have a national state structure. In
Afghanistan which has mixed ethnic and cultural population, Pashto, Tajik,
Uzbek, Hazara, Aymak, Farsivan, Brahmi, Turkoman, Baluchi and Nuristani ethnic
groups live. All these ethnic groups
speak their own language and follow their own traditions and customs. For
instance, some of the members of Turkoman families live both in Turkmenistan
and in Afghanistan, and about half of Pashtun live in Pakistan. Therefore, it
is possible to say that in Afghanistan a tribal mentality has developed in
place of national mentality. In Afghanistan which is
one of the undeveloped countries, 90% of the population are uneducated. Per
capita income is around 800 dollars. Because the transportation and
communication are poorly developed in Afghanistan the central goverment cannot
reach the towns and villages in the mountains and valleys. The influence of the
ministers and bureaucrats in the central government is confined to the capital
Kabul, outside the capital the tribal leaders and landowners are free to do as
they please. For all these reasons most Afghans do not even know what national
identity is and they are indifferent to the central government. In 20th century
Afghanistan because of its geographic position gain importance for the two
countries Russia and England. Russian Tsars for centuries strove to expand
Russia’s borders from Siberia to the east and south, to the wast steps of
Central Asia[1]
Abdur Rahman [2],
who ruled Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901, expresses the sad faith of his country
with the following words:
(3) “How can a small
power like Afghanistan, which is like a goat between these lions (British
and Tsarist Russia), or a grain of wheat between the strong millstones of the grinding mill, stand
midway of the stones without being ground to dust?” [3]
Abdur
Rahman came to power after the Second British-Afghan War, and at that time
Kabul was under British control. The half of Abdur Rahman’s life had passed in
Russia and he had been the advocate of Russia, however he feared that
Afghanistan would be captured not by British, but by Russians. We understand this fear from his following
words:
(4) “The Russian policy in Asia is that
in any way, rightly or wrongly, friendly or
unfriendly, with peace or war, the Islamic
kingdoms should be washed away…
They would be glad if Turkey (then the
Ottoman Empire, encompassing modern
Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon,
Israel and all of Arabia), Persia and
Afghanistan ceased to exist as kingdoms
but were maintained merely to be used
as tools in the service of Russia herself,
in which case it would be a matter of
indifference whether they existed or not,
and their duration would simply depend
on the length of time that Russia required
them to serve her purpose.
…If once Russians make up their minds to
do a thing, there is no stopping them,
and no changing their policy… Their habit
of forward movement resembles the
habit of the elephant, who examines a spot
thoroughly before he places his foot
upon it, and when once he puts his weight
there is no going back, and no taking
another step in a hurry until he has put
his full weight on the first foot, and has
smashed everthing that lies under it”[4]
Although
British knew that Abdur Rahman had good relations with Russians they allowed
him to take power, because at that time there was no one else to take control
of the country. On one hand Abdur Rahman continued his good relationship with
Russia, on the other pursuing a strong policy in internal affairs he followed a
policy which prevents outside forces to take advantage of the Afghan
territories, but at the same time he improved his relations with England,
America and Japan to keep Russia away from Afghanistan.
In
1907, through a treaty signed between England and Russia, England agreed to
control the foreign policy of Afghanistan, but would not interfere in her
internal affairs and would not occupy the country, and Russia accepted that
Afghanistan was outside of her sphere of influence. However, the Bolsheviks,
who took the control in 1917, like their predecessors, saw their position in
Central Asia as a part of their world strategy. In 1919 Leon Trotsky describes
the Russian strategy of that time as follows:
(5)
“…the road to Paris and London lies via the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab
and
Bengal”[5]
Later
Lenin also makes a similar statement:
(6)
“…the outcome of the struggle between capitalism and communism will be
determined
by the fact that Russia, India and China, etc., constitute the
overwhelming
majority of the population of the globe” [6]
There
are two reasons for Russia to be interested in Afghanistan: defence and attack.
