ISSN: 2158-7051 ==================== INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN STUDIES ==================== ISSUE NO. 5 ( 2016/2 ) |
Socio-political changes in Russia after 1991.
Russian “escape from freedom” or “lost in transformation”?
Justyna Olędzka*
Summary
The disintegration of the USSR
undoubtedly was a traumatic moment for the Russians. Difficulties in fulfilling
basic social needs overshadowed both the resentimental yearning for the
imperial glory and the proper moment for the society to begin the authentic
socialization, and hence the development of the political participation
process. The results of perestroika were disappointing not only to its authors
but also the recipients of the actions to modernize the extremely ideological
reality. Such understood system transformation reduced the possibility to
conduct the effective social dialogue to the minimal level, so it increased the
confusion of the society. The widespread disappointment with the lack of real
effective capitalism and the prosthetics social policy of the country was not
compensated neither with the idea of freedom captivating the crowds nor the
regime equipped with the ability to design the alternative axiological system,
and therefore the ideological one.
Key Words: Keywords: Russia
after 1991, socio-political changes in Russia, the results of perestroika.
Introduction
The
disintegration of the USSR undoubtedly was a traumatic moment for the Russians.
Difficulties in fulfilling basic social needs overshadowed both the
resentimental yearning for the imperial glory and the proper moment for the
society to begin the authentic socialization, and hence the development of the
political participation process. The results of perestroika were disappointing
not only to its authors but also the recipients of the actions to modernize the
extremely ideological reality.[1] Of course the animators
of reforms conducted on such a huge scale assumed the existence of objective
difficulties affecting the speed ad effectiveness of the changes, resulting
from the historical-cultural context, territorial, religious and ethical
structure of the country.[2] According to A. Stelmach,
it was a kind of trap for the society, which in the initial phase of the
transformation process was full of enthusiasm for changes, but the lack of
expected effects in the form of the allocation of the democratic system also in
the non-institutional layer, plunged the society in frustration.[3] In addition, there was
also adopted the principle of the primacy of the representatives of the old
regime over the oppositionists, for all reformative activity took place in the
atmosphere of strict conspiracy and secrecy of the part of actions of the state
representatives. Such understood system transformation reduced the possibility
to conduct the effective social dialogue to the minimal level, so it increased
the confusion of the society.[4] The widespread
disappointment with the lack of real effective capitalism and the prosthetics
social policy of the country was not compensated neither with the idea of
freedom captivating the crowds nor the regime equipped with the ability to
design the alternative axiological system, and therefore the ideological one.
These phenomena were described by B. Misztal as “political orphanhood” and
“worldview homelessness”, which occur as one of the elements associated with
the processes of the system transformation and ultimately giving the effect of
atrophy of the political, social and axiological system.[5]
The Russian society did
not accept the proposal of other solution patterns in the sphere of ideas,
specific to the civilisation and political circles of the West. In place of the
Soviet comprehensive vision of the whole internal and geopolitical reality,
there was created the ideological vacuum.[6] The social reactions to
it we can even include the elements of “escape from freedom” also present after
the period of transformation and with a direct effect on the legitimised
paradigm of the state leadership of B. Yeltsin, V. Putin and D. Medvedev.[7]
Was the demand for the
particular leadership model encoded in the social awareness?[8] Individuals personifying
the political power in the system transformation period, starting from M.
Gorbachev and his associates to B. Yeltsin, represented the generation of
post-Stalinist party activist (“children of the XX Congress”), for whom the
monolithic Soviet ideology has been permanently affected by the delegitimizing
actions of N. Khrushchev. These politicians did not represent the environment
of extreme party doctrinaires.[9]
Lost society. Confused or lost society?
