ISSN: 2158-7051 ==================== INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN STUDIES ==================== ISSUE NO. 4 ( 2015/2 ) |
The Role and Importance of the Oligarchs and Business Class within the Oppositional Movements against the Ruling Regime in Kazakhstan
SELIM OZTURK*
Summary
In the article, I try to analyze the role and
importance of the oligarchs and business class at the formation of oppositional
movements in Kazakhstan. Firstly, I focus on early opposition movements until
the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and their characteristic features, secondly
the emergence of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and then the emergence of
For a Just Kazakhstan. Lastly I touch upon the characteristics and features of
opposition movements in other post-Soviet countries and their comparison with
Kazakh opposition. While focusing on these issues, I try to analyze the
intervening variables which produced the emergence of Kazakh opposition, the
relations and cleavages among the country’s elite and reasons and results of
the split inside the regime’s elite. At conclusion, I try to overview
Kazakhstan’s role model in Central Asia for the development of opposition, and through
that way, the democracy in the neighboring countries, which look like
Kazakhstan characteristically.
Key words: The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, For a Just Kazakhstan, Kazakh opposition, the regime’s elite, opposition movements.
Introduction
Nursultan Nazarbayev governed Kazakhstan since its
independence in 1991. He and his family have almost all the political and
economic power of the country. In Kazakhstan there are also business elite
which emerged from the early privatization era of the country, and these elite
are also forced to be depended on Nazarbayev’s regime. After the dissolution of
the USSR and independence of Kazakhstan, all the significant resources and
companies of the country were shared among the Kazakh oligarchs and tycoons
through the early privatization era. In contrast to ideological groups and
players like the oppositions in Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; the oligarchs and
business class emerged as the main political players on political arena in
Kazakhstan. Since there are not any emerging ideological political movements in
the country, the system is preceded through the agreements and cleavages among
the oligarchs and business sector owners.
In the political arena of Kazakhstan, there are many political
parties, but only one single effective party, Otan. Otan is the party of Nursultan
Nazarbayev. For the presidential elections, almost all the parties go to
elections under groupings and blocks.
Nur Otan, formed in 2006 as a result of the combination of the Civic
Party and Asar Party, led by Dariga Nazarbayeva, with Otan party, is the common
block and movement supporting Nazarbayev’s presidency.[1]On the other side, there are many
political parties located both in opposition side and supportive side in
Kazakhstan and many of them are also ideological parties such as Communist
Party of Kazakhstan, People’s Communist Party and Tabigat ecological union etc.[2]
but their reflection upon the public is almost absent. According to Anthony Clive Bowyer, the
political parties in Kazakhstan are classified in two as soft opposition and
hard opposition. Soft opposition parties
are Adilet, Ak-Zhol (Bright Path), Kazakh Social Democratic Party, Communist
Party of Kazakhstan and Communist People’s Party ; and hard opposition parties
are Azat, also known as Naghyz Ak Zhol Party, “True Bright Path”, All National
Social Democrat Party and Alga (Forward) People’s Party. There are also
supportive parties of the presidential regime of Nazarbayev such as Rukhaniyat
(Rebirth Party) and Party of Patriots.[3]
In addition to these parties, the most active key actors
in politics and elections were oppositional movements, and the most popular of
them are two: the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and For a Just Kazakhstan,
because these opposition movements emerge as a result of elite cleavage and
disagreement among business class inside the regime and then as a result of the
transformation of this cleavage into dissident movements.
Early
Opposition Movements until the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and their Characteristic
Features
There are a few popular movements before 2001, until
the emergence of the DCK. The first one is Azamat founded in 1996, the second
one is People’s Congress and the third one is Republican People’s Party founded
in 1998. These oppositional movements were small scale and not as influential
as the formation of the DCK.
Azamat movement was founded by former prominent
governmental officials in 1996 and participated in the parliamentary elections
of 1999. But, the movement was not successful in the elections. In 1998, Republican People’s Party was founded
by ex-prime minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin as an opposition party. Kazhegeldin tried to form a broader
oppositional front including other dissident groups with the name of Forum of
the Democratic Forces of Kazakhstan for 1999 elections. However, Kazhegeldin
had to go to exile abroad because of so many pressures and his movement failed.[4]
Both of these movements had to fail because of limited funding and lack of
financial support. In order to lead an opposition movement in Kazakhstan, it is
necessary to be financially powerful and influential and to risk investing
enough in political competition. These
early opposition movements differentiated from the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan
and For a Just Kazakhstan. According to Bowyer;
“A
key commonality that these opposition movements shared is that, during their
emergence, Kazakhstan elite base had not yet undergone the process of division
and conflict that later arose as a result of diversifying economic interests.