Bolsheviks on one hand were thinking that England will use Afghanistan as a
route to occupy Russia and she will invade Russian territories by overthrowing
the Soviet Government, on the other hand they wanted to use Afghanistan as a
stepping stone to India and from here provoking Indian people to drive out
British from India. And the Afghan Government which wanted to save itself from
English control and attain complete independence believed that the Soviet
Government would be able to help them in these efforts. Lenin, in a letter
written in November 1919 to the Afghan king Amanullah, congratulated him for
his efforts to create an independent and a free Afghanistan and in responds to
the Afghan Government’s request he wrote:
(7)
“Soviet Russia and Afghanistan continue the joint struggle against the most
rapacious
imperialistic government on earth, Great Britain”[7]
But
these warm relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union were damaged
because of the wrong policies of the Soviet Government towards Muslim
minorities. In 1920 Soviet units took the Bukhara Emirate and the Khanate of
Khiva and exiled their leaders to Afghanistan. The Soviet Government, wanting
to keep good relations with Amanullah, broke the ice between the two sides
through a treaty signed in 1921 in which they promised to protect the
independence of Bukhara and Khiva and to pay him one milyon rubles annually.
Besides this in 1924 the Soviets helped Amanullah in a revolt which broke out
against Amanullah’s reforms by sending planes to bomb the areas where the
rebels lived in. The Soviet Government’s assitance to Amanullah did not end
with this. They provided Afghanistan all kinds of help in communication and
transportation. However the Soviet Union in their relationship with Afghanistan
always persued a long term strategic investments. All the military help given
to Afghanistan by the Soviets served their plans to built a suitable
infrastructure for themselves. The airbases in Afghanistan were built to
satisfy the Soviet needs. But the year after the friendship between Afghanistan
and Russia was broken with the settlement of Uzbek immigrants and Basmach
rebels on the island of Central Togay [8],
which the Afghans claimed was their northern territory. The same year the Soviets as an answer to
this action, sending their units to Afghanistan right away, the first time
invaded the country and made the island a part of their territories. In
response, Amanullah sending additional unit of troops to the north wanted to
send the Soviets the message that a war could break out. The British minister
having heard about the occupation by the Soviets reported London that the
Soviets were active as far as the Hindu Kush. However in 1926 the Soviet
Government pulled all their units out thinking that it is not worth making
enemies of England and Afghanistan and signed an agreement confirming that the
island belong to Afghanistan.
Amanullah,
like the Iranian Shah Reza Pahlavi, taking the founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk as his model, wanted to carry out radical social reforms in his
country. But the radicals and his enemies seeing the photographs of his tour to
Europe and Middle East in 1927-28 in which his wife was unveiled and wearing
western clothes, they blamed him for going against God and Islam. In order to
realize his reforms Amanullah never gained support that Ataturk had. Besides
Amanullah could not see that Ataturk was proclaimed a national hero by his own
people, he was a very good politician and at the same time he was a commander
in chief of the Turkish army, and that he was a ruler who took the power with
help of the British and his people were suspicious of his kingdom and were
against his reforms.
Amanullah
who restricted the autonomy of the tribes, reduced the influence of the
religious leaders, opposed the poligamy and veil, forced man to wear western
clothes, opened schools for the girls and made a change in the monetary system,
finally in 1929 by the force of the Peshtuns who were supported by the British,
fleeing Kabul, was forced to go to Kandahar. The illiterate Tajik Bacha, who
was leading the rebels, declaring himself as king and assembled a ministry
which was formed of villagers. The government of Bacha lasted nine months, towards
the end of 1929 it was overthrown by Nadir Shah and Bacha himself was executed.
As a first attempt Nadir Shah quit supporting some of the radical reforms which
Amanullah wanted to put into practice. Having signed a treaty with the Soviets
in 1931 Nadir Shah made the agreements stronger and promised that the Afghan
territories will never be used for attacks against the Soviet Government. After
this treaty the Basmach leader Ibrahim was arrested and executed, the rebels’
activities were supressed and in Afghanistan the existence of the Basmach
rebels came to an end. However, in 1933, as a result of the uprisings created
by Amanullah’s supporters who were against his unfair trial in
Afghanistan, Nadir Shah was killed and
his son Muhammed Zahir Shah took his place. The new emir, without making any
change in the cabinet and internal policy, tried to improve the relations with
the foreign countries and external trade.
The
Soviet Government did not interfere the civil war which took place in
Afghanistan and after the civil war improving his relations with Afghanistan,
made the ties stronger with the existing government. With a commercial treaty
signed by Afghanistan and Soviets the trade between the two countries became
increased. Nevertheless the Afghan Government’s good relations with the Soviets
got weakened in 1937 after the Afghan Government entered the Saadab Pact, which
vehemently opposed the Turkey’s, Iran’s, Iraq’s and Soviet’s expanding policy.
The Soviet’s strategic ambitions for Afghanistan remained unchanged for years.