Rich literature
analysing the range of behaviours of societies undergoing another phases of
system transformation presents different social reactions. Especially important
is the study of reactions being the consequence of the increasing level of
social stress – the effect of axiological revolution (these social reactions
are described by the concept of “lost in transformation”[10]). The steps of the
designed state sanction were to bring the basic effect in the form of
de-totalitarisation of Russia. The real reconstruction was required not only by
the post-Soviet economy and public institutions, but the social tissue should
be regenerated, which was degenerated and physically exterminated with greater
or smaller intensity in a systematic way for many decades. Elimination of the
intellectual elites in the USSR was coupled with the activities, which promoted
the common education and eliminated illiteracy,
however these actions were calculated only for the preparation of the society
for the receipt of propaganda messages in different forms, while not for the
construction of the authentic intellectual culture of the society. As a result,
contemporary Russians were not able to generate a real alternative to the
government, which channelled almost the whole intellectual and economic
potential of the society. The same mechanism was used during the formation of
the Soviet establishment, almost without difficulties completely adapting to
new Russia. There should be emphasised the important aspect of mass reactions
(with a significant emotional charge) among the Russian society. One should
indicate the tendency for negative voting and its susceptibility to populist
slogans, often having a huge propaganda potential, but in fact oxymoronic.[11] Similarly, the
propaganda structures are significant: conspiracy theories, the syndrome game
of the “besieged fortress” and the hyperbole of the external and internal
threats, the clear polarization of the world: own – strange, friend – enemy,
the Russian – “black”.
De-ideology of the
intellectual and cultural elites with the hegemony of the
authority elites is the deliberate action of the Kremlin leaders – it
belongs to the tools to “putinise” the country. Manifestations of this process
can be regarded as the symptoms of the critical crisis for the civilisation
identity of Russia, that is the time of troubles.
Therefore, the silence of the elites towards the progressing authorisation of
the political-social life and the replication of the defective mechanism of the
creation of the political power is easily explainable.
Despite the obvious
decline in the position of own country on the international arena, the belief
in the privileged role of Russia generally functioned in the collective
consciousness. It was one of the elements of the post-imperial syndrome, which
engulfed the society. These behaviours can be included more to the sphere of
compensatory measures, because psychological needs signalled by the society
(e.g. the need to confirm the auto-stereotype) were not realized. On the
contrary – there were noted another disasters of propaganda actions calculated
to improve the morale of the nation. An example would be the abandonment of the
arms race as an expression of transferring the measures and attention of the
authority from the military industry to other branches of the economic activity
of the country. Also due to economic reasons there was abandoned the pursuit of
the conquest of space. The nuclear arsenal was reduced not as the troublesome
decline after the cold war, but as a result of pro-military education of the global
military powers. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, even if it generated
sentiments for the parts of the old political solutions, did not translate into
the social mobilisation. People did not want to bear the sacrifices in the name
of the ideas, which arguments have significantly weakened. The society started
the process of self-regeneration, mostly based on the economic activity in the
macro and micro scale, and the conformist adaptation to the post-transformation
political-economic reality. Social stratification transformed in a violent
manner. The most important effect of these changes was the generation of the
layer, so-called, New Russians and the mass impoverishment of the middle class
and the strictly developed professional groups – e.g. officers’ families.[12] The attempts to
compensate shortages within the economy, resulting in the lowering of the life
standard, were compensated to the Russians by the offers to rebuild the
ideological project – the empire. However, the young generation was not
interested in similar world view projects. It adapted to new rules and purely
pragmatically accepted the change of the geopolitical role of the Russian
Federation, designing its place in a way devoid of the political context as
consumers of the mass culture goods.[13] New Russians did not
undertake attempts of sanctions of the deeply retarded (atrophic) social ties.
The process of alienating the poor layers of the society progressed.[14] It is true that a part
of the society, expressing a firm resistance against the rapid system reforms,
constituted by the representatives of the party bureaucracy transported itself
almost without prejudice into the state administration of the Russian Federation, however, the real mechanism of regulation of the
socio-economic life remained unchanged.
A major problem for the
social recipient of the effects of the Russian transformation from the
totalitarian system into the democratic one was the weakness of the ideological
counter positions and the way of the chaotic and non-plan reformation of the
socio-political-economic relations within the triangle: power - property –
layer of the ownership consumers. The changes took place outside the official,
free-market regulations. The abolition of the nationalisation of property did
not bring results in the form of the structure of the free-market
privatization. The process of generating the axiological and economic lability
of the society has begun.
