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ISSN: 2158-7051

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF

RUSSIAN STUDIES


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ISSUE NO. 12 ( 2023/1 )

 

 

 

 

 

RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS OUTCOMES

 

AYSE DIETRICH*

 

 

 

Summary

 

The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and ten-year war that followed were the result of long, historical interest in the country by Russia that dates back to the 19th century combined with the Soviet Union’s desire to protect and promote friendly communist regimes. The war failed to achieve the Soviet Union’s goals, and even contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, but even today the Russian Federation maintains an active interest in Afghanistan for many of the same reasons that its predecessor did.

 

Key Words: Soviet – Afghan War, Great Game, Soviet Strategy, Soviet Collapse.

 

Introduction

 

For ages Afghanistan has suffered numerous invasions from the Persians, Greeks, Scythians, Huns, Mongolians, Arabs, Turks, British and Russians. The borders of Afghanistan many times were subjected to change because of the raise and fall of Central Asian Empires.That is, the faith of Afghanistan’s borders was in the hands of her neighbours. Afghanistan does not have a national state structure. In Afghanistan which has mixed ethnic and cultural population, Pashto, Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Aymak, Farsivan, Brahmi, Turkoman, Baluchi and Nuristani ethnic groups live.

All these ethnic groups speak their own language and follow their own traditions and customs. For instance, some of the members of Turkoman families live both in Turkmenistan and in Afghanistan, and about half of Pashtun live in Pakistan. Therefore, it is possible to say that in Afghanistan a tribal mentality has developed in place of national mentality.

In Afghanistan which is one of the undeveloped countries, 90% of the population are uneducated. Per capita income is around 800 dollars. Because the transportation and communication are poorly developed in Afghanistan the central goverment cannot reach the towns and villages in the mountains and valleys. The influence of the ministers and bureaucrats in the central government is confined to the capital Kabul, outside the capital the tribal leaders and landowners are free to do as they please. For all these reasons most Afghans do not even know what national identity is and they are indifferent to the central government.

In 20th century Afghanistan because of its geographic position gain importance for the two countries Russia and England. Russian Tsars for centuries strove to expand Russia’s borders from Siberia to the east and south, to the wast steps of Central Asia[1], and England, since 18th century, continued to gradually invade toward north-western India. In the 19th century England became aware of Tsarist Russia’s expantionist policy in Central Asia and in the end began to worry that this policy could result in Russia being able to reach India. In this century England twice invaded Afghanistan fearing that the Russians would invade Afghanistan to reach India and use it as a transit point, however in face of Afghan’s determent resistance they were forced to withdraw. Russia observing this situation from afar, acted coutiously and delayed its plans for Afghanistan. In the end both empires, England and Russia, being relactant to confront each other directly, they decided to add a new territory, Wakhan Coridor, which extends from Afghanistan to the Chinese border and separates India’s northern border state from Pamir mountains in Russian territories.           

Abdur Rahman [2], who ruled Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901, expresses the sad faith of his country with the following words:

(3) “How can a small power like Afghanistan,

which is like a goat between these lions (British and Tsarist Russia),

or a grain of wheat between the strong millstones of the grinding mill,

stand midway of the stones without being ground to dust?” [3]

Abdur Rahman came to power after the Second British-Afghan War, and at that time Kabul was under British control. The half of Abdur Rahman’s life had passed in Russia and he had been the advocate of Russia, however he feared that Afghanistan would be captured not by British, but by Russians.  We understand this fear from his following words:

(4) “The Russian policy in Asia is that in any way, rightly or wrongly, friendly or

unfriendly, with peace or war, the Islamic kingdoms should be washed away…

They would be glad if Turkey (then the Ottoman Empire, encompassing modern

Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and all of Arabia), Persia and

Afghanistan ceased to exist as kingdoms but were maintained merely to be used

as tools in the service of Russia herself, in which case it would be a matter of

indifference whether they existed or not, and their duration would simply depend

on the length of time that Russia required them to serve her purpose.

…If once Russians make up their minds to do a thing, there is no stopping them,

and no changing their policy… Their habit of forward movement resembles the

habit of the elephant, who examines a spot thoroughly before he places his foot

upon it, and when once he puts his weight there is no going back, and no taking

another step in a hurry until he has put his full weight on the first foot, and has

smashed everthing that lies under it”[4]

Although British knew that Abdur Rahman had good relations with Russians they allowed him to take power, because at that time there was no one else to take control of the country. On one hand Abdur Rahman continued his good relationship with Russia, on the other pursuing a strong policy in internal affairs he followed a policy which prevents outside forces to take advantage of the Afghan territories, but at the same time he improved his relations with England, America and Japan to keep Russia away from Afghanistan.

