Source: CIA, The World Factbook (2015)

The SCO member states live in quite different conditions from their former Socialist comrades in the Eastern Europe that have so far relatively well conformed to the EU regulations of liberal-democracy and market economy. The SCO zone has been the contested ground among different civilizations, and is one of the most poverty-stricken parts of the globe. There is no tangible clue with which some common values can be established. In other words, diversity is commonality in this region. To make matters worse, the state borders artificially drawn by Joseph Stalin are running through the vast, culturally fragmented, ethnically intermixed, and deeply affected by warriors’ tradition territories. Newly independent countries from USSR were all devoid of self-sustained administrative, police, and military structure, let alone economic viability. For the people in the region, the immediate and essential needs are security of life and sustainable economy, how moderate may it be.

The most pressing threat to the life of people in the region is the Islamic extremism. With ties across a wider region, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, the extremists posed formidable threats that no country could defend effectively by oneself. In Uzbekistan, a number of Islamic radical organizations appeared mainly in the Ferghana Valley seeking to establish a Caliphate during the 1990s. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were facing the same danger of Islamic extremist parties. Kazakhstan was trying to control the activity of Uyghur separatists (Rashid, 2003, 2009). China has its own concern over the separatist forces in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Its fear centers on a transnational network supporting the Uyghur separatists in general, and Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in particular (Zhao, 2011; Odgaard & Nielsen, 2014). Russia has its own concern over the Islamic extremism, especially in the Northern Caucasus, but not exclusively there. Moscow appreciates the destructive effects of extremists’ threat emanating from CA over the various parts of its territory with Muslim plurality (Chuikov, 2015). It was the conversion of those concerns that brought the SCO member states together.

The CIS had its own Anti-Terrorist Center in Bishkek. The mechanism, however, was not effectively used even at the times of severe threats emanating from Afghanistan since 1996. To fill the vacancy, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan formed a coordination center to conduct joint operations against terrorists in the wake of the 1999-2000 attacks. It was further strengthened by the Treaty “On Joint Actions in Fighting Terrorism, Political and Religious Extremism, and Transnational Organized Crime,” signed on April 21, 2000 among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Tolipov, 2006). It eventually merged with Sino-Russian “strategic partnership” and incarnated in the SCO in 2001. As defined in its charter, the SCO’s main purpose is “working together to maintain regional peace, security and stability” in general, and the containment of Islamist rebel groups in particular (Fredholm, 2013: 4).

Since its onset, the SCO has displayed successful records in its battle against the Islamic extremism. According to its official sources, the law enforcement structures of the SCO have prevented several hundreds of terrorist attacks (Barski, 2011). So far, all SCO countries have contained the threat to the extent they can control it by their own jurisdiction without outside help. Thanks to the deterrent of SCO, there is a marked reduction in the tensions with regard to Chechnya and Xinjiang, respectively. It is impressive if one recalls the recent anarchies in Middle East and North Africa.

The SCO’s success in the battle against terrorism was achieved mainly by three measures. First, it settled the territorial disputes. Since its start, the SCO brought about rapid consensus among the member states on the mutual recognition of international border. It enabled effective control of the borders, and facilitated the viable tackling over cross-border terrorism and organized crime. It worked as an effective barrier to prevent the Afghanistan war from spreading into the region (Iwashita, 2004; Lukin, 2007; Aris, 2009; Guang, 2009, 2013).

Second, the SCO members reached at a consensus on the definition of terrorism. The Shanghai Convention defines the notion of the so-called “three evils” - “terrorism, extremism and separatism” clearly (Article 1). Its Article 6 delineates the member states’ duties as to cooperate and assist each other through exchange of information, execution of requests concerning operational search actions, development and implementation of agreed measures to prevent, identify and suppress the acts of “three evils,” any attempts of financing or arms supplies and trainings. Moreover, it envisaged concerted legislation and normative regulations against the phenomena among the member states.

The agreement enabled the member states to introduce well-coordinated measures against the phenomena within the jurisdiction of each country. The SCO states piled up the common list of terrorists, extremists, and separatists, and cracked them down in a coordinated way. A great attention was paid to the cooperation of law-enforcement systems of the SCO member states, and a mechanism coordinated in a legal and organizational manner was created (Zakharov, 2015). It made difficult for the terrorist groups to make use of other country’s territory as their safe heaven, and narrowed the niche for the trans-border collaboration among the different terrorist groups (Lukin 2007: 142; Aris, 2009: 466; Song, 2014:94).

