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SOCIO-POLITICAL CHANGES IN RUSSIA AFTER 1991. RUSSIAN “ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM” OR “LOST IN TRANSFORMATION”?

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Summary

The disintegration of the USSR undoubtedly was a traumatic moment for the Russians. Difficulties in fulfilling basic social needs overshadowed both the resentimental yearning for the imperial glory and the proper moment for the society to begin the authentic socialization, and hence the development of the political participation process. The results of perestroika were disappointing not only to its authors but also the recipients of the actions to modernize the extremely ideological reality. Such understood system transformation reduced the possibility to conduct the effective social dialogue to the minimal level, so it increased the confusion of the society. The widespread disappointment with the lack of real effective capitalism and the prosthetics social policy of the country was not compensated neither with the idea of freedom captivating the crowds nor the regime equipped with the ability to design the alternative axiological system, and therefore the ideological one.

Key Words: Keywords: Russia after 1991, socio-political changes in Russia, the results of perestroika.

Introduction

The disintegration of the USSR undoubtedly was a traumatic moment for the Russians. Difficulties in fulfilling basic social needs overshadowed both the resentimental yearning for the imperial glory and the proper moment for the society to begin the authentic socialization, and hence the development of the political participation process. The results of perestroika were disappointing

not only to its authors but also the recipients of the actions to modernize the extremely ideological reality.^[1] Of course the animators of reforms conducted on such a huge scale assumed the existence of objective difficulties affecting the speed and effectiveness of the changes, resulting from the historical-cultural context, territorial, religious and ethical structure of the country.^[2] According to A. Stelmach, it was a kind of trap for the society, which in the initial phase of the transformation process was full of enthusiasm for changes, but the lack of expected effects in the form of the allocation of the democratic system also in the non-institutional layer, plunged the society in frustration.^[3] In addition, there was also adopted the principle of the primacy of the representatives of the old regime over the oppositionists, for all reformative activity took place in the atmosphere of strict conspiracy and secrecy of the part of actions of the state representatives. Such understood system transformation reduced the possibility to conduct the effective social dialogue to the minimal level, so it increased the confusion of the society.^[4] The widespread disappointment with the lack of real effective capitalism and the prosthetic social policy of the country was not compensated neither with the idea of freedom captivating the crowds nor the regime equipped with the ability to design the alternative axiological system, and therefore the ideological one. These phenomena were described by B. Misztal as “political orphanhood” and “worldview homelessness”, which occur as one of the elements associated with the processes of the system transformation and ultimately giving the effect of atrophy of the political, social and axiological system.^[5]

The Russian society did not accept the proposal of other solution patterns in the sphere of ideas, specific to the civilisation and political circles of the West. In place of the Soviet comprehensive vision of the whole internal and geopolitical reality, there was created the ideological vacuum.^[6] The social reactions to it we can even include the elements of “escape from freedom” also present after the period of transformation and with a direct effect on the legitimised paradigm of the state leadership of B. Yeltsin, V. Putin and D. Medvedev.^[7]

Was the demand for the particular leadership model encoded in the social awareness?^[8] Individuals personifying the political power in the system transformation period, starting from M. Gorbachev and his associates to B. Yeltsin, represented the generation of post-Stalinist party activist (“children of the XX Congress”), for whom the monolithic Soviet ideology has been permanently affected by the delegitimizing actions of N. Khrushchev. These politicians did not represent the environment of extreme party doctrinaires.^[9]

Lost society. Confused or lost society?

Rich literature analysing the range of behaviours of societies undergoing another phases of system transformation presents different social reactions. Especially important is the study of reactions being the consequence of the increasing level of social stress – the effect of axiological revolution (these social reactions are described by the concept of “lost in transformation”^[10]). The steps of the designed state sanction were to bring the basic effect in the form of de-totalitarianisation of Russia. The real reconstruction was required not only by the post-Soviet economy and public institutions, but the social tissue should be regenerated, which was degenerated and physically exterminated with greater or smaller intensity in a systematic way for many decades. Elimination of the intellectual elites in the USSR was coupled with the activities, which promoted the common education and eliminated illiteracy, however these actions were calculated only for the preparation of the society for the receipt of propaganda messages in different forms, while not for the construction of the authentic intellectual culture of the society. As a result, contemporary Russians were not able to generate a real alternative to the government, which channelled almost the whole