In 1939, in a protocol signed by Hitler and Stalin, the Soviets openly declared
their intension to expand their territories towards Indian Ocean and Persian
Gulf.
The
same year Zahir Shah’s regime continued to improve the relations with foreign
countries, especially with Nazi Germany, and Germany began to sent military
equipments, Hitler’s secret agents started to work in the Afghan Government
offices and Central Bank as advisors. Afghanistan officialy announced that she
was neutral in September 1939, right after the 2nd World War
started. But in spite of this Germany pursued a policy which supported the
Peshtun rebels in the north-west with money and weapon against England and
Soviets. The policy which Germany followed in Afghanistan put the Afghan
Government in a difficult position, in 1941 the Soviet Government blaimed
Afghanistan for violating the treaty signed in 1931 and warned the Afghan
Government to expel the German agents who were conducting actions against the
Soviets from the Afghan territories immediately. England gave the Afghan
Government a similar message. Upon this, except the diplomats, all the Germans
in Afghanistan were deported.
In
May 1945, when the war was ended America, England, France and the Soviet Union
requested all German officials to be arrested in Kabul. The Afghan Government
having carried out the Allies request, they handed the German officials over to
the Soviets. When the Soviets with their Allies America and England defeated
the Nazi Germany, Hitler’s plans to make İran, Afghanistan, Turkey and
India German colonies came to an end.
England,
weakened after the war, with the founding of independent governments of India
and Pakistan, could not maintain its power in India and had to withdraw. Once
England left these areas the Soviets increased their influence in Afghanistan.
1950’s are the years when the Soviets’ influence reached the highest level. At
this time relations between the Afghan Government and Pakistan cooled
immediately after the British left the area, because the Afghan Government
requested the Pakistani Government to give the North-West Frontier Province to
Afghanistan, which was within Pakistan’s borders, where part of Afghanistan’s
largest ethnic group, the Peshtuns, whose population was approximately that of
Pakistans, were living. The Pakistani Government rejecting this request closed
its borders to Afghanistan. The Soviets, who were asked for help by the Afghan
Government, support Afghanistan as opposed to Pakistan which was supported by
the Americans, and with a trade treaty signed by the two countries trade
doubled. This helped the Soviet Government to gain strength against the
Americans which refused to arm Afghanistan, but did provide military asistance
to Pakistan and to put Afghanistan gradually under further Soviet influence. In
1955, when the Afghanistan’s Prime Minister Muhammed Davud could not get the
support he expected from the Amerikan Government, he applied to the Soviets for
military aid, and the Soviet Government responded by providing a 100 million
dollars credit guarantee and the visit to Kabul of General Secretary of the
Communist Party Krushchev together with Prime Minister Bulganin. Besides
providing the credit the Soviets undertook the constructions of roads, bridges
and an airport in Kabul. Here it is clear that the Soviets’s undertaking all
the construction business in Afghanistan, as mentioned before, was based on
strategic considerations. Krushchev at the beginning of the 60s talked about
the strategic purpose of the economic help they provided the Afghans as
follows:
(8)
“The road network had great strategic significance because it would have
allowed
us to transport troops and supplies in
the event of war with either Pakistan or
Iran”
[9]
All
the aid the Soviets provided Afghanistan helped them to prepare step by step
for their later occupation of the country. With a later treaty Davud signed the
Soviets undertook the training of the Afghan soldiers. In this way, when the
Afghan soldiers trained by the Soviets returned back to their country they
continually revolted against the current government and the king.
Zahir
Shah removed Davud who was advising Zahir Shah about his reforms because of his
conduct against the Soviets. However, right after Davud left his office Zahir
Shah, accepting the reforms Davud’s recommended, in 1964 he adopted a New
Democracy constitution, a program which included a parlament, elections,
freedom of the press and the right to form political parties. As a result of
this program in January, 1965 first communist Afghan People’s Party (PDPA) was
founded and Nur Muhammed Taraki became the general secretary of this party.
Congress formed the Central Committee and one of the founders of PDPA, Babrak
Karmal was elected as a member of this Committee. In 1967 the party was divided
into factions because of the differences of opinion. The head of the People’s
party was Taraki, and the head of Perchem was Babrak.
