ISSN: 2158-7051 ==================== INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN STUDIES ==================== ISSUE NO. 6 ( 2017/1 ) |
Russia-Azerbaijan relations after August 2008
Summary
The significance of the
Azerbaijan-Russia relations is varied due to the extent of its importance for
both Azerbaijan and Russia. For Azerbaijan, relations with Russia was formed in
terms of protection of the independence and territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan, while for Russia these relations based on the goal of achieving
either the regional or global targets. Azerbaijan-Russia relations both from
the perspective of historical process and as of now concerned not only in these
two countries, but also the fate of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The speculations were browsing
around that after the August 2008 events Azerbaijan "has started to
approach Russia". The main thesis of this material is that Azerbaijan
preserved its balanced foreign policy regardless of strengthening of Russia's
regional and global position in the region after the August 2008 and 2010 and
despite Russia's insistence and pressures towards Baku.
Key Words: Azerbaijan,
Russia, balanced foreign policy, August 2008, Gabala RLS, Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.
Introduction
The significance of the
Azerbaijan-Russia relations is varied due to the extent of its importance for
both Azerbaijan and Russia. Inherently, these relations constitute one of the
most important dimensions of Azerbaijan's foreign policy. For Azerbaijan,
relations with Russia was formed in terms of protection of the independence and
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, while for Russia these relations based on
the goal of achieving either the regional or global targets. Azerbaijan-Russia
relations both from the perspective of historical process and as of now
concerned not only in these two countries, but also the fate of the Caucasus
and Central Asia.
Azerbaijan that fell under the
Russia's control as of the first quarter of 19th century, became a field of
struggle in the early 20th century, the Second World War and the late 20th
century among other powers who wanted to get the control of this region
together with Russia due to Azerbaijan's vast natural resources (especially oil
and gas). The geographical position of Azerbaijan appeared pretty important in
the post-Cold War era in terms of struggle of the West, especially the United
States and opposite forces (Russia, Iran, to some extent China) for Caucasus
and Central Asia region.
This period the ruling powers in
Azerbaijan followed a different policies both in general terms and in terms of
relations with Russia. After short period of the pro-Russian policy of Ayaz
Mutellibov administration, the period of Abulfaz Elchibey has been pursuing
significantly an anti-Russian, but pro-Western policies, while Heydar Aliyev
prioritised the balanced foreign policy orientation considering the sensitivity
of Russia as well. During this period and afterwards, Azerbaijan, along with
pursuing the framework of a balanced foreign policy in general, has carried out
major projects with the Western countries during Ilham Aliyev's administration.
In this period, Russia's weight in the centre of Azerbaijan's foreign policy
has not changed much, but positive or negative processes has been experienced
in terms of relations with Russia.
Azerbaijan, as a country suffering
from the problem of territorial integrity, was concerned with the territorial
loses of Georgia and Ukraine after both country openly resisted Russia during
August 2008 and afterwards respectively. Russian officials even have made
comments threatening the territorial integrity and the independence of Belarus and
Kazakhstan. Thereupon, the former Soviet republics followed more careful
policies towards Russia, their reluctance on participation in the Russia-led
integration process has decreased. Thus, the events in August 2008 has
strengthened the position of Russia in the former Soviet Union geography.
The speculations were browsing
around that after the August 2008 events Azerbaijan "has started to
approach Russia". The main thesis of this material is that Azerbaijan
preserved its balanced foreign policy regardless of strengthening of Russia's
regional and global position in the region after the August 2008 and 2010 and
despite Russia's insistence and pressures towards Baku. Although Russia pleased
with the limitations in Azerbaijan's relations with the West in this period,
Azerbaijan was able to resist Russia regardless of 'Nagorno-Karabakh' conflict
and both parties could not agree on the Gebele RLS, eventfully Russia was
forced to leave Gabala RLS. Thus, the Russian military presence in Azerbaijan
has completely ended.
In this study, we will study the
history and current state of the Azerbaijan-Russia relations and make an
assessment on the future of the relationship.
