ISSN: 2158-7051 ==================== INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN STUDIES ==================== ISSUE NO. 5 ( 2016/2 ) |
Georgian Press about Georgian-Abkhaz “Post-Colonial” Conflict and Cultural-Political Relations between Georgia and Russia in Post-Soviet Time
NATALIA SVANIDZE*
Summary
The
subject matter of the present article is the reflections of the Georgian-Abkhaz
conflict and Abkhaz war (1992-1993) in the Georgian print media and the
Georgian-Russian public and political relations.
The
Georgian media discourse analysis the period from the 1980s to the present
outlines feasible prospects for the resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.
We
will look at the revaluation of the Soviet paradigms, as well as the
intentional mistakes made in order to
underscore the necessity for Georgia,
Abkhazia and Russia, to overcome their negative stereotypes in favor of the
future civilized interethnic relations. We aim to show the absurd and paranoid
nature of violence, the need for kindred nations to have relations in order to
maintain their identity, the advantages of rational consensus of nations
located on the same geopolitical plane vis-a-vis violence, and that there is no
alternative to the humanitarian will of bilateral political forgiveness and
reconciliation.
Key Words: Mimicry, Hybridity,
Subaltern, Binary oppositions of ‘My own’ and ‘Other’, the Colonizer and the
Colonized, the Centre (Metropolis) and the Periphery.
“The Georgians’ right
to this land and sea should also be protected. . . . There is always a place
for cultures; only uncultured people are not able to find a place, because the
very expression of ethnic hatred is anti-cultural per se.”[1]
April 9, 1989, marked
the day when Georgian resistance to the bureaucratic ideology of the Soviet
empire was officially and universally declared. Georgia started to assert its
own identity in the global politics as early as since the 1990s.[2] The
process of self-determination of nations in our country signaled joining the new world order, i.e. the adversary of
the socialist system, the ‘Other’ (the West). However, the pre/postcolonial
criticism contributing to the extensive process of decolonization persisted[3] in
the Georgian literary/media discourse[4] for over two centuries.
It is impossible to
conceptualize the postcolonial theoretical approach towards the Georgian-Abkhaz
conflict[5] without taking into
account the history of Georgia’s “accession” to the Russian Empire / the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics; whereas the precedent of one country
subordinating another by force can safely be described by the term “colonization”.
The present article singles out certain stereotypes[6] that have had their
toll on exacerbating the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.
Importantly, the
cultural processes in the post-Soviet Georgia were significantly influenced by
public figures (such as A. Bakradze, M. Kostava, Z. Gamsakhurdia and others).[7] The
postcolonial sub-cultural social and political journalism itself, with its
negative and positive features appeared to comprise the basic category of the
new Georgian identity. From the very moment Georgia embarked on the path of
building an independent state, the newly fledged country came to face a natural
need to get to know the world at large and adapt to it. It has been correctly
noted that after the 28 October 1990 elections, the conjectural newspapers,
previously strictly controlled by the Soviet Government, start to change their
names. So, this process is indicative of “a switch of emphasis not only within
the categories of identity, but also within the dominant ideology.”[8]
Franc Fanon argues
(Fanon, 1961) that the purpose of decolonization on the global level is to
change the world order, but, unfortunately, it is not something one can make
appear by a magic wand.[9] According
to D. Moor, (Moor, 2001)[10] the
postcolonial extraordinariness of the Soviet regions has not yet been properly
assessed. In the process of strengthening political power through seizing
freedom by violence, the Georgian and Abkhaz subaltern[11] makes use of the available
resources anew trying to regain autonomy damaged under the colonial oppression.[12]
However, the post-Soviet subject, intrinsically aggressive to any form of
totalitarianism, but politically unprepared and used to being patronized by
another, recognizes, as would have been expected, the part of the National
Movement that fights the subordinate past with the most primitive methods
(besides, subordination is not characteristic of empires only; dominant elite
groups can also have qualitatively subordinate subjects, just like they are
subordinate to dominant institutions).[13] In this respect, an
interesting picture is provided by publications such as: “Once again about the
ancient inhabitants of Abkhazia” by A. Oniani, “The scientific mischief
continues” and “Scientific ignorance in the Abkhaz studies”, “Khrushchev, the
Abkhaz and Georgians”.