Changes taking place in
the political culture undergoing transformation from the non-democratic into
democratic (even formally) were only partially the result of the spontaneous
social interactions. Assimilation of the system of democratic values by the
civil society and public institutions took place on the Russian soil determined
by historical experiences and propaganda devaluing democracy and its tools both
before and after 1991. The failure of the project of the democratization of
Russia was decided by the widespread social opinion with the external, strange
in terms of civilisation, non-system ontology of this hierarchy of values.[15] Therefore, the
successful process of the democratic values diffusion in the Russian society
has not been conducted, while the democratic rituals were with ease accepted to
the canon of basic political actions. Effectiveness (especially economic) of
the state leaders opened before them the virtually unlimited arsenal of
measures limiting democracy or preventing its selective treatment.[16] The Russian society
built its trust to the state power primarily on the basis of trust to the
authorities. The ease of the political power personalization was the result of
the general reluctance to politicize different areas of life, and historical
experiences of the society justified this rush towards the apolitical character.[17] Of decisive importance
for the essence of the Russian democracy was to exercise strict control over
the information by the state power (even its rationing and selection). It was
all the easier that the core of power consisted of representatives of power
sectors equipped with special prerogatives used in the field of information
security. Alternation of the highest authorities took place outside the process
of the democratic social choice. It was basically the denial of the previous
achievements of the Russian system transformation. Parliamentary election were becoming less important for the construction
of the political and state structures, and the legislature lacked also the
instruments of the real control of the executive power.[18] Nomenclature, existing
in the literature, used to determine the Russian variety of democracy (façade
democracy, imitation democracy, virtual democracy, controlled
democracy) thus defines the same phenomenon.[19]
For the analysis of the
legitimacy models of the power of presidents B. Yeltsin and V. Putin what is
important are the moderations of the political culture initiated by them .[20] These actions are all
the easier because in the Russian Federation is noted the unchanged deficit of
the activity of the civil society, primarily expressed in the ritualized
elements of the direct democracy, with the systematic weakening of the
appropriate formal axiological solutions of motivation.[21] In the early 90s, president B. Yeltsin offered the society the construction of
a new political-socio-economic project, combining the seeds of the political
participation of the civil society and the first-fruits of the free-market
economic mechanisms. Political practice proved that these plants were mainly
focused on the effectiveness of the populism explored by the leader.
Passivity of the Russian
society towards the political actions shaping the social reality directly
concerning particular individuals and the image of the institution of the
country using the intermediaries – officials in dealing with members of the
society is the hallmark of social macro-groups, living in the post-Soviet area.
It seems that it can be said that the cultivation of elements of the Soviet
standard of embedding the individual in the social life, that is the acceptance
of the specific place in the social and political life meaning the preference
of community solutions over the individualistic activity, is implemented within
the representative democracy.
Auto-alienation of the
society members out of the political life – with extremely poor orientation in
the mechanisms of exercising and reproducing the political power at all levels
– generates bold behaviours of the political power, which with the lack of
authentic social control and the lack of formalized symptoms of the social
protest in a clear way focuses different forms of power. The central power only
in the ornamental way treats the rule of performing the role of the sovereign
of the state power by the people. State power treats the society not as an
equal partner of the public dialogue, but makes the process of its
objectification. Degeneration of democratisation takes place at all levels of
the country, also the institutions established after 1991 function in a
pathological way (see: the process of peculiar personal reproduction of the
institution of the president), and the most acute social problem is corruption
(in various sizes).
One of the
manifestations of the stratification changes within political power was the
generation by the post-Soviet nomenclature-party structures, uniformed officers
and representatives of the oligarchic business of the common set (hard to
identify by virtue of its provenance), creating the plasma of power key for the
process of legitimacy of Putin’s presidency. It is the organisational base
constructing the leaven of the social layer, being the parallel world to the
official representatives of the political power.[22]
When performing the
highest function of the state by Yeltsin, socio-political support of the regime
in the form of the newly created class of oligarchs was easily identifiable.
