
Although it seems unusual, it is of course important to know ‘who’ is reviewing a book written by ‘whom’. As a winner of prestigious global scholar awards named after Japan’s two prime ministers as well as the sole founder and creator of the Asia Pacific Institute for Global Studies (APIGS) as a truly world-class and cutting-edge research think tank in a ‘blossoming Bangladesh’, I have indeed recently given my provocative opinions, vigorous criticisms and worthwhile feedbacks in reviews of books that are authored by some of the globe’s most established academics and are produced by the world’s not only most prominent publishers but also many propitious presses. In keeping up with this trend, I hold a relish to review this volume individually written by Kent E. Calder who is the director of Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies under the Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC. In fact, this book is published under the auspices of this institution. Calder, who is regarded as a distinguished Edwin O. Reischauer Professor, is basically a Japan expert. For a little detail, he was awarded the 2014 “Order of the Rising Sun” (Gold Rays with Neck Ribbon) by the Japanese government for his contributions to the development of Japan studies in his country, the United States (US). He, who is the first executive director of Harvard University’s Program on US-Japan Relations, is also Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), an American think thank established in the US capital city over 50 years ago that has been named the world’s ‘No. 1’ think tank for international security for the past five years consecutively. An author of many single-authored and co-authored volumes produced from the well-known publishers internationally, he has contributed extensively on contemporary Asia as well.

Calder, who has gathered practical (including his boyhood life) encounters by spending 11 years living and researching in Japan in addition to 4 years elsewhere in East Asia, animatedly expresses that he has long been fascinated with the future of the developing world, and the role that it would
ultimately play on the international stage. He declares that China and India have emerged into the
global economy since the end of the Cold War, and Russia has taken on a newfangled incarnation. In
particular, he is envisaging the future when China would fully awake and able to move the world.
Calder is even wondering whether Iran together with the Muslim world and Islamic fundamentalism
as global political force would once again turn up to re-configure the international scene. As
revealed by him, a new world is moving out of the American presence in Iraq at an end beyond the
Bin Laden era and that in Afghanistan receding. Because Calder regards Asia with his warm support,
he also discloses that from the dawn of his academic career, he began trying to make intellectual
sense of the Asian change and its global impact. According to him, such an effort has consumed the
better part of the last several decades, even as the transformation itself unfolds, and is still
continuing. In his ‘Preface’, he therefore states: “This book, which chronicles and explains the
gradual emergence of a more integrated Eurasia, has thus been in many ways thirty years and more
in the making” (p. xx). Besides, Calder contends that this publication project got inspirations from a
broad range of intellectual stimuli in addition to his personal experiences while he was blessed with a
capable and loyal circle of research assistants as well as the continuing assistance of his friends and
family. Actually, he has a feeling of self-assurance that the readers could rely on this volume as an
outcome of his groundbreaking research granted that the political economy of global energy
transition has been a hallmark of the world affairs over the past three decades, nowhere more so
than on the Eurasian continent at the dawn of the current century. Despite all these assertions, I
should embellish my reflections about this publication before making my eventual and equitable
judgments inasmuch as I conscientiously cast my eye over all of its pages.

At first sight, Calder does not have a quite clear idea about the tectonic plates of the world map. In
the book’s ‘A Note on Conventions’, he clarifies: “The term ‘Eurasia’ is used when both ‘Asia’ and
‘Russia’ are implied” (p. xvii). But Asia is a continent (the largest on earth) and Russia is one of the
countries of North Asia as one of Asia’s six sub-regions. Strictly speaking, ‘Eurasia’ as an ‘inter-
continent’ does not go with the term ‘continent’ any of the world’s six widest expanses of
inhabited land (ie, Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania and South America). In any case,
the word ‘Eurasian’ taken for this book’s title can be contested. From an elucidative perspective,
‘Eurasia’ is made, by adding ‘Eur’ (from Europe) with ‘Asia’ (from Asia). Though he recognizes
‘Eurasia’ as a ‘continent’ with no conspicuous geologic boundary physically separated (by a sea or
ocean) between Europe and Asia, this ‘super-continent’ is the combined landmass of these two
different continents of the globe. In fact, the division between them is a historical and cultural
construct. In several places of the volume, Eurasia is also considered as a landscape that includes the
Middle East (ie, West Asia) and the successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) (for short, Soviet Union), in an improper mode. Apart from it, the phrase ‘East
Asia’, which topographically and traditionally encompasses both ‘Northeast Asia’ and ‘Southeast
Asia’, is not well elucidated.

