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THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE OLIGARCHS AND BUSINESS CLASS WITHIN THE OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS AGAINST THE RULING REGIME IN KAZAKHSTAN

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Summary

In the article, I try to analyze the role and importance of the oligarchs and business class at the formation of oppositional movements in Kazakhstan. Firstly, I focus on early opposition movements until the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and their characteristic features, secondly the emergence of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and then the emergence of For a Just Kazakhstan. Lastly I touch upon the characteristics and features of opposition movements in other post-Soviet countries and their comparison with Kazakh opposition. While focusing on these issues, I try to analyze the intervening variables which produced the emergence of Kazakh opposition, the relations and cleavages among the country's elite and reasons and results of the split inside the regime's elite. At conclusion, I try to overview Kazakhstan's role model in Central Asia for the development of opposition, and through that way, the democracy in the neighboring countries, which look like Kazakhstan characteristically.

Key words: The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, For a Just Kazakhstan, Kazakh opposition, the regime's elite, opposition movements.

Introduction

Nursultan Nazarbayev governed Kazakhstan since its independence in 1991. He and his

family have almost all the political and economic power of the country. In Kazakhstan there are also business elite which emerged from the early privatization era of the country, and these elite are also forced to be depended on Nazarbayev's regime. After the dissolution of the USSR and independence of Kazakhstan, all the significant resources and companies of the country were shared among the Kazakh oligarchs and tycoons through the early privatization era. In contrast to ideological groups and players like the oppositions in Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; the oligarchs and business class emerged as the main political players on political arena in Kazakhstan. Since there are not any emerging ideological political movements in the country, the system is preceded through the agreements and cleavages among the oligarchs and business sector owners.

In the political arena of Kazakhstan, there are many political parties, but only one single effective party, Otan. Otan is the party of Nursultan Nazarbayev. For the presidential elections, almost all the parties go to elections under groupings and blocks. Nur Otan, formed in 2006 as a result of the combination of the Civic Party and Asar Party, led by Dariga Nazarbayeva, with Otan party, is the common block and movement supporting Nazarbayev's presidency.^[1] On the other side, there are many political parties located both in opposition side and supportive side in Kazakhstan and many of them are also ideological parties such as Communist Party of Kazakhstan, People's Communist Party and Tabigat ecological union etc.^[2] but their reflection upon the public is almost absent. According to Anthony Clive Bowyer, the political parties in Kazakhstan are classified in two as soft opposition and hard opposition. Soft opposition parties are Adilet, Ak-Zhol (Bright Path), Kazakh Social Democratic Party, Communist Party of Kazakhstan and Communist People's Party ; and hard opposition parties are Azat, also known as Naghyz Ak Zhol Party, "True Bright Path", All National Social Democrat Party and Alga (Forward) People's Party. There are also supportive parties of the presidential regime of Nazarbayev such as Rukhaniyat (Rebirth Party) and Party of Patriots.^[3]

In addition to these parties, the most active key actors in politics and elections were oppositional movements, and the most popular of them are two: the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and For a Just Kazakhstan, because these opposition movements emerge as a result of elite cleavage and disagreement among business class inside the regime and then as a result of the transformation of this cleavage into dissident movements.

Early Opposition Movements until the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and their Characteristic Features

There are a few popular movements before 2001, until the emergence of the DCK. The first one is Azamat founded in 1996, the second one is People's Congress and the third one is Republican People's Party founded in 1998. These oppositional movements were small scale and not as influential as the formation of the DCK.

Azamat movement was founded by former prominent governmental officials in 1996 and participated in the parliamentary elections of 1999. But, the movement was not successful in the elections. In 1998, Republican People's Party was founded by ex-prime minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin as an opposition party. Kazhegeldin tried to form a broader oppositional front including other dissident groups with the name of Forum of the Democratic Forces of Kazakhstan for 1999 elections. However, Kazhegeldin had to go to exile abroad because of so many pressures and his movement failed.^[4] Both of these movements had to fail because of limited funding and lack of financial support. In order to lead an opposition movement in Kazakhstan, it is necessary to be

financially powerful and influential and to risk investing enough in political competition. These early opposition movements differentiated from the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and For a Just Kazakhstan. According to Bowyer;

“A key commonality that these opposition movements shared is that, during their emergence, Kazakhstan elite base had not yet undergone the process of division and conflict that later arose as a result of diversifying economic interests. In addition to their lack of independent economic resources, opposition leaders including Suleimenov and Auezov were unable to overcome social and political cleavages that they shared with others from their generation of intellectuals.”