The SCO has an interstate security structure, known as the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). It is a rather moderate institution composed of several dozens of intelligent officers, with its main tasks being exchange of intelligence information (Matveeva & Giustozzi, 2008: 13-4). Regardless of low-level collaboration, the past records of RATS are highly appreciated by member states as it has played important roles in harmonization of security laws, contact between national and local police forces, and regular exchange of information among the key security officers. The merit of RATS lies in its ability to develop a single approach for SCO states in the fight against terrorism and other problems. Each state is expected to coordinate its national legislative and internal security procedures with other SCO member states based on the recommendation of RATS, regardless the latter has no jurisdiction to enforce its policy recommendations (Aris, 2009: 469-70). The principle of nonintervention is persistent in this field.

The SCO’s record in the fight against terrorism merits special attention, when one compares it with the US endeavors. Although the US led “war on terror” have so far expended several trillion dollars and deployed hundreds of thousands of soldiers, it has proliferated, rather than eliminated, militant Islamic extremists. In contrast, for all its slack and low-level cooperation, the SCO has prevented the Jihadists to create their “Caliphate” enclaves within its territory. The difference came from their treatment to the phenomena. The US approach is more inclined to conventional state security strategy, thus its campaigns put emphasis on military actions against “terror centers” and “sponsor states of terrorism.” In contrast, the SCO is addressing more directly the terrorism itself, and prefers judicial and police measures. In the light of “post-Westphalian” nature of international Jihadism, the phenomena oriented approach of SCO, rather than the state oriented US model, is more likely to reduce its danger, as the former help recover the law enforcement functions of member states by its sovereignty oriented non-interference principles (Chung, 2006; Lukin, 2007; Yuan, 2010; Hongxi, 2013; Sahara, 2104).

The networking effect to fend off external intervention

The third advantage of SCO is the leverage of their network position to collectively push off the pressure imposed from outside. One of the serious deficiencies of the US “war on terror” is its inconsistency addressing the question. Its coalition against ISIL is a typical example. While waging airstrikes against the ISIL positions, the US pays little attention to impair Jihadists’ fighting potentials by coordinating joint actions among the interested parties. Its exclusion of Syria, Iran and Russia from the coalition, due to its insistence on “democracy” agenda, fatefully reduces the combat efficiency on the ground. Moreover, the US inconsistency on the definition of terrorism has empowered extremist groups such as al-Nusra front and Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). As William Blum put it, “The United States is not actually against terrorism per se, only those terrorists who are not allies of the empire... The United States has also provided close support to terrorists, or fought on the same side as Islamic Jihadists... [For Washington] to further foreign policy goals [are] more important than fighting terrorism” (Blum, 2013: 17). Such US position paradoxically explains the successful records of the SCO’s struggle against terrorism.

The SCO countries, especially Russia and China, have introduced rigorous monitoring and cracking-down mechanisms against terrorists. For instance, China adopted an early warning and prevention system. The objective of this system is to monitor the activities of terrorist groups, forestall their attacks, and cut their financing. To buttress it up, the authorities have a quick response mechanism to take speedy and determined measures to neutralize perpetrators (Guang, 2006: 21). This implies, at the same time, the law enforcing authorities can have arbitrary powers to watch out citizens’ activities, interfere in business exchanges, and preemptive policing. It gives rooms for human rights activists and their external supporters to criticize the authorities of violation of democratic principles. Indeed, it often happens that the Western media, NGOs, EU, Japan and USA voiced concerted accusation after major cracking-down operations are carried out in China and Russia. If it were the case for smaller state, it would bring about political crisis and end up in providing wider niche for terrorist activities. On the contrary, the SCO’s networking leverage has skillfully prevented the negative effect of the external “moral” interventions. Let us see the mechanism taking the Andijan incident and ensuing development as an example.

After the September 11 attack, the US interest in CA significantly increased. The SCO countries welcomed the US initiative of war against the Taliban, believing that they could share the same interest with Washington. Accordingly, they took an active part in the coalitions operation, providing facilities and military bases (Guang, 2005: 503). The attitudes corroborates that the SCO is not an anti-Western club but ready for cooperation in the field of common interests. The intentions of US and SCO, however, were not perfectly overlapped. While the SCO states expected the Americans as an ally in their war on terrorism, the US made use of their goodwill to enhance its “democracy” agenda, pushing them to political and market reforms in exchange of various economic aids controlled by its semiofficial “NGOs” (Tolipov, 2006: 156).

So long as the push remained at parole level, cooperation could work. For instance, Uzbekistan security services placed hundreds of alleged terrorists in custody in 2002. While the UN issued a report on constant abuse and torture of the detainees, Washington remained unconcerned with such “undemocratic” tendencies (Yastrebova, 2010). So, Tashkent was ready to sign a Declaration “On Strategic Partnership” with the US in March 2002. The change of tide came in March 2005, when an uprising overthrew the regime of Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan. After the parliamentary elections of February, protestors stormed several government buildings and forced Akayev to flee the country. The Western media described the events as “the Tulip Revolution” in which democratic forces successfully pulled down a dictator. Soon afterward, on 13 May 2005, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, an extremist group closely tied with Taliban, stormed a jail in Uzbek town of Andijan, setting free a total of 23 suspects of terrorism. The rebel subsequently attacked a police station, military garrison and local government building (Rashid, 2009: 344). The raids triggered off an uprising that merged with wider socioeconomic discontent, and several thousands of people gathered in the central square to express their opposition to the regime of President Islam Karimov. Karimov swiftly sent security forces. The units opened fire at the crowd and a total of 187 people were killed according to the official announcement (Matveeva & Giustozzi, 2008: 2).