The
New Democracy program which Zahir Shah adopted in 1964 did not
restricted the authority of the king. Zahir Shah, who spent most of his time
outside the country, did not consider it important whether this program went
well or not. Davud, who received much support from the military and the
communists who opposed the king’s indifference, announced over the radio the
end of the monarchy, the founding of a new republic and his assumption of the
presidency and prime ministry of the newly founded republic with the coup 17
July, 1973. The Perchem party supported
Davud’s coup, therefore Davud gave the party members a seat in his new
government. Later in 1977 by preparing a new constitution Davud started a
single party period and in this way with the new constitution only one party,
that is the National Revolution Party
was allowed to be established. Davud also elected the members of the Central
Commitee by himself. Meanwhile Davud, who wanted to reduce the dependence of
Afghanistan on the Soviets began to improve his relations with other countries,
especially Iran and Pakistan. In order to solve the Peshtun problem with
Pakistan he cooperated with the Pakistani prime minister; in order for
Afghanistan to gain independence from the Soviets he arranged visits to other
countries, began to send his soldiers to Egypt and India to receive training
and he signed a treaty to improve trade with China. These anti-democratic
actions and the foreign policy Davud followed made the communists in
Afghanistan and consequently the communists in Moscow angry. The Soviet
government realized that Davud had rightest tendencies in his internal and
foreign policy, however as Davud’s tendencies did not effect their policies in
Afghanistan they took no steps to remove him from power. In April 1977 after
Davud’s visit to Brezhnev in Moscow, an Economic Cooperatioon Agreement was
signed between the two countries, thus the unfriendly relations were somewhat
softened.
Davud’s
anti-democratic internal policy which began his single party period, forced the
two parties, the People’s and Perchem, which were separate from the PDPA, to
unite in the summer of 1977 in order to overturn Davud’s regime, and also
became a reason for them to form a new PDPA. The Soviets, who were annoyed with
Davud’s regime, also played a significant role in the uniting of these two parties.
There
were other reasons for the movements against Davud’s regime which gained
antipathy with its anti-democratic actions. In those years the unemployment
rate increased, forcing thousands of Afghan citizens to migrate to Iran and
other Gulf states to find jobs. In order to place his relatives and close
friends in the parliament Davud removed numerous officials from their posts. He
also maintained opposition to the workers and removed communists from the
cabinet. Meanwhile in Kabul a number of politicians were assinated. As a result
of all these, in order to overturn Davud’s regime, his opponents began to
gather supporters by arranging visits all over the country, to form new groups
both in the military and among civilians. On 17 April 1978 after the
assasination of one of the founder of the PDPA Mir Akbar Khayber, a funeral was
arranged for the PDPA leaders on 19 April 1978, ten thousand people attended
this funeral and shouted anti imperialist slogans. Upon this Davud put all the
communists and the leaders Taraki, Babrak and Amin who attended the funeral
under arrest. However, thinking that the military was still loyal to him, he
completely ignored the fact that supporters of this movement existed within the
military. At the beginning Amin, who was under arrest, was kept under house
arrest, this provide him to be in touch with other party members, civilians and
soldiers with whom he planed the coup. All these tactical mistakes cost Davud’s
life. Although Amin was under house arrest, by keeping his leader position of
the coup that was to be carried out shortly, he began to assign the people who
were to command. He put Colonel Aslam
Vatanjar in command of the ground forces and Colonel Abdul Kader in command of
the air forces. On the morning of 27 April the tanks, that were under
Vatanjar’s command, surrounded the Presidential Palace in Kabul which was
protected by the Republican guards; in the afternoon of the same day the units
under Colonel Kader’s command rained rockets down on the defenders. In the
evening Colonel Kader announced over the radio that the administration had come
under the control of the Revolutionary council, the next morning all the guards
were surrounded. Davud who refused to surrender was killed with his wife,
children, brother and grandchildren.
At
this point, it is impossible to think that the Soviets abondoned the Afghans in
their coup attempt to overturn Davud’s regime which they were already not
pleased with. However, this should not mean that the Soviets planed the coup
and it was carried out with their military assistance. The coup was planed and
carried out entirely by the Afghan civilians and soldiers.