intellectual and economic potential of the society. The same mechanism was used during the formation of the Soviet establishment, almost without difficulties completely adapting to new Russia. There should be emphasised the important aspect of mass reactions (with a significant emotional charge) among the Russian society. One should indicate the tendency for negative voting and its susceptibility to populist slogans, often having a huge propaganda potential, but in fact oxymoronic.^[11] Similarly, the propaganda structures are significant: conspiracy theories, the syndrome game of the “besieged fortress” and the hyperbole of the external and internal threats, the clear polarization of the world: own – strange, friend – enemy, the Russian – “black”.

De-ideology of the intellectual and cultural elites with the hegemony of the authority elites is the deliberate action of the Kremlin leaders – it belongs to the tools to “putinise” the country. Manifestations of this process can be regarded as the symptoms of the critical crisis for the civilisation identity of Russia, that is the time of troubles. Therefore, the silence of the elites towards the progressing authorisation of the political-social life and the replication of the defective mechanism of the creation of the political power is easily explainable.

Despite the obvious decline in the position of own country on the international arena, the belief in the privileged role of Russia generally functioned in the collective consciousness. It was one of the elements of the post-imperial syndrome, which engulfed the society. These behaviours can be included more to the sphere of compensatory measures, because psychological needs signalled by the society (e.g. the need to confirm the auto-stereotype) were not realized. On the contrary – there were noted another disasters of propaganda actions calculated to improve the morale of the nation. An example would be the abandonment of the arms race as an expression of transferring the measures and attention of the authority from the military industry to other branches of the economic activity of the country. Also due to economic reasons there was abandoned the pursuit of the conquest of space. The nuclear arsenal was reduced not as the troublesome decline after the cold war, but as a result of pro-military education of the global military powers. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, even if it generated sentiments for the parts of the old political solutions, did not translate into the social mobilisation. People did not want to bear the sacrifices in the name of the ideas, which arguments have significantly weakened. The society started the process of self-regeneration, mostly based on the economic activity in the macro and micro scale, and the conformist adaptation to the post-transformation political-economic reality. Social stratification transformed in a violent manner. The most important effect of these changes was the generation of the layer, so-called, New Russians and the mass impoverishment of the middle class and the strictly developed professional groups – e.g. officers’ families.^[12] The attempts to compensate shortages within the economy, resulting in the lowering of the life standard, were compensated to the Russians by the offers to rebuild the ideological project – the empire. However, the young generation was not interested in similar world view projects. It adapted to new rules and purely pragmatically accepted the change of the geopolitical role of the Russian Federation, designing its place in a way devoid of the political context as consumers of the mass culture goods.^[13] New Russians did not undertake attempts of sanctions of the deeply retarded (atrophic) social ties. The process of alienating the poor layers of the society progressed.^[14] It is true that a part of the society, expressing a firm resistance against the rapid system reforms, constituted by the representatives of the party bureaucracy transported itself almost without prejudice into the state administration of the Russian Federation, however, the real mechanism of regulation of the socio-economic life remained unchanged.

A major problem for the social recipient of the effects of the Russian transformation from the totalitarian system into the democratic one was the weakness of the ideological counter positions and the way of the chaotic and non-plan reformation of the socio-political-economic relations within the

triangle: power - property – layer of the ownership consumers. The changes took place outside the official, free-market regulations. The abolition of the nationalisation of property did not bring results in the form of the structure of the free-market privatization. The process of generating the axiological and economic lability of the society has begun.