The US response to the event was extraordinary harsh. White House press secretary Scot McClellan condemned “the indiscriminate use of force against unarmed civilians” and called for an international investigation. Senator John McCain described the Andijon events as “not unexpected in a country that does not allow the exercise of human rights and democracy.” The assistant secretary of State Dan Fried asserted that promotion of human rights and democratization are of the US primary importance. President Bush, in his part, made an official speech calling for an international investigation (Yastrebova, 2010; Heathershaw, 2007: 130).

The government of Uzbekistan was deeply offended by the US response, as they believed the unrest was the act of terrorism. The US upholding of the rioters’ cause led them to the confidence that Washington’s commitment to human rights was a cover to its real objectives - to overthrow the government. Karimov claimed that the events in Andijan were linked to the “Tulip Revolution,” and implied the US involvement with following words: “The scenario was identical, they wanted to repeat the coup in Kyrgyzstan” (Ambrosio, 2008: 1331). He refused to even consider the call for an international investigation, and expressed deep mistrust for its intention: “I can even say in advance what [the international investigators’] conclusions would be. The conclusions would be no different from those in Chechnya and other countries” (Heathershaw, 2007: 131). Such categorical rejection cost much. Washington withheld $8 million of aid to Uzbekistan in protest at the incident, and warned that it would withhold $22 million of aid, unless it allowed a full inquiry.^[20]

The plight of Karimov was greatly alleviated by sympathetic attitudes of his SCO colleagues. The SCO Secretary-General Zhang shared the same view on the “Tulip revolution” and described the protesters as “religious extremist forces” (Ambrosio, 2008: 1332). The Chinese and Russian presidents issued a joint statement castigating unnamed states that “pursue the right to monopolize or dominate world affairs” by seeking to “impose models of social development” (Bailes et al, 2007: 7). The climax came on 5 July when the heads of the SCO states made a joint declaration denouncing the “pretense to monopoly and domination in international affairs.” It precluded the unilateral intervention on the pretext of “human rights,” and upheld different approaches by saying: “In the area of human rights it is necessary to respect strictly and consecutively historical traditions and national features of every people.” It even requested the eviction of US bases.^[21] Emboldened by the strong backings, Uzbekistan delivered a memorandum to the US embassy in Tashkent demanding the removal of the US airbase at Kharshi-Khanabad (K2) within 6 months on 29 July. On 21 November 2005 the US evacuated the base, which it had occupied since 2001, something that would have been unrealistic, if it had had been an isolated effort of Tashkent alone.

The Astana declaration caused serious concern among the US policy makers. On 19 July 2005, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution expressing concern over the SCO declaration. US State Department spokesman Sean McCormack told a press briefing that it is up to individual states, not the SCO, to determine their relationship with foreign troops. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld hurriedly visited Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in late July, and tried to convince the two governments that it was in their best interest to give in (Tolipov, 2006: 161). Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made an official visit to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in October 2005 with the same purpose (Lukin, 2007: 149-51). The US concern was not over the damage that the loss of air base would cause on its operations in Afghanistan. Rumsfeld admitted that he did not believe US operations in Afghanistan would be hurt if Tashkent denied continued use of K2, because there are other options in the region.^[22] As one US expert noted that “having bases in Central Asia also sends a message to China and to Russia that this is now a significant U.S. sphere of influence” in December 2005, the Washington’s real concern was the recession of US presence in the region (Bailes et al, 2007: 12).

The US response to the Kyrgyz and Uzbek affairs, coupled with its insistence on military presence even after the end of major battle in Afghanistan, led the SCO members to the common confidence that the US intention was regime changes (Wilson, 2009: 386; Aris & Snetkov, 2013: 214; Dadabaev, 2014: 113). The belief united them tightly, and induced them to take collective actions. They now realized the necessity of concerted stance to uphold the non-interference principle and to prevent intrusion in their internal affairs by the West (Aris, 2009: 468). As the SCO communiqué of 2006 states that the Astana Summit created “favorable conditions for the Organization to conduct more robust multilateral cooperation in various areas,”^[23] the SCO was cumulatively becoming more coherent and functioning organization after 2005. In 2006, the role of the SCO Secretariat was strengthened and the SCO’s anti-terror cooperation was enhanced and systemized by the introduction of a new mechanism that keep member states’ permanent representatives at the anti-terror structure (Guang, 2005: 502). The next year, the SCO announced its plans to fight against international drug mafia as the financial backbone of terrorism. In 2008, the SCO declared to actively participate in resolving Afghanistan’s problem.^[24]