Right
after Davud’s regime overthrown the communists formed a new government and on
30 April they announced that the council took power and Taraki became not only
the head of the council, but also prime minister. At the same time Taraki was
also appointed again as the general secretary of the PDPA. And Amin became the
deputy prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs of the council. The
minister of foreign affairs of the new government Amin without waiting he went
to Moscow to be in touch with officials, on December 1978 by signing the
Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty they intended to show the world that there were
close relations between the two countries in the fields of economics, culture,
technology, education, health and military, and that they closely followed
Moscow’s policy. At the same time Taraki and Amin wanted to create an image in
the world that Afghanistan was neutral. With this aim in mind as soon as Taraki
took power, he requested help from other countries, including America. In order
to make Afghanistan a modern country and to improve the living standarts of
Afghan people Taraki began a serious of reforms. However, when superimposing
his reforms on he prefered to use force. With this policy came the imprisonment
and even the execution of numerous civilians and bureaucrats, and as a reaction
to this Afghan people started uprising in many places of the country. The
uprisings which broke out before only in villages and towns spreaded rapidly
also other provinces, the rebels killed many government officials, soldiers in
big cities and the Soviet citizens living in Afghanistan. Meanwhile on February
1979 the American ambassador in Afghanistan was kidnapped in Kabul and killed.
In the end because the uprisings could not suppressed with the forces the
government’s had in hand forced the Soviet government to send more soldiers and
equipment to Afghanistan, the Soviet aircraft began to be seen in the sky’s of
Afghanistan. By thinking that Amin played a major role in both the uprisings
and in preventing them being suppressed the Kremlin informed Taraki who came to
Moscow on September 1979 that Amin should be removed from his position. After
Taraki went back to Afghanistan he invited Amin to the palace, but the moment
he arrived they open fire upon him and killed the people came along with him.
Amin who escaped from the fire without any injury came back to the palace with
the soldiers supporting him and captured Taraki. Later with his order Taraki
was executed.
The
announcement Amin’s new minister of foreign affairs made in an invitation given
to the ambassadors of all of the communists countries, that the Soviet foreign
minister Puzanov attempted to assassinate him, Amin’s overly nationalistic
attitude, his inability to provide stability in the country, not having
Taraki’s supporters in his cabinet (who were recommended by the Soviets) made
the Kremlin suspicious of him becoming closer to the Americans. For this
reason, the Soviets, deciding that the military intervention was inevitable in
order to get rid of Amin, while they continued attempting to remove Amin from
his position, began to concentrate troops in Afghanistan.
On
the morning of 27 December 1979 Soviet special units (SPETNAZ comandos), taking
all the airports and roads in Afghanistan under their control, entered Afghan
territory. Approximately 100,000 Soviet soldiers were in Afghanistan now. In
the evening of the same day the Soviet soldiers surrounded the Presidency
Palace, Amin, who was seized with his family, was killed. After Amin’s death,
Babrak Karmal took the government over with the support of the Soviets.
Babrak
Karmal, considered a Soviet puppet by his people, could not receive the support
he expected neither from the parlament nor his people, although he made great
efforts to sovietize Afghanistan. Babrak’s sovietizing program consisted of
hiring the Soviet citizens for the important positions in government
institutions and allowing important decisions to be taken by these people,
regulating the government, economy, education and the other services according
to the Soviet system. Babrak’s doctor,
guards, advisors and all the people worked for him were Soviet. The Afghan
people, not believing the sincerity of the person who became so alieniated from
them, seeing that the reforms were not working and the economy was getting
worse, began to show strong opposition and resistance to his policy.
The
Soviets whose occupation of Afghanistan lasted ten years announced the outside
world that Afghanistan many times asked military help from the Soviets and the
Afghan government invited the Soviet officials. However, it is impossible for
Amin to ask military help from the Soviets, because at that period his
relations with the Kremlin were straigned, this can be understood from his
assasination immediately after the Soviet occupation.
Then,
what were the real reasons for the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan?
The
first reason was the strategic location of Afghanistan. The Soviets wanted to
reach the Indian Ocean’s open warm waters. The Soviet Unions northern harbors
were frozen for much of the year, and passages from the Baltic and Black Seas
were very narrow, contrary to that the Indian Ocean never froze and it did not
have narrow passages. The second reason was the fear of radical Islamic terrorists would spread the Soviet territory. The third reason was the hope of spreading communism to the
neighboring countries. Having communist countries on the borders meant the
security of the Soviet territories. Base on Brezhnev’s Doctrine once a country
became communist must always remain communist. Any country which was not
communist would always be a threat. In order to guarantee the obedience of
communist regimes in neighboring countries the Soviets pursued a policy of
stationing large number of Soviet troops in these countries. As it happened in
Poland, Czechoslavakia, Hungary, Mongolia and East Germany. The Soviets
perceived North Korea, China, Yugoslavia and Romania as threats because these
countries adopted independent regimes when the Soviets withdrew their units; in
order not to make the same mistake they intended to station their troops there
for a long time. The fourth reason for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was
centuries long territorial expansion, to become a threat to the West by taking
the Persian Gulf, which had 56% of the world’s petroleum, Central Asia, South
Asia, and Africa under their control.