History of Azerbaijan-Russian relations and the importance of both
countries for each other
Azerbaijan-Russia
relations has been previously formed on the basis of relations between beyliks/khanates and dukes (knyaz) until the period of when modern
Azerbaijani and Russian governments has been established. Historically,
interest of Russia in Azerbaijan was stemming from former's desire to access
the warm seas. For that purposes, Russian armed units managed to enter to the
surroundings of Baku in 914, but were forces to leave the region losing the
shootout with a 15 thousand Turkish-Muslim unity in the northern part of the
Caspian in the same year.[1]
The attacks on the Russians to Azerbaijan, even in a small scale, had continued
during ten centuries and stopped later. In 1465, Shirvanshakh Ferruh Yaser has
sent his relative Hasan Bey to Moscow with various gifts in order to
"streamline the trade and diplomatic relations". Next year, Great
Duke of Moscow Ivan III has sent an embassy delegation headed by Vasili Papin
to Shamakhy, thus the relations has gained a diplomatic nature.[2]
Once Russia became stronger, it made continuous moves southward and took the
control of the northern part of Azerbaijan (current Azerbaijan Republic in its
entirety) following the signature of Gulistan Treaty (1813) and Turkmenchay
Treaty (1828) with Gadjars/Qacarlar
(Iran) after many years of wars.[3]
Azerbaijan
declared its independence on May 28, 1918, but since the Bolshevik government
in Russia did not recognize them and wanted to plant a Bolshevik regime in
Azerbaijan, no serious relationship have been formed between them. Despite many
attempts of Azerbaijan to prevent the threats stemming from the north, the
country could withstand these threats 23 months only and was occupied by the
Bolsheviks Russian troops on April 27, 1920 and a day later the Soviet
government was established in Azerbaijan.[4]
From these date until Azerbaijan re-declared its independence in August 30,
1991, there has been no an inter-state relations between Azerbaijan and Russia.
With
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia and Azerbaijan re-emerged as two
independent states on the world stage. But the features of two states for each
others were different. In terms of Azerbaijan, the meaning of Russia can be
expressed as followings:
1.
Russia, as a heir of the empire, was considered a main threat to independence
of Azerbaijan both during the period of the struggle for independence and the
first years of independence;
2.
Russia was supporting Armenia occupying the territories of Azerbaijan,
subsequent threat to Azerbaijan's territorial integrity;
3.
Russia was seeking to prevent the Azerbaijan's independent energy policies;
4.
Meanwhile, Russia is a key country in terms of solution of the problem on
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity (Nagorno-Karabakh conflict);
5.
Russia was an important route for Azerbaijan, who doesn't have an access to
open seas, in order to reach the open seas and Europe.
6.
Russia was a part of Azerbaijan's "diversification of pipelines"
strategy in terms of energy policies;
7.
A huge number of Azerbaijani citizens working in Russia
(subsequently Russia is a source of revenues for Azerbaijanis);
8. Russia is a market for Azerbaijan's
agriculture products.
Russia also considered Azerbaijan a
strategically important part of the Caucasus.[5] In general, the importance
of the Caucasus for Russia can be expressed as followings:
1. In order to achieve a shorter
path southwards (in terms of expansionist strategy to the Indian Ocean) and to
strengthen its claims for being a global power by keeping the region under
control;
2. To keep Turkey and Iran (due to
their ambitions to expand towards north-east/east) and other states (that seek
to reach Russia's borders through Iran and Turkey) away from its borders; to
limit/terminate the separatist attempts of different ethnic groups in its southern
regions (the North Caucasus), thus reduce the concerns on territorial
integrity;
3. To prevent (or at least limit)
the imposition alternative natural resources into the market, thus to preserve
the dependence of consumer states of those resources, on Russia.
4. To limit the possibility of
reaching 'Turkestan' by the West, the United States, through this region;
5. The importance of its military
presence in the Caucasus in terms of regional and global objectives;
6. The psychological factors in
terms of the imperial history and goal of becoming a global power;
7. The Caucasus is of importance for
Russia in terms of protecting its Caspian and Black Sea coast;
8. In particular, Azerbaijan's
policy was important in terms of accepting the demands of Russia in the former
Soviet Union geography or the resistance to these demands.
If we look at the course of the
relationship, when Azerbaijan regained its independence in 1991, Russia has
been reluctant to develop diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan, although Ayaz
Mutellibov known as a pro-Russian was in power.[6]
Regardless the opinion of Azerbaijani Parliament, however, Ayaz Mutellibov had
made a gesture to Russia by signing the Alma-Ata Declaration on December 21,
1991 that envisaged joining the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[7]
Following the resignation of Mutellibov on
March 6, 1992, when Azerbaijan gradually begin to move away from Russia,
Russian Foreign Minister Kozırev visited Baku on April 3, 1992 and Russia has
recognized the independence of Azerbaijan on April 4, 1992 and the diplomatic
relations were established between two countries.[8]
During this period, Head of Parliament Yagub Mammadov who was carrying out the
mandate of the President of Azerbaijan demonstrated careful stance in dealing
with Russia, since Azerbaijani Parliament has not ratified the Alma-Ata
Declaration and Azerbaijani authorities did not participate in CIS meeting.