In 1907, through a treaty signed between England and Russia, England agreed to control the foreign policy of Afghanistan, but would not interfere in her internal affairs and would not occupy the country, and Russia accepted that Afghanistan was outside of her sphere of influence. However, the Bolsheviks, who took the control in 1917, like their predecessors, saw their position in Central Asia as a part of their world strategy. In 1919 Leon Trotsky describes the Russian strategy of that time as follows:

(5) “…the road to Paris and London lies via the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab and

                  Bengal”[5]

Later Lenin also makes a similar statement:

(6) “…the outcome of the struggle between capitalism and communism will be

                  determined by the fact that Russia, India and China, etc., constitute the

                  overwhelming majority of the population of the globe” [6]

There are two reasons for Russia to be interested in Afghanistan: defence and attack. Bolsheviks on one hand were thinking that England will use Afghanistan as a route to occupy Russia and she will invade Russian territories by overthrowing the Soviet Government, on the other hand they wanted to use Afghanistan as a stepping stone to India and from here provoking Indian people to drive out British from India. And the Afghan Government which wanted to save itself from English control and attain complete independence believed that the Soviet Government would be able to help them in these efforts. Lenin, in a letter written in November 1919 to the Afghan king Amanullah, congratulated him for his efforts to create an independent and a free Afghanistan and in responds to the Afghan Government’s request he wrote:

(7) “Soviet Russia and Afghanistan continue the joint struggle against the most

                  rapacious imperialistic government on earth, Great Britain”[7]

But these warm relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union were damaged because of the wrong policies of the Soviet Government towards Muslim minorities. In 1920 Soviet units took the Bukhara Emirate and the Khanate of Khiva and exiled their leaders to Afghanistan. The Soviet Government, wanting to keep good relations with Amanullah, broke the ice between the two sides through a treaty signed in 1921 in which they promised to protect the independence of Bukhara and Khiva and to pay him one milyon rubles annually. Besides this in 1924 the Soviets helped Amanullah in a revolt which broke out against Amanullah’s reforms by sending planes to bomb the areas where the rebels lived in. The Soviet Government’s assitance to Amanullah did not end with this. They provided Afghanistan all kinds of help in communication and transportation. However the Soviet Union in their relationship with Afghanistan always persued a long term strategic investments. All the military help given to Afghanistan by the Soviets served their plans to built a suitable infrastructure for themselves. The airbases in Afghanistan were built to satisfy the Soviet needs. But the year after the friendship between Afghanistan and Russia was broken with the settlement of Uzbek immigrants and Basmach rebels on the island of Central Togay [8], which the Afghans claimed was their northern territory.  The same year the Soviets as an answer to this action, sending their units to Afghanistan right away, the first time invaded the country and made the island a part of their territories. In response, Amanullah sending additional unit of troops to the north wanted to send the Soviets the message that a war could break out. The British minister having heard about the occupation by the Soviets reported London that the Soviets were active as far as the Hindu Kush. However in 1926 the Soviet Government pulled all their units out thinking that it is not worth making enemies of England and Afghanistan and signed an agreement confirming that the island belong to Afghanistan.

Amanullah, like the Iranian Shah Reza Pahlavi, taking the founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as his model, wanted to carry out radical social reforms in his country. But the radicals and his enemies seeing the photographs of his tour to Europe and Middle East in 1927-28 in which his wife was unveiled and wearing western clothes, they blamed him for going against God and Islam. In order to realize his reforms Amanullah never gained support that Ataturk had. Besides Amanullah could not see that Ataturk was proclaimed a national hero by his own people, he was a very good politician and at the same time he was a commander in chief of the Turkish army, and that he was a ruler who took the power with help of the British and his people were suspicious of his kingdom and were against his reforms.

Amanullah who restricted the autonomy of the tribes, reduced the influence of the religious leaders, opposed the poligamy and veil, forced man to wear western clothes, opened schools for the girls and made a change in the monetary system, finally in 1929 by the force of the Peshtuns who were supported by the British, fleeing Kabul, was forced to go to Kandahar. The illiterate Tajik Bacha, who was leading the rebels, declaring himself as king and assembled a ministry which was formed of villagers. The government of Bacha lasted nine months, towards the end of 1929 it was overthrown by Nadir Shah and Bacha himself was executed. As a first attempt Nadir Shah quit supporting some of the radical reforms which Amanullah wanted to put into practice. Having signed a treaty with the Soviets in 1931 Nadir Shah made the agreements stronger and promised that the Afghan territories will never be used for attacks against the Soviet Government. After this treaty the Basmach leader Ibrahim was arrested and executed, the rebels’ activities were supressed and in Afghanistan the existence of the Basmach rebels came to an end. However, in 1933, as a result of the uprisings created by Amanullah’s supporters who were against his unfair trial in Afghanistan,  Nadir Shah was killed and his son Muhammed Zahir Shah took his place. The new emir, without making any change in the cabinet and internal policy, tried to improve the relations with the foreign countries and external trade.