Changes taking place in the political culture undergoing transformation from the non-democratic into democratic (even formally) were only partially the result of the spontaneous social interactions. Assimilation of the system of democratic values by the civil society and public institutions took place on the Russian soil determined by historical experiences and propaganda devaluing democracy and its tools both before and after 1991. The failure of the project of the democratization of Russia was decided by the widespread social opinion with the external, strange in terms of civilisation, non-system ontology of this hierarchy of values.^[15] Therefore, the successful process of the democratic values diffusion in the Russian society has not been conducted, while the democratic rituals were with ease accepted to the canon of basic political actions. Effectiveness (especially economic) of the state leaders opened before them the virtually unlimited arsenal of measures limiting democracy or preventing its selective treatment.^[16] The Russian society built its trust to the state power primarily on the basis of trust to the authorities. The ease of the political power personalization was the result of the general reluctance to politicize different areas of life, and historical experiences of the society justified this rush towards the apolitical character.^[17] Of decisive importance for the essence of the Russian democracy was to exercise strict control over the information by the state power (even its rationing and selection). It was all the easier that the core of power consisted of representatives of power sectors equipped with special prerogatives used in the field of information security. Alternation of the highest authorities took place outside the process of the democratic social choice. It was basically the denial of the previous achievements of the Russian system transformation. Parliamentary election were becoming less important for the construction of the political and state structures, and the legislature lacked also the instruments of the real control of the executive power.^[18] Nomenclature, existing in the literature, used to determine the Russian variety of democracy (façade democracy, imitation democracy, virtual democracy, controlled democracy) thus defines the same phenomenon.^[19]

For the analysis of the legitimacy models of the power of presidents B. Yeltsin and V. Putin what is important are the moderations of the political culture initiated by them.^[20] These actions are all the easier because in the Russian Federation is noted the unchanged deficit of the activity of the civil society, primarily expressed in the ritualized elements of the direct democracy, with the systematic weakening of the appropriate formal axiological solutions of motivation.^[21] In the early 90s, president B. Yeltsin offered the society the construction of a new political-socio-economic project, combining the seeds of the political participation of the civil society and the first-fruits of the free-market economic mechanisms. Political practice proved that these plants were mainly focused on the effectiveness of the populism explored by the leader.

Passivity of the Russian society towards the political actions shaping the social reality directly concerning particular individuals and the image of the institution of the country using the intermediaries – officials in dealing with members of the society is the hallmark of social macro-groups, living in the post-Soviet area. It seems that it can be said that the cultivation of elements of the Soviet standard of embedding the individual in the social life, that is the acceptance of the specific place in the social and political life meaning the preference of community solutions over the individualistic activity, is implemented within the representative democracy.

Auto-alienation of the society members out of the political life – with extremely poor orientation in the mechanisms of exercising and reproducing the political power at all levels –

generates bold behaviours of the political power, which with the lack of authentic social control and the lack of formalized symptoms of the social protest in a clear way focuses different forms of power. The central power only in the ornamental way treats the rule of performing the role of the sovereign of the state power by the people. State power treats the society not as an equal partner of the public dialogue, but makes the process of its objectification. Degeneration of democratisation takes place at all levels of the country, also the institutions established after 1991 function in a pathological way (see: the process of peculiar personal reproduction of the institution of the president), and the most acute social problem is corruption (in various sizes).

One of the manifestations of the stratification changes within political power was the generation by the post-Soviet nomenclature-party structures, uniformed officers and representatives of the oligarchic business of the common set (hard to identify by virtue of its provenance), creating the plasma of power key for the process of legitimacy of Putin's presidency. It is the organisational base constructing the leaven of the social layer, being the parallel world to the official representatives of the political power.^[22]

When performing the highest function of the state by Yeltsin, socio-political support of the regime in the form of the newly created class of oligarchs was easily identifiable. The big business created the economic-political corporations with the support of the media business, and although the principles of its functioning were unclear, this situation did not undermine the principle of legality of the institution and actions representing the country.^[23]