In addition to their lack of independent economic resources, opposition leaders
including Suleimenov and Auezov were unable to overcome social and political
cleavages that they shared with others from their generation of intellectuals.”
There is not any elite cleavage in the formation of
these movements. Azamat was a movement of a group of former government
officials, People’s Congress was movement of a group of intellectuals and
People’s Republic is only led by former Prime Minister Khazgeldin dissidents
around him with Western support. There should have been cleavage and a split in
elite interests in Kazakhstan for a real challenge against the existing regime.
In these early opposition movements, there was not any intra-elite competition in
the process of their formation.[5]
The Emergence
of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan
The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan was established in
November 2001. It was a result of intra elite cleavage inside the existing
regime. Inside the founders of the movement, Gaymzhan Zhakiyanov, the governor
of Pavlador, Oraz Zhandosov, deputy premier, Mukhtar Ablyazov, former minister
of energy and the owner of Astana Holding, Rahkat Aliyev, President
Nazarbayev’s son in law, Zhannat Yertlesova, deputy defense minister, Erzhan
Tatishev, head of Turan Alem Bank, Kairat Kelimbetov, deputy finance minister
and Nurzhan Subkhanberdin, the head of Kazkommertz Bank and Bulat Abilov, the
deputy chairman of Nazarbayev’s Otan Party[6]The new movement was not welcomed well by President Nazarbayev. The
movement faced suppression, imposed by the presidential clique and ruling
elite, and in the end, it was disbanded in February 2005 without participating
in the presidential elections.
The reasons which caused the formation of the DCK are
significant in Kazakhstani politics and these reasons are quite different from
any other political movement or party having emerged in any other Central Asian
state. The basic reason as every academician and expert focusing on Kazakh
policy is the intra elite cleavages on the political arena of Kazakhstan.
Fragmenting economic interests of the newly minted national bourgeoisie caused
intra elite of cleavages and break-out of conflicts among the oligarchs having
cooperated inside the existing regime.[7] While
these oligarchs had been cooperating well until 2001, they began contradicting
and getting into conflict because of diversifying economic interests. This
situation was a bit disputable but is so much related to macroeconomic
development of the country. Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan, rather than other Central
Asian republics, adapted to economic liberalization policies and became the
most market-oriented and reformed economy in the region. Kazakh economy is far
beyond other Central Asian states with its emerging economic power as a result
of its economic liberalization policy. The large natural resources of the
country also helped the country’s economy to develop. Within this adaptation
period for advanced macroeconomic level, the government allowed so many
privatization and this early privatization caused so many oligarchs and tycoons
to emerge. And these oligarchs began getting in economic competition. To enable
and guarantee the perfect competition, they needed democratization and reforms.
In other words, economic liberalization enforced political liberalization,
democratization demands and self-interested elites began pursuing their
interests against the ruling elite.
“Neither
will democracy simply arise once these countries reach some specified level of
economic development. Rather, with economic liberalization, escalating
competition among elites for their share of the economic pie and their growing
instrumental commitment to the rule of law seem to be the source of genuine
political change.”[8]
Economic liberalization is a catalyst for a regime
change. And elites challenge the regime by promoting democratic reforms. The
link between economic liberalization and democratic reforms is effective upon
the development of an opposition.[9] The
authoritarian government also unwittingly caused other actors out of itself to
increase their demands intended to democratization and rule of law inside the
process of the creation of advanced market economy.[10]
The economic, governmental and technocrat elites of
the country took part inside the DCK. For example, among the appointed
qualified and well-educated technocrats by Nazarbayev, many participated in the
new movement founded in 2001.[11] All
oligarch members, who led the DCK, were parts of Kazakhstan’s business and
political elite. They have enough wealth and their participation in politics is
defined as different aims and intentions.[12]
“Unlike
the traditional conception of political involvement as providing access to
economic privilege, the DCK represented a different formulation of pursuit of self-interest”.[13]
“Those
who leave the government and join the ranks of the opposition are guided solely
by self-interest and share no ideological or political goals beyond their
desire for access to the spoils that those in the privileged inner circle have
hoarded for themselves.”[14]
Briefly, the aim is not achieving the wealth, rather,
is enabling to share the wealth through their self-interests. Their aim was to
provide perfect and fair competition in terms of business sector and banking,
and to guarantee their business interests against the monopolization of
Nazarbayev’s family upon every sector in the country.[15] Nazarbayev’s
family and their monopolization attempts in every sector of the country
endangered the interests of other elite cliques. Nazarbayev’s family, son in
laws and daughters monopolized the country’s largest businesses and banks. To
give example, Elistroi (Construction Company), Dastarkhan (restaurant chain),
Khabar (National television channel) and Nurbank are controlled by Nazarbayev’s
family.[16] In
addition the sons in law have strong control in every part of economy. Rakhat
Aliev[17],
son in law, controlled print and broadcast media outlet with his wife Dariga
Nazarbayeva, the eldest daughter of the president. He also had high level
control in tax police and customs. Timur Kulibayev, another son in law of
Nazarbayev, controlled the largest companies in oil, gas and banking sectors.[18]
“In
the late 1990s, as Nazarbayev’s family attempted to dominate the media, oil and
banking sectors at the expense of other powerful industrial groupings in the
country, Kazakhstan’s emerging tycoons grew uncomfortable over their decreasing
ability to safeguard their interests.”[19]
In terms of formation of an opposition, the ongoing
clientelistic and patrimonial system, improving against the key interests of
the elites, are constructed upon the exact obedience to the ruler of the
country. This reason, in terms of intra elite cleavage, is more crucial rather
than the competition among the clans or any other traditional forms of social
cleavage.[20] For
example, Bulat Abilov, one of the prominent figures of the DCK clearly emphasized
his reason to participate in the new movement.