The big business created the economic-political corporations with the support
of the media business, and although the principles of its functioning were
unclear, this situation did not undermine the principle of legality of the
institution and actions representing the country.[23]
The
party system of the Russian Federation has undergone a deep metamorphosis since
the beginning of the 90s. Its transformations can be regarded as the metaphor
of all changes of the system and practices of governance in contemporary Russia.[24] Democratic, multi-party
beginnings of the formation of the party system were through the appropriate
manipulation led to the stage of stabilisation and façade institutionalisation
of the political pluralism.[25] The initial party
activity of the political scene was the implementation of different visions of
developing the inheritance after the communist party, both ideological and
personnel.[26]
Structures of the multi-party gradually disintegrated, while the party system
generated as the result of the actions of the system transformation mechanisms
was extremely complex with a very wide ideological spectrum.[27] Polarization generated
by ideological differences (e.g. communists - nationalists) did not translate to the
program polarity (especially caused by the relation to capitalism and
marketization). This favoured the foundation of intentional, although often
single, alliances between the ideologically extreme organisations.[28] However, most often, the
community of inter-party interests had a different genesis – the desire to
conduct personal confrontations.[29] Both politicians and the
society represented completely different emotional attitude, from euphoria to
total discrediting. This resulted in the ephemeral political initiatives: there
were created quasi-political parties, cliques, camarillas[30], representing a very
narrow circle of founders.[31] “The infantile stadium
of political pluralism” was even harder to convert into a stable multi-party
system. The more openly president Yeltsin sought for the construction of the
Russian preidentialism, the more pragmatically he
treated the formation of the so-called disposable parties.[32] For obvious reasons, the
tendency has been maintained and intensified during the presidency of V. Putin.
However, the provenance
of the political elite has never been broken off.[33] For years it was a group
monopolizing the intellectual and political activity, even the leaders of
democratic movements most often descended from the CPSU structures.[34] The potential of young
reformers was rejected by the society experienced by the nuisance effects of
the economy modernization processes and the conviction about the low
effectiveness of the action of political parties. Political parties
representing the multi-party system, from obvious reasons, did not have chances
for rooting in the social and legal structure (the lack of the so-called
constitutionalization of political parties).[35] This fact has also been
negatively influenced by their multitude and the inability to identify the
party based on the characteristic program features and the instantiation of the
recipient’s demands. Classic typologies of political parties are not capacious
enough to reflect the criteria of socio-political divisions of the Russian party
system.[36]
Determinants shaping the
Russian party system both under president B. Yeltsin
and V. Putin was the tendency of the politicians to cabinet and behind the
scenes actions. This gave the effect in the form of commonly used measures of
manipulation for the needs of managing the public opinion, low incentives to
motivate politician to activity of participation in the party system and high
level of personalization of political parties.[37] The Russian society does
not express in the collective forms of protest (except for the relatively few
protests, demonstrations) opposition towards the roadblock of the political
promotion. The elections only formally represent the circulation of power –
they only serve gaining its legitimacy.
Until
1993 functioned opposition representing different poles of the party scene
especially active in parliament. Such moderation of the political scene led to
the practical destruction of the authentic system opposition. Of course, it was
necessary for the preservation of the democratic form of the country, what led
to the evident devaluation of the democratization process. In Kremlin there was
created a basic element institutionalizing the social distrust – the
pro-Kremlin opposition. It should be noted that the first-fruits of the
opposition evaluating naturally from the party system of Russia were
categorised by president Putin as the non-system opposition, referring to the
non-democratic methods delegitimizing the state leadership.[38] One of the elements of
the project of the animated opposition by the Kremlin leaders (“rationed
opposition”) was the maintenance of the attractiveness of the communist party
by modernising its program and stimulating the nationalist parties’ actions
(especially concerning the elements of programs referring to the imperial
traditions). Generating the nationwide protest movement against the control by
the highest authorities with the party system is so difficult that the attempts
of the systematic opposition actions were undertaken only in big urban agglomerations.
Peripherals exhibit the anti-Kremlin attitude sympathising with communist
parties, although this can be qualified rather as the manifestations of sojuznostalgii, rather than the
expression of genuine political preferences. Despite the formal, scrupulously
followed restrictions for the institutional attempts of the initiation of the
party activity of the Russian society, the actually existing, powerful
socio-political structure are the organisations not formulating the state
policy. Russia’s party system is the hybrid model combining the democratic
rules (democratic legitimacy) with authoritarian interpretations of these
provisions.[39]
Russian electoral campaigns are the chain link the least absorbing for the
power team in the field of social engineering, a particularly large degree of
routinization is shown by presidential campaigns. In the case of presidential
elections in 1996, the candidate for re-election presented a theatrical
creation, constructed only for the purposes of a single electoral effect. Even
then the familia of B. Yeltsin had a
decisive impact on the actions of the almost puppet ruler. His weakness was
mainly determined by the biological barriers. Campaigns before the
parliamentary elections have, however, corresponded to a large extent to the
real situation on the political scene. The situation changed during the
presidency of B. Yeltsin. The outcome of parliamentary and presidential
elections gave a clear legitimacy to exercise the state power by V. Putin. This
legitimacy was the function not of the authentic electoral rivalry, but high
frequency.[40]
The electoral process, therefore, had the character of a plebiscite, which
easily predictable results were largely the result of the pre-election
campaigning monopolizing the public message.