The ruling Azerbaijan People's Front
under the leadership of Abulfaz Elchibey began in Azerbaijan since May 15, 1992
de-facto and since June 7, 1992 de-jure. Since Elchibey prioritized the
independence and the relations with other states based on equal status and
resisted the hegemonic approaches of Russia, his ruling period was considered
as the most problematic period in terms of Azerbaijan-Russia relations. In
fact, early years of this period also experienced relatively a period of
efficiency, thus Elchibey had paid an official visit to Russia and signed a
number of agreements between the two countries.
However, absence of Russia in
Azerbaijan's planned oil contracts as a shareholder, consequently arrival of
the Western companies to the region, the policy of non-alignment with CIS, the
withdrawal of the Russian troops from the country, etc. was disturbing steps for
Russia. On the other hand, Russia has started to implement the "Doctrine
of New Abroad" since the 1993 and in the face of this policy, some circles
in the USA supported the thesis of not giving the necessary support to the
former Soviet republic, instead has advocated the adoption of the former Soviet
Union as a backyard of Russia. Under these circumstances, the policies pursued
by Russia through various means against Azerbaijan proved successful, on the
one hand Azerbaijan faced the risk of civil war, on the other hand, Russia
supported Armenia have increased attacks on Azerbaijan. The coup carried out in
June 1993 overthrew Abulfez Elchibey from the presidential office and the
important part of Azerbaijan's territories was occupied by Russian-backed Armenia.
Heydar Aliyev, who has been elected
a Chairman of the Parliament on June 15, 1993 after he was invited to Baku to
prevent civil war by Elchibey during the coup attempt, along with maintaining
this position and after he was elected a President of Azerbaijani, has used a
soft rhetoric for Russia and has tried to soothe Russia's "anger".
For this purpose, as a main
important indicator of the abandonment of the pro-Western policy of Elchibey
period, the activities of the western companies working in Azerbaijan have been
suspended on June 22, 1993 and even their bank accounts were frozen.[9]
Particularly, in order to stop the occupation of Azerbaijan's territories by
Armenia with the support of Russia and to liberate its occupied territories,
Haydar Aliyev aimed at changing the attitude of Russia on this issue, confirmed
Azerbaijan's will to develop good relations with Russia and to join the CIS
during his visit to Russia and meeting with Yeltsin Russian President and the
other officials in the summer of 1993. On July 20, 1993 Azerbaijan Parliament
approved the Membership Agreement for CIS and Haydar Aliyev went to Moscow to
sign related agreements on September 24 1993.[10]
During this period, Heydar Aliyev
was criticized with the "He turned his face to Russia",
"Azerbaijan is losing its independence," and with similar criticisms.
However, in the process of joining the CIS, Heydar Aliyev both in his public
statements to Azerbaijanis and in the talks with Russian officials consistently
emphasized the independence, stated that the main reason to join the CIS was
maintaining the relations with former Soviet republics.[11]
In the first 6 months of his ruling
that ended the Russian opposition in the foreign policy and even clearly acted
as a pro-Russian for a while, Haydar Aliyev administration, after not
experiencing too much positive developments in Russia's policy towards
Azerbaijan, had turned his face slightly to the West since the 1994 and the
negotiations with Western oil companies had been re-launched. In the coming
periods, a new framework for Azerbaijan-Russia relations (balanced foreign
policy strategy of Azerbaijan) took the drive. Since then, the basic dynamics
of Azerbaijan-Russia relations until today can be summarized as follows:
- Russia's strategic objectives
(foreign policy, national security and military doctrines);
- Azerbaijan's strategic objectives
(national security and military doctrine, foreign policy conception);
- Important problems of both
countries (Karabakh, Chechnya issue);
- The production of natural
resources in the region to international markets and its transportation;
- Legal Status of the Caspian
- Global competition for the region,
Azerbaijan's benefits from this global competition and regional and global
balance of power; partial challenges of the global competitiveness posed to
Russia;
- Historical, religious, ethnic
factors;
- In both countries, the impact of
other areas of domestic policy and foreign policy (in particular, the status of
relations of both countries with Armenia; the relationship with global and
regional actors, the US, Turkey, Iran, China etc. can also be added);
- Global developments affecting the
regional balance (September 11, August 2008, the Syrian crisis and etc.).
Russia often regarded Azerbaijan in
the framework of called "Near Abroad" doctrine. The "Near
Abroad" terminology, first time expressed by Russian former Foreign
Minister Andrei Kozırev, envisaged the unification of the former Soviet
republic under the federation or confederation umbrella with Russia both in
military and economic senses.[12]
The special privileges for Russia in its "Near Abroad" and the
granting an authority to Russia's armed forces to intervene in the conflict in
the former USSR geography as a "peacekeeping force" were among the
basic objectives of the new doctrine.[13]
In February 1993, the foreign policy
doctrine based on "Near Abroad" approach has been adopted by the
Security Council of Russian Federation and entered into force in April 1993
after the approval of Boris Yeltsin. Russia's military doctrines adopted since
1993, national security documents and foreign policy doctrines emphasized the
importance of the former Soviet Union geography and especially the preservation
of the Russian language and culture abroad in this region, as well as
highlighted the threat posed by the approach of NATO to Russia's borders and
the cooperation in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
in particular.
