ISSN: 2158-7051 ==================== INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN STUDIES ==================== ISSUE NO. 6 ( 2017/2 ) |
THE BOLSHEVIKS COME TO POWER THE REVOLUTION OF 1917 IN PETROGRAD, By Ayse Dietrich*, Published by: Pluto Press, London. Written by
Alexander Rabinowitch, Year of Publishing: 2017. Subject Area: History of the
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Book Type: History, Russian and Soviet History.
Total Number of Pages: 400. ISBN: 9780745399980, £16.00, Paperback.
The book includes List of Illustrations,
Acknowledgements, Note on Transliteration, Dates and Terminology, Preface to
the Centenary Edition, Introduction, Sixteen Chapters, Notes, Selected
Bibliography and Index.
Although the Bolshevik Revolution
has been the subject of numerous previously published books, Alexander
Rabinowitch’s The Bolsheviks Come to Power The
Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd provides an account of many less known aspects of the
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.
In the Introduction, Rabinowitch discusses
the source of his interest in studying and writing about the
October revolution, arguing that existing works fail to answer many key
questions related
to the October revolution, and that many works present a view of the revolution only
from the perspective of their own political view, and that the political
behavior of the Petrograd workers, soldiers, and sailors, and its impact on the
course of the revolution are not taken into account. Therefore, the author’s
primary aim is to describe the development of the "revolution from
below" and the activities of the Bolshevik party organization in Petrograd
between February and October 1917 in order to determine the real reasons for the
Bolsheviks’ success.
The
author claims that Vladimir Ilich Lenin was a major influence in steering the
party towards an early socialist revolution. By organizing the Russian working
class into an effective political force capable of overthrowing the Tsar, Lenin
believed he could bring about a socialist revolution without Russia passing
through a period of liberal government and capitalist industrial development. According
to the writer in 1917 the Petrograd Bolshevik organization included many
"moderate" Bolsheviks, who repeatedly rejected the vast majority of
Lenin's basic theoretical and strategic assumptions. In addition, the author asserts
that the Provisional Government included a number of talented, well-known
figures. However, the writer stresses his intention is not to minimize Lenin’s
important role in the development of the revolution, taking pains to point out several factors
that he sees as contributing to the Bolsheviks’ effectiveness compared to other
parties. By simply presenting the information found in sources from this period
the writer leaves it to the reader to determine whether his reconstruction of
events and conclusions are plausible
The
first Chapter, “The July Uprising”
starts with a depiction of the uprising with demonstrators carrying banners and
demanding the transfer of power to the Soviet; the undeniable Bolshevik
involvement in the preparation of this “unrest among the proletariat and
soldiers for their own purposes"[1], and
“totally irresponsible Bolshevik agitation” in Petrograd; the horrific living
standards, and the spreading wave of strikes across the country. To illustrate his point that the
Bolsheviks were not welcomed by the masses and many others, Rabinowitch
provides reports from newspapers that display this dislike. He then turns his
attention to military affairs: the Kerensky offensive, launched on June 18, and
the decisive German counterattack begun on July 6; how the demoralized
condition of the Russian army resulted in heavy losses; the objectives of the
war that were incomprehensible to most of the soldiers and their antagonism
toward their officers; and their desertions from the army; Lenin’s return to
Russia and the accusations that he was a German agent and had organized the
July uprising with the help of Germany due to his opposition to the war effort.
The author claims that the accusations that the July uprising was instigated by
Lenin in cooperation with the Germans was groundless since Lenin had worked very
hard to prevent an insurrection from breaking out.
Chapter
Two, “The Bolsheviks under Fire”, provides detailed information about the Petrograd
newspapers’ treatment of the charges against the Bolsheviks as established fact,
and their ferocious attacks against the Bolsheviks and Lenin blaming the
Bolsheviks for openly acting contrary to the will of the revolutionary
democracy; and the Provisional Government's adoption of repressive measures and
use of force against militant leftist which began very early on the morning of
July 5; and the decree issued on night of July 6-7 that all organizers and
leaders of the armed movement against the government should be arrested and
brought to trial as traitors to their nation and the revolution. The Chapter
also discusses the arrests of Trotsky, Martov, Lunacharsky, the issue of a
warrant for Lenin's arrest; and Lenin’s firm decision not to surrender and eventual
escape to Finland.
The
third chapter, “Petrograd during the Reaction”, describes the killing of seven Cossacks
fighting insurgents during the July days in Petrograd; the political atmosphere
prevailing there until a sudden shift to "a counterrevolutionary
orgy" as Menshevik Vladimir Woytinsky put it; the Provisional Government’s efforts to use
this killing to mobilize a large crowd for the funerals to publicly demonstrate
their victory over the insurgents in an attempt to restore order; the
imprisonment of Bolshevik members in the aftermath of the July uprising and the
“rebels” continuing to remain politically active in prisons.