The party system of the Russian Federation has undergone a deep metamorphosis since the beginning of the 90s. Its transformations can be regarded as the metaphor of all changes of the system and practices of governance in contemporary Russia.^[24] Democratic, multi-party beginnings of the formation of the party system were through the appropriate manipulation led to the stage of stabilisation and façade institutionalisation of the political pluralism.^[25] The initial party activity of the political scene was the implementation of different visions of developing the inheritance after the communist party, both ideological and personnel.^[26] Structures of the multi-party gradually disintegrated, while the party system generated as the result of the actions of the system transformation mechanisms was extremely complex with a very wide ideological spectrum.^[27] Polarization generated by ideological differences (e.g. communists - nationalists) did not translate to the program polarity (especially caused by the relation to capitalism and marketization). This favoured the foundation of intentional, although often single, alliances between the ideologically extreme organisations.^[28] However, most often, the community of inter-party interests had a different genesis – the desire to conduct personal confrontations.^[29] Both politicians and the society represented completely different emotional attitude, from euphoria to total discrediting. This resulted in the ephemeral political initiatives: there were created quasi-political parties, cliques, camarillas^[30], representing a very narrow circle of founders.^[31] “The infantile stadium of political pluralism” was even harder to convert into a stable multi-party system. The more openly president Yeltsin sought for the construction of the Russian preidentialism, the more pragmatically he treated the formation of the so-called disposable parties.^[32] For obvious reasons, the tendency has been maintained and intensified during the presidency of V. Putin.

However, the provenance of the political elite has never been broken off.^[33] For years it was a group monopolizing the intellectual and political activity, even the leaders of democratic movements most often descended from the CPSU structures.^[34] The potential of young reformers was rejected by the society experienced by the nuisance effects of the economy modernization processes and the conviction about the low effectiveness of the action of political parties. Political parties representing the multi-party system, from obvious reasons, did not have chances for rooting

in the social and legal structure (the lack of the so-called constitutionalization of political parties).^[35] This fact has also been negatively influenced by their multitude and the inability to identify the party based on the characteristic program features and the instantiation of the recipient's demands. Classic typologies of political parties are not capacious enough to reflect the criteria of socio-political divisions of the Russian party system.^[36]

Determinants shaping the Russian party system both under president B. Yeltsin and V. Putin was the tendency of the politicians to cabinet and behind the scenes actions. This gave the effect in the form of commonly used measures of manipulation for the needs of managing the public opinion, low incentives to motivate politician to activity of participation in the party system and high level of personalization of political parties.^[37] The Russian society does not express in the collective forms of protest (except for the relatively few protests, demonstrations) opposition towards the roadblock of the political promotion. The elections only formally represent the circulation of power – they only serve gaining its legitimacy.

Until 1993 functioned opposition representing different poles of the party scene especially active in parliament. Such moderation of the political scene led to the practical destruction of the authentic system opposition. Of course, it was necessary for the preservation of the democratic form of the country, what led to the evident devaluation of the democratization process. In Kremlin there was created a basic element institutionalizing the social distrust – the pro-Kremlin opposition. It should be noted that the first-fruits of the opposition evaluating naturally from the party system of Russia were categorised by president Putin as the non-system opposition, referring to the non-democratic methods delegitimizing the state leadership.^[38] One of the elements of the project of the animated opposition by the Kremlin leaders (“rationed opposition”) was the maintenance of the attractiveness of the communist party by modernising its program and stimulating the nationalist parties' actions (especially concerning the elements of programs referring to the imperial traditions). Generating the nationwide protest movement against the control by the highest authorities with the party system is so difficult that the attempts of the systematic opposition actions were undertaken only in big urban agglomerations. Peripherals exhibit the anti-Kremlin attitude sympathising with communist parties, although this can be qualified rather as the manifestations of *sojuznostalgii*, rather than the expression of genuine political preferences. Despite the formal, scrupulously followed restrictions for the institutional attempts of the initiation of the party activity of the Russian society, the actually existing, powerful socio-political structure are the organisations not formulating the state policy. Russia's party system is the hybrid model combining the democratic rules (democratic legitimacy) with authoritarian interpretations of these provisions.^[39] Russian electoral campaigns are the chain link the least absorbing for the power team in the field of social engineering, a particularly large degree of routinization is shown by presidential campaigns. In the case of presidential elections in 1996, the candidate for re-election presented a theatrical creation, constructed only for the purposes of a single electoral effect. Even then the *familia* of B. Yeltsin had a decisive impact on the actions of the almost puppet ruler. His weakness was mainly determined by the biological barriers. Campaigns before the parliamentary elections have, however, corresponded to a large extent to the real situation on the political scene. The situation changed during the presidency of B. Yeltsin. The outcome of parliamentary and presidential elections gave a clear legitimacy to exercise the state power by V. Putin. This legitimacy was the function not of the authentic electoral rivalry, but high frequency.^[40] The electoral process, therefore, had the character of a plebiscite, which easily predictable results were largely the result of the pre-election campaigning monopolizing the public message.