From the liberal point
of view, due to objective reasons, it was simply impossible for Georgia to have
consistent and rational political references to the West in the 1990s. The
heightened conflict that escalated into a serious military action, affected all
ethnic groups living in Abkhazia, including, of course, Georgians and Abkhaz,
who, although were by far not numerous, represented[14] titular ethnic groups..[15] The
UN observers came to the conclusion that both sides (Georgia and Abkhazia) were
responsible for obvious violations of human rights. In May 1998, however, the
warfare resumed.[16]
This fact, as the political analyst Svante Cornell comments (Svante, 2000),
“once again dashed the hope of resolving the conflict in the near future”.[17] Obviously,
the step towards the “metaphysical” freedom taken by the national government
proved to be a step back with respect to civic interests (quite often, the
leaders of the struggle for liberation were making public statements that
caused negative feelings among ethnic groups enjoying status of national
minorities in Georgia. “Anti-Georgian forces” were also taking advantage of the
situation).[18]
Under “Perestroika”, both Georgia and Abkhazia found ways to justify their
claims to independence.
The Western scholarly
language has defined the Georgian-Abkhaz type of conflict by a relevant term as
“postcolonial conflict”.[19] The
Georgian discourse of the 1990s explicitly points out that the given conflict
is essentially the post-Soviet conflict between Russia and Georgia. It does not
stem solely from the antagonism between “the Georgian and Abkhaz nationalists”,
but rather derives from the two-century-long controversy between Georgia and
Russia (since the early nineteenth century until present).
Resorting the “icons”
The practice of
resorting to “icons” is, in general, a strategy directed at maintaining
collective identity; it creates a sense of increased threat, thus even more
strongly consolidating the community members. The above technique has been used
as a means of information warfare by all three parties – Georgia, Russia, and
Abkhazia.[20] It
might as well be due to the artificially created information vacuum – or other
internal reasons – that the Abkhaz side failed to fathom profoundly that the
post-imperial Russia, in fact, was applying its tactic to achieve a complete
assimilation of the southern periphery. The transforming metropolis, having
claims to be the world’s leading power, had no intention whatsoever to give up
this century-old plan – it would mean relinquishing the entire region of the
Caucasus and amount to the recognition of its own fiasco. The scrutiny of the
materials in the Georgian Media of the 80s and the 90s of the 20th
c. as well as the 2000s shows the validity of several stereotypes that have to
different degrees been further reinforced by a series of essays such as: “False
legends”[21] and
“The Abkhaz people and the Abkhaz language”.[22] The results epitomize the
following Abkhaz / Georgian stereotypes:
1.
The Georgians
are to blame for all problems the Abkhaz have;
2.
The Abkhaz
people are “Not our own people”, they are “Other” Caucasians;
and Georgian/Russian
stereotypes that have been largely reinforced by articles such as: “The Russian
cruelty”,[23]or
“Let’s call enemy its name”[24]:
1.
The Russians are
conquerors /aggressors;
2.
No one had ever
been successful in bringing the Caucasus and Russia together by force;
3.
Russia remains
to be an “eternal enigma”.
If we take the spatial notch of the
“Soviet Culture” for the historical time pertaining to general culture, then it
is possible to harmoniously locate the complex of self-perception by Georgian
culture in the Soviet space, on the one hand, and place the Abkhaz cultural
complex within the boundaries of Soviet Georgia, on the other.
The situation in the
state becomes complicated when one nation perceives the other as “Other”/ “not
belonging to it” while the relatedness to others often has a markedly negative
/ confrontational nature. Subsequently, we come across clear indications of
bipolarism of Russian politics in periodical discussions. Unfortunately, the
stakeholder parties do not hesitate to freely interpret the norms of the
international law and the UN Charter. This exactly circumstance is highlighted[25] in
the article “Georgia is ready to break up” when he construes that the
historical reality of our country against the background of the dispersing
(Soviet) Union has turned into a major source of “ethnic” conflicts ever since
the 1990s as the Soviet ethnic policy were on a par with the common goals of
the Empire to manage the peripheries by “time bombs" guided by the Devide Et Impera principle:[26]
The imperial politics of Tsarist Russia and
Bolshevik Russia in Abkazia in the 19th and the 20th
centuries are almost identical. The unrestrained striving to propound the
Georgian regions as ethnicities and set them up against each other,
deliberately inciting feud between the Georgians and the Apsua appears to be
the fundamental right of the Soviet politics.[27]
We can see different
modes of impacting the imperial power as active and continuous ever since
colonization. The resistance discourse and interaction are what factor most in
the sustainability theory. The mutually beneficial relationship established
between the governments of the metropolis and the peripheries is evident
enough. As highlighted by Edward Said (Said, 1995)[28]: Scholars, whether
consciously or unconsciously, were creating a new ideological mechanism
enabling the conquerors to exercise control and exonerating their actions.