The Soviet Government did not interfere the civil war which took place in Afghanistan and after the civil war improving his relations with Afghanistan, made the ties stronger with the existing government. With a commercial treaty signed by Afghanistan and Soviets the trade between the two countries became increased. Nevertheless the Afghan Government’s good relations with the Soviets got weakened in 1937 after the Afghan Government entered the Saadab Pact, which vehemently opposed the Turkey’s, Iran’s, Iraq’s and Soviet’s expanding policy. The Soviet’s strategic ambitions for Afghanistan remained unchanged for years. In 1939, in a protocol signed by Hitler and Stalin, the Soviets openly declared their intension to expand their territories towards Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

The same year Zahir Shah’s regime continued to improve the relations with foreign countries, especially with Nazi Germany, and Germany began to sent military equipments, Hitler’s secret agents started to work in the Afghan Government offices and Central Bank as advisors. Afghanistan officialy announced that she was neutral in September 1939, right after the 2nd World War started. But in spite of this Germany pursued a policy which supported the Peshtun rebels in the north-west with money and weapon against England and Soviets. The policy which Germany followed in Afghanistan put the Afghan Government in a difficult position, in 1941 the Soviet Government blaimed Afghanistan for violating the treaty signed in 1931 and warned the Afghan Government to expel the German agents who were conducting actions against the Soviets from the Afghan territories immediately. England gave the Afghan Government a similar message. Upon this, except the diplomats, all the Germans in Afghanistan were deported.

In May 1945, when the war was ended America, England, France and the Soviet Union requested all German officials to be arrested in Kabul. The Afghan Government having carried out the Allies request, they handed the German officials over to the Soviets. When the Soviets with their Allies America and England defeated the Nazi Germany, Hitler’s plans to make İran, Afghanistan, Turkey and India German colonies came to an end.

England, weakened after the war, with the founding of independent governments of India and Pakistan, could not maintain its power in India and had to withdraw. Once England left these areas the Soviets increased their influence in Afghanistan. 1950’s are the years when the Soviets’ influence reached the highest level. At this time relations between the Afghan Government and Pakistan cooled immediately after the British left the area, because the Afghan Government requested the Pakistani Government to give the North-West Frontier Province to Afghanistan, which was within Pakistan’s borders, where part of Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, the Peshtuns, whose population was approximately that of Pakistans, were living. The Pakistani Government rejecting this request closed its borders to Afghanistan. The Soviets, who were asked for help by the Afghan Government, support Afghanistan as opposed to Pakistan which was supported by the Americans, and with a trade treaty signed by the two countries trade doubled. This helped the Soviet Government to gain strength against the Americans which refused to arm Afghanistan, but did provide military asistance to Pakistan and to put Afghanistan gradually under further Soviet influence. In 1955, when the Afghanistan’s Prime Minister Muhammed Davud could not get the support he expected from the Amerikan Government, he applied to the Soviets for military aid, and the Soviet Government responded by providing a 100 million dollars credit guarantee and the visit to Kabul of General Secretary of the Communist Party Krushchev together with Prime Minister Bulganin. Besides providing the credit the Soviets undertook the constructions of roads, bridges and an airport in Kabul. Here it is clear that the Soviets’s undertaking all the construction business in Afghanistan, as mentioned before, was based on strategic considerations. Krushchev at the beginning of the 60s talked about the strategic purpose of the economic help they provided the Afghans as follows:

(8) “The road network had great strategic significance because it would have allowed

                  us to transport troops and supplies in the event of war with either Pakistan or

                  Iran” [9]   

All the aid the Soviets provided Afghanistan helped them to prepare step by step for their later occupation of the country. With a later treaty Davud signed the Soviets undertook the training of the Afghan soldiers. In this way, when the Afghan soldiers trained by the Soviets returned back to their country they continually revolted against the current government and the king.

Zahir Shah removed Davud who was advising Zahir Shah about his reforms because of his conduct against the Soviets. However, right after Davud left his office Zahir Shah, accepting the reforms Davud’s recommended, in 1964 he adopted a New Democracy constitution, a program which included a parlament, elections, freedom of the press and the right to form political parties. As a result of this program in January, 1965 first communist Afghan People’s Party (PDPA) was founded and Nur Muhammed Taraki became the general secretary of this party. Congress formed the Central Committee and one of the founders of PDPA, Babrak Karmal was elected as a member of this Committee. In 1967 the party was divided into factions because of the differences of opinion. The head of the People’s party was Taraki, and the head of Perchem was Babrak.