In
Chapter Four, “The Ineffectiveness of
Repression”, the author states that almost none of the government’s main
repressive measures adopted in this period was fully implemented or succeeded
in achieving its objectives. Although many Bolsheviks were jailed after the
rebellion's collapse, the majority of the Petrograd party organization's almost
thirty-two thousand members were not disturbed by the authorities, in part
because the All-Russian Executive Committees' stubbornly insisted that action
be taken only against individuals, and not against whole political groups. According
to the author, contrary to the claims of some historians these attacks of the
Bolsheviks were not part of a deliberate government plan to eliminate the
Bolsheviks and the militant labor movement. Rather, all major post-July attacks
on the left were either part of government attempts to confiscate weapons, or
were ordered by anonymous, low-level officials with approval from higher levels
of government.
Next,
the author examines why the authorities failed to prosecute cases related to
German-agent charges. He concludes that attempting to prosecute these cases
could have proved embarrassing for the government for several reasons: it was
impossible to prove that funds from German sources were funneled to the
Bolsheviks during the July uprising; the main actor in this “conspiracy”, Lenin,
was never arrested; and many of those who were arrested after the July days
were taken into custody and imprisoned on the basis of hearsay. In addition, he
argues that the five-month-old Provisional Government was unable to cope with a
judicial problem of this magnitude and that a lack of coordination between the
military and civil agencies created further confusion and delay.
The
next topic in this chapter discusses how moderate socialists sold out to the
government and why the Bolsheviks withdrew the slogan “All Power to the
Soviets” and made a declaration for placing power in the hands of the revolutionary proletariat and peasants. He delineates
the main differences between Lenin and Stalin, claiming that while Lenin
called on the party to make a clear break with more moderate political groups
and point the masses toward an armed seizure of power independent of the
soviets, Stalin's primary focus was on the need for restraint and consolidation.
Rabinowitch
argues that Stalin’s failure was the result of not discussing the future of the
soviets, relatively passive view of the party's future political role among the
masses and failing to mention the international situation.
The
author continues by examining why the Military Organization was the most
severely damaged and criticized institution after the July uprising, the
Military Organization’s rationale for organizing the July uprising without authorization
from the Central Committee and why sympathy for the Bolsheviks rapidly
increased in the garrison.
In
Chapter Five, “The Bolshevik
Resurgence”, Rabinowitch
discusses the arguments that were formed concerning the current political
situation in order to resolve varying assessments of it, as well as the party’s
efforts to strengthen the position of "internationalists" by
incorporating all elements dedicated to the struggle against the
counterrevolution and the major factors for their success.
In
the sixth chapter, “The Rise of
Kornilov”, the author depicts the atmosphere after the July uprising. In
this chapter, Rabinowitch
points out that since Kerensky could not significantly influence the course of
events, and Russia’s political crisis was deepening, society and top military
personnel began to cooperate and devote increasing attention to support of
preparations for the establishment of a military dictatorship. General Lavr Kornilov
was being considered for the post of dictator although he understood very
little about the conflicting concerns of the various political groups and
classes within Russian society. after resigning from his post and departing for
the southwestern front, hostile and antagonistic towards the Soviet, Kornilov
decided to restore order in Petrograd, urging the government to authorize strict
measures to restore discipline in the army, reinstate capital punishment, and
create a dual authority in the army. The author also discusses Kornilov’s
increased popularity, making him a powerful political figure among both
liberals and conservatives and a natural rival to Kerensky, and his attempted military
action against the government.
Chapter
seven, “Kornilov versus Kerensky”,
continues with the developments of the events in the previous chapter, among
them the growing enmity between Kerensky and Kornilov, the deepening
polarization of Russian society, and Kerensky's weakness in the current
circumstances.
The
eighth chapter, “The Bolsheviks and
Kornilov’s Defeat”, continues the narrative of events in the Kornilov
affair. It begins with the open struggle between Kornilov and Kerensky. It then
discusses Lenin’s rejection of entering into any political alliance and joining
the moderate socialists and the government in the fight against Kornilov,
assuming that most of the socialists and the Provisional Government were
equally hostile to the revolution. The author describes how the Bolshevik
Military Organization prepared to defend the revolution through newly
established groups such as the Committee for Struggle and other non-party mass
organizations in the emergency created by the advance of Kornilov's forces. Rabinowitch
states that they worked “in collaboration with the Soviet on a technical and
informational basis while fully retaining our independent political position”.