Successfully implemented strategies
It
can be said that the colonial strategies: a) assimilation of the subjugated /
hybridization through language and b) developing a historical myth – creating
an exaggerated perceptions of their past and origin – had been successfully
implemented with respect to Abkhazia. A rather brusque political language had
been forcing its way through against the background of the ongoing global and
national self-determination and vis-à-vis a “balanced” political discussion.
The Georgian print Media of the 1990s, full of national rhetoric, apparently
did not or could not take into account how Abkhazia (Ossetia) would act after
Georgia attained independence. The government of the newly fledged country was
sending ethnic minorities living in Georgia the same messages on the official
or unofficial level that had itself considered as the main flaw of the
metropolis (throughout two centuries) and had criticized it for that.
Unwittingly, the figures bearing a new national identity (A.Bakradze, Z.
Gamsakhurdia, M. Kostava, Ch.
Amiredjibi, and others) started to
resemble “tiny” orientalists”.[29] The
attempt to legalize the term “Absua” with respect to the Abkhaz at the academic/
public level, and that with a connotation offensive to the Abkhaz, was a
manifestation of this very shortcoming: ”the Apsua, same as Abazinians, appear
on the territory of Abkhazia only in the late Middle Ages. No Apsua had ever
lived in Abkhazia until 1621.“[30]
It has been justly asserted that scientific
assumptions have totally destroyed the historical consciousness of
Georgian-Abkhaz unity. Therefore, as the researcher Z. Abzianidze (Abzianidze,
2000) says, “before sitting down at the table of negotiations, we all need to
first look into our own souls . . . determine our share of blame in what has
happened . . . , ” forget about revenge, and discard “Homo Bellator” (an armed
man) from our thought.[31] Even
today, one can hear conflicting theories passed off as “scientific"
contending, on the one hand, that “the contemporary Abkhaz" / Apsua are
people who have come from outside, while, on the other hand, stating just the
opposite: that the Abkhaz are Georgian just like Pshavs or Rachvelians . . . being
mixed does not mean that the Circassians are Abkhaz or vice versa.”[32] Exaggerated
national self-esteem is a certain reflex to compensate for the lost war in
Abkhazia. The myth of “Georgian nationalism”, an attempt to “forcefully
georgianize” minorities, the so called “Georgianization Theory”,
“discriminating” ethnic minorities – this is how some western authors
characterize the Georgian policy towards national minorities pursued until the
beginning of the twenty-first century.[33]
Thus, there are at least two
reasons – a) placing the Abkhaz in an ethnic area not of Georgian provenance;
B) scientific re-signification of the Abkhaz subject as its “Other" kin –
due to which the Abkhaz intellectual elite quite logically casts the Georgian
subject out of the physical / virtual territory perceived as “its own” just
like the Georgian ethnic subject itself discards Russificators (especially
considering that the Georgian subject is better informed and, subsequently,
carries a greater responsibility); the Abkhaz subject, on the other hand, as
stated in certain Georgian circles, is “misinformed"[34] about the real historical
processes and its information policy is also under imperialist rule.
Destroyed social constructs
The postcolonial subjects discoursing from the rationalist scientific
position, those who pioneer to resolve the conflict, have always understood
that the endless clamor about the aboriginal roots would not lead anywhere but
to deepening the rift: any version about the origin was equally irritating for
the disoriented ethnic unity serving the purpose imposed on it by the Empire.