The New Democracy program which Zahir Shah adopted in 1964 did not restricted the authority of the king. Zahir Shah, who spent most of his time outside the country, did not consider it important whether this program went well or not. Davud, who received much support from the military and the communists who opposed the king’s indifference, announced over the radio the end of the monarchy, the founding of a new republic and his assumption of the presidency and prime ministry of the newly founded republic with the coup 17 July, 1973. The Perchem party supported Davud’s coup, therefore Davud gave the party members a seat in his new government. Later in 1977 by preparing a new constitution Davud started a single party period and in this way with the new constitution only one party, that is the National Revolution Party was allowed to be established. Davud also elected the members of the Central Commitee by himself. Meanwhile Davud, who wanted to reduce the dependence of Afghanistan on the Soviets began to improve his relations with other countries, especially Iran and Pakistan. In order to solve the Peshtun problem with Pakistan he cooperated with the Pakistani prime minister; in order for Afghanistan to gain independence from the Soviets he arranged visits to other countries, began to send his soldiers to Egypt and India to receive training and he signed a treaty to improve trade with China. These anti-democratic actions and the foreign policy Davud followed made the communists in Afghanistan and consequently the communists in Moscow angry. The Soviet government realized that Davud had rightest tendencies in his internal and foreign policy, however as Davud’s tendencies did not effect their policies in Afghanistan they took no steps to remove him from power. In April 1977 after Davud’s visit to Brezhnev in Moscow, an Economic Cooperatioon Agreement was signed between the two countries, thus the unfriendly relations were somewhat softened.

Davud’s anti-democratic internal policy which began his single party period, forced the two parties, the People’s and Perchem, which were separate from the PDPA, to unite in the summer of 1977 in order to overturn Davud’s regime, and also became a reason for them to form a new PDPA. The Soviets, who were annoyed with Davud’s regime, also played a significant role in the uniting of these two parties.  

There were other reasons for the movements against Davud’s regime which gained antipathy with its anti-democratic actions. In those years the unemployment rate increased, forcing thousands of Afghan citizens to migrate to Iran and other Gulf states to find jobs. In order to place his relatives and close friends in the parliament Davud removed numerous officials from their posts. He also maintained opposition to the workers and removed communists from the cabinet. Meanwhile in Kabul a number of politicians were assinated. As a result of all these, in order to overturn Davud’s regime, his opponents began to gather supporters by arranging visits all over the country, to form new groups both in the military and among civilians. On 17 April 1978 after the assasination of one of the founder of the PDPA Mir Akbar Khayber, a funeral was arranged for the PDPA leaders on 19 April 1978, ten thousand people attended this funeral and shouted anti imperialist slogans. Upon this Davud put all the communists and the leaders Taraki, Babrak and Amin who attended the funeral under arrest. However, thinking that the military was still loyal to him, he completely ignored the fact that supporters of this movement existed within the military. At the beginning Amin, who was under arrest, was kept under house arrest, this provide him to be in touch with other party members, civilians and soldiers with whom he planed the coup. All these tactical mistakes cost Davud’s life. Although Amin was under house arrest, by keeping his leader position of the coup that was to be carried out shortly, he began to assign the people who were to command. He put Colonel Aslam Vatanjar in command of the ground forces and Colonel Abdul Kader in command of the air forces. On the morning of 27 April the tanks, that were under Vatanjar’s command, surrounded the Presidential Palace in Kabul which was protected by the Republican guards; in the afternoon of the same day the units under Colonel Kader’s command rained rockets down on the defenders. In the evening Colonel Kader announced over the radio that the administration had come under the control of the Revolutionary council, the next morning all the guards were surrounded. Davud who refused to surrender was killed with his wife, children, brother and grandchildren.

At this point, it is impossible to think that the Soviets abondoned the Afghans in their coup attempt to overturn Davud’s regime which they were already not pleased with. However, this should not mean that the Soviets planed the coup and it was carried out with their military assistance. The coup was planed and carried out entirely by the Afghan civilians and soldiers.

Right after Davud’s regime overthrown the communists formed a new government and on 30 April they announced that the council took power and Taraki became not only the head of the council, but also prime minister. At the same time Taraki was also appointed again as the general secretary of the PDPA. And Amin became the deputy prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs of the council. The minister of foreign affairs of the new government Amin without waiting he went to Moscow to be in touch with officials, on December 1978 by signing the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty they intended to show the world that there were close relations between the two countries in the fields of economics, culture, technology, education, health and military, and that they closely followed Moscow’s policy. At the same time Taraki and Amin wanted to create an image in the world that Afghanistan was neutral. With this aim in mind as soon as Taraki took power, he requested help from other countries, including America. In order to make Afghanistan a modern country and to improve the living standarts of Afghan people Taraki began a serious of reforms. However, when superimposing his reforms on he prefered to use force. With this policy came the imprisonment and even the execution of numerous civilians and bureaucrats, and as a reaction to this Afghan people started uprising in many places of the country. The uprisings which broke out before only in villages and towns spreaded rapidly also other provinces, the rebels killed many government officials, soldiers in big cities and the Soviet citizens living in Afghanistan. Meanwhile on February 1979 the American ambassador in Afghanistan was kidnapped in Kabul and killed. In the end because the uprisings could not suppressed with the forces the government’s had in hand forced the Soviet government to send more soldiers and equipment to Afghanistan, the Soviet aircraft began to be seen in the sky’s of Afghanistan. By thinking that Amin played a major role in both the uprisings and in preventing them being suppressed the Kremlin informed Taraki who came to Moscow on September 1979 that Amin should be removed from his position. After Taraki went back to Afghanistan he invited Amin to the palace, but the moment he arrived they open fire upon him and killed the people came along with him. Amin who escaped from the fire without any injury came back to the palace with the soldiers supporting him and captured Taraki. Later with his order Taraki was executed.