Working through these institutions, Bolshevik Military Organization members were
able to help mobilize and arm large numbers of workers, soldiers, and sailors, as
well as give programmatic and tactical direction. Some individual trade unions also
joined the struggle against Kornilov, the most important being the Union of
Railway Workers. They unquestioningly obeyed the government and soviet’s orders
to hold up and redirect these troops, and to ignore Kornilov’s orders. The aim
of Kornilov’s coup d’état in August 1917 was to overthrow the unstable
Provisional Russian Government, yet it failed. Kornilov had underestimated his
soldiers’ allegiance to the Bolsheviks, evidence of a complete lack of understanding
between the military leadership and his soldiers.
Chapter
nine, “The Question of a New
Government”, begins with the description of Krymov leading his troops in
an unsuccessful assault on Petrograd. The author claims that once the Kornilov
threat subsided, Kerensky began planning the formation of an authoritarian
government, a right-socialist- liberal coalition cabinet in which the influence
of the Kadets would be stronger, dedicated to restoring law and order. According
to the author moderate socialists who had previously supported Kerensky’s suppression
of the Bolsheviks after the July Days were pushed towards a closer alliance
with the extreme left and into conflict with the government due to their
experience with Kornilov, Kerensky’s intention to make the Kadets a part of his
government, and their concerns over the Kadets’ counterrevolutionary activity
and role in the Kornilov conspiracy. Consequently, they demanded the release of
Bolshevik leaders still imprisoned due to their suspected involvement in the
July uprising.
Soon,
factory workers, soldiers, and sailors in the anti-Kornilov movement began to issue
political declarations giving their views on the nature of the future
government. Their demands included that the Kadets and all counterrevolutionary
bourgeoisie hold no positions in the government; to prevent a new
counterrevolutionary attack, state power should be given to the workers,
soldiers, and poorer peasantry; and all power must be transferred to the
soviets to create a national democratic republic. The author stresses that the
emphasis on the formation of a revolutionary government to create a democratic
republic, rather than a dictatorship of the proletariat and poorer peasantry
was Kamenev's work, reflecting the programmatic views of Bolshevik moderates which
envisioned the inclusion of representatives of such "democratic"
institutions as the trade unions, zemstvos, municipal dumas, and
cooperatives which were not part of the Soviet. This proposal was presented during
a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet on August 31 and adopted the following day.
Rabinowitch argues
that the Kornilov experience destroyed the rightist movement. The Kadets were suspected
(not always fairly) of having cooperated with Kornilov, and were temporarily
excluded from the cabinet. In addition, whatever success Kerensky had achieved
since early July in restoring governmental authority and strengthening the army
early July was lost. On the other hand, the crisis resulted in increased
popular support for the Soviets. Competing local political organizations and
revolutionary committees were more numerous than ever across revolutionary
Russia. Workers were not only more militant and better organized, many of them
were now armed. At the same time, democratic committees in the army which had
organized soldiers against the Kornilov movement, gained a new lease on life.
Within the Petrograd garrison, many regimental committees were now under the
control of the Bolsheviks rather than more moderate elements. The Bolsheviks emerged
as the winners in the Kornilov affair and Kornilov’s defeat demonstrated the
great potential power of the left and the immense attraction of the Bolshevik’s
program.
Chapter
ten, “All Power to the Soviets”,
describes Lenin’s response to the Kornilov crisis. He urged Bolsheviks to take
part in the struggle against Kornilov, to expose Kerensky's weaknesses and
shortcomings and to pressure on the government at every opportunity. The
chapter also discusses Lenin’s interpretation of the slogan "All Power to
the Soviets" which he had revived in his work "On Compromises".
Lenin explained that it meant a radical restructuring of the entire old state
apparatus which hindered anything democratic. In addition, the chapter examines
the disputes between Kamenev who advocated the creation of a broad, democratic
coalition government rather than an exclusively soviet regime, and Trotsky who
urged a full transfer of power to the soviets on the creation of a new
socialist government, and the prospects for the peaceful development of the
revolution. Later, there is an examination of Lenin’s motives for abandoning
the moderate positions he advocated in "On Compromises" and calling
on the Bolsheviks to prepare for an immediate armed uprising. The author also explores
the necessity for the Bolsheviks to seize power at that somewhat unfavorable moment;
the reasons Lenin approached immediate insurrection as an art and considered it
a fundamental tenet of Marxism; the conditions which Lenin regarded as
conducive to a successful insurrection; and developments in the Petrograd
Soviets and the replacement of the coalition with a truly revolutionary
government.