Moreover, the volume’s main title (The New Continentalism) sounds ‘less important’ relative to its
sub-title (Energy and Twenty-First Century Eurasian Geopolitics) that is ‘more important’. Any
audience might reasonably ask why ‘continentalism’ is preferred to a most commonly used term
‘regionalism’, given that ‘continent’ is synonymous with ‘region’. It is also a question how or
whether continentalism can challenge the concept of ‘national independence’. By way of
explanation, Calder should have better described the term ‘continentalism’ as the axis of agreements
in the form of closer trade links or mutual energy sharing policies that favor regionalization, ie,
cooperation and integration as this process’s fruits between two or more countries as an eventual larger grouping within a region. However, conceding that the sub-title is purposeful, it is not adequate enough. It is just because the only term ‘Geopolitics’ is utilized in the sub-title, and ‘geoeconomics’ is ignored. I come across that he adopts ‘geopolitics’ as a product of political-military nexus. But this key term, especially in international relations (IR), is not essentially defined as it is intricately twisted by geographical factors affecting energy protection from potential threat at a time when the interaction between the two in the literary theories on IR is increasingly ebullient in Eurasia. Indeed, these two tightly linked elements should have really been needed, because Calder is determined to hypothesize his self-proclaimed international ‘political economy’ approach for conducting his research. He himself avows: “These epic changes in the world of energy have profound implications for global political economy” (p. xxiv). Anyway, the term ‘geopolitics’ is not portrayed even precisely. In addition, none of the two most imperative phrases (‘oil/petro diplomacy’ and ‘economic diplomacy’) as a modernistic model of decision-making or conventional statecraft for government-to-government negotiation in international economic relations to achieve a nation’s monetary interest and/or hard security is made intelligible at all. Moreover, he ignores revisiting the theory of ‘energy dependence’, which is generally explicated as either mankind’s reliance on primary/secondary energy for the using up of such resource, or it can narrowly be delineated as the interdependence of one country on energy resources from another country. In essence, the notion on production and consumption as well as demand and supply of energy resources is absent in this project. In this connection, while Calder at his own discretion professes that ‘energy geopolitics’ has become a fashionable subject of late, it can just be interrogated why he has not given us the third degree on energy for sustainable development or/and energy security as one of the most integral dimensions of the human security fabric as against such an already existing too popular or so discussed topic. Needless to say, I understand that the term ‘Energy’ (in the sub-title) is applied to refer to such non-renewable resources as fossil fuels including crude oil (petroleum) and natural gas. Nevertheless, while this term can be defined from different angles, it looks to be unpretentious. Lastly, Calder incautiously intends to appropriate ‘New’ (in main title) and ‘Twenty-First Century’ (in sub-title), as these two frequently exercised phrases are tantamount.

More critically and frankly, in spite of the fact that it is a sizable volume divided into nine chapters (except the introduction), almost half of it (Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 8) read either extraneous or exorbitant. To be clear-cut and all-inclusive, observing that an ample portion of this work is on the American political-economic involvement with Eurasian region, it is not reflected in the book’s title. Discerning also that the study wants to cover ‘Eurasia’, it gives an excessive coverage on ‘Asia’. When it comes to my comments to each individual chapter, Chapter 1, which routinely outlines and assesses the new world order finally emerging in the Cold War’s wake after two decades of transition, reads rather ridiculous. In a 33-page long Chapter 2, Calder considers how geography is still compellingly influencing the transnational energy flows, both directly realized by and indirectly mediated through the adaptive political structures as well as how energy thereby practically shapes the profile of the global contours. Nonetheless, since such an issue of interrelationships among people, state and territory was for centuries an avidly studied and debated subject both academically and professionally, it is nothing innovative with ingenious brainchild. In the same style, he devotes himself to a too big Chapter 3 consisting of 54 pages, which identifies six critical junctures (CJs) as follows: (1) The oil shock and the changing ownership of Middle Eastern energy away from the nationalization of Western major multinational oil companies (1973-1975); (2) China’s four modernizations under Deng Xiaoping’s reform initiative and opening regime contributing to growth.
and energy demand (1978); (3) India’s succession from financial crisis and subsequent reforms towards accelerating growth and burgeoning demand for energy (1991); (4) The collapse of the Soviet Union that acted as a catalyst to revived Eurasian interdependence (1991-1992); (5) The Iranian revolution and an Islamist State that estranged Iran from the US, its former ally (1979); and (6) The advent of Vladimir Putin and his geo-strategically molding of Russia into a proactive petrostate (1999-2008). Calder believes that these six specific events in each mentioned time altogether have not only helped markedly transform Eurasia’s continental picture of rigidity, hesitance and inaction in a deep-rooted geopolitical divides but also helped sweepingly create diverse possibilities for remodeling the latent underlying correspondences of the petrostates and energy consuming nations of Eurasia into concrete alliances, more immediate and seriously interactive than ever before. Additionally, he introduces the notion of CJs, which were heretofore replicated widely in the realm of domestic political development, to deepen understanding of structural change in a variety of IR arenas. Notwithstanding all these truisms, one can want to know why Calder has chosen such a state-of-the-art title of this book, if he had to largely cover the old geographic stories and narratives of historical deeds.