V. Putin proposed
Russians a peculiar interpretation of the social contract. The society accepts
the fact that the partisan president fulfils the basic role marked out by the
Constitution from 1993, in theory is an arbitrator, however, the political practice
of the president’s action indicates that he is the active player on the Russian
political scene (in different spheres of its activity he presents multiple
shades of initiatives).[41] Political culture built
after 1991 in Russia included many solutions reducing the importance of the
social engagement in the democracy process .[42] Especially
the control functions, key for the formal expressions of the social distrust
were poorly developed. This applies both to the controlling of the
president’s institution and the parliament: the validity of the free mandate in
practice means the lack of legal possibilities to exert the influence on the
MPs by the voters. Contemporary Russian parties are staff (and not mass), they
do not constitute a link mediating in the dialogue between the society and the
political power, they also do not review the actions of the political
establishment, because they do not select candidates issued in the elections –
this function was taken over by the President.[43] Their weakness is also
determined by the constitutional provisions: they predict a small, symbolic,
influence on the shaping of the government, so the executive policy of the
country. Besides, we must remember about a certain regularity listed within
this system. The election results are an impulse to initiate further political
parties. The party system itself, from purely ideological reasons, does not
generate political parties and it only creates the organisations marginalized
by the voters. The weakness of the Russian party system is thus directly
proportional to the length of the democratic reforms formally transposing the
totalitarian country in the democratic one (of course only in the declarative
sphere). Numerous irregularities undoubtedly having a trace impact on the electoral
result (various depreciation of the opposition candidates – including the
registration difficulties, problems with liquidity and rationality of the
boundaries of constituencies, the lack of respect for the electoral silence),
however, do not decide about the legitimacy for the leadership team.[44] Especially in the case
of the team of president Putin, the use of actions on the borderline of the law
seems to be unnecessary.
The introduction into
the political scene of the personalities outside the official mainstream of the
political life is essentially equivalent to the displacement of such a person
from the business circles and/or from special services. This results in a
specific structure of the party system. A clear simplification for this type of
actions is the fact that the Russian electorate responded very positively to
the initiative to form of the power party in its successive incarnations.
Although at the beginning of the construction of the party system of the
Russian Federation the electorate was variable in its decisions, after 2000 it
is faithful to the power parties. Free elections – the flagship achievement and
the basic argument of the political legitimacy of the democratic system
transformation of the Russian political system – are not the mechanism for
implementing democratic contents. Also, there is selectively expanded the base
of presidential prerogatives at the expense of resigning from the use of
elections. As an example we can indicate the casus of appointing governors.
Since
1996 the presidential elections have taken on the characteristics of
routinization.[45]
While the reduction of fragmentation on the party scene was reflected in the
composition of the party representation proposed during the electoral
campaigns, although it seems that the composition of Duma was mainly determined
by the strong position of the president.[46]
[1]Kievan A. George in the famous Ucieczka z ,,sali numer sześć assessed the project as follows: “the
perestroika and glasnost contained the idea of the moral regeneration.
Gorbachev probably from the beginning was aware that the changes at the
institutional level are not enough for the political and economic renewal of
the country, that we should pay attention to the “mental aspect”, that is
mainly introduce a better discipline and eradicate corruption and
neutralisation, as well as increase the real impact of the masses on the
political life of the country. This meant democratisation, electoral reforms
and glasnost`, cit. A. George, Ucieczka z ,,sali
numer sześć”. Rosja na rozdrożu przeszłości i
teraźniejszości, Warsaw 2004, p.57.