There is not any elite cleavage in the formation of these movements. Azamat was a movement of a group of former government officials, People’s Congress was movement of a group of intellectuals and People’s Republic is only led by former Prime Minister Khazgeldin dissidents around him with Western support. There should have been cleavage and a split in elite interests in Kazakhstan for a real challenge against the existing regime. In these early opposition movements, there was not any intra-elite competition in the process of their formation.^[5]

The Emergence of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan

The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan was established in November 2001. It was a result of intra elite cleavage inside the existing regime. Inside the founders of the movement, Gaymzhan Zhakiyanov, the governor of Pavlodar, Oraz Zhandosov, deputy premier, Mukhtar Ablyazov, former minister of energy and the owner of Astana Holding, Rahkat Aliyev, President Nazarbayev’s son in law, Zhannat Yertlesova, deputy defense minister, Erzhan Tatishev, head of Turan Alem Bank, Kairat Kelimbetov, deputy finance minister and Nurzhan Subkhanberdin, the head of Kazkommertz Bank and Bulat Abilov, the deputy chairman of Nazarbayev’s Otan Party^[6]The new movement was not welcomed well by President Nazarbayev. The movement faced suppression, imposed by the presidential clique and ruling elite, and in the end, it was disbanded in February 2005 without participating in the presidential elections.

The reasons which caused the formation of the DCK are significant in Kazakhstani politics and these reasons are quite different from any other political movement or party having emerged in any other Central Asian state. The basic reason as every academician and expert focusing on Kazakh policy is the intra elite cleavages on the political arena of Kazakhstan. Fragmenting economic interests of the newly minted national bourgeoisie caused intra elite of cleavages and break-out of conflicts among the oligarchs having cooperated inside the existing regime.^[7] While these oligarchs had been cooperating well until 2001, they began contradicting and getting into conflict because of diversifying economic interests. This situation was a bit disputable but is so much related to macroeconomic development of the country. Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan, rather than other Central Asian republics, adapted to economic liberalization policies and became the most market-oriented and reformed economy in the region. Kazakh economy is far beyond other Central Asian states with its emerging economic power as a result of its economic liberalization policy. The large natural resources of the country also helped the country’s economy to develop. Within this adaptation period for advanced macroeconomic level, the government allowed so many privatization and this early privatization caused so many oligarchs and tycoons to emerge. And these oligarchs began getting in economic competition. To enable and guarantee the perfect competition, they needed democratization and reforms. In other words, economic liberalization enforced political liberalization, democratization demands and self-interested elites began pursuing their interests

against the ruling elite.

“Neither will democracy simply arise once these countries reach some specified level of economic development. Rather, with economic liberalization, escalating competition among elites for their share of the economic pie and their growing instrumental commitment to the rule of law seem to be the source of genuine political change.”^[18]

Economic liberalization is a catalyst for a regime change. And elites challenge the regime by promoting democratic reforms. The link between economic liberalization and democratic reforms is effective upon the development of an opposition.^[9] The authoritarian government also unwittingly caused other actors out of itself to increase their demands intended to democratization and rule of law inside the process of the creation of advanced market economy.^[10]

The economic, governmental and technocrat elites of the country took part inside the DCK. For example, among the appointed qualified and well-educated technocrats by Nazarbayev, many participated in the new movement founded in 2001.^[11] All oligarch members, who led the DCK, were parts of Kazakhstan’s business and political elite. They have enough wealth and their participation in politics is defined as different aims and intentions.^[12]

“Unlike the traditional conception of political involvement as providing access to economic privilege, the DCK represented a different formulation of pursuit of self-interest”.^[13]