Chapter
eleven, “Lenin’s Campaign for an
Insurrection”, opens with Lenin’s criticism of the Mensheviks and
Socialist Revolutionaries’ rejection of their compromise to peacefully transferring
power to the soviets and the Bolsheviks’ failure to boycott the Preparliament.
The chapter also examines Lenin’s his frustration with their lack of initiative
to prepare for the overthrow of the government and to take advantage of the
circumstances to overthrow Kerensky while the developments in all major European
countries indicated that the worldwide proletarian revolution was at hand.
Lenin accused the Bolsheviks of being "miserable traitors to the
proletarian cause" if they delayed seizing power any longer. Lenin clearly
expressed to the Bolsheviks the need “to agitate inside the party for an
earnest attitude towards an armed uprising”. Nevertheless, he claimed that the
Central Committee did not even consider his proposal, and saw this as “a subtle
hint that he should keep his mouth shut, and as a proposal for him to retire”
and believed that “if they "wait" for the Congress of Soviets and let
the present moment pass, they will ruin the revolution”. Lenin’s
resignation, however, was never formally considered by the Central Committee.
The chapter also discusses the Central Committee’s censorship of Lenin’s views;
how the government put the revolution and the people in danger with the help of
the ruling parties; and the conflict between the Central Committee and the
Executive Committee over Lenin’s views. Then, it covers Lenin’s meeting with
the Central Committee's twenty-one members, and his claim that the government
was about to surrender Petrograd to the Germans as a means of stifling the revolution;
Lenin’s efforts to agitate the leaders with the claim of a possible peace
settlement at Russia's expense, and his assertion that the international
situation required the Bolsheviks to take the initiative at once. The chapter
also examines Kamenev and Zinoviev’s criticism of an armed uprising on
theoretical and practical grounds, their emphasis the importance of the petty
bourgeoisie in the development of the Russian revolution, and their skepticism of
Lenin’s belief that most Russians supported the Bolsheviks and that the majority
of the international proletariat did also. The author asserts that, contrary to
later Soviet claims, the meeting between Lenin and the Bolshevik Central
Committee failed to dispel doubts within the Central Committee, and that
afterwards Bolshevik organizations began to energetically prepare a popular
armed uprising as Lenin had urged. Instead, he argues that Lenin only managed
to persuade the Central Committee to take steps towards insurrection after
weeks of pressuring, threatening and cajoling it.
In
Chapter twelve, “Obstacles to an
Uprising”, the decisions made to organize an uprising at the Northern
Region Congress to overthrow Kerensky; the factors why the Northern Region
Congress failed to trigger an uprising; Kamenev and Zinoviev’s concerns that a
declaration of armed insurrection would put not only the party, but the world
revolution at risk, and their efforts to postpone this declaration and active
use of the congress to bring down the government are examined. The author
points out that the reports of nineteen district representative indicate
large-scale apathy by the populace to an uprising – only eight reported that
the people in their district appeared to be prepared to participate while the
other eleven reported varying degrees of disinterest or opposition. As a
result, the Central Committee disregarded Lenin, and simply accepted Kamenev’
resignation from the party leadership, and ordered Kamenev and Zinoviev to
refrain from any public statements contrary to the Central Committee’s
decisions.
The
thirteenth chapter, “The Garrison
Crisis and the Military Revolutionary Committee”, begins by describing
the atmosphere before the uprising. The writer points out the factors that
argued against an insurrection at that time, namely, the lack of weapons,
trained personnel and organizations, and the almost certain opposition of other
political parties, peasants, soldiers, factions within the Bolshevik Party
itself, and possibly even the trade unions and soviets. The chapter then
examines the event that became the pretense for an uprising, Kerensky’s plan to
transfer most of the Bolshevized garrison troops to the front lines. It then
goes on to cover the accusations that Kerensky intended to surrender Petrograd
in order to quell the revolution and the reaction of soldiers in Petrograd to
this news. In reaction to the Provisional Government’s assault on the extreme
left the soldiers expressed the lack of confidence in the government, called
for a transfer of power to soviets, and followed this with a pledge of their
own support to the Petrograd Soviet. However, the author does point out that
despite claims to the contrary, there is no evidence that the Provisional
Government had any intention of surrendering Petrograd to Germany without a
fight.
Chapter
Fourteen, “On the Eve”, examines
the Kerensky offensive which began at midnight October 23-24, the Military
Revolutionary Committee’s approach and its declaration not to prepare and carry
out a seizure of power, but to exclusively defend the interests of the
Petrograd garrison and the democracy from counterrevolutionary encroachments
before calling for a counterattack and a mass rising against the Provisional
Government.