Parallel to the development, the collective will to fend off the US intrusion was pronounced repeatedly. The sixth SCO summit underscored “the Shanghai spirit” as the base for a new and non-confrontational model of international relations, and called for discarding the “Cold War mentality” (Lukin, 2007: 141). In February 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed the Declaration on the World Order in the 21st Century. It upheld that “international human rights protections should be based on the principles of firmly safeguarding the sovereign equality of all countries and not interfering in each other's internal affairs.” It also called for that “no social and political systems and models should be imposed from the outside” (Niazi, 2007).

The growing solidarity of the SCO affected the behavior of its most pro-Western member, Kyrgyzstan. President Kurmanbek Bakiev, who was elected with US support, prohibited the use of USA Manas base for combat operations, and restricted its function as a hub for humanitarian aids. In 2007, at the Bishkek summit of SCO, Bakiev called for the further reduction of US military presence (Niazi, 2007). In 2009, the Kyrgyzstan government announced that it would close down the base, only to reverse its decision after the US upped the annual rent from $17 million to $60 million. In November 2011, however, newly elected President Almazbek Atambayev announced that he would close the base when its lease ran out in 2014. The Manas air base was formally closed in June 2014 (Kucera, 2014).

The eviction of two US bases illustrates the network leverage of SCO. While a single state is no match for the influence of “sole world super power,” the collective action with other SCO member states fortifies the bargaining position of each member to the extent it could preclude the unilateral imposition of the Leviathan’s arbitrary will. It, in turn, reinforces the mutual confidence among the members, further enhances their cooperation, and bolsters each member’s bargaining power. The advantage of SCO as a model of inter-state cooperation exactly lies here. Contrary to the assumption of liberal-democracy regional institutionalism theories, the development of the SCO is in large part a result of growing confidence in its capability to address particular issues apart from ideology and political creed (Aris, 2009: 473-4; Dadabev, 2014: 104). Its cooperation first focused on security area, settlement of border issues and coordination of law enforcement mechanism for the better fighting against terrorism. When successes are achieved, cooperation moved on to the next area, a collective diplomacy to counteract the US infiltration into their region. At this stage, the level of cooperation went up from a technical teamwork to a common creed – upholding sovereign equality and non-interference, as opposed to external imposition of liberal democracy model.

The US role in the Sino-Russian rapprochement

The SCO’s functionalist approach to common agenda has so far recorded tangible successes. Its counter-terror cooperation has entered into a geopolitical dimension, fermenting a mutual trust among the member states into a common political creed. One of the most important achievements is the Sino-Russian unison. The SCO has allowed two big brothers to coexist and to manage their relations with the Central Asian states without any open confrontation. It may prepare the preconditions for further cooperation in economic areas. The past assessment of researchers, however, holds skeptical views in this direction. Some see potential sources of discord in the different relationship among the members that constitutes three dimensional matrix, between China and Russia, China’s and Russia’s relationships with the CA states, and relationships among the CA states (Yuan, 2010; Carroll, 2011; Dadabev, 2014; Song, 2014). Out of those three dimensions, the first one is of primary importance, as it dictates the other two dimensions, albeit the latters have connotations in the first dimension in reciprocal way. Many presuppose essential incompatibility of interests between China and Russia. The view is especially strongly pronounced by analysts with “neo-realist” approaches. As they start from the assumption that a state acts to maximize its interests, they predict big states with their own interests can not live together harmoniously for a long time. According to them, the Sino-Russian unison is temporary, and will come to a breaking point sooner or later (Kerr, 2010: Carroll, 2011). More empirical assessments share the similar views. They claim the SCO has followed a difficult path even in security areas due to inherent dissonance between China and Russia. Some argue Russians see the SCO useful only to the extent that it helps check the Western expansion into its sphere of influence, such as NATO’s eastern shift and the US military presence in CA (Song, 2014:95). Others underscore incompatibility of security strategies of Beijing and Moscow. For instance, Russia’s priority on CSTO is considered as the crucial obstacle for SCO to develop into a meaningful security framework (Frost, 2009).