“Those who leave the government and join the ranks of the opposition are guided solely by self-interest and share no ideological or political goals beyond their desire for access to the spoils that those in the privileged inner circle have hoarded for themselves.”^[14]

Briefly, the aim is not achieving the wealth, rather, is enabling to share the wealth through their self-interests. Their aim was to provide perfect and fair competition in terms of business sector and banking, and to guarantee their business interests against the monopolization of Nazarbayev’s family upon every sector in the country.^[15] Nazarbayev’s family and their monopolization attempts in every sector of the country endangered the interests of other elite cliques. Nazarbayev’s family, son in laws and daughters monopolized the country’s largest businesses and banks. To give example, Elistroi (Construction Company), Dastarkhan (restaurant chain), Khabar (National television channel) and Nurbank are controlled by Nazarbayev’s family.^[16] In addition the sons in law have strong control in every part of economy. Rakhat Aliev^[17], son in law, controlled print and broadcast media outlet with his wife Dariga Nazarbayeva, the eldest daughter of the president. He also had high level control in tax police and customs. Timur Kulibayev, another son in law of Nazarbayev, controlled the largest companies in oil, gas and banking sectors.^[18]

“In the late 1990s, as Nazarbayev’s family attempted to dominate the media, oil and banking sectors at the expense of other powerful industrial groupings in the country, Kazakhstan’s emerging tycoons grew uncomfortable over their decreasing ability to safeguard their interests.”^[19]

In terms of formation of an opposition, the ongoing clientelistic and patrimonial system, improving against the key interests of the elites, are constructed upon the exact obedience to the ruler of the country. This reason, in terms of intra elite cleavage, is more crucial rather than the competition among the clans or any other traditional forms of social cleavage.^[20] For example, Bulat Abilov, one of the prominent figures of the DCK clearly emphasized his reason to participate in the new movement. His successful attempt to purchase Karmet (an enormous metallurgical complex) by privatization influenced his act of being dissident.^[21] As a result, the cleavage is deriving from diversifying economic interests among the ruling elite, not because of political, regional or ideological reasons. For example, in Tajikistan, the political challengers are among regional groupings, but in Kazakhstan, among economic elites.^[22]

The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan faced so much suppression from the ruling elite since the first day of its establishment. The DCK was founded officially on November 18, 2001. The DCK participated in 2004 parliamentary elections by cooperating with Communist Party of Kazakhstan led by Serikbolsin Abdildin, but it could not take any seat in the parliament. All the members participating in the movement were fired from the public service. After a high level pressure began to be implemented over the DCK, a group of members left and founded a more moderate version, named the Ak Zhol Party. The most prominent figures of the DCK Mukhtar Ablyazov and Golyzhn Zhakiyanov were accused of misuse of office and tax evasion, and jailed in 2002. Therefore, Amnesty International in 2003 declared these two men as the political prisoners and stated that there was a political repression in Kazakhstan. In July 2004, the DCK was disbanded. In autumn 2005, Alga (Forward) People's Party^[23] was established as a successor of the DCK, but this new party was not allowed to be registered.^[24] In addition, the international observers criticized the 2004 election results. While OSCE was condemning the results and political suppression upon the opposition, CIS supported Nazarbayev and defended that there was not any inequality or wrong implemented policy by the current regime. Instead, CIS blamed the DCK for attempting to create chaos in the country. The DCK was seen by the CIS like similar movements, causing colorful revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. However, it was different in base of its emergence. The economic self-interest pursued by business elite was a driving factor rather than purposes of transforming country into an exact pro-Western state and changing its axis as it happened in Ukraine and Georgia. Both DCK and then For a Just Kazakhstan movements were supported by OSCE because of undemocratic suppression and implementation over them.