These issues are of great importance
and taken into account by Azerbaijan in practice for relations between Russia
and Azerbaijan. However, Azerbaijan's official documents emphasize the
integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions in particular,
rather than that of Russia. For instance, although Azerbaijan prioritized the
development of international cooperation on the basis of "integration to
European Union and World Community" and equal partnership in its "Law
on National Security" (Article 6.2.9) dated June 29, 2004, Russia was not
mentioned there. The National Security Concept (NSC) of Republic of Azerbaijan
dated May 23, 2007 defined Azerbaijan as a country "sharing the
progressive values of Europe and an integral circle of the Euro-Atlantic
security system". The Article 4.1.2 of NSC defines the "integration
into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures" as one of the "main
directions of Azerbaijan's national security policy". Whereas, relations
with Russia have been mentioned under the "cooperation with the countries
of the region" (Article 4.1.5.1) after the relations with Turkey, Georgia,
Ukraine and Moldova within the framework of GUAM. The general expressions are
used in the document concerning the relations with Russia.[14]
Military Doctrine of the Republic of Azerbaijan dated June 8, 2010 also
mentioned the development of cooperation with Euro-Atlantic security system and
NATO on the basis of mutual interests, however, did mention neither Russia nor
Russia-led military organizations.[15]
As the remaining period, although
Russia lost its dominant position on issue of the occupation of Azerbaijan’s
territories by Armenia, but maintained its 'key country' role and continues to
do so.[16]
Russia's attitude on this conflict and its relations with Armenia constitutes
to be the most important reason for the ups and downs in Azerbaijan-Russia
relations.
Although, Russia demonstrated
jealous stance towards Azerbaijan's oil and natural gas contracts with the
foreign companies, the energy lobbying led by the former prime minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin in Russia, the intensive works on the establishment of good
relations with Azerbaijan, the negotiations held with the Azerbaijani
authorities had a positive result and Russian LUKoil company has gained 10%
stake in the 'Contract of Century' signed on September 20, 1994 in Baku.[17]
In the later periods, Russia has continued to receive a share from the oil
agreements of Azerbaijani. Initially, Russia did not accept the involvement of
the foreign companies in development of the Azerbaijan's oil fields, later
Moscow softened its stance, notably when Vladimir Putin came to the power since
the energy factor became the main weight of Russia's foreign policy.[18]
During the ruling power of Haydar
Aliyev, the Chechnya issues was constituting the main axis of the problems in
Azerbaijan-Russia relations. Chechnya problem in the bilateral relations was
felt clearly during the period of the first Russian-Chechen war (1994-1996).
During the first Chechen-Russian war, Russia had claimed that Chechens were
supported by Azerbaijan, but Azerbaijan rejected these claims. While Russia
continued these claims, Moscow applied an economic embargo over Azerbaijan's
export. Russia continued to this claim and has imposed unilateral and
undeclared economic sanctions for 3 years over Azerbaijan, which was carrying
out 70 percent of its exports to Russia.[19]
After the signature of the Khasavyurt Agreement between Russia and Chechnya in
1996 and the Chechnya issue removed from the agenda of relations between Russia
and Azerbaijan and Russia was gradually removed unilateral economic embargo
imposed on Azerbaijan due to 'Chechnya' issues.
The Chechnya issue emerged in
Azerbaijan-Russia relations again after the attack of troops from Chechnya to
Dagestan in August 1999 and subsequent attack of Russia to Chechnya under the
slogan of 'fighting against the international terrorism'. The accusations of
Russia against Azerbaijan even has gone beyond the rhetoric and a Russian
military aircraft dropped a grenade launcher in Gimir village of Azerbaijan's
northern Zagatala district on October 1, 1999.[20]
Despite the denials of the event by Russian Air Force Commander Lieutenant
General Anatoly Kornukov, then Russian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Blokhin stated
"they lost the bomb".[21]
After Vladimir Putin came to power as a president, Azerbaijan has considerably
changed this policy and restricted the activities of Chechens in Azerbaijan,
while some of them have been arrested, were extradited to Russia.
Strengthening Russia and Azerbaijan during the
Putin era
Interests of Russia to
Azerbaijan was boosted following Vladimir Putin took the power in Russia, while
Azerbaijani government faced the pressure of Russia from time to time. After
Azerbaijan gained its independence, the first official visit from Russia on the
level of head of state was the visit of Vladimir Putin on January 9-11, 2001.