Much larger frictions were pointed out in the field of economic cooperation. From the onset, Beijing saw the SCO as a vehicle to facilitate greater regional economic integration, as it provides a forum for China to expand its influence in the region (Yuan, 2010: 856). China sought to transform the SCO into a financial cooperation and customs union. On the other hand, Russia’s goals were to reassert its economic influence over the former USSR territories including CA, as its priority was the Moscow-led Customs Union and Eurasian integration. The rivalry was the main hindrance to the SCO’s economic cooperation (Carroll, 2011:7; Dadabev, 2014: 116-7). A Chinese researcher complained, for instance: “The trade and investment facilitation was far from being reached and a free trade area is still considered taboo…Russia is proving to be an ever-increasing obstacle to any coordination or cooperation initiatives that would include China in a comprehensive energy framework within the region” (Song, 2014: 96, 101). Recent development unfolding between Beijing and Moscow, however, has made such negative estimations somewhat obsolete.

In March 2014, the West launched a series of economic sanctions against Russia with the pretext of Ukrainian conflicts. The US-led sanctions came as a serious blow to the Russian economy that had deeply integrated into the Western systems. The West singled out the Russia’s oil and gas sectors as its main target, believing that they were the major source of power for President Vladimir Putin. It introduced a series of restrictions on trade and investment transactions, disregarding their purportedly espoused “liberal economy” codes and conduct (Shadrina, 2014: 67-8). The externally imposed restrictions pushed Russia for a pivotal change to the East. Russian Gazprom signed, after ten years of negotiations, a US$ 400 billion contract envisaging a 30-year gas supply with China on 21 May 2014. The deal involves the construction of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline with an annual capacity of 38 bcm. In October 2014, Gazprom disclosed its negotiations with China on another pipeline project – the Altai - of annual capacity 30 bcm. The gas deals were just a prelude of a comprehensive economic cooperation between the two countries. Chinese financial institutions and companies rescued Russian capital shortage by providing loans and upfront prepayments (Shadrina, 2014: 74-5). The financial cooperation further consolidated by the Ruble-RMB currency swap.^[25] Chinese companies swiftly filled the business vacuum created by withholding of the Western capital. Chinese investment enabled many interrupted construction projects to resume, and Chinese commodities complemented the supply shortage form the West.^[26]

The Chinese inflow of credit and goods much alleviated Russian economic plight that had reached at almost desperate level during the second half of 2014. The ruble slump stopped by the middle of January 2015, and the currency rallied again, recovering almost half of its loss vis-à-vis USD by early May. Other indexes are improving steadily. As a result, the US-led sanctions failed to produce any discernible effect in a middle term, and President Vladimir Putin's regime and the country it runs have successfully avoided collapse. Moreover, the sanctions accompanied several side effects that do not please the West very much. First, the sanctions precipitated the Sino-Russian economic integration. In May 2015, China and Russia signed 32 contracts of various construction projects and investment, including the one that connects Beijing and Moscow by rapid trains. The deals are expected to increase the share of Chinese capital in Russia from 18% to 25% in 2015, and up to 40% in the future.^[27] Due to the development, the perennial question of SCO – sluggish economic cooperation – has more than solved, and the organization set about to deeper integration. China and Russia have already agreed, in general line, on the merger of the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEC) with the Chinese project of “Silk Road” in the way that Russia supports the construction of the "Silk Road" economic zone and the PRC supports all efforts of the Russian Federation to promote the integration processes in the EAEC.^[28] The SCO is expected to provide the basic framework for the integration, and a 10-year strategy drafted by the Russian side is to be adopted during the SCO summit in Ufa.^[29] Second, the two countries have undertaken the steps for “de-dollarization” of international trade. The Russia reduced its US treasury holdings from 131.8 billion in January 2014 to 82.2 billion in March 2015.^[30] Beijing has already moved away from dollar-denominated assets and is expanding the scope of its investment targets including infrastructure and property projects abroad.^[31] As noted above, the tandem has also started a strong push for an alternative international finance through AIIB, NDB, CRA, and other multilateral banking systems.

The Sino-Russian rapprochement is not restricted to the economic areas. A significant improvement has been underway in their bilateral military cooperation since the summer of 2014. In September, Rosoboronexport signed a contract with China for the Almaz S-400 Triumph air defense missile system. S-400 system is the Russia’s latest surface-to-air missile, and Moscow had long withheld to sell them to Beijing for fear of reverse engineering. China and Russia held frequent high-level exchanges to discuss bilateral military cooperation with the purpose of comprehensive strategic partnership.^[32] In November, vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission Xu Qiliang mentioned: “Advancing China-Russia military cooperation is a priority for China's armed forces' foreign relations.”^[33] The next day, Sergei Lavrov replied: “The tie between Moscow and Beijing is one of the key factors to enhance stability and security on the planet.”^[34] Those remarks illustrate that the Sino-Russian military cooperation has been well beyond the level of “strategic partnership.” An Russian analyst describes it as “entente” (Trenin, 2015: 19), but it seems much better to call as a practical alliance, as the recent Sino-Russian joint naval drills imply. In May 2015, for the first time in history, Chinese navy entered into the Black Sea and Mediterranean for military exercise. According to the Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman: “The aim is to increase our navies’ ability to jointly deal with maritime security threats [Italic is added].”^[35] It can be translated into that China has now a shred military interest with Russia even in the remote areas that it has so far had no direct security threat.