The Movement of “For a Just Kazakhstan”

The elite cleavage continued after the DCK experience. While the DCK was prevented from joining the 2005 presidential elections and was imposed to many pressure by the ruling elite. Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, in 2004, resigned from his position in Otan Party and parliamentary speaker, and joined the new oppositional movement and took the leadership of this opposing movement.^[25] The new movement's name was For a Just Kazakhstan and it aimed to continue the popular wind, created by the DCK regarding the challenge against the ruling class. The analysis of Barbara and Azamat Junisbai about Tuyakbai's challenge is significant to theorize the issue.

“Tuyakbai's defection to the opposition, for whatever reason signifies the continuation of internal and decision within the country's political elite. Taken together, these developments suggest that Kazakhstan's current political evolution is a direct result of ongoing intra elite competition, which was brought on by the twin processes of economic liberalization and interest diversification among the country's elite.”^[26]

Tuyakbai's and his movement's aim was to continue the mission led by the DCK, which was presenting a unified coalition and nominating a single candidate for the presidential elections. Tuyakbai managed to register on his third try on August 2005 for the elections. In the formation of the coalition for his electoral bloc, Communist Party of Kazakhstan, the True Ak Zhol Party (Naghyz Ak Zhol Party), which was founded by a group including Bulat Abilov, ex-governor of the National Bank Oraz Kandosov and Altynbek Sarsenbayev, ex minister of information, who had left Ak-Zhol Party of Alikzhan Baimenov criticizing it of being puppets of the regime,^[27] and the Alga People's Party, founded instead of disbanded DCK, participated and formed a strong coalition.^[28] The purposes of For a Just Kazakhstan were democratization of the political system, election of the governors, investigation of corruption cases including the family of Nazarbayev and the fair

distribution of the national wealth.^[29]

Tuyakbai and his open challenge to the regime by defending the business elite's interests displayed his close link with the oligarchs of the country. He seemed as the representative of business elite that contradicted with the regime regarding distribution of wealth. For example, Alikhan Baimenov rejected to participate in Tuyakbai's bloc by stating that "The party, Ak Zhol, does not want to be a toy of rich persons."^[30] In 2005 elections, Nazarbayev became the winner with a tremendous vote ratio. According to official numbers, Nazarbayev took 91 percent of the vote and Tuyakbai only took 8 percent of the vote. The bloc of For a Just Kazakhstan failed in 2005 elections but managed to challenge the authoritarian regime for the first time in Kazakhstan. The intra elite cleavage inside the ruling elite frightened the authoritarian regime of Nazarbayev through that election race. On the other side, Tuyakbai continued his way by founding a new party after facing so much suppression due to his leadership of the common bloc, For a Just Kazakhstan. The All-National Social Democratic Party was established by him and the party aimed to run for seats in 2007 elections. But both Tuyakbai and his supports were imposed to many unlucky events and pressure before and after the election period.

"In May, a group of men stormed a For a Just Kazakhstan meeting and threatened to kill Tuyakbai, who escaped unharmed."^[31]

"In November 2005, For a Just Kazakhstan member Zamanbek Nurkadilov was found shot dead in his home, and two nephews of Naghyz Ak Zhol leader Altynbek Sarsenbayev were beaten by off-duty police officers. As with other inspired political movements this decade, For a Just Kazakhstan's leadership suffered under pressure and intimidation."^[32]

The Characteristics and Features of Opposition Movements in Other Post-Soviet Countries and Their Comparison with Kazakh Opposition

In Kyrgyzstan, the opposition emerged with the spontaneous mass mobilization of dissidents and it developed independently and outside the control of opposition leaders. Poverty, lack of economic growth, corruption was basic beneficiary tools for the opposition to mobilize the masses. In that perspective, Kazakh and Kyrgyz oppositions are different from each other. Kazakh opposition is more organized and is strengthened by the independent wealthy leadership which manages to create a recognizable political platform. The Kazakh opposition has a political agenda and program proposing a regulation of a new legislation and constitution.^[33] Kyrgyz opposition was constructed through a number of disorganized and competing opposition camps which lacked a strong leadership. In addition, they do not have any purpose or program for beyond the change of a regime. Because of deriving from local scale interests of the regions, they cannot develop a wider political agenda and the movement remained limited among local elites who merge for tactical reasons.^[34] The only distinctive side of Kyrgyz opposition than Kazakh one is its success to mobilize the large number of population and persuade them to demonstrate on the streets.