The other half (Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9) is concerned with the core aims of the book. I had to leaf through Chapter 4, because it usually reviews in comparative context the oil and gas reserves, the energy production and export capabilities as well as the regular proclivities of the predominant energy trading nations within Eurasia. Later, I went toward Chapter 5 that examines the broad-based consequences of rising energy income on the domestic political economy of producer nations that varies substantially from nation to nation, when naturally prompting different utility trade-offs between short-run producer revenue and market stability. Calder thinks that the evolving transcontinental relationships among the Eurasian next-door neighbors depend intrinsically on deepening the internal role of the Eurasian petrostates. He continues to argue that those transnational energy relationships, both maritime and overland, are more than mere arms-length, short-term economic transactions – they have prospect of transforming the nature of the world in which we live (p. 114). As per his assumption, although the mere geographical proximity does not necessarily imply economic interdependence, cooperation or solidarity, the universe’s most consequential energy producers and energy consumers located in Eurasia are obviously arrayed in remarkable geographic propinquity to one another. At the same instant, he opines that possibilities for deeper cohesion for energy linkages with the reduction of inevitable conflicts are greatly enhanced by both domestic political idiosyncrasies and economic complementarities with respect to energy among the nations of this region. I surely agree with Calder who believes in the dynamic reality of this continent that had for so many years been static, segmented and detached from the mainstream of the global affairs, and the continent that has suddenly began transfiguring itself into something more. But he seems overwhelmingly positive about Asia’s future, crucifying that he does not seriously consider the political-economic fragilities and uncertainties of Eurasia as contemplated by many social science scholars or the irresolute diplomacy and foreign policy for balancing power politics to maximize economic profits in a daredevil competition among the great power aspirants of this continent ever more convoluted by the turbulent conditions.

Of course, Chapters 6 and 7 are more focused on the volume’s theme. In Chapter 6, Calder delves into the major national accessible markets across Asia with which the four large energy producing nations of West Asia or the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Iran), North Asia (Russia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan) and the Gulf alone producing more than 30 percent of the world’s oil that are
commercially oriented at a faster pace to the four major energy consuming countries of Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) and South Asia (India). As mentioned in this chapter, two of them (Japan and Korea) that are the more mature economies where CJs did not occur have virtually no domestic oil and gas. The other two (China and India) cope with already huge populations, long-term explosive economic upswing and limited domestic energy reserves apart from heavily polluting coal. As it also finds, together these four consumers of Asia, which rank among the five largest (following only the US) oil importers around the world, are growingly configure the global energy demand. Evidently, over 42 percent of global primary energy consumption increases with the rise in income since 1990 are attributable to China and India alone, because the radical renovations of these two rising giants decisively set their new growth engines in motion that have become extremely hungry for energy. Regardless, all these four capitalist consumers in Northeast and South Asia confront a radically more ‘demanding supply management’ in contrast to the energy producers’ distinctive ‘supplying demand management’ for the imported oil and gas that they need badly than the US, Europe or the producing nations themselves. Calder reckons that all these consumers share a crucial common feature, ie, chronic energy insecurity. Whereas, there are abundant reserves, ie, nearly half the globe’s entire proven reserves of oil remaining in just three countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq), giving those petrostates in these Asian sub-regions not only a renewed political-economic means of supplying energy but also a boosted clout in the international politics and economics. Yet, the petrostates suffer from industrial policy weaknesses and other chronic failures to make the best use of their resources (energy usage, manufacturing machinery, mass transport, etc.). In other words, they frequently (but not inevitably) suffer from ‘resource curse’ (also known as the paradox of plenty), meaning that they tend to have less economic growth with less democratic culture, and thus impotent to achieve more developmental success than countries with fewer natural resources. Summarily, the political-economic forces are now bringing the fast-rising consumers and the well-endowed petrostates of the Asian two hemispheres into a dramatically unprecedented symbiosis.