The announcement Amin’s new minister of foreign affairs made in an invitation given to the ambassadors of all of the communists countries, that the Soviet foreign minister Puzanov attempted to assassinate him, Amin’s overly nationalistic attitude, his inability to provide stability in the country, not having Taraki’s supporters in his cabinet (who were recommended by the Soviets) made the Kremlin suspicious of him becoming closer to the Americans. For this reason, the Soviets, deciding that the military intervention was inevitable in order to get rid of Amin, while they continued attempting to remove Amin from his position, began to concentrate troops in Afghanistan.

On the morning of 27 December 1979 Soviet special units (SPETNAZ comandos), taking all the airports and roads in Afghanistan under their control, entered Afghan territory. Approximately 100,000 Soviet soldiers were in Afghanistan now. In the evening of the same day the Soviet soldiers surrounded the Presidency Palace, Amin, who was seized with his family, was killed. After Amin’s death, Babrak Karmal took the government over with the support of the Soviets.

Babrak Karmal, considered a Soviet puppet by his people, could not receive the support he expected neither from the parlament nor his people, although he made great efforts to sovietize Afghanistan. Babrak’s sovietizing program consisted of hiring the Soviet citizens for the important positions in government institutions and allowing important decisions to be taken by these people, regulating the government, economy, education and the other services according to the Soviet system. Babrak’s doctor, guards, advisors and all the people worked for him were Soviet. The Afghan people, not believing the sincerity of the person who became so alieniated from them, seeing that the reforms were not working and the economy was getting worse, began to show strong opposition and resistance to his policy.

The Soviets whose occupation of Afghanistan lasted ten years announced the outside world that Afghanistan many times asked military help from the Soviets and the Afghan government invited the Soviet officials. However, it is impossible for Amin to ask military help from the Soviets, because at that period his relations with the Kremlin were straigned, this can be understood from his assasination immediately after the Soviet occupation. 

Then, what were the real reasons for the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan?

The first reason was the strategic location of Afghanistan. The Soviets wanted to reach the Indian Ocean’s open warm waters. The Soviet Unions northern harbors were frozen for much of the year, and passages from the Baltic and Black Seas were very narrow, contrary to that the Indian Ocean never froze and it did not have narrow passages. The second reason was the fear of radical Islamic terrorists would spread the Soviet territory. The third reason was the hope of spreading communism to the neighboring countries. Having communist countries on the borders meant the security of the Soviet territories. Base on Brezhnev’s Doctrine once a country became communist must always remain communist. Any country which was not communist would always be a threat. In order to guarantee the obedience of communist regimes in neighboring countries the Soviets pursued a policy of stationing large number of Soviet troops in these countries. As it happened in Poland, Czechoslavakia, Hungary, Mongolia and East Germany. The Soviets perceived North Korea, China, Yugoslavia and Romania as threats because these countries adopted independent regimes when the Soviets withdrew their units; in order not to make the same mistake they intended to station their troops there for a long time. The fourth reason for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was centuries long territorial expansion, to become a threat to the West by taking the Persian Gulf, which had 56% of the world’s petroleum, Central Asia, South Asia, and Africa under their control.

In the 80s Constantin Chernenko used the following words for the Soviets’ strategy in Afghanistan:

(9)“Iran, Afghanistan, the Near East, and the Indian Ocean are all links in the same

                  chain – a chain that is pulling in the direction of war for all states and people” [10]

Until 1979 the Soviets did not have any serious problems on its borders. However, although this was the case, the anxiety that the rebels would take over control, that they would receive support from the United States and China, and as a result of this the United States would obtain bases in Afghanistan, became another reason for the Soviets to have their units enter Afganistan.