The deepening military cooperation implies underlying motivations that can not be fully explained by the economic necessity imposed by the Western sanctions. There are many sighs that imply deep mistrust on the side of Russia and China toward the West and its espousing values. The irrationality of Washington’s insistence on sanctions has led the Russian leadership to a strong suspicion of their underlying intentions. For instance, the first Minsk ceasefire was agreed by the initiative of Russia on 5 September. The next week, Washington imposed a new set of sanctions targeting Russian banks, energy companies and military industries. Putin interpreted the action as “not to humiliate us, but to subjugate us. They want to solve their own problems at the cost of ours.”^[36] Foreign Minister Lavrov corroborated: “It is not because the Ukrainian crisis will take some time, but because the overall reassessment of American’s place in the world.”^[37] On 25 October, Putin remarked: “The probability of a series of acute conflicts with indirect and even direct involvement of major powers has sharply increased... Ukraine is an example of such conflicts that influence a global balance of power.”^[38] On 7 February 2015, Putin mentioned on the US attempts to maintain a unipolar world by holding back Russian development.^[39] These discourses succinctly show that the Kremlin considers the US sanctions as a tool to curb Russia for the sake of US hegemony over the world.

There are other tangible signs that Moscow’s fear is so deep that they believe the US is trying to destroy the Russian Federation from within. In his speech at the ceremony of Unity Day on 4 November 2014, President Putin called for the national solidarity by quoting the events of early 17^th century: “The pain for the motherland, for the internecine feuds, and for treason, united people of different nationalities and faiths into one… Dear friends, this year we had to face difficult challenges. As it happened many times in our history, our people respond them with solidarity, moral and spiritual ascendancy.^[40] On 4 December 2014, Putin mentioned, as a part of his speech to the Federal Assembly, of “Yugoslav scenario.” “They [the Americans] always estrange us from our neighbors either directly or behind the scenes… This [sanctions] is not a nervous reaction of the United States over the Ukraine coup nor so-called ‘Crimean spring’…The external supports for separatism in Russia is absolutely obvious and there is no doubt. We are happy to have let the Yugoslav scenario of disintegration and dismemberment to fail. We will never allow it.”^[41] As one of such preventive measures, Putin signed a decree “On the Federal Agency for the Affairs of Nationalities” on 31 March 2015. Its main task is to strengthen the unity of the multinational people of Russia.

In the same month, Russian Security Council announced that the “color revolutions technology” would be applied to Russia by the United States with high probability.^[42] Putin instructed the Council to draw up a new strategy for countering extremism until 2025 by following words: “We see the tragic consequences brought about by a wave of so-called ‘color revolutions,’ the crowbars with which external powers interfere into other countries’ affairs… The authorities are obliged to do everything necessary so that this will never happen in Russia.”^[43] According to the Kremlin, the “color revolutions technology” is composed of hostile media propaganda in conjunction with external sources, popular unrest orchestrated by pro-Western NGOs, and instigation of extremists.^[44] Upon this belief, Moscow has tightened its grip over media and NGOs, and taken high alert to extremist activities. Since previous year, the government has put various pressures on media through legislation and informal interventions. For instance, the Federal Assembly adopted a new law that restricted the share of foreign capital in Russian mass media up to 20% on October 2014. The government announced it had cracked down the activities of 350 foreign agents and scouts in 2014.^[45] As Putin has openly announced his conviction that a number of opposition organizations in Russia working in the interests of other states, more strict monitoring has been introduced on the NGO’s with alleged foreign ties. The government amended the legislation of NGOs and granted the Ministry of Justice the authority to impose the foreign agent label on NGOs in May 2015.^[46] Five organizations: Carnegie Foundation, Transparency International, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and “Memorial” are the firsts to be put on the black list.^[47]

The discourses and measures, mentioned above, illustrate that the Russian leaders has reached at the strong confidence that the US has a concrete plan to destroy Russia from within by creating popular unrest to safeguard its world hegemony. The belief, how ungrounded it may be, led them to take various preventive measures that are seen as “anti-democratic” by the West. Their intention, however, is not to reject democracy per se, but to prevent disastrous outcomes that the imposition of Western version of “democracy” will cause. They realized how biased the Western espousal of human rights and the “double standard” in their implementations. For them such denouncement of “anti-NGO law” by a State Department spokeswoman sounds nothing but hypocrisy, as they know well that it was Washington that has isolated the Russian people from the world: “We are concerned this new power… is a further example of the Russian government’s… intentional steps to isolate the Russian people from the world.”^[48] In the mind of Kremlin policy makers, quite different identity has already taken root.