His successful attempt to purchase Karmet (an enormous metallurgical
complex) by privatization influenced his act of being dissident.[21] As
a result, the cleavage is deriving from diversifying economic interests among
the ruling elite, not because of political, regional or ideological reasons.
For example, in Tajikistan, the political challengers are among regional
groupings, but in Kazakhstan, among economic elites.[22]
The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan faced so much
suppression from the ruling elite since the first day of its establishment. The
DCK was founded officially on November 18, 2001. The DCK participated in 2004
parliamentary elections by cooperating with Communist Party of Kazakhstan led
by Serikbolsin Abdildin, but it could not take any seat in the parliament. All
the members participating in the movement were fired from the public service.
After a high level pressure began to be implemented over the DCK, a group of members
left and founded a more moderate version, named the Ak Zhol Party. The most
prominent figures of the DCK Mukhtar Ablyazov and Golymzhan Zhakiyanov were
accused of misuse of office and tax evasion, and jailed in 2002. Therefore,
Amnesty International in 2003 declared these two men as the political prisoners
and stated that there was a political repression in Kazakhstan. In July 2004,
the DCK was disbanded. In autumn 2005, Alga (Forward) People’s Party[23]
was established as a successor of the DCK, but this new party was not allowed
to be registered.[24] In addition, the international
observers criticized the 2004 election results. While OSCE was condemning the
results and political suppression upon the opposition, CIS supported Nazarbayev
and defended that there was not any inequality or wrong implemented policy by
the current regime. Instead, CIS blamed the DCK for attempting to create chaos
in the country. The DCK was seen by the CIS like similar movements, causing
colorful revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. However, it was
different in base of its emergence. The economic self-interest pursued by
business elite was a driving factor rather than purposes of transforming
country into an exact pro-Western state and changing its axis as it happened in
Ukraine and Georgia. Both DCK and then
For a Just Kazakhstan movements were supported by OSCE because of undemocratic
suppression and implementation over them.
The
Movement of “For a Just Kazakhstan”
The elite cleavage continued after the DCK experience.
While the DCK was prevented from joining the 2005 presidential elections and
was imposed to many pressure by the ruling elite. Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, in 2004,
resigned from his position in Otan Party and parliamentary speaker, and joined
the new oppositional movement and took the leadership of this opposing
movement.[25]
The new movement’s name was For a Just Kazakhstan and it aimed to continue the
popular wind, created by the DCK regarding the challenge against the ruling
class. The analysis of Barbara and Azamat Junisbai about Tuyakbai’s challenge
is significant to theorize the issue.
“Tuyakbai’s
defection to the opposition, for whatever reason signifies the continuation of
internal and decision within the country’s political elite. Taken together,
these developments suggest that Kazakhstan’s current political evolution is a
direct result of ongoing intra elite competition, which was brought on by the
twin processes of economic liberalization and interest diversification among
the country’s elite.”[26]
Tuyakbai’s and his movement’s aim was to continue the
mission led by the DCK, which was presenting a unified coalition and nominating
a single candidate for the presidential elections. Tuyakbai managed to register
on his third try on August 2005 for the elections. In the formation of the coalition
for his electoral bloc, Communist Party of Kazakhstan, the True Ak Zhol Party (Naghyz
Ak Zhol Party), which was founded