There are some common points of the regime changes which occurred in post-Soviet states: Rose Revolution (2003) in Georgia, Orange Revolution (2004) in Ukraine, and Tulip Revolution (2005) in Kyrgyzstan. For example, there were authoritarian regimes, development of civil society, a major split within the ruling elite, popular discontent caused by socio-economic factors, delegitimization of the authoritarian regimes in both of these countries.^[35] Some of these factors are valid for Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states. For example, the existence of authoritarian regimes and major split within the ruling elite are also valid for Kazakhstan. The major split within

the ruling elite is also dependent on the existence of authoritarian regime. But, in Kazakhstan the major split within the major elite is because of macroeconomic development and transition to liberal economy and early privatization which caused the strengthening of business elite. In Kazakhstan, there is not so much development of civil society like in Ukraine and Georgia, and popular discontent because of socio economic factors like in Kyrgyzstan. The only factor that questionizes the authority in Kazakhstan is the displeased business class, known as the oligarchs.

When we look at the situation in Uzbekistan and the socio-economic situation in Uzbekistan, it is a bit different from Kazakhstan. For example, the uprising in Andijon in Uzbekistan is more related to local economic relations and contradictions in the region rather than politico- ideological reasons (increase of radical Islam in the region). The growing wealth of local business class in Fergana region and their rejection to involve in the system through sharing their wealth with government officials and police is the basic factor that caused the conflict in the region. The basic features of the conflict in Uzbekistan is being more local scale and increasing power of entrepreneurs which were seen as a threat to the monopoly of groups who are allied with the government in the region. Since national level elites in Uzbekistan is characterized by their Soviet style homogeneity, the local level increasing business class was not welcomed well and accepted by the ruling elite. The distinction between Kazakh opposition backed by macroeconomic level elites and Uzbek opposition backed by local level elites is that the scale of elite cleavage in Uzbekistan is local, on the other hand, in Kazakhstan; there is a conflict among the ruling class and in macroeconomic level. In addition, while there is an organized political opposition which can make pressure over the system for systemic democratic reform both in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, opposition is so weak, popular, spontaneous, disorganized and without a strong leadership.^[36]

In Uzbekistan, there were not any developments about the government's attempt for transition to economic liberalization therefore it seems difficult for a strong opposition to emerge from elite cleavage linking to macroeconomic reasons.^[37] In comparison with other Central Asian states like Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan is the most developed in the region in terms of political opposition. However, Kazakh opposition is less lucky than Ukrainian, Georgian and Kyrgyz oppositions because of not being able to mobilize masses and demonstrations, in addition, being incapable to take public support. There is also important deficiency in Kazakh opposition: the absence of NGOs' influence in the emergence of opposition. In Georgia and Ukraine, oppositions were backed by a high level NGO support and Western organizations. The NGO activities and NGO network is common and strong in Ukraine and Georgia unlike Central Asian states. Both in Ukraine and Georgia, NGOs, Western influence such as EU or US funding since the 1990s in these states, dissident TV networks and an elite cleavage in Ukraine and also lame duck syndrome in their ruling governments directly influenced the emergence, increase and success of the oppositions. In Kazakh government, there has not been any lame duck syndrome yet, instead, there is a strong leadership and powerful ruling circle around him. Foreign influence and NGO tradition is almost absent and ineffective here.

In terms of the emergence of opposition, the Tajik opposition^[38] is a bit different from the others in the region. Maybe the Tajik model is the unique one among others in terms of its characteristics, because it is the most ideology oriented and legitimizes itself with the ideas of which it is consisted instead of relying on its legitimacy to wealthy personalities like in Kazakhstan. It is also within the system officially and was approved by the ruling government as a legitimate political player in the country.