V. Putin proposed Russians a peculiar interpretation of the social contract. The society

accepts the fact that the partisan president fulfils the basic role marked out by the Constitution from 1993, in theory is an arbitrator, however, the political practice of the president's action indicates that he is the active player on the Russian political scene (in different spheres of its activity he presents multiple shades of initiatives).^[41] Political culture built after 1991 in Russia included many solutions reducing the importance of the social engagement in the democracy process.^[42] Especially the control functions, key for the formal expressions of the social distrust were poorly developed. This applies both to the controlling of the president's institution and the parliament: the validity of the free mandate in practice means the lack of legal possibilities to exert the influence on the MPs by the voters. Contemporary Russian parties are staff (and not mass), they do not constitute a link mediating in the dialogue between the society and the political power, they also do not review the actions of the political establishment, because they do not select candidates issued in the elections – this function was taken over by the President.^[43] Their weakness is also determined by the constitutional provisions: they predict a small, symbolic, influence on the shaping of the government, so the executive policy of the country. Besides, we must remember about a certain regularity listed within this system. The election results are an impulse to initiate further political parties. The party system itself, from purely ideological reasons, does not generate political parties and it only creates the organisations marginalized by the voters. The weakness of the Russian party system is thus directly proportional to the length of the democratic reforms formally transposing the totalitarian country in the democratic one (of course only in the declarative sphere). Numerous irregularities undoubtedly having a trace impact on the electoral result (various depreciation of the opposition candidates – including the registration difficulties, problems with liquidity and rationality of the boundaries of constituencies, the lack of respect for the electoral silence), however, do not decide about the legitimacy for the leadership team.^[44] Especially in the case of the team of president Putin, the use of actions on the borderline of the law seems to be unnecessary.

The introduction into the political scene of the personalities outside the official mainstream of the political life is essentially equivalent to the displacement of such a person from the business circles and/or from special services. This results in a specific structure of the party system. A clear simplification for this type of actions is the fact that the Russian electorate responded very positively to the initiative to form of the power party in its successive incarnations. Although at the beginning of the construction of the party system of the Russian Federation the electorate was variable in its decisions, after 2000 it is faithful to the power parties. Free elections – the flagship achievement and the basic argument of the political legitimacy of the democratic system transformation of the Russian political system – are not the mechanism for implementing democratic contents. Also, there is selectively expanded the base of presidential prerogatives at the expense of resigning from the use of elections. As an example we can indicate the *casus* of appointing governors.

Since 1996 the presidential elections have taken on the characteristics of routinization.^[45] While the reduction of fragmentation on the party scene was reflected in the composition of the party representation proposed during the electoral campaigns, although it seems that the composition of Duma was mainly determined by the strong position of the president.^[46]

^[1]Kievan A. George in the famous *Ucieczka z „sali numer sześć* assessed the project as follows: “the perestroika and glasnost contained the idea of the moral regeneration. Gorbachev probably from the beginning was aware that the changes at the institutional level are not enough for the political and economic renewal of the country, that we should pay attention to the “mental aspect”, that is mainly introduce a better discipline and eradicate corruption and neutralisation, as well as increase the real impact of the masses on the political life of the country. This meant democratisation, electoral reforms and glasnost”, cit. A. George, *Ucieczka z „sali numer sześć”*. *Rosja na rozdrożu przeszłości i teraźniejszości*, Warsaw 2004, p.57.

^[2]According to T. Bodio in the studies of the post-Soviet area the interest of the studies on the “transformation-democratisation” decreases, while there is an increase of the popularity of the civilisation paradigm, see T. Bodio, *Wyjaśnienie cywilizacyjne w badaniach transformacji w Azji Centralnej*, [in:] T. Bodio (ed.), *Przywództwo, elity i transformacje w krajach WNP: problemy metodologii badań*, Warsaw 2010, p. 471- 490.