However, I do not view that interactions on oil and gas with regional neighbors or closer tie between producer and consumer in intra-Asian energy is always smooth sailing, realizing that that it cannot be attained without strenuous efforts or without presenting some difficulties. In other expressions, energy neither is freely available through market systems nor its consumption is easily accessible to all, particularly the countries with ‘energy poverty’ that have deficiency of access to modern energy activities. Obviously, the domestic markets of China, Japan and India are vulnerable to global oil price shocks, because all these three economies cope with such a catastrophe when the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) proclaim an ‘oil embargo’. With this regard, while Calder gives a priority to export, import, investment and lending involving energy, he does not offer an insight into the effect of foreign aid and free trade agreements (FTAs) on oil business in the Eurasian markets. Therefore, it would have been intriguing, if he had probed how the official development assistance (ODA) as a proxy of coercive diplomacy of the oil-poor nations affect the policy preferences of the oil-rich countries. And, understanding Calder’s right point that none of the four Asian energy-ravenous clients is home to preeminent multinational companies in the energy sector, he should have more assiduously investigated how the multinational conglomerates from Japan as a single nation has led to the Eurasian economic operations, notably in the spheres of energy-efficient construction services with large-scale financial investments as well as avant-garde technological solutions. Furthermore, while he is pessimistic that all lack the political-military leverage, particularly on the high seas, to ensure unimpeded transport for their imported energy...
supplies, his research is low on an inexorably progressive analysis about the Eurasian energy in the
great power game. In this milieu, Calder takes a note of his own country, ie, America that is also
heavily dependent on energy imports over three-fifths of this country’s consumption because of the
steady decline of its crude oil. He detects: “Most fatefully, they (ie, the booming Eurasian energy
producing and consuming nations) erode the virtually unlimited direction that the United States has
enjoyed in international affairs for a full generation since the Berlin Wall went down. For all
America’s global geopolitical weight, its soft power, and the dynamism of its leadership, not to
mention the far-flung and formidable transnational networks of its people, the United States controls
the levers of neither global energy demand nor supply (p. xxv). On Calder’s authority also, the US
will likely find it harder to rely, in a maturing multipolar world, on the power of global regimes that
have so often in the past felicitously embedded America’s own international influence and norms.
Very briefly, he bluntly informs us about why and how Washington ought to advance toward the
Eurasian continentalism, since the growing potential of Eurasia has now come to consequently
undermine America’s preeminent global position geopolitically, geostrategically and
geoeconomically. Anyhow, Calder maybe hesitates to hold a straightforward standing against his
own nation. It is seemingly because this once unipolar hegemon has over many decades led to
unsettle West Asia by engendering political chaos and economic damage resulting in severe anxiety.
Further, the US strives to make the Middle East a pivot for its magnified armed forces simply to
strategically gain economic benefits of energy therein apart from Central Asia. Moreover,
Washington is now recalculating its petro diplomatic maneuvers encircling these sub-regions of Asia
that have disgracefully faced untold scandalous harassments by this time.