In
the 80s Constantin Chernenko used the following words for the Soviets’ strategy
in Afghanistan:
(9)“Iran,
Afghanistan, the Near East, and the Indian Ocean are all links in the same
chain
– a chain that is pulling in the direction of war for all states and people” [10]
Until 1979 the Soviets did not have any serious problems
on its borders. However, although this was the case, the anxiety that the
rebels would take over control, that they would receive support from the United
States and China, and as a result of this the United States would obtain bases
in Afghanistan, became another reason for the Soviets to have their units enter
Afganistan.
Brezhnev’s comments about this issue as follows:
(10)
“There is a real treat that Afghanistan would lose its independence and be
turned
into
an imperialist military bridgehead on our southern border… The time came
when
we no longer could fail to respond to the request of the government of
friendly
Afghanistan. To have acted otherwise would have meant leaving
Afghanistan prey to imperialism, allowing the aggressive
forces to repeat in
that
country what they had succeeded in doing, for instance, in Chile…To have
acted
otherwise would have meant to watch passively the establishment on our
southern
border of a seat of serious danger to the security of the Soviet state” [11]
Another
possible reason was the confused state of affairs prevalent in Afghanistan.
However, the military stationing and the financial support which began with the
intent to end the bad developments in Afghanistan dragged the Soviets into a
deeper swamp and the Soviets, like Tar Baby [12],
remain stuck in Afghanistan.
A
few weeks after the invasion started the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan
was 85,000, in 1982 100,000 and in 1985 this number reached 115,000. In order
to carry out this tactic which developed to seize the whole Afghanistan and
which intended to result in less casualities, the human resources were
supported by helicopters, tanks, bombers, rockets and artillery. In many places
they used fire powers rather than human resources. The Soviets heavily bombed
the villages where the rebels lived., destroying houses, food and water
resources they made it impossible for the rebels and their supporters to return
to their own villages. These Soviet tactics forced 3 million Afghans to leave
their own country and to settle in Pakistan, Iran, European countries and
America.
The
Soviet intervention of Afghanistan was not confined to only human resources and
fire power. In these attacks, where chemical weapons were used 47 times, within
a year 6,000 Afghan people were killed. All of these tactics helped the
resistance to get stronger, to form well equiped groups. The rebels responded
to the Soviet intervention by killing or mutulating the captured Soviet
soldiers. The resistance movements, which carried on only in villages, had
already spread to Kabul. It is known that in 1982 in the clashes with the
rebels almost 15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed. The Soviets responded to this
by increasing their attacks. They demolished the big cities in Kandahar and
Herat, bombed the rebels settlements with heavy artillery, both Afghan people
and the Soviet units suffered heavy losses. By this time the number of Afghans,
who took shelter in Pakistan, reached 2.5 million. On June 1982 first time
Pakistan and Afghanistan began to negotiate, in November of the same year
General Assembly of United Nations passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal
of foreign forces from Afghanistan. On April 1983 in Brezhnev’s funeral Yuri
Andropov informed the Pakistani president Ziya ül Hak that they would like to
withdraw and if Pakistan stoped supporting the rebels it would make the
withdrawal quiker. However Chernenko, who took power after Andropov died in
1984, followed a policy to make the Soviet position stronger and to shelve the
negotiations. In 3rd Geneva meeting Chernenko’s new government officially
announced that they had no intentions to withdraw the Soviet troops from
Afghanistan. Towards the end of 1984 the number of the people who left
Afghanistan reached 5 million, 3 million of the refugees took shelter in
Pakistan and 2 million of them settled in Iran. At the end of the war which
gradually expanded its borders to Pakistan and Iran, with the encouragement of
Pakistan, the American president Reagan pledged to support rebels through
Pakistan and to provide 280 million dollars a year. In 1985, Gorbachov, who
took power after Chernenko’s death, thought at first that they had to
scrutinize their foreign and therefore their Afghan policy. Gorbachov, who
aimed at restoring the country’s economy, re-evaluated foreign enterprises that
were both unpopular within and outside the country, and which were expensive to
maintain. For this reason it can be said that Gobachov played an important role
in beginning the Soviet’s withdrawal from Afghanistan.
On
April 1985 Reagan in National Security Directorate Directive (NSDD,166) signed
a resolution to drive out the Soviets from Afghanistan no matter what it takes.