^[3]A. Stelmach, *Zmiana i stabilność w systemie politycznym współczesnej Rosji*, Poznan 2003, p. 351.

^[4]S. Gardocki, *Instytucja prezydenta w polityce Federacji Rosyjskiej*, Torun 2008, p. 282 - 288.

^[5]B. Misztal, *Wstęp. Subtelności liberalizmów współczesnych*, [in:] *Aktualności wolności. Wybór tekstów*, B. Misztal, M. Przychodzeń (choice), Warsaw 2005, p. 13.

^[6]Growth of social stress and axiological confusion, see V. Tarnavskiy, *Dzieci swoich czasów. Ruchy młodzieżowe w Rosji a zmiany kulturowe po upadku ZSRR*, Warsaw 2007, p. 53.

^[7]See. L. Szerepka, *Sytuacja demograficzna w Rosji*, CES studies no. 24, July 2006.

^[8]According to S. Bieleń: “Russian democracy, therefore, has its characteristics, conditioned by a peaceful transformation of the totalitarian system. The drama of the Russian country lies in the fact that despite the social and political changes, it still remains hostage of the centuries-old tradition of patriarchal and authoritarian governments. For these reasons, there is a permanent danger that Russia agrees to a certain degree of democratisation not due to the conviction of its ruling elites, but as a result of a momentary weakness”, S. Bieleń, *Rosja w poszukiwaniu demokratycznej tożsamości*, [in:] *Szkice o Rosji*, ed. A. Stępień Kuczyńska, J. Adamowski, Łodz – Warsaw 2000, p. 27 - 28.

^[9]S. Bieleń, *Tożsamość międzynarodowa Federacji Rosyjskiej*, Warsaw 2006, p. 106.

^[10]A. Skrzypek, , *Druga smuta. Zarys dziejów Rosji 1985 -2004*, Warsaw 2004. p. 63.

^[11]According to A. Bartnicki: “The key to the system became the formation of the parallel political reality. The Russian project with “democracy without representation” perfectly fits with its form to

the communist propaganda, “the Soviet democratic country” the goal is the same, to maintain the monopoly of power, but also to monopolize the potential competition”, [in:] A. Bartnicki, *Demokratycznie legitymizowany autorytaryzm w Rosji*, Białystok 2008, p. 73.

[12]T. Kisielewski, *Schyłek Rosji*, Poznań 2007, p. 76.

[13]A. Furier, *Druga smuta. Zarys dziejów Rosji 1985 -2004*, Warsaw 2004, p. 52.

[14]W. Igrunow, (discussion), *Nacjonalizm jest eksportowym towarem Zachodu*, [in:] *Studzy i wrogowie imperium. Rosyjskie rozmowy o końcu historii*, ed. F. Mechmes, Cracow 2009, p.82.

[15]Although there are different opinions: “In contrast to Poland, in Russia democracy was not conceived as the western idea, but as the spontaneous liberalization of the society and its return to own traditions”, [in:] G. Pawłowski, L. Szewcowa, *Kim jest Dmitrij Miedwiediew*, [in:] *Studzy i wrogowie imperium. Rosyjskie rozmowy o końcu historii*, ed. F. Mechmes, Cracow 2009, p.160.

[16]S. Markow wonders: “I have still not obtained the answer to my question. Does democracy in Russia deserves to be called “virtual”?” A more adequate is the term “imitation democracy”. Russia is in motion. Communist authoritarianism has been left far behind. Now it moves from anarchy and chaos towards democracy. The current system contains the elements of authoritarianism, chaos and anarchy, as well as democracy proportionally of a little bit of everything. While the authoritarian part imitates the democratic institutions. Besides, it cannot be any different. Today democracy is seen as the only form of the international legitimacy.”, S. Markow, *Polska tylko przeszkadza*, [in:] *Studzy i wrogowie imperium. Rosyjskie rozmowy o końcu historii*, ed. F. Mechmes, Cracow 2009, p.98.