Then, Calder gets immersed in Chapter 7. It digs into the friendly trans-regional collaborative
understanding, which has intermittently started to emerge, by linking the Eurasian states once again
with cohesive partnerships across their previously disjointed continent towards fostering a long-term
interdependence. However, though Calder stresses the still-inchoate nature characterized by the
involved stakeholders of Asia confronting repeatedly each other in divisive regional rivalries that
have not yet disappeared from Asia, he is convinced by the fact that these entente relationships are
all mutually collegial. In this respect, Calder highlights that Eurasia (not America) as in the days of
the ‘Classic Silk Road’ once again stands at the central actor on the stage of global energy affairs.
Since he also hopes, the ‘New Silk Road’ as an all-purpose intra-regional initiative will ultimately
establish an internationally significant synergistic network of enhanced economic corridors
extending between East Asia and West Asia, when better integrating Eurasia. But he does not
acknowledge that the New Silk Road (also called the Belt and Road Initiative) is often referred to as
a Chinese pledge, ie, Beijing’s economic diplomacy and geopolitical positioning. In a nutshell, even
though ‘complex continentalism’ is slowing emerging markets in Eurasia, a palpable
interconnectivity and a functional interdependence are visible in this continent in the midst of
today’s economic globalization. Anyway, while Calder gives his assurance “These new
collaborations, or entities, as I call them, take many forms – diplomatic, commercial, political-
military, corporate, and even cultural. They are conducted at many levels – subnational, national,
and, at the multinational level, in many forms – bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral”, such a
variety of aspects makes his book too tenebrous in the especial rationale that it does not take a
problem-solution technique to an adaptive, assistive and inclusive ‘global energy governance’
architecture that analyzes the energy market from a multilateral institutionalist standpoint. That
means, it does not fill the existing gap with scenarios on how regulatory institutions can ensure
reliable sources of energy at an affordable cost, get the measure of financial risks for it, and provide
emergency response mechanisms to unburden interruptions in energy supply.

As I said before, Chapter 8 foregrounds the necessity for a proactive strategic response on the part of the global community in general and the US with recrimination Washington’s current posture in particular. Even so, a trimmed version of this chapter could have wisely been merged into Chapter 9, because these two chapters read similar. However, given that Chapter 8 tries to lay groundwork for the conclusion to follow, Chapter 9 offers the future prospects and policy implications for the thriving Eurasian countries at the peak. Though much remains to make Calder’s case clear yet, I am certainly of the same opinion as Calder that globalism after all is in its essence antithetical to the parochialism and energy-centric mercantilism implicit in Eurasian continentalism, whose principal national and subnational adherents lack the broad interests and liberal values that would benefit from a globalist approach. I at the same time admire, it is definitely a purpose-built work for the Washington’s decision-makers. One of the reviews in favor of this volume that is extracted by a former US vice president in its back-cover correctly puts forward: “Kent Calder’s The New Continentalism paints a sobering profile of the emerging post-Iraq changes that we face across Eurasia, and the importance of energy policy in meeting them”. Undeniably, Calder concludes with a stride to search an assessment of what is decent for this go-getter region. It is probably because, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), more than half of the projected increase in global energy consumption from 2012 to 2040 occurs among the developing nations of Asia, outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a grouping in which neither China nor India is a member state. In spite of these, a fairly good amount of deliberations of this chapter is a summary of what all other chapters have already discovered. As regards the issues for future research, Calder himself confesses: “Clearly more research is needed on the connections among energy markets, geopolitics, and patterns of conflict in international affairs, as these associations are understudied theoretically and seem destined to grow more salient in the real world” (p. 286).

Accordingly, this volume would have been more seductive to the worldly-wise researchers, if Calder had answered to my following bold questions as follows: (1) Whether is the global powers’ politicization of energy environs and their fight for economic interest, necessity and convenience involving oil and gas might instigate another world war in the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime? (2) What are the actual feelings of a regularly ‘dwindling America’ in the post-US global order, because once America’s preeminent Cold War competitors are now tending to invite this long-held sole superpower to engage in a race for energy? (3) How do evolving Russia-Japan energy deals help reshape the Eurasian geopolitics, while America owing to its strategic advantage in an every cost-competitive energy world erodes Russia’s gas monopoly in the European Union (EU)? (4) How does energy-hankering and post-triple-disaster Japan as an established and great power react to China that has last year eclipsed the US as the world’s topmost buyer of foreign oil and India has already surpassed Japan in oil use, only next to the US and China? (5) When will Japan and China hook up with each other for consolidating peace in a volatile Asia intact, since these two Northeast Asian titans have come to ramp up regional tensions in the Persian Gulf to a new height? (6) Why do the relations between the Northeast Asian ‘great powers’ and the West Asian ‘middle powers’ make sense for the energy security in Asia as a whole, viewing that all the world powers struggle to tap African natural resources end energy reserves?