The same type of mindset has been widespread among the Beijing leaders. China has since long expressed anxiety over “external” instigation in Tibet and Xinjiang using “democratic” rhetoric (Kerr, 2010: Odgaard & Nielsen, 2014). They have used almost identical vocabulary as the Russians. In 2011, for instance, a Chinese scholar wrote: “The threat from the West can cause instability. External forces are preparing intervention capitalizing on adoption of western democracy. Violent riots have a particularly serious effect on regional stability, as they easily cause interference from outside” (Hayyung, 2011). The mindset was the most clearly displayed during the political crisis in Hong Kong of 2014.

In late September, a number of students started occupation of central areas in Hong Kong, requesting election reforms and dismissal of the mayor whom they regarded as Beijing’s henchman. As the movement gathered momentum by joining of thousands of residents, the CPC was thrown into a difficult position. They were exposed to harsh criticism orchestrated by the Western media, governments, and international organizations. The mainstream Western media depicted the event as a “pro-democracy” movement, and the Hong Kong version of  “Color Revolution,” branding it as “Umbrella Revolution.” British Prime Minister David Cameron expressed his “deep concern” and upheld “the importance of giving the Hong Kong people a democratic future.” In Washington, U.S. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said that her government was concerned by reports of the police actions and urged a swift, transparent and complete investigation. The EU expressed “concern” and warned Beijing that it was “closely monitoring developments.”

China did everything to fend off such Western intervention, while carefully refraining from preemptive use of coercive measures. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei argued that Hong Kong’s affairs were China’s domestic matters and no country or individual had a right to interfere. He rightly pointed out that the support for illegal act such as occupation amounted to an abetment of crimes.^[49] Beijing knew well the Western “concern” was not about possible unrest but about the removal of occupiers, no matter how orderly and lawful it may be. It was solid proof, they believe, of the Western instigation of the occupation. The following lines of CPC’s central organ, People’s Daily, conveyed the straightforward sentiment of Beijing’s political elite. “It is inevitable that these new moves on the part of the US government, non-governmental organizations and media will be associated with the US involvement in the ‘Color Revolutions’ in the CIS, Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere. The US purports to be promoting the ‘universal values’ of ‘democracy, freedom and human rights,’ but in reality the US is simply defending its own strategic interests and undermining governments it considers to be ‘insubordinate.’”^[50] We can see here almost same rhetoric as the Kremlin’s concern over the “color revolutions technology.”

The oratorical coincidence is by no means an accident as China has long felt the same fear of US intention to destroy their country from within. The following article appeared in People’s Daily in March 2015 displayed exactly the same assessment as the Russians. “The East Turkestan Islamic Movement is a clear and present threat to China's security... However, due to the prejudice originating from different ideologies and political systems, China's efforts have sometimes been misinterpreted. Some foreign countries were reluctant to define the incident as a terrorist one. Instead, they characterized it as a symptom of ‘ethnic conflict.’ Those countries use double standards on terrorism, linking the campaign against terrorism in China to ethnic issues.”^[51] At the moment, Beijing felt real anxiety over the possible spillover of the Hong Kong upheaval in Xinjiang. In January 2015, for instance, the Political Bureau of the CC CPC issued an unusual communiqué that warned China was facing “unprecedented security risks.”^[52]

The Sino-Russian concern over the US intrigue is not completely ungrounded. Washington has singled the two countries as its main security risks in the new version of National Security Strategy. It relates: “China [should] uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights. We will closely monitor China’s… expanding presence in Asia… We will deter Russian aggression.”^[53] The bellicose language, no doubt, has aggravated the Sino-Russian concern over the “color revolution technology.”^[54] The common belief of the US conspiracy has led China and Russia to a new stage of shared identity. Nothing more clearly articulated this than the joint speech of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin addressed at the 70^th anniversary of victory of WWII on 8 May in Moscow. In the ceremony which most the Western leaders boycotted, the two heads of state chanted their countries’ centrality as the “two major battlefields” of the war, and asserted the joint efforts based on a “profound friendship” of two nations had been basic forces that destroyed Nazism and Japanese militarism, the two main aggressors of global peace. Both leaders highlighted that it was China and Russia that had created the basis of the contemporary world. This view constitutes a stark contrast with that of the US that insists on the primal roles of American “democracy” during the war and its aftermath. “We stand,” Xi said, upholding shared historical experience, “ready to deepen the traditional friendship with the Russian people.” Putin, for his part, made point that the two countries would oppose any attempt to deny and distort history. Based on this identical understandings of history, the two heads of state pledged to promote each other's development, expand the Eurasian common economic space, strengthen military interaction and help the whole Eurasian continent maintain development and stability.^[55]