The visit scheduled for 2000 had been postponed twice for various reasons, but
eventually Putin visited Baku with huge delegation on January 9, 2001.[22] During the visit the
parties tried to exchange careful expressions for each other.
The visit of then President of
Azerbaijan Haydar Aliyev 24-26 to Russia on January 24-26, 2002 has constituted
the second phase of the Putin-Aliyev mobility. The bilateral discussions took
place between the two heads of state on January 25, 2002 in the Kremlin Palace.
In his speech during talks Putin mentioned that for the first time the
cooperation on the military level will take place between Azerbaijan and
Russia, while Haydar Aliyev emphasized that the development of the relations
was observed particularly during President Putin's Government.[23]
The following agreements was signed between Azerbaijan and Russian President
during this visit:
1. The Agreement on Status of Gabala
Radio Location Station ('Gabala RLS', or in the words of Russia 'Deryal RLS')
and Principles of Utilization;
2. The long-term Economic
Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian
Federation for the period up to 2010;
3. The Joint Declaration of
President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and the President of the
Republic of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev.
Apart from that, the cooperation
agreement has been signed between the relevant authorities on the direction and
principles of economic cooperation between the two countries, on the creation
of joint companies in cooperation and exchange of information for the
prevention of tax evasion and on the cooperation of border forces.[24]
The most important point should be
emphasized that Russia is still the most important power in the region. The
Aliyev's visit draws particular attention to three points. The first of these
was the signing of an agreement on Gabala RLS, as Putin also noted, the first
cooperation on military matters between Azerbaijan and Russia; second, Putin's
statements regarding Russian language and Russian cultural values; third, for
the first time the authorities of both countries talked about the strategic
partnership between the two countries.[25]
In fact, these two bilateral visits
reflect the general trends of Azerbaijan-Russia relations and continues today
as well. When Ilham Aliyev became the president of Azerbaijan, while Dmitry
Medvedev the president of Russia, the general course of neither Azerbaijan's
foreign policy, nor the main line of the Azerbaijan-Russia relations (despite the
bumpy period) has not experienced a very serious change. Mutual visits at the
highest level have continued its increasing intensity, but sometimes also
experienced tensions. For example, after the good track record of relations
between the two countries, the first serious tensions were popped out in late
2002 early 2003 on three main issues (petroleum agreements; espionage charges
and claims on assistance to Chechnya; attitudes towards the citizens of
Azerbaijan in Russia).[26]
Ilham Aliyev has continued his
father's foreign policy line after he has been selected a President of
Azerbaijan and the relations with Russia are also developed in this framework.
Ilham Aliyev held his first official visit to Russia during February 5-7, 2004.
In Moscow Ilham Aliyev has held meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin,
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, Chairman of Federation Council Sergei Mironov,
Speaker of State Duma Boris Gryzlov, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov and Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov and has made assessment on all areas of bilateral
relations. In this stage, the Russian President Vladimir Putin paid his first
visit to Azerbaijan on February 21-22, 2006 on the eve of "Year of Russia
events in Azerbaijan".
When Russia transferred the major
part of military ammunitions to Armenia during the unloading process of its
military bases in Georgia, it led to the short-term tensions in
Azerbaijan-Russia relations. Although Russian officials claimed that they moved
the ammunitions to the Russian military base (102) in Armenia, however, it was
found out that an important part of the ammunition were given to the Armenian
army. In general, Azerbaijan was angered because of Russia's significant arm
support to the Armenian army.[27]
In this regard, the reduction of Azerbaijani oil transportation through the
Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline was noteworthy.
Meanwhile, in order to enhance the
cooperation between the two governments the Intergovernmental Economic
Cooperation Commission was established and the joint commission studies established
for the determination of the border between the two countries. Russia
intensified its social-cultural works in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijani students
have been set a quota for more scholarships (for example, 178 in 2007, 198 in
2008, 284 in 2009) each year. On February 27, 2007, the Baku branch of the
Moscow State University was opened. The Moscow Open University also continues
its educational activities in Baku.
The events of August 2008 and the bilateral relations afterwards
The developments in Azerbaijan-Russia
relations after August 2008 events can be assessed in the framework of Russia's
increasing influence in the former Soviet Union geography and the development
in the Turkey-Armenia relations during this period.