[17]M. Leonyiew: “We have the concept of real sovereignty. It is not so that the sovereign democracy is a cover for the specifics of the Russian system. Sovereign democracy is based on the belief of the elite that Russia, due to the historical conditions and current circumstances, cannot and should not cede sovereignty to other countries and international organisations”, M. Leonyiew, op. cit., p. 156; see A. de Lazari, *Pozytywista Putin*, „Przegląd Polityczny” 2004, no. 66, p. 139.

[18]Particular importance of the Constitution 1993 and the position of the president outside the sphere of three power.

[19]A. W. Jelonek, *W stronę nieliberalnej demokracji*, Warsaw 2002, p.196.

[20]J. Potulski, *System partyjny...*, p. 165.

[21]J. Potulski, *Ibidem*, p. 222 - 223.

[22]According to A. Bartnicki mechanisms of power began to structurally resemble the semi-mob dictatorship of South America.

[23]S. Bieleń, *Tożsamość...*, p. 41.

[24]The electoral system did not fulfil the role of the stabilizer of the party system, see A. Stelmach, *Zmiana...*, p. 109.

- [25]The process of democratization of the political system (see J. Potulski, *System partyjny...*, p. 192).
- [26]Social and institutional scope of the communist party was almost unlimited.
- [27]A. Furier, *Druga*, p. 31.
- [28]Categories: right, centre, right do not coincide with the Polish typologies. In Russia established the division of political parties based on the criterion of relation to the power, and not on the ideological and program differences.
- [29]Motivation of activities of political parties, see J. Bratkiewicz, *Rosyjscy nacjonaliści w latach 1992 1996. Od detradycjonalizacji do retradycjonalizacji*, Warsaw 1998, p.13.
- [30]Multi-party system began to shape in Russia in the years of 1988 - 1990.
- [31]A. Stelmach, *Zmiana...*, p. 147.
- [32]From “Choice of Russia” by Jegor Gajdar, through “Our Home Russia” by Wiktor Czernomyrdin and „The whole homeland of Russia” by Jurij Łużkow and Jewedługienij Primakow, the Interregional Unity Movement, to the United Russia”
- [33]Russian “earthquake”, despite a very dramatic course and a huge rate of changes, was still far from completion. It has survived a lot of elements of the old order. The smartest caciques in the party have long since found employment as businessmen and consultants. Average appartchiks have practically not moved from the stools they occupied. Although the headquarters of the Central Committee became now the central of the Russian government, changes among the employees of the building were small.”, [in:] D. Remnick, *Grobowiec Lenina*, Warsaw 1997, sp. 564.
- [34]J. Potulski, *System partyjny...*, p. 206 - 207.
- [35]In Russia the phenomenon of the so-called constitutionalization of political parties did not take place (after J. Potulski, *System partyjny...*, p. 14).
- [36]R. Backer, *Rosyjskie myślenie polityczne za czasów prezydenta Putina*, Torun 2007, p.4248.
- [37]According to J. Potulski: “The property of Russian creativity of political organisations was a widespread phenomenon that the leaders become the creators of the party, and not the other way round, the parties create leaders”, J. Potulski, *System partyjny...*, p. 205.
- [38]Characteristics of the fragment of the opposition, see R. Backer, *Rosyjskie myślenie polityczne za czasów prezydenta Putina*, Torun 2007, p. 257 – 273.
- [39]“The collapse of the normative regulators of social life and the inherent phenomenon of anatomy can create the need for authoritarian solutions”, an opinion of A. Bartnicki, *Demokratycznie...*, p. 22.
- [40]A. Stelmach, *Zmiana...*, p. 30.

[41]Ibidem, p. 208.

[42]A. Furier, *Druga...*, p. 257.

[43]M. Nizioł, *Dylematy kulturowe międzynarodowej roli Rosji*, Lublin 2004, p.111.

[44]J. Felsztynski, W. Pribilowski, *Korporacja zabójców. Rosja, KGB i prezydent Putin*, Warsaw 2008, p. 132 - 135.

[45]S. Bieleń, *Tożsamość...*, p. 176.

[46]J. Potulski, *System partyjny...*, p. 232.

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