Brezhnev’s comments about this issue as follows:

(10) “There is a real treat that Afghanistan would lose its independence and be turned

                     into an imperialist military bridgehead on our southern border… The time came

                     when we no longer could fail to respond to the request of the government of

                     friendly Afghanistan. To have acted otherwise would have meant leaving

                     Afghanistan  prey to imperialism, allowing the aggressive forces to repeat in

                     that country what they had succeeded in doing, for instance, in Chile…To have

                     acted otherwise would have meant to watch passively the establishment on our

                     southern border of a seat of serious danger to the security of the Soviet state” [11]

Another possible reason was the confused state of affairs prevalent in Afghanistan. However, the military stationing and the financial support which began with the intent to end the bad developments in Afghanistan dragged the Soviets into a deeper swamp and the Soviets, like Tar Baby [12], remain stuck in Afghanistan.

A few weeks after the invasion started the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was 85,000, in 1982 100,000 and in 1985 this number reached 115,000. In order to carry out this tactic which developed to seize the whole Afghanistan and which intended to result in less casualities, the human resources were supported by helicopters, tanks, bombers, rockets and artillery. In many places they used fire powers rather than human resources. The Soviets heavily bombed the villages where the rebels lived., destroying houses, food and water resources they made it impossible for the rebels and their supporters to return to their own villages. These Soviet tactics forced 3 million Afghans to leave their own country and to settle in Pakistan, Iran, European countries and America. 

The Soviet intervention of Afghanistan was not confined to only human resources and fire power. In these attacks, where chemical weapons were used 47 times, within a year 6,000 Afghan people were killed. All of these tactics helped the resistance to get stronger, to form well equiped groups. The rebels responded to the Soviet intervention by killing or mutulating the captured Soviet soldiers. The resistance movements, which carried on only in villages, had already spread to Kabul. It is known that in 1982 in the clashes with the rebels almost 15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed. The Soviets responded to this by increasing their attacks. They demolished the big cities in Kandahar and Herat, bombed the rebels settlements with heavy artillery, both Afghan people and the Soviet units suffered heavy losses. By this time the number of Afghans, who took shelter in Pakistan, reached 2.5 million. On June 1982 first time Pakistan and Afghanistan began to negotiate, in November of the same year General Assembly of United Nations passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. On April 1983 in Brezhnev’s funeral Yuri Andropov informed the Pakistani president Ziya ül Hak that they would like to withdraw and if Pakistan stoped supporting the rebels it would make the withdrawal quiker. However Chernenko, who took power after Andropov died in 1984, followed a policy to make the Soviet position stronger and to shelve the negotiations. In 3rd Geneva meeting Chernenko’s new government officially announced that they had no intentions to withdraw the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Towards the end of 1984 the number of the people who left Afghanistan reached 5 million, 3 million of the refugees took shelter in Pakistan and 2 million of them settled in Iran. At the end of the war which gradually expanded its borders to Pakistan and Iran, with the encouragement of Pakistan, the American president Reagan pledged to support rebels through Pakistan and to provide 280 million dollars a year. In 1985, Gorbachov, who took power after Chernenko’s death, thought at first that they had to scrutinize their foreign and therefore their Afghan policy. Gorbachov, who aimed at restoring the country’s economy, re-evaluated foreign enterprises that were both unpopular within and outside the country, and which were expensive to maintain. For this reason it can be said that Gobachov played an important role in beginning the Soviet’s withdrawal from Afghanistan.          

On April 1985 Reagan in National Security Directorate Directive (NSDD,166) signed a resolution to drive out the Soviets from Afghanistan no matter what it takes. Besides this Reagan’s government decided to provide antiaircraft Stinger missiles to the rebels. However, the delivery of the missiles to the rebels did not happen until September 1986. From this date on the advanced Stinger missiles began to cause heavy losses of Soviet aircraft to the extent that the cost of lost planes reached 2.5 million dollars in 1987; thus it is possible to say that the Stinger missiles played an important role in the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan. In November of the same year Moscow was finally ready to make plans to withdraw from Afghanistan. Although the negotiations between Reagan and Gorbachov were accelerated, both parties did not come to an agreement to bring about a Soviet withdrawal. Soviet planes together with Afghan planes continued bombing the rebels and civilian settlements. The war, which the Afghan and the Soviet governments carried out in these areas, increased the reaction and hatred of the Afghan people and control of these areas became impossible. In addition to this, arguments broke out among the Afghan and the Soviet soldiers over war tactics.