Along with August 2008 events, the
visit of Turkey's then president Abdullah Gul to Armenia, dubbed as a
"football diplomacy"[28],
Azerbaijan's foreign policy demonstrated anti-Western stance, the relations in
the energy field with Turkey were strained, Azerbaijan signed a gas deal with Russia
(the signing of the Moscow Declaration[29]
on "the military way of solution will not applied" to the Karabakh
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia under the Russia's mediation on
November 2, 2008, could be added here), Azerbaijan participated in the
Nabucco's ceremony in Ankara at the ministerial level only. All these kindled
the discussions around Azerbaijan's foreign policy changes again.[30]
Because, the visits to France,
Russia and Iran shortly after Ilham Aliyev took the office in 2003, browsed speculations
that Azerbaijan has gave up its balanced policy, which was criticized that the
country would move the relations with Russia and Iran to higher level. However,
Novruz Mammadov, then head of foreign policy department in the Presidential
Administration rejected in the press conference the criticism regarding
"pro-Russian foreign policy of Azerbaijan" and reiterated the
"continuation of Baku's balanced foreign policy line founded by Heydar
Aliyev".[31] The
one of the most serious responses to the similar criticisms came again from
Novruz Mammadov, mentioned in the journal of "Azerbaijan Focus"
(dated 2010) published by the Centre for Strategic Studies under the President
of the Republic of Azerbaijan. According to Mammadov, "the current line of
Azerbaijan's foreign policy is 15 years old" emphasizing the continuation
of balanced foreign policy line, but also highlighted the importance of
relations with Russia and non-alignment with Western blocks.[32]
In the article, Novruz Mammadov also highlighted the claim that
"pro-European course was one of the priorities of Azerbaijan from the
first days of independence" and stressed the importance of relations with
the EU and NATO. In fact, after the collapse of USSR Azerbaijan indeed
participated almost in all of the anti-Russian buildings (except NATO) and
still continues to this line. The answer of the questions on the continuation
of main line in the Azerbaijan-Russia relations after 2008 is particularly
important in the context of two issues:
1. Integration initiatives in
Russia's former Soviet Union;
2. Future of Gabala RLS, as the
remains of Russia's military presence in Azerbaijan.
Despite all the pressures over
Azerbaijan in this period, the country remained outside of the Moscow-led
integration initiatives. Azerbaijani authorities has strengthened the emphasis
on independence in their statements due to irrationality of siding at the same
block with Armenia, which is hitherto occupying the Azerbaijan's territories.
In fact, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev several times stated that Armenia
didn't occupy the Azerbaijani territories alone as it didn't have enough
capability, but Armenia occupied Azerbaijan's territories with the help of
supporters. It was supposed to he was meant more Russia with this statement. In
terms of Azerbaijan's resistance against Russia on Gabala RLS, the attitudes of
other former Soviet Republics, notably Armenia and Ukraine were important. On
21 April 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovych signed an agreement in Kharkov city, which granted Russia the right
to keep Russia's Black Sea Fleet in the Sevastopol naval base in Ukraine's
Crimea, until 2042.[33]
The agreement signed in 1997 between Russia and Ukraine envisaged the use of
the Sevastopol base by the Russian Navy until 2017. In 2004, pro-Western forces
after coming to power in Ukraine during "Orange Revolution" endorsed
the NATO membership of Ukraine and evacuation of this base in 2017 at the
latest. Ukraine was angered with the utilization of Russia's Black Sea fleet in
the Sevastopol base against Georgia during August 2008 war.
20 August 2010, Russia and Armenia
has signed a protocol to extend the duration of the Russian military base in
Armenia until the year 2044 including with enhancing Russia's authority and
without demanding any financial compensation.[34]
According to previous protocol, which was signed on the March 16, 1995, the
tenure of this base was identified as 25-year (should be terminated in 2020).
The extension of the Russian military bases in Ukraine and Armenia long before
the tenure, has created additional pressure over Azerbaijan. Despite those
pressures, Azerbaijan have held its position tight in the negotiations with
Russia regarding the Gabala RLS with Russia and the Gabala RLS was terminated
its operations as of December 10, 2012 due to failure to reach an agreement
with Russia.[35] As
of 2013 Russian totally left the Gabala RLS. Different statements were made on
the issue that the disagreement was stemming from economic reasons and it was
alleged that Russia supported the opposition against Ilham Aliyev during the
presidential elections held in Azerbaijan in 2013. But all these explanations
did not change a significant fact: Russia for the first time, especially after
the August 2008 war, was not able to get what it wanted of particular
importance in the former Soviet Union.
Another test in the
Azerbaijan-Russia relations was experienced during the Turkey-Russia crisis
following the shot of Russian military aircraft by Turkey. At this stage, the
Azerbaijani authorities have tried to display more balanced attitude and to
exert efforts to resolve the crisis between Russia and Turkey. However,
Azerbaijan demonstrated a closer stance towards Turkey during the visit of
former Prime Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoglu to Azerbaijan on December 3-4,
2015. Ilham Aliyev at the beginning, middle and end of his speech of December 3
2015 stressed that "we stand by Turkey on every issues" during his
meeting with Ahmet Davutoglu.[36]
Amidst the Turkey-Russia crisis, Ilham Aliyev and Receb Tayyib Erdogan
demonstrated more warmer attitude during Aliyev's visit to Turkey on March 15,
2016 and embraced each-others several times.