To recapitulate, this book has several ‘strong points’ counter to various ‘weak points’. First, although
the volume’s title is both uneventful and unpolished, this publication is concentrated upon the world’s most enterprising but baffling super-continent as well as the two most defining IR variables (energy and geopolitics) central to the global historic changes underway in Eurasia. I agree with Calder that we are still failing to firmly grasp or to adequately cope with the most significant political-economic consequences of energy that are quietly falling upon us. Second, it is true that some theorizations are expeditiously diagnosed in the book’s ‘Introduction’. But a full-fledged chapter is not necessarily enumerated as a form of distinction or boundary between the conceptual investigations and research findings. Actually, some ambiguities and inadequacies are found in the set of theoretical framework with the muddle being crucially methodical. Still, the hybrid approach is pleasingly graceful in appearance. Third, too descriptive, superfluity and reiterated contents in each chapter might easily put off the attention of any reader who nowadays wishes to thumb through a book written in a summarized manner. In short, the tactlessly organized volume generates huge informative discussions while lacking many key concerns and hot debates. Besides, Calder’s claim is neither strong nor original, and he does not offer an overriding emphasis to carry out this project. Yet, his research findings will be of use. Fourth, the volume’s long list of references does not add any work in the non-English (Arabian, Chinese, Hindi, Japanese or Russian) language. Some references are too backdated, ie, published in the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, etc. Even, this section includes three references published in 1890, 1900 and 1906, but the volume was expected to cover the only most concurrent events, as it title stands. In defiance of these, Calder has succeeded in materializing the main goals of this highly readable publication. Fifth, some readers because of their anti-Asian sentiment might blame Calder for his so pro-Asian stance on this volume. But it is a piece that can be distinguished from the already considerable literatures on the similar subject. In fact, I have recently reviewed a book on energy revolution, great powers and international security co-authored by two in-house foreign policy analysts at the Washington, DC-based Brookings Institution. Compared to it, Calder seems vocal in expressing the truth. Sixth, even though this publication considers the simultaneous quest of both Asia and Russia for new global geopolitical roles in today’s ‘flat’ world with manifold horizons of happenstance and unprecedented speed of changes but regretfully without more meaningful ventures, it fully reveals how once remote strangers have become reachable friends now in the continent kindled by sudden spectacular ascendancy, mainly with the noticeably growing nexus in energy matters. Very succinctly, global energy is intimately linked to Eurasia.

In conclusion, Calder examines both the ‘consumerism’, ie, the protection of consumers’ interests aside from the cultivation of producers’ ideologies that encourages the acquisition of goods and services in an ever-increasing amount from the international political economy viewpoints of convergences and divergences in Eurasia. He proffers practical policy recommendations how to handle the forthcoming quandaries to energy’s role not only for the Eurasian human endurance but also for the global security as a whole. In compliance with him, the great and middle powers should not unreasonably require to get engaged in power struggles with each other for oil and gas in an era of bumper energy reserves. Calder ultimately proposes that only through hard work, conducive arrangement and more sensitive diplomacy, a stable, nascent and prosperous Eurasian entente based on oil and gas in an aggressive market can be prevented from creating in a high-cost energy world where growing tensions to a resource of economic values for our next generation is deepening and where economics is engagingly shaped by politics (both domestic and trans-national). On the other hand, it is one of the toughest tasks for the involved Eurasian nations’ private sector, and incredibly the international green non-government organizations (NGOs) that are quite skeptical about many of
the globe’s oil companies’ profit-driven motives. As a result from the blend of theories and practices, this so timely volume has its relevance not only to the disciplines of comparative politics, public policy, international relations and global political economy but also to the areas of Asian studies, Eurasian studies, American studies and world studies. Last but not least, a cordial credence can definitely be given to Kent Calder, a senior, committed and accomplished scholar, for such an auspicious production due principally to its policy repercussions. I do not have any restraint to wish my best for this publication’s highest circulation worldwide. From my side, as I have reviewed this action-packed book with my opposite thoughts on each and every chapter in an embracing, exhilarating and illuminating style, my piece of scholarship will constructively be contributive to the people consisting of not only advanced researchers, graduate students, university professors but also oil diplomats, government policymakers and corporate professionals interested in the energy as one of the world’s most instrumental powers as well as the largest and most varied industries aligned with the above-mentioned academic fields.

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