Besides this Reagan’s government decided to provide antiaircraft Stinger
missiles to the rebels. However, the delivery of the missiles to the rebels did
not happen until September 1986. From this date on the advanced Stinger
missiles began to cause heavy losses of Soviet aircraft to the extent that the
cost of lost planes reached 2.5 million dollars in 1987; thus it is possible to
say that the Stinger missiles played an important role in the withdrawal of the
Soviets from Afghanistan. In November of the same year Moscow was finally ready
to make plans to withdraw from Afghanistan. Although the negotiations between
Reagan and Gorbachov were accelerated, both parties did not come to an
agreement to bring about a Soviet withdrawal. Soviet planes together with
Afghan planes continued bombing the rebels and civilian settlements. The war,
which the Afghan and the Soviet governments carried out in these areas,
increased the reaction and hatred of the Afghan people and control of these
areas became impossible. In addition to this, arguments broke out among the
Afghan and the Soviet soldiers over war tactics.
At
the beginning of 1988 the American Secretary of State Shultz put pressure on
the Soviets to determine a date for their withdrawal. In 1987 Shultz as a
response to the Soviets, who announced that the withdrawal would begin with
supporting units, informed that the withdrawal should begin with combat units
and supporting units should be withdrawn later from Afghanistan. In response
Shevardnadze emphasized that in order for the Soviet units to be withdrawn it
was necessary for the Americans to cut aid to the rebels. The determination of
the Soviets on withdrawal became definite when Gorbachov announced that the Soviet
soldiers would withdraw on 15 May. On 14 April 1988 Pakistan and Afghanistan
signed Geneva treaty which guaranteed the withdrawal of the Soviet units from
Afghanistan by the Americans and the Soviets. On May 1988 the Soviet units
began to withdraw their troops gradually from the east of Afghanistan. However,
constant attacks arranged by the rebels to the Soviet convoy caused the
withdrawal process to slow down. The Soviet units had to respond to these
attacks with the Afghan units in order to keep their own losses low. At the end of long lasted negotiations with
the rebels, the Soviets were able to withdraw their first units on 18 May, and
the second at the end of May. This delay costed the Soviets to lose their 13,600
soldiers. As a result of the heavy losses during the withdrawal and the rebels
continuous attacks, the Soviets, with the fear that the communist Kabul
government would fall, began to provide MIG-27 jets, Scud missiles and advanced
weapons to the Afghan military and immediately after this on 5 November 1988
the withdrawal of the units was delayed. At the end of long negotiations on
January 1989 in Tahran the Soviet officials sat down to talk the cease-fire,
the rebels promised that they would do everything possible to stop the attacks
during the withdrawal of the Soviet units. Upon this the Soviet withdrawal
process started again. At the end of January the Soviets withdraw their units
from 26 provinces. And in mid February 1989 the Soviet Union, by withdrawing
the last unit from Afghanistan, they put an end to the invasion that lasted ten
years, costed 15,000 Soviet soldiers life and millions of dollars, caused a
great reaction in the international arena. Before the Soviets withdraw the last
soldier from Afghanistan gave 1 million dolar money and military help and they
left the settlements and the bases to the Afghans in order for the Afghan
government to resist the rebels, however the Afghan government could not stop
people from joining the rebels who had received military aid from the American
government. On 16 February 10,000 Afghan soldiers joined the rebels. The reason
for that was not only the misrule of the country; disagreements within the
People’s party and the struggle for leadership forced many people to leave the
country and to join the rebels. To some extent, the withdrawal of the Soviets
from Afghanistan became a reason for civil war to start. As soon as the Soviets
withdraw, disagreements among the members of the Perchem and People parties
broke out. With the Soviet withdraw from Afghanistan the Soviets’ mediator role
between the two parties came to an end.
The
reason why the Soviet strategy, which cost the Soviets heavy losses in
Afghanistan, did not work was that the Soviets suddenly put in front of the
traditionalist, Muslim Afghan people an atheist and a communist government,
which they never grew accustomed to; they acted independently of the Afghan
people and sometimes of the Afghan government forces when they interfered with
the rebels; they made no effort to reconcile the ethnic groups and the rebels;
they mercelessly destroyed the settlements of the Afghan people when they crushed rebellions, and they used
chemical weapons. The Soviets’ Afghanistan experience showed that in order to
achieve good political results military power alone was not enough. A power
which was equipped with most advanced weapons was defeated by the rebels,
because captains and commanders were not trained to fight against guerrilla
tactics, but against NATO countries. They had no authority to make any decision
on their own, or they were inexperienced in these matter. All these negative
conditions and mistaken policies caused the Soviets to be defeated in the war
they had started in Afghanistan.