Permanent violence characteristic of the colonial world was immanently repeated
in the former Soviet Union, at a time when the indigenous social construct /
everyday life was already destroyed.[35] The Abaz, Apsua or Apsar,
defending Georgia were alienated from the concept of Georgian-hood by the
scholars or intellectual elite that shaped the so-called “Abkhaz
separatism". The irritation of the Abaz consciousness reached its
extremes, “their existence was ejected from the Georgian-hood” and the
remaining vacuum was filled in return with the Russian “brotherly
friendship".[36]
According to the researcher U. Gruska (Gruska, 2000),[37] the
conflict in Abkhazia comes mainly as a result of the confrontation between the
Georgian and Abkhaz nationalists. In our opinion, this is just one factor that
kindled the conflict. The key role in the Abkhaz conflict goes to Russia’s
desire to retain political influence in the “near abroad”. Creating the
resistant anti-colonial discourse, the contemporary (2000s) Georgian print
Media are tenaciously trying to prove their truth in the controversy with
metropolitan subject: “The concept of “Georgian colonialism" is unknown to
literature; it is familiar with “Russian colonialism”. Having Georgians live or
settle in their own homeland / country (in the case, Abkhazia) cannot be
considered as Colonialism.’’[38] Both
sides, the Georgian and the Abkhaz, know perfectly well that the only way to
get rid of a colonist is to expel him from the world he has colonized, is a
certain representation of Manichaeism[39] on the secular level. As F.
Fanon notes (Fanon, 1961), “not only is a colonist content with the physical
space due to its totalitarian nature, but achieves the quintessence by
declaring the colonized society devoid of value. The native is declared
unethical, the one that denies values; it is the enemy to meanings, i. e. the absolute evil.”[40]
Thus, the Abkhaz identity was expressed for the Georgians in an unusual toponym
Apsua,[41]
while a successful experiment, that of the Russification of their cultural
codes, was carried out on the Abkhaz ethnicity.
According to Susan Layton (Layton, 2005), “The correlation of the
subject of a smaller ethnicity to the subject of a greater ethnicity can be
described as sexual, as the strong one wants to take responsibility for the
weak one at the expense of offending her virginal nature”.[42] In our opinion, because of
the unconscious gender, the Georgian nominal discourse inadvertently reinforced
the resistance persisting on the unconscious level, “transferring” all possible guilt onto Russia (and the Abkhaz, in
their turn, blaming Georgians), under the pretext that the “virginal nature”
cannot be blamed. The responsibility for the committed evil is placed on the
experience-bearing masculine icon: “Russia’s deception and treachery is not
surprising to anyone. For half of the world, it is not a reliable partner [...]
Russia cannot be trusted, of course.“[43] However, the collective
perceptions of the anti-Georgian oriented Abkhaz did not coincide with our own
perceptions. During the self-determination period (1988-1989), the legitimate
paradigm of “being Georgian, speaking Georgian and building an independent
state” is illegitimate for the Abkhaz elite / public circles. “My own” of the
Georgian academic historical discourse – “the Georgians and Abkhaz had a common
misfortune in the face of Russian colonialism in the 19th century"[44] –
becomes “Other”, it becomes alien to the Georgian context because its
standardized national language factually / legally has long been Russian.
Language in the post-colonial philosophy[45] is synonymous to thought;
being part of culture, it is used as a tool of oppression by the metropole in the same way as any
other method is. “Language has always been a weapon of spiritual enslavement”,
- says Ngugi wa Thiong’o (Thiong’o, 2004).[46] There is no denying that
the Soviet empire prioritized the promotion of the development of art and
culture as well as various fields of science,[47] but in Georgia, who was
creating a new identity, what had been installed by force could not be
eradicated by the same force.[48] It
is exactly this type of force that ethnic minorities have been underscoring
(this view has been permanently rejected by Georgian objects of discussion). It
might be true that the new ethnicity had lost touch with its old homeland and,
now referred to as Apsua, did not have any other homeland (by contrast with
Ossetians),[49] but
the derogative terms only intensified the hatred between participants of the
dialogue, prolonging reconciliation for uncertain time and reinforcing all the
more the status of the frozen conflict".[50] In the narratives of the 1980s
and the 1990s, the Abkhaz subaltern perceived itself for the most part as
victim, just like the Georgian counterpart did in its turn. This
“Martyrological Paradigm”[51]
implies primarily a political idea[52].