Conclusion
In general, Azerbaijan
considered Russia a threat and a country trying to occupy former in the
historical process, while Russia has assessed Azerbaijan in the dilemma of
opportunities and threats. In terms of Russia, Azerbaijan is a bridge for
access to south and opportunity with other features, but also a threat due to
its cooperation with others powers After Azerbaijan gained independence, the
policies of Elchibey administration (anti-Russian and pro-Western) without
taking into account Russia, have not been successful. However, during the
administration of Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan's relations with Russia continued
on the basis of balance of power. Russia's intensive endeavours to
maximize its interests in Azerbaijan have not been very successful given
Azerbaijan's security and energy policies.
Today, the criticisms on
Azerbaijan's shifting close to Russia is unfair. Among the reasons of that,
there are Azerbaijan's disappointments for its expectations from the West, the
changes in Russia's global and regional powers and activities. While Azerbaijan
demonstrated harsh reaction towards the alleged free of charge transfer of
weapons from Russia, worth to billions of dollar, to Armenia in 1997 and 2000;
the transfer of military commodities/harwares in Georgia (under the Western
pressure) to Armenia and to Armenia-occupied regions of Azerbaijan and pursued
a pro-Western policies[37],
the disappointments from the West caused the similar opposite reactions.
Due to current conditions, the
future of Russia-Azerbaijan relations will be significantly determine according
to the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the rate of Azerbaijan's
stance towards Russia's request. In this context, lack of provision of military
assistance by Russia to Armenia during the ''four-day-war'' in early April 2016
in the Armenian-Azerbaijani line of contact, was used as a means of improving the
public image of Russia in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan, as a newly independent country,
contained problems where undoubtedly the outside forces could intervene. Under
these conditions, the country is not able to set its foreign policy line alone.
While Azerbaijan is trying to maintain a balanced foreign policy line, it is
seeking to take advantage of the power balance between countries with interests
in the region. In this context, there may be mutual adjustment of external
demands for Azerbaijan. Whereas, Russia may extend its pressures over
Azerbaijan again to include the country in its own controlled establishments in
the upcoming periods. Russia's possible success to gain a dividends in
Azerbaijan by using its resources will be of loss of not Azerbaijan only, but
as well as of other countries of the region and other states with interests in
the region. At this stage, the relations of Azerbaijan with other major powers
will be important.
[1]Süleyman Əliyarlı, Azərbaycan Tarixi, Bakü,
Azerbaycan Yayınevi, 1996, s. 212.
[2] Əliyarlı, Azərbaycan Tarixi, s. 331.
[3]Əliyarlı, Azərbaycan Tarixi, s. 619.
[4]Cemil Hasanlı, Azerbaycan Tarihi 1918-1920, Ankara, Azerbaycan Kültür Derneği,
1998, s. 410.
[5]Nazim Caferov, Araz Aslanlı, “Kuzey Kafkasya: Azerbaycan İçin Riskler ve Fırsatlar”, Karadeniz Araştırmaları, Yaz 2016, Sayı 50, s. 2-4.
[6]Nazim Cafersoy, Eyalet-Merkez Düzeyinden Eşit Statüye; Azerbaycan-Rusya ilişkileri
(1991-2000), ASAM, Ankara 2000, s. 9.
[7]Musa Qasımlı, Azərbaycan Respublikasının Xarici Siyasəti (1991-2003), II Hissə, Bakı, Mütərcim, 2015, s. 505
[8]Kıyaslamak gerekirse, Azerbaycan’ın
bağımsızlığını Türkiye 9 Kasım 1991’de, ABD ve İran ise 25 Aralık 1991’de
tanımışlardı.
[9]Cafersoy, Eyalet-Merkez..., s. 23.
[10]“Müstəqil Dövlətlər Birliyi (MDB)”, http://www.mfa.gov.az/content/947
[11]Buraxılışa məsul: Ramiz Mehdiyev, Hidayət Orucov, Heydər Əliyev: Müstəqilliyimiz əbədidir (Birinci kitab iyun, 1993 -
may, 1994), Bakı, Azərnəşr, 1997, s. 29-30.
[12]Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 Ocak 1992’den aktaran Nesib Nesibli “Azerbaycan ve Moskova-Erivan-Tahran Jeopolitik Kuşatması”, Stratejik Analiz, Cilt 1, Sayı: 4, 200, s. 63.
[13]Ümit Özdağ, “SSCB’den Rusya Federasyonu’na (1985-1993), Avrasya Dosyası, Kış 1993, Cilt 3, Sayı 4, s. 174.