The war in Afghanistan caused the economy
contract and also made it harder for the Soviets to hide what realy happened in Afghanistan.[13]
The Soviet people were unaware of the true number of casulties since the soldiers and veterans were told not to write home anything about casualties and operations and more than eight years of fighting, the Soviet government made no statement on casualties. However, despite censorship, information about the losses and atrocities spread in the Soviet Union. The veterans returned from Afghanistan with psychological problems and overtime some even developed drug addictions. The increase in drug addiction resulted in high demand for drugs which, in turn, led to a higher volume of drug trafficking from Afghanistan.[14]
The
Soviet invasion also damaged the relations with America, Western Europe and the
Far East. The embargos America imposed on grain and advanced technology upon
the invasion disrupted the Soviet economy. The Soviet invasion also encouraged
the Americans to equip their army with new weapons. As a result, the
arms race accelerated and spiralled out of control.
The Soviets gained some profit from the invasion. They could place the people they had chosen at the head of the government and they could improve their strategic position, specifically in the Gulf. The invasion also gave the Soviets the opportunity to exploit sources of valuable minerals and inexpensive natural gas there. The Soviets acquired a lot of experience with the invasion and had the opportunity to test new weapons.
The Soviet withdrawal had a positive effect on their relations with the Americans. The changes in Soviet policy resulted in the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaty (SALT); after the negotiations the Soviet government reduced military spending, began to review monetary policy to revive the nations economy.
After the Demise of the Soviet Union
Russia’s main objective in
Afghanistan is to stabilize the country internally and to avoid threats which
may emerge from the country. After the fall of the Taliban regime, Russia
established good relationship with the Karzai government and tried to include
Afghanistan into various regional frameworks by organizing meetings at the
level of national leadership. Diplomats from Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Iraq, China, India, and all five Central Asian countries met with the Taliban
delegations and the Afghanistan High Peace Council in Moscow in November 2018.
In 2020, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Central Asia. Russia
viewed this visit and US activities in Central Asia as damaging stating that
America’s strategy with Central Asian countries for Afghanistan without the
participation of the Russian
Federation is unacceptable.
Russia increased its diplomatic efforts with the Taliban and even demanded lifting sanctions on the Taliban in the United Nations. Russia
also showed its support to strengthen economic ties with Kabul by organizing
the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum of 2022 and inviting the Afghan
delegation to this organization. From the Taliban perspective, economic ties
are very important since Russia not
only exports oil, petrol and weapons, but also Russian businesses would provide
maintenance of military equipment, participate in infrastructural projects, and develop deposits of rare earth metals like lithium. The Taliban authorities were expecting
to improve the country’s economic situation by depending on imports from Russia.
Since Afghan assets are still frozen in Western banks, the Taliban authorities believed that Russia’s
imports might help to improve the isolated Afghan economy. However, in order to
attract Russian investments in the country, the Taliban must be able to provide
a secure environment.
[1]
Russia after eliminating Mongols as a threat to Western Europe persued a policy
of describing itself as The Third Rome and being the dominant power in
Christian world. There are three reasons why Moscow’s dream of becoming The
Third Rome did not come to pass: 1- Religion: in the 11th
century Christianity split into two: Catholic and Orthodox. And with Martin
Luther’s Reformation at the end of the 15th century Christianity was
divided three main groups. The religious unity that existed when
[2]He is known by the
nickname “Iron Emir”.
[3]Barth, 1990, p.199.
[4]Klass, 1990, p.2.
[5]Bodansky, 1990, p.232.
[6]Hammond, 1984, p.7.
[7]Hammond, 1984,p.10.
[8]Basmachs were using this island as a base where
they can make their raids on the Soviets.
[9]Bodansky, 1990, p.233.
[10]Ibid.
[11]Hammond, 1984, p. 133.
[12]The Tar Baby from the Uncle Remus Stories symbolizes a
situaton from which escape is impossible and which goes from bad to worst.
[13]Bradsher, 1999, p.241.
[14] Ibid, p.249.
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*Ayse Dietrich - Professor, Part-time, at Middle East Technical University, Department of History and Eurasian Studies. Editor and the founder of the International Journal of Russian Studies (IJORS) e-mail: editor@ijors.net, dayse@metu.edu.tr, dietrichayse@yahoo.com
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