[2]According to T. Bodio in the
studies of the post-Soviet area the interest of the studies on the
“transformation-democratisation” decreases, while there is an increase of the
popularity of the civilisation paradigm, see T. Bodio, Wyjaśnienie cywilizacyjne w
badaniach transformacji w Azji Centralnej, [in:] T. Bodio (ed.), Przywództwo, elity i transformacje
w krajach WNP: problemy metodologii badań, Warsaw 2010, p. 471- 490.
[3]A. Stelmach, Zmiana
i stabilność w systemie politycznym współczesnej Rosji, Poznan 2003, p. 351.
[4]S. Gardocki, Instytucja prezydenta w polityce Federacji Rosyjskiej, Torun 2008,
p. 282 - 288.
[5]B. Misztal, Wstęp. Subtelności
liberalizmów współczesnych, [in:] Aktualności
wolności. Wybór tekstów , B. Misztal, M. Przychodzeń (choice), Warsaw
2005, p. 13.
[6]Growth of social stress and
axiological confusion, see V. Tarnavskyi, Dzieci
swoich czasów. Ruchy młodzieżowe w Rosji a zmiany kulturowe po upadku
ZSRR, Warsaw 2007, p. 53.
[7]See. L. Szerepka, Sytuacja
demograficzna w Rosji, CES studies no. 24, July 2006.
[8]According to S.
Bieleń: “Russian democracy, therefore, has its characteristics, conditioned by
a peaceful transformation of the totalitarian system. The drama of the
Russian country lies in the fact that despite the social and political changes,
it still remains hostage of the centuries-old tradition of patriarchal and
authoritarian governments. For these reasons, there is a permanent danger that
Russia agrees to a certain degree of democratisation not due to the conviction
of its ruling elites, but as a result of a momentary weakness”, S. Bieleń, Rosja w poszukiwaniu demokratycznej
tożsamości, [in:] Szkice o Rosji,
ed. A. Stępień Kuczyńska, J.
Adamowski, Łodz – Warsaw 2000, p. 27 - 28.
[9]S. Bieleń, Tożsamość
międzynarodowa Federacji Rosyjskiej, Warsaw 2006, p. 106.
[10]A. Skrzypek, ,
Druga smuta. Zarys dziejów Rosji 1985 -2004, Warsaw 2004. p. 63.
[11]According to A. Bartnicki:
“The key to the system became the formation of the parallel political reality.
The Russian project with “democracy without representation” perfectly fits with
its form to the communist propaganda, “the Soviet democratic country” the goal
is the same, to maintain the monopoly of power, but also to monopolize the
potential competition”, [in:] A. Bartnicki, Demokratycznie legitymizowany
autorytaryzm w Rosji, Bialystok
2008, p. 73.
[12]T. Kisielewski, Schyłek
Rosji, Poznan 2007, p. 76.
[13]A. Furier, Druga
smuta. Zarys dziejów Rosji 1985 -2004, Warsaw 2004, p. 52.
[14]W. Igrunow, (discussion), Nacjonalizm jest eksportowym towarem Zachodu, [in:] Słudzy i wrogowie imperium. Rosyjskie
rozmowy o końcu historii, ed. F. Mechmes, Cracow 2009, p.82.
[15]Although there are different
opinions: “In contrast to Poland, in Russia democracy was not conceived as the
western idea, but as the spontaneous liberalization of the society and its
return to own traditions”,
[in:] G. Pawłowski, L. Szewcowa, Kim jest Dmitrij Miedwiediew, [in:] Słudzy i wrogowie imperium. Rosyjskie rozmowy o końcu
historii, ed. F. Mechmes,
Cracow 2009, p.160.
[16]S. Markow wonders: “I have
still not obtained the answer to my question. Does democracy in Russia deserves
to be called “virtual”?” A more adequate is the term “imitation democracy”.
Russia is in motion. Communist authoritarianism has been left far behind. Now
it moves from anarchy and chaos towards democracy. The current system contains
the elements of authoritarianism, chaos and anarchy, as well as democracy
proportionally of a little bit of everything. While the
authoritarian part imitates the democratic institutions. Besides, it
cannot be any different. Today democracy is seen as the only form of the
international legitimacy.”, S. Markow, Polska tylko przeszkadza, [in:] Słudzy i wrogowie imperium. Rosyjskie
rozmowy o końcu historii, ed.