“Looking generally at Central Asia, successful opposition parties are few and far-between. One that may have evolved into more of an idea party rather than one relying on personalities is

the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). It should be immediately noted that, however, that this party is the only one of its kind in Central Asia; nowhere else are religion based political parties allowed to register."^[39]

Nazarbayev's good relations with Russia through the CIS and CSTO and with China through SCO help him sustain his regime. His successful performance regarding his country's macroeconomic development also provides him a good deal of credit in the public opinion. The large underground resources of the country, banking sector, and privatization policies enabled development and liberalization in economy and this caused the business elite to begin demanding more fair distribution of wealth and more competitive economic market and this process directed the business elite to seek their rights and demands through establishing oppositional movements and challenging the President and his circle. In Kazakhstan as a prominent state in Central Asia, the different types of equation emerge in its socio-politic and economic structure. The liberalization in economy triggers the developments in democracy and enables the creation of political opposition against the ruling regime. This is related to the conditions of the country that have formed since its independence, to the heritage taken from the Soviet era. The system and regime has been governed and controlled by a group of elite in both bureaucracy and business. Under these shaped conditions, the only challenge increasing within the existent system is inside this ruling class. Diversifying economic factors, disagreement over economic share and demand for more fair economic distribution are basic determinative factors in the emergence of the split inside the ruling regime. The opposing element is also a part of the existed ruling system. The opposition emerges by separating from the ruling system.

The equation for the formation of the opposition:



Conclusion

The method of the development of the opposition and through that way the development of democracy in Kazakhstan, on the other side, might be a good model for probable developments and formations of oppositions in the neighboring countries in Central Asia. Central Asian countries which have owned their independence for twenty years are new and inexperienced about both state

building and nation building; moreover do not have any idea about democracy building. Their own conditions somehow enable to create their own structures. The authoritarian regimes of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan cannot risk adapting to economic liberalization policies and avoid implementing policies for transition to macroeconomic level. In that manner, Kazakhstan seems a good model for both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan which are extremely similar to Kazakhstan in socio-economic realm.

^[1]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008:13.

^[2]Ryan Kennedy, A Colorless Election, The 2005 Presidential Election in Kazakhstan, and What It Means for the Future of the Opposition, Problems of Post-Communism, 2006:48.

^[3]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008: 12.

^[4]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008: 30.

^[5]Antony Clive Bowyer, “*Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan*”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008: 31.

^[6]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2005: 380.

^[7]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2005, 374.

^[8]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2005:374.

^[9]Ibid, 381.

^[10]Ibid, 376.

^[11]Ibid, 377.

^[12]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2005: 383.

[13]Ibid, 383.

[14]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005:, 377.

[15]Ibid, 383.

[16]Ibid, 384.

[17]He was husband of Dariga Nazerbayeva, the daughter of Nazaerbayev. He and his wife controlled many of the various sectors in Kazakhstan. But, he contradicted with his father in law. He was accused of being behind a coup plot against Nazarbayev and he was sent to exile in 2007 and made divorce from his wife. He now lives in exile in Malta and continues to oppose to his father in law by criticizing Kazakhstan of human rights violations. His official site is <http://www.rakhat.org/>.

[18]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2005: 384.

[19]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005: 384.

[20]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2005: 384.

[21]Ibid, 382.

[22]Ibid, 375.

[23]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008:29.

[24] <http://www.choicesforkazakhstan.com/2011/11/kazakhstan-made-its-choice-ten-years-ago/>

[25]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005: 374.

[26]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2005: 387.

[27]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008: 26.

[28]Ryan Kennedy, A Colorless Election The 2005 Presidential Election in Kazakhstan, and What It Means for the Future of the Opposition, Problems of Post-Communism, 2006: 48.

[29]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008: 33-34.

[30]Ryan Kennedy, A Colorless Election The 2005 Presidential Election in Kazakhstan, and What It Means for the Future of the Opposition, Problems of Post-Communism, 2006: 48.

[31]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008: 34

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[33]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005: 387.

[34]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005: 388.

[35]Theodor Tudoroiu, “Rose, Orange and Tulip: The failed post-Soviet revolutions”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2007: 336.

[36]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005: 388.

[37]Ibid, 389.

[38]Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan.

[39]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008: 37.

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