The recent development in the Sino-Russian relation illustrates the degree of maturity of their bilateral relations. It has already gone beyond the stage of “strategic partnership” i.e. limited cooperation in certain fields where the both parties had common interests. It has reached at such high level that they are ready to carry out comprehensive cooperation in various fields. The basic factor that brought them together so tightly is their shared concern over the US threats. No matter how fantastic it may sound, the threats are real for them, and both of them have developed identical theory of “color revolutions technology” i.e. the US tactics of regime change. As they consider the US championing “democracy” the main tools of plot, they are watchful at those who uphold it in their countries. It is wrong, however, to assume that the two countries opted for oppressive regime. Both of them have no idea to renegade the modern values. Rather, their argument centers on the gradual applicability of democracy and human rights in accordance with socio-economic development. In other words, they adhere cultural relativism vis-à-vis the Western egocentrism. It is due to this asymmetry that the Western pressure for unconditional acceptance of their set of principles has produced nothing but counter effects. The stronger the pressure grew, the tighter the ties of two countries has become. The shared sense of estrangement form the West has helped China and Russia upgrade their common creed into a common identity. They now look at each other more as in terms of Self, rather than friendly Other. Their Selfness was first defined by the shared Otherness in relation with the West, then, it developed into more solid form based on a sense of identical historical experience. The Sino-Russian rapprochement has already reached at the level one can say as an accord. As the two big brothers have created strong solidarity, the SCO will become more effective and functioning organization.

Conclusion

As unipolar globalization has already gone and the arrival of new bipolar system is not plausible, the multipolarity is reality in our near future. Albeit what exact shape the new multipolar world will take is unforeseeable, a great powers’ accord such as we saw in the nineteenth century is impossible, as the interdependency of nation states has so deeply progressed. The new system will be built on several regional structures on which a number of states, both large and small, reside harmoniously. The effectiveness of sovereignty oriented and utilitarian cooperation the SCO has displayed will be the key for a peaceful transition and the sustainability of the new system.

The success of SCO put the Chinese initiative of “Belt and Road” into an optimistic perspective. As the dismay expressed by the Washington policymakers over the AIIB suggests, the Chinese success will increase the counter pressure from the West in general, and from the USA in particular. It may bring about serious military confrontations, such as the recent US intimidation with show of force over the Nansha Islands dispute. The US cognizance of Others is so narrow that it hardly allows any room between “friends” and “foes.” The network leverage of regional cooperation will provide the solution to possible disastrous collisions, as it empowers the smaller players in the international relations vis-à-vis great powers, and produces pushing back effect of latters’ unilateralism. The US unilateralism, disguised as universality, has led the rest of the world, i.e. the countries that dare not fully embrace it, like Russia and China, to construct counter-identities and consolidate their solidarity. As Daniel Flemes infers, the rising powers will not grant the USA the legitimacy and sole authority to define the rules of the game (Flemes, 2013: 1032). It no doubt further precipitates the multipolarization of the global systems, so does it the decline of self-claimed “leader” of unipolar world.

The Chinese approach has additional advantages for the effective consolidation of the networked world. The “Silk Road Spirits” presupposing Otherness of its partners will enable more horizontal and reciprocal ties with the less competitive countries. Its multilayered approach prevents the world division into hostile blocks, reduces the risk of open confrontations between military alliances, and promotes transparency of interstate exchange.

There are, at the same time, some rooms for skepticism. First, it is totally open to question whether the so-called “win-win” cooperation will produce the presupposed effects of mutual prosperity. As the rapid growth of the EEs was largely the product of neoliberal globalization, it will be necessary for the exponents of new order to substantiate alternative model of development. More elaborate assessment is necessary to ascertain the advantage of regional economic cooperation. Second, one can predict several security risks if the US retreat is inevitable. Accidental outbreaks of hostilities will be more difficult to preclude in the regions where no viable interstate structure has been established, such as North Eastern Asia. How to fill the growing vacuum the US retreat creates is a question to be addressed. Third, the promotion of mutual trust among different civilizations through dialogue seems too optimistic, if not naïve. As identifying Self is a historical process, Self/Other dimensions will change in accordance with the alteration of perceived context. For instance, it is more than likely that the Sino-Russian accord will be fragile if the perceived US threats eventually disappear as a result of marginalization of the world hegemon. To nourish endurable mutual trust is a fresh challenge for peaceful transition of the world. Fourth, qualitative changes in existing political, social, economic and cultural systems are necessary to be accompanied by the transformation. As Boris Kagarlitski pointed out, if the changes will not put an end to capitalism, they merely substitute the current neoliberal model with a new welfare state (Kagarlitski, 2015: 11). How effectively address those questions is prerequisite for an endurable multipolar world in the future.