At the beginning of 1988 the American Secretary of State Shultz put pressure on the Soviets to determine a date for their withdrawal. In 1987 Shultz as a response to the Soviets, who announced that the withdrawal would begin with supporting units, informed that the withdrawal should begin with combat units and supporting units should be withdrawn later from Afghanistan. In response Shevardnadze emphasized that in order for the Soviet units to be withdrawn it was necessary for the Americans to cut aid to the rebels. The determination of the Soviets on withdrawal became definite when Gorbachov announced that the Soviet soldiers would withdraw on 15 May. On 14 April 1988 Pakistan and Afghanistan signed Geneva treaty which guaranteed the withdrawal of the Soviet units from Afghanistan by the Americans and the Soviets. On May 1988 the Soviet units began to withdraw their troops gradually from the east of Afghanistan. However, constant attacks arranged by the rebels to the Soviet convoy caused the withdrawal process to slow down. The Soviet units had to respond to these attacks with the Afghan units in order to keep their own losses low.  At the end of long lasted negotiations with the rebels, the Soviets were able to withdraw their first units on 18 May, and the second at the end of May. This delay costed the Soviets to lose their 13,600 soldiers. As a result of the heavy losses during the withdrawal and the rebels continuous attacks, the Soviets, with the fear that the communist Kabul government would fall, began to provide MIG-27 jets, Scud missiles and advanced weapons to the Afghan military and immediately after this on 5 November 1988 the withdrawal of the units was delayed. At the end of long negotiations on January 1989 in Tahran the Soviet officials sat down to talk the cease-fire, the rebels promised that they would do everything possible to stop the attacks during the withdrawal of the Soviet units. Upon this the Soviet withdrawal process started again. At the end of January the Soviets withdraw their units from 26 provinces. And in mid February 1989 the Soviet Union, by withdrawing the last unit from Afghanistan, they put an end to the invasion that lasted ten years, costed 15,000 Soviet soldiers life and millions of dollars, caused a great reaction in the international arena. Before the Soviets withdraw the last soldier from Afghanistan gave 1 million dolar money and military help and they left the settlements and the bases to the Afghans in order for the Afghan government to resist the rebels, however the Afghan government could not stop people from joining the rebels who had received military aid from the American government. On 16 February 10,000 Afghan soldiers joined the rebels. The reason for that was not only the misrule of the country; disagreements within the People’s party and the struggle for leadership forced many people to leave the country and to join the rebels. To some extent, the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan became a reason for civil war to start. As soon as the Soviets withdraw, disagreements among the members of the Perchem and People parties broke out. With the Soviet withdraw from Afghanistan the Soviets’ mediator role between the two parties came to an end.  

The reason why the Soviet strategy, which cost the Soviets heavy losses in Afghanistan, did not work was that the Soviets suddenly put in front of the traditionalist, Muslim Afghan people an atheist and a communist government, which they never grew accustomed to; they acted independently of the Afghan people and sometimes of the Afghan government forces when they interfered with the rebels; they made no effort to reconcile the ethnic groups and the rebels; they mercelessly destroyed the settlements of the Afghan people when they crushed rebellions, and they used chemical weapons. The Soviets’ Afghanistan experience showed that in order to achieve good political results military power alone was not enough. A power which was equipped with most advanced weapons was defeated by the rebels, because captains and commanders were not trained to fight against guerrilla tactics, but against NATO countries. They had no authority to make any decision on their own, or they were inexperienced in these matter. All these negative conditions and mistaken policies caused the Soviets to be defeated in the war they had started in Afghanistan.

The war in Afghanistan caused the economy contract and also made it harder for the Soviets to hide what realy happened in Afghanistan.[13]

The Soviet people were unaware of the true number of casulties since the soldiers and veterans were told not to write home anything about casualties and operations and more than eight years of fighting, the Soviet government made no statement on casualties. However, despite censorship, information about the losses and atrocities spread in the Soviet Union. The veterans returned from Afghanistan with psychological problems and overtime some even developed drug addictions. The increase in drug addiction resulted in high demand for drugs which, in turn, led to a higher volume of drug trafficking from Afghanistan.[14]

The Soviet invasion also damaged the relations with America, Western Europe and the Far East. The embargos America imposed on grain and advanced technology upon the invasion disrupted the Soviet economy. The Soviet invasion also encouraged the Americans to equip their army with new weapons. As a result, the arms race accelerated and spiralled out of control.

The Soviets gained some profit from the invasion. They could place the people they had chosen at the head of the government and they could improve their strategic position, specifically in the Gulf. The invasion also gave the Soviets the opportunity to exploit sources of valuable minerals and inexpensive natural gas there. The Soviets acquired a lot of experience with the invasion and had the opportunity to test new weapons.

            The Soviet withdrawal had a positive effect on their relations with the Americans. The changes in Soviet policy resulted in the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaty (SALT); after the negotiations the Soviet government reduced military spending, began to review monetary policy to revive the nations economy.

 

After the Demise of the Soviet Union

 

Russia’s main objective in Afghanistan is to stabilize the country internally and to avoid threats which may emerge from the country. After the fall of the Taliban regime, Russia established good relationship with the Karzai government and tried to include Afghanistan into various regional frameworks by organizing meetings at the level of national leadership. Diplomats from Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, China, India, and all five Central Asian countries met with the Taliban delegations and the Afghanistan High Peace Council in Moscow in November 2018.