[14]“Azərbaycan Respublikasının milli təhlükəsizlik konsepsiyası”, http://www.mdi.gov.az/files/uploader/Milli_tahlukasizlik_konsepsiyasi.doc
[15]“Azərbaycan Respublikasının Hərbi Doktrinası”, http://www.mod.gov.az/qanun/qanunvericilik/Herbi_doktrina.pdf
[16]Nazim Cafersoy, “Bağımsızlığın 10. Yılında
Azerbaycan-Rusya İlişkileri”, Avrasya Dosyası, Azerbaycan Özel, Cilt
7, Sayı 1, İlkbahar 2001, s. 295.
[17]Nesib Nesibli, Azerbaycan Jeopolitiği ve Petrol, Bakü, Hazar Üniversitesi yayını,
2000, s. 27.
[18]Nazim Cafersoy, “Enerji Diplomasisi: Rus Dış
Politikasında Araç Değişimi”, Stratejik
Analiz, Ankara, Aralık 2000, Cilt
1, Sayı 8, s. 52.
[19]Hasan Kuliyev,
“Rusya’nın Azerbaycan Stratejisi”,
Avrasya Dosyası, Kış 1996, Cilt 3, Sayı 4, s. 202.
[20]“Azerbaijan Protests Russian Missile Strike”, RFE/RLNewsline - October 7, 1999, http://origin.rferl.org/content/article/1142008.html.
[21]Azadlıq, 02-04
Oktyabr 1999.
[22]Sinan Oğan-Hasan Kanbolat, “Kafkasya
Terazisinde Yeni Dengeler: Putin’in Azerbaycan Ziyareti”, Stratejik Analiz, Ankara,
Şubat 2001, Cilt 2, Sayı 2, s. 34.
[23]Azərbaycan, 29-30 Yanvar 2002.
[24]Azərbaycan, 29-30 Yanvar 2002.
[25]“Bakı ilə Moskva arasındakı münasibətlər
strateji xarakter qazanmışdır” Yeni
Azerbaycan, 29 Yanvar 2002.
[26]Araz Aslanlı, “Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti ile
Rusya Federasyonu Arasındaki Gerginlik Sürmektedir”, http://www.avsam.org/haftalikanaliz/13-17_01_2003/
(18 Mayıs 2003).
[27]“Ermənistanın açıq və gizli silah alveri: regional təhdidlər artır”, 18 Noyabr 2015, http://az.azeridefence.com/ermenistanin-aciq-ve-gizli-silah-alveri-regional-tehdidler-artir/
[28]Stephen Kinzer, “Turkish-Armenian football
diplomacy”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/sep/03/turkey.armenia,
3 September
2008; Dorian Jones, “Football
Match Provides Opening for Healing Turkish-Armenian Relations”, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-12/2008-12-19-voa26.cfm?moddate=2008-12-19,
19 December 2008.
[29]“Russia's Medvedev hosts Nagorno-Karabakh
talks”, Nov 2, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL2389234
[30]“Azerbaijani-Russian
Relations Hostage To Pragmatism”, Liz Fuller, RFE/RL, http://www.rferl.org/content/AzerbaijaniRussian_Relations_Hostage_To_Pragmatism/1200803.html, September 17, 2008; Jim Nichol, Azerbaijan: Recent Developments and U.S.
Interests, Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-522.pdf,
September 4, 2009.
[31]Babek Bekir, “Has Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy
Changed?”, http://www.rferl.org/reports/azerbaijan-report/2004/02/0-160204.asp
(16 February 2004)
[32]Novruz Məmmədov , “Azərbaycan
Xarici Siyasətinin Əsas İstiqamətləri Haqqında”, Azerbaijan Focus, Sayı
2, Yanvar-Mart 2010, s. 19.
[33]Andrew Osborn, “Russia's Black Sea Fleet to stay in Ukraine until 2042”, 21 Apr 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7615790/Russias-Black-Sea-Fleet-to-stay-in-Ukraine-until-2042.html
[34]“Russia, Armenia Sign Extended Defense Pact”, August 20, 2010, http://www.rferl.org/a/Russian_President_Medvedev_To_Visit_Armenia/2131915.html
[35]Ioanna - Nikoletta Zyga, Russia's new aerospace defence forces:
Keeping up with the neighbours, 22 February 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/491478/EXPO-SEDE_SP(2013)491478_EN.pdf
[36]“Ilham Aliyev and Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu made statements for the press”, 03 december 2015, http://en.president.az/articles/16978
[37]“Vəfa Quluzadə: Rusiya ilə diplotamik münasibətləri
kəsməliyik”, Türküstan, 13 Dekabr 2009.
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