Chapter
Fifteen, “The Bolsheviks Come to Power”,
begins with the activities of sailors in the Baltic Fleet and at Kronstadt, and
the operations planned for the Pavlovsky Regiment; Red Guard detachments from
the Vyborg, Petrograd, and Vasilevsky Island districts, and the Keksgolmsky
Regiment. The author describes the capture of the Provisional Government’s last
positions in Petrograd by revolutionary forces and the seizure of the Mariinsky
and Winter Palaces by the Military Revolutionary Committee forces after Lenin’s
proclamation of the transfer of political power from the Kerensky government to
the Military Revolutionary Committee, ushering in a new era in Russian history.
In
the “Epilogue” the author
discusses the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets’ approval of Lenin's
decrees on peace and land; the appointment of a provisional revolutionary
government; the resistance to the Bolsheviks which formed around the Committee
for Salvation organized by the Mensheviks and SRs in the Petrograd City Duma which
claimed the right to form a Provisional Government and its organization of an
uprising in Petrograd which only the Kadets joined. It then covers Lenin's
ultimatum announcing that the "opposition" would observe party
discipline and support policies agreed upon by the majority, or face expulsion
from the party; in protest, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, Nogin, and Miliutin
resigned from the Central Committee. The final topics are the formation of a
short-lived Bolshevik-Left SR coalition government and Kamenev and his
associates’ resignation in protest to the signing of the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk which ended Russia’s involvement in World War I, and the
beginning of the Civil War in Russia.
The
author concludes that the Bolsheviks predominated in Petrograd because the
Kadets and moderate socialists were inherently weak in this period, while the and
the radical left was both active and influential. These factors are the result
of the unique characteristics of Russia's political, social, and economic
development during the nineteenth century and before. Without doubt, World War
I also played a major role in how the 1917 revolution in Petrograd played out. If
the Provisional Government had not been committed to military victory, a policy
which lacked broad support by 1917, it might have dealt better with the numerous
problems that emerged from the collapse of the old order and, in particular, to
meet popular demands for immediate fundamental reform. The Bolsheviks’ party
platform, summarized in the slogans "Peace, Land, and Bread" and
"All Power to the Soviets", was one element of the party’s strength
and popularity in 1917, as was their skillful campaign in support of the
Kronstadt sailors, Petrograd factory workers and soldiers.
In
the end the writer attributes the Bolsheviks’ success not only to Lenin’s
decisive leadership and the Bolsheviks’ unity and discipline, but also to its
comparatively tolerant, decentralized and democratic organization and mode of
operation combined with an open, mass character. He asserts that the Bolsheviks
gained support when the masses came to believe that the congress and the
revolution were under threat, and not out of a desire for Bolshevik rule.
The
book does have one shortcoming, namely that some events are not fully explained.
For example, if there were so many talented leaders among the Bolsheviks and in
the Provisional Government, and moderate Bolsheviks like Kamenev, Zinoviev,
Lunacharsky, and Riazanov were among the party's most articulate and respected
spokesmen, as claimed by the author, then why were they unable to impose their
authority to control the revolution and end Lenin’s discussions on how the
revolution should proceed by arresting him or accepting his resignation from
the Central Committee? How was Lenin able to take leadership of the revolution?
Does this show the weakness of the Central Committee, or does it indicate the
strength of Lenin’s ideas and influence? Also, would a non-violent, gradual
revolution have been possible in light of the events of the Russian Civil War? Was the armed-conflict inevitable? What
brought Russia into this bloody war?
Overall,
the book “The Bolshevik Come to Power” is a very well written source on the
narration of the Bolshevik Revolution and Alexander Rabinowitch has given us a
solid effort. This book
provides a more complete understanding of the important and controversial
issues related to the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolution which brought about
dramatic changes in the history of Russia and covers areas previously ignored. In
particular, the author has given a detailed, lengthy account of Lenin’s
disputes with the other Bolshevik leaders. What becomes clear from this account,
however, is that despite often intense disagreement between Lenin and other
Bolshevik leaders, Lenin’s views ultimately prevailed in determining the course
of the revolution.
The author has also done an
admirable and thorough survey of the literature in this field. For the
centenary of the Revolution, Pluto Press has made a significant contribution to
academicians, researchers and students by reprinting this book.
*Ayse Dietrich - Professor, Part-time, at Middle East Technical University, Department of History. Editor and the founder of the International Journal of Russian Studies. e-mail: editor@ijors.net, dayse@metu.edu.tr, dietrichayse@yahoo.com
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