Fazil Iskander, an authority among the Abkhaz, wrote as early as in
1989: “I cannot see any special national peculiarity here. Injustice,
stupidity, bribery reigned everywhere in our country”.[53] S. Chervonnaya ranks the
Georgian-Abkhaz “ethnic was "as a “Myth”:
. . . Ни
"добровольного," ни "прогресивного," ни "независимого
от Грузии" присоеденения Абхазии к России не было [...] Российское
самодержавие, действительно, постепенно продвигается в Закавказье, по кускам,
по частям аннексируя страны и порабощая его народы, постоянно чередуя при этом
кровавое население с посулами, обещаниями.“ (There has not been either "voluntary" or
"progressive", or "independent of Georgia" merger of
Abkhazia with Russia [...] Russian autocracy is indeed gradually moving forward
in the Caucasus, annexing countries piece by piece, part by part, and enslaving
their peoples, constantly supplying the blood-spattered people with alternative
promises.)[54]
Conclusion
The separation of
Georgia from the General Soviet space did not occur without a loss to the
state. Disintegration of the territorial integrity, protection of
monolingualism, and legal equality are the key problems that emerged as soon as
Georgia began to break away from the uniform Soviet body. As to Europe, in whom
excessive hopes might have been placed as a mediator in the Georgian political
discourse, as D. Chakrabarty (Chakrabarty, 2000) justly observed, it acted as
“a silent reviewer of the historical knowledge.“[55]
The analysis of the
journalistic materials pertaining to the period of the 2000s shows the need to
overcome the belligerent stereotypes and bring ethnic relations to the cultural
wing in order to secure non-false / non-violent peace, provided this is really
grounded on sincere repentance and oblivion. The principles of peaceful coexistence without
territorial / human losses are relevant to all three parties. The subject of
the post-Soviet Georgian ethnos, the homo ex-Sovieticus, creates a reality that
attempts to replace the Soviet Union with the virtual post-Soviet Union.
However, it is not directed at overcoming the Soviet stereotypes / myths within
itself, as it sees the paradigms established in the Soviet era in absolute
terms. The subordination period models of thought come back in the form of
obsessive ideas and actions showing resistance to the attempts of unshackling
oneself from the past. In the article “The Cultural / Socio-Cultural Conflict
in a Transitional Society”, [56] B. Tsipuria notes
that, surprising as it might seem, since the 1990s “the post-Soviet, traumatic,
but nonetheless stagnant situation in Georgia has not resulted in a conflict
between cultural spaces”. The cardinal difference between the discourses of the
1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s is that a requirement to break the stereotypes
emerges in the 2000s. This change can be achieved through a cultural dialogue,
since culture is a function and source of identity, and alternatively, the most
powerful weapon of resistance in the postcolonial society. Consequently,
throughout three decades (from the 1980s up to the 2000s), the character of the
Georgian print Media can in the main be defined as an “anti-imperialist
discourse” that stands as a guarantee for the assertion / preservation of one’s
own identity (that of smaller nations) in the global, rapidly changing world.
[1]B. akhmadulina da skhv., 1999. chven ruseteli
mts'erlebi, lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 48
, 3.
[2]Georgia
declared its independence based on the results of the March 31, 1991, national
referendum.
[3]What is
meant is the discontent spurred in the Georgian political thought as a result
of the violation of the Giorgievsk Treaty provisions concluded in 1801.
[4]The loss
of national statehood was a major theme already within the Georgian Romanticism
(the 1st half of the 19th c.) marked with pervasive sadness stemming from the
tragic contemplation of that loss.
[5]T.
Khabeishvili. 1995. sakartvelo dasashlelad mzadaa, tbilisi, 186–189: 5–3; Sh.
Vadachk'oria. 1997. apkhazetis sak'itkhi 20–iani ts'lebis kartul p'olit'ik'ur
azrovnebashi, tsisk'ari, 12 . 96-101; T. Gugeshashvili, 2001. vushvelot
sakartvelos, asi (100) mts'erlis gazeti, 3: 4; L. Pruidze, 1999. simartle
apkhazetze, mnatobi, 9–10: 152-158. G. Rogava, 1997. tsarizmis shovinist'uri
saek'lesio p'olit'ik'a apkhazetshi, p'olit'ik'a, 7–9 48–53; K'. T'oliashvili,
2000. rusetis sinodis saek'lesio p'olit'ik'a apkhazetshi me-19 sauk'unis
mits'urulsa da me-20 sauk'unis dasats'qisshi, mnatobi, 9–10/ 64-68;
[6]The
concept of the ‘stereotype’ has been coined in 1922 by an American journalist
'Walter Lippmann. In his Public Opinion,
Lippmann defined ‘stereotype’ as a simplified, preconceived idea, which does
not stem from personal experience. “Introduction to LGBT journalism,” the Media
and stereotypes, Chapter Four. http://www.nplg.gov.ge/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.exe?e=d-00000-00---off-0civil2-civil2-01-1--0-10-0--0-0---0prompt-10--..-4----4---0-0l--11-ru-00---10-help-50--00-3-1-00-0-00-11-1-0utfZz-8-10-0-11-1-0utfZz-8-00&a=d&cl=CL1.32&d=HASH09424f8a61f0e82a221717.4.1
(25.04.2014).
[7]Z.
Gamsakhurdia, 1989. samegrelos sak'itkhi, lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 44 , 6-11;
R. Miminoshvili, G. Panjik'idze. 1989.
simartle, mkholod simartle, lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 48 , 2-15;
[8]Kh.
Maisashvili, 2010. erovnuli ident'obis rep'rezent'atsia 1990–1991 ts'lebis
kartul bech'dur mediashi, tb., 58.
[9]Franc, Fanon, 1961. The Wretched of the Earth, (Grove press, Broadway, New York, by Richard Philcox.
[10]Moor, D. Chioni, 2001. “Is the Post-in Postcolonial the Post-in
Post-Soviet? Toward a Global Postcolonial Critique,” (PMLA, The Modern Language Association Of America, Officers for the Year,
Ed: Carlos J. Alonso, 111-128.
[11]I think,
if Muhajir had been a ,,creation " of Georgians , Georgian kids would not
have been sold at the Istanbul slave market as Abkhaz. I would emphasize here
that that Russian intellectuals suffered colonial administration as much as
non-Russian speaking and ethnically non-Russian representatives of the Russian
empire.
[12]A.
Oniani, 1999. isev da isev apkhazetis udzveles binadarta shesakheb,
lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 45 , 4-5; T. Mibchuani, 1998. metsnieruli
tsughlut'oba grdzeldeba, lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 50 , 3; P'. Topuria, 2000.
khrushchovi, apkhazebi da kartvelebi,“ lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 51, 7; A.
Grishak'ashvili, 2002. gamarjoba, apkhazeto! mshvidobit, sakartvelo?!“
lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 32, 4; E. Khosht'aria–brose, 2001. ra ,sabedists'ero
shetsdoma’ daushves iak'ob gogebashvilma da skhva kartvelebma, lit'erat'uruli
sakartvelo, 13, 15; T. Mibchuani, 2001. metsnieruli umetsreba
apkhazmtsodneobashi, lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 29 , 13; G. Panjik'idze, 1995.
sait midis adamiani, lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 15 , 4-5; Ts. Bregvadze, 2002.
rusuli sisast'ik'e, asi (100) mts'erlis gazeti, 29 , 5.
[13]Dipesh
Chacrabarty, 2001. Provincialising Europe, (Princtone
University Press,): 101.
[14]“From
20,000 to 30,000 ethnic Georgians have been reported killed and over 250,000
people became internally displaced or refugees from Abkhazia as a result of the
Conflict. Throughout the conflict, numerous atrocities have had been committed
by both sides including ethnic cleansing against ethnic Georgian population,
from 2,500 to 4,000 Abkhaz have been killed and 20,000 Abkhaz have been turned
into refugees.”http://ka.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E1%83%90%E1%83%A4%E1%83%AE%E1%83%90%E1%83%96%E1%83%94%E1%83%97%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1_%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9B%E1%83%98_(1992-1993) (27.03.2014).
[15]Title
ethnicity is the ethnicity from whose name the country’s name derives. http://www.nplg.gov.ge/gwdict/index.php?a=term&d=5&t=6508
(07.05.2014).
[16]The
warfare resumed in May 1998 in Gali district, in the southern part of Abkhazia
bordering with Georgia proper.
[17]Svante
Cornell, 2014. Religion as a factor in the Caucasian conflicts. http://www.culturedialogue.com/resources/library/translations/svantecornell.shtml (25.04.2014).
[18]V.
Qolbaia da skhv. 1999. apkhazetis labirinti, tb., 85.
[19]Catherine Douillet, 2010. The Quest for
Caribbean Identities: Postcolonial Conflicts and Cross-Cultural Fertilization
in Derek Walcott’s Poetry, vol.7, no 1 .http://ejournals.library.vanderbilt.edu/index.php/ameriquests/article/view/169/183 (25.04.2014.)
[20]“The Media standardizes information in order to bring it closer to a
stereotype. The performance played out by the Media often leads people to
becoming susceptive to a hidden system of ideological domination, i.e. does not
allow the object to elaborate its own position." ”The Media and
stereotypes.”http://www.nplg.gov.ge/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.exe?e=d-00000-00---off-0civil2-civil2-01-1--0-10-0--0-0---0prompt-10--..-4----4---0-0l--11-ru-00---10-help-50--00-3-1-00-0-00-11-1-0utfZz-8-10-0-11-1-0utfZz-8-00&a=d&cl=CL1.32&d=HASH09424f8a61f0e82a221717.4.1 ( 25.04.2014)
[21]T.
Gasviani, 1994. tsru legendebi, lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 33 , 6.
[22]T.
Mibchuani, 1995. apkhazebi da ,apkhazuri ena, lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 26 , 5.
[23]Ts.
Bregvadze, 2002. rusuli sisast'ik'e, asi (100) mts'erlis gazeti, 29 , 5.
[24]R.
Mishveladze, 2002. mt'ers mt'eri davarkvat, asi (100) mts'erlis gazeti, 13 , 1.
[25]T.
Khabeishvili, 1995 a. sakartvelo dasashlelad mzadaa,“ 186/189, tbilisi: 5–3.
“The right of nations to self-determination is the holy of the holies, but
neither the Final Act of the Helsinki historic meeting nor Article 1 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights include the revision of
state borders by force.”
[26]T. Khabeishvili, 1995 b. Let’s recall the agent Sitin’s letter:
“separation of Abkhazia should take place gradually, step by step, first by
using ideological influence, and then, if need be, resorting to arms.”
[27]L, Pruidze, 1999. simartle apkhazetze, mnatobi, 9-10 , 152-158.
[28]Edward,
W. Said,“Orientalism,” 1995 (2006).
[29]Noteworthily, according to the researcher T. Janelidze, by introducing the
“Georgian nationalism” theory into the Western scientific and journalistic
literature “the Russophile approach acquires a certain ideological legitimacy”.
T. Janelidze, ,,apkhazetis k'onplikt'i da ruseti dasavletis p'olit'ik'ur
k'vlevebshi,” tb., (2007): 11.
[30]T. Mibchuani, 1998.
[31]Z.
Abzianidze, 2000. Homo Bellator, Druzhba Narodov“, 12 .http://magazines.russ.ru/druzhba/2000/12/zaza.html ( 06.05.2014).
[32]P'.
Topuria, khrushchovi, apkhazebi da kartvelebi, lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 51 (2000): 7.
[33]T. Janelidze, 2007. apkhazetis k'onplikt'i [. . .], 7.
[34]Z.
P'ap'askiri, 1994. umetsrobis parti–purti“, lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 25 , 8.
[35]It is
known that in the Muhajir period, only very few of those Abkhaz exiled to
Turkey managed to return; the rest, being misinformed, blamed Georgians for
everything. G Eradze in his Scientific
Solution to the Abkhaz Problem (Eradze, 2001) is amazed at the fact that,
for some reason, the Abkhaz do not pay due homage to A. Orbeliani’s
contribution and personal sacrifice.
[36]G.
Eradze, 1993. apkhazi da sakartvelo,“ tb., 77
[37]Gruska,
Ulrike: 2005. Separatimus in Georgien. Moglichkeiten und Grenzen friedlicher
Konfliktregelung am Beispiel Abchasien, Arbeitspapier
Nr. 1/2005, Universitat Hambur_IPW, 3.
[38]Georgians did not settle in Abkhazia on a mass scale, since the Russian Empire
regarded “both the Abkhaz and Georgians equally ‘unreliable peoples’, at least
at the initial stage, prohibiting Georgians to settle in this region of Georgia
and at the same time deporting the Abkhaz and settling reliable colonists,
predominantly Russians and Armenians, in the vacated areas. " T.
Janelidze, 2007. apkhazetis k'onplikt'i da ruseti dasavletis p'olit'ik'ur
k'vlevebshi,“ tb., 30.
[39]here: the world, as a contraposition
between evil and good; Dictionary of Christianity. 2011. ISBN: 978-9941-0-3408-4.http://www.nplg.gov.ge/gwdict/index.php?a=term&d=16&t=949
[40]F.
Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 1961. Grove
press, Broadway, New York, translation from French by Richard Philcox, 6.
[41]2014.
According to the uthors of international political studies: one part of the
Abkhaz is Christian, and the rest are Muslim. “Generally speaking, the Abkhaz
are an interesting examples of the preserved of pagan traditions, a mix of
Islam and Christianity, and an overall low religious profile”. Svante Cornell, Religion as a Factor in Conflicts in the
Caucasus.http://www.culturedialogue.com/resources/library/translations/svantecornell.shtml (12.04.2014)
[42]S. Layton,
2005. Russian Literature and Empire, Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to
Tolstoy, (Cambridge University Press,
206.
[43]K'.
Imedashvili, 1993, gavtavisupldet shishisgan, tbilisi,38, 4.
[44] A. Nik'oleishvili, 2002. giorgi shervashidze,“
tsisk'ari, 6–7 , 116-121.
[45]Under
the legislation of the Republic of Georgia, the Georgian language was awarded
the status of the sole state language. The constitution, however, granted the
same status to Abkhaz, which was native only to 1/6 of the Republic.
[46]Ngugi wa
Thiong’o, 2004. Decolonising the Mind,’’ in: Colonial, Post-Colonial, and
Transnational Studies, Literary Theory: An anthology; Second edition, Edited by Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, Blackwell
publishing , 1130.
‘’Language was the means of the spiritual
subjugation“.
[47]“But the Georgian cultural influence on Russia was not limited to
Georgia’s mountainous landscape, which fascinated and inspired Russian writers
and thinkers“D. Maghradze, 1991. ist'oriuli p'aralelebi,“mnatobi, 6 , 125-149.
[48]S.
Minashvili, 1992. pazil, hai, pazil,“ lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 5 , 4-5.
[49]Ts. Chkhik'vishvili, 1997. zhurnal ‘Mind and Human Interaction’- is
redakt'ors“, lit'erat'uruli sakartvelo, 15
, 12.
[50]“The
concern of the Georgian scholars: the necessity to bring the truth down to the
Abkhaz population poisoned by information, the truth being ‘a Manuel in History
of Abkhazia’, remained a concern with the book being in circulation since
1991.
[51]Z.
Andronik'ashvili, g. maisuradze, 2007. sakartvelo 1990: damouk'ideblobis
pilologema, anu gauazrebeli gamotsdileba, ,,nlo_novoe lit'erat'urnoe obozrenie;
Andronik'ashvili, Z. 2007. udzlurebis dideba. kartuli p'olit'ik'uri teologiis
mart'irologiuri p'aradigma, in the
collection: Political theology: Before and After Modernity ,Ilia University,
73–113.
[52]The role
of the Sacrificial Lamb frees the object of torture from any responsibility
whatsoever, as it has already brought sacrifice through its own torture, i.e.
it has already been redeemed from sin.
[53]Glotok
Kisloroda, 1989. Moskovskij Komsomolec .
[54]
S. M. Chervonnaja, 1993. Abhazija-1992: Postkomunistichesskaja (Gruzinskaja)
Vandeja,’’ Moskva , 35.
[55]Dipesh
Chacrabarty, 2000. Provincialising Europe, Princtone
University Press, 28.
[56]V.
K'eshelava, 1995. kvata shek'rebis dro,“ p'olit'ik'a, 4–6 , 13–14; Z. Gogia,
1995. apkhazeti_sakartvelos erovnuli k'rizisi, p'olit'ik'a, 7–8 , 24; A.
Menteshashvili, 1995. kartul–apkhazurik'onplikt'i da ruseti, p'olit'ik'a, 7–8 ,
5–9.
[57]B.
Ts'ipuria, 2010. k'ult'uruli/sotsiok'ult'uruli k'onplikt'i gardamaval
sazogadoebashi, ts'akhnagi: pilologiur k'vlevata ts'elits'deuli, 2 , 239–251.
[57]Ibid.
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ბიბლიოგრაფია
*Natalia Svanidze - Ph.D., from ISU_Tbilisi State University of Ilia Chavchavadze, participant of the conference "Russia and Georgia After Empire", Cultural and Literary Aspects, (which took place in Tbilisi in 1915 year, moderator Ruhr University of Bochum), presents the part of the Dissertation "Georgian-Russian cultural/political relations in the early 21st century" e mail: natalia.svanidze.1@iliauni.edu.ge
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