F. Mechmes, Cracow 2009, p.98.
[17]M. Leonyiew: “We have the concept of real
sovereignty. It is not so that the sovereign democracy is a cover for the
specifics of the Russian system. Sovereign democracy is based on the belief of
the elite that Russia, due to the historical conditions and current
circumstances, cannot and should not cede sovereignty to other countries and
international organisations”, M. Leonyiew, op. cit., p. 156; see A. de Lazari, Pozytywista Putin, ,,Przegląd
Polityczny” 2004, no. 66, p. 139.
[18]Particular importance of the Constitution 1993
and the position of the president outside the sphere of three power.
[19]A. W. Jelonek, W stronę nieliberalnej demokracji, Warsaw 2002, p.196.
[20]J. Potulski, System
partyjny…, p. 165.
[21]J. Potulski, Ibidem, p.
222 - 223.
[22]According to A. Bartnicki mechanisms
of power began to structurally resemble the semi-mob dictatorship of South
America.
[23]S. Bieleń, Tożsamość…, p. 41.
[24]The electoral system did not
fulfil the role of the stabilizer of the party system,
see A. Stelmach, Zmiana…, p. 109.
[25]The process
of democratization of the political system (see J. Potulski, System partyjny…, p. 192).
[26]Social and institutional
scope of the communist party was almost unlimited.
[27]A. Furier, Druga …., p. 31.
[28]Categories: right, centre,
right do not coincide with the Polish typologies. In Russia established the
division of political parties based on the criterion of relation to the power,
and not on the ideological and program differences.
[29]Motivation of activities of
political parties, see J. Bratkiewicz, Rosyjscy
nacjonaliści w latach 1992 1996. Od
detradycjonalizacji do retradycjonalizacji, Warsaw 1998, p.13.
[30]Multi-party system began to
shape in Russia in the years of 1988 - 1990.
[31]A. Stelmach, Zmiana…, p. 147.
[32]From “Choice of Russia” by Jegor Gajdar,
through “Our Home Russia” by Wiktor Czernomyrdin and „The whole homeland of
Russia” by Jurij Łużkow and Jewedługienij Primakow, the Interregional Unity
Movement, to the United Russia”
[33]Russian “earthquake”, despite a very dramatic
course and a huge rate of changes, was still far from completion. It has
survived a lot of elements of the old order. The smartest caciques in the party
have long since found employment as businessmen and consultants. Average appartchiks
have practically not moved from the stools they occupied. Although the
headquarters of the Central Committee became now the central of the Russian
government, changes among the employees of the building were small.”, [in:] D. Remnick, Grobowiec
Lenina, Warsaw 1997, sp. 564.
[34]J. Potulski, System
partyjny…, p. 206 - 207.
[35]In Russia the phenomenon of
the so-called constitutionalization of political parties did not take place
(after J. Potulski, System partyjny…, p.
14).
[36]R. Backer, Rosyjskie
myślenie polityczne za czasów prezydenta Putina, Torun 2007, p.4248.
[37]According to J. Potulski:
“The property of Russian creativity of political organisations was a widespread
phenomenon that the leaders become the creators of the party, and not the other
way round, the parties create leaders”, J. Potulski, System partyjny…, p. 205.
[38]Characteristics of the
fragment of the opposition, see R. Backer, Rosyjskie myślenie polityczne za czasów
prezydenta Putina, Torun 2007, p. 257 – 273.
[39]“The collapse of the normative
regulators of social life and the inherent phenomenon of anatomy can create the
need for authoritarian solutions”, an opinion of A. Bartnicki, Demokratycznie…, p. 22.
[40]A. Stelmach, Zmiana…,
p. 30.
[41]Ibidem, p. 208.
[42]A. Furier, Druga…, p. 257.
[43]M. Nizioł, Dylematy kulturowe międzynarodowej roli Rosji, Lublin 2004, p.111.
[44]J. Felsztinski, W. Pribiłowski, Korporacja zabójców. Rosja, KGB i prezydent Putin, Warsaw 2008, p.
132 - 135.
[45]S. Bieleń, Tożsamość…,
p. 176.
[46]J. Potulski, System
partyjny…, p. 232.
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