In 2020, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Central Asia. Russia viewed this visit and US activities in Central Asia as damaging stating that America’s strategy with Central Asian countries for Afghanistan without the participation of the Russian Federation is unacceptable.

Russia increased its diplomatic efforts with the Taliban and even demanded lifting sanctions on the Taliban in the United Nations. Russia also showed its support to strengthen economic ties with Kabul by organizing the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum of 2022 and inviting the Afghan delegation to this organization. From the Taliban perspective, economic ties are very important since Russia not only exports oil, petrol and weapons, but also Russian businesses would provide maintenance of military equipment, participate in infrastructural projects, and develop deposits of rare earth metals like lithium. The Taliban authorities were expecting to improve the country’s economic situation by depending on imports from Russia. Since Afghan assets are still frozen in Western banks, the Taliban authorities believed that Russia’s imports might help to improve the isolated Afghan economy. However, in order to attract Russian investments in the country, the Taliban must be able to provide a secure environment.

 

 



 

[1] Russia after eliminating Mongols as a threat to Western Europe persued a policy of describing itself as The Third Rome and being the dominant power in Christian world. There are three reasons why Moscow’s dream of becoming The Third Rome did not come to pass: 1- Religion: in the 11th century Christianity split into two: Catholic and Orthodox. And with Martin Luther’s Reformation at the end of the 15th century Christianity was divided three main groups. The religious unity that existed when Istanbul was The Second Rome was no longer. 2- Politics: Unlike Rome and Byzantium, Russia did not have a large Empire. 3- Legitamacy: Both Rome and Istanbul were directly founded by the Romans. Moscow had no such link with Rome.

[2]He is known by the nickname “Iron Emir”.

[3]Barth, 1990, p.199.

[4]Klass, 1990, p.2.

[5]Bodansky, 1990, p.232.

[6]Hammond, 1984, p.7.

[7]Hammond, 1984,p.10.

[8]Basmachs were using this island as a base where they can make their raids on the Soviets.

[9]Bodansky, 1990, p.233.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Hammond, 1984, p. 133.

[12]The Tar Baby from the Uncle Remus Stories symbolizes a situaton from which escape is impossible and which goes from bad to worst.

[13]Bradsher, 1999, p.241.

[14] Ibid, p.249.

 

 

Bibliography

 

Arnold, Antony. Afghanistan. The Soviet Invasion in Perspective. Hoover International Studies, Stanford University, 1985.

Barth, Fredrik. ‘Cultural Wellsprings of Resistance in Afghanistan’. Afghanistan. The Great Game Revisited. Freedom House, 1990, p.187-202.

Bodansky, Yossef. ‘Soviet Military Involvement in Afghanistan’. Afghanistan. The Great Game Revisited. Freedom House, 1990, p.229-285.

Girardet, Edward. Afghanistan. The Soviet War. Croom Helm, London, 1985.

Hammond, Thomas, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, Westview Press, Colorado, 1984.

Hyman, Anthony. Afghanistan under Soviet Domination 1964-91, MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1992.

Klass, Rosanne. ‘The Great Game Revisited’. Afghanistan. The Great Game Revisited. Freedom House, 1990, p.1-29.

Rogers, Tom. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Greenwood Press, London, 1992.

Sarin, Oleg & Dvoretsky, Lev. The Afghan Syndrome. The Soviet Union’s Vietnam. Presidio,1993. 1993.

Bradsher, S. Henry, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, Oxford University Press, 1999.

Aliyev, Nurlan. “How Russia Views Afghanistan Today”,
https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/russias-contemporary-afghan-policy/

Claudia Chia, Zheng Haiqi. “Russia’s Policy Overtures in Afghanistan”,
https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/russias-policy-overtures-in-afghanistan/

Ivan U. Klyszcz. “Reframing Russia’s Afghanistan Policy”,
https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/07/reframing-russias-afghanistan-policy/

Silvia Boltuc. Russia about to boost cooperation with the Islamic Emirate of

Afghanistan”,
https://www.specialeurasia.com/2022/10/03/russia-afghanistan-cooperation/

Ayaz Gul. “Russia to Host Multilateral Talks on Afghanistan November 16”,

November 09, 2022
https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-to-host-multilateral-talks-on-afghanistan-november-16/6828126.html

Józef Lang. “Afghanistan: the view from Russia”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, February 2014.
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/weu/0030157/index.html

 

 



 

*Ayse Dietrich - Professor, Part-time, at Middle East Technical University, Department of History and Eurasian Studies. Editor and the founder of the International Journal of Russian Studies (IJORS)
e-mail:  editor@ijors.net, dayse@metu.edu.tr, dietrichayse@yahoo.com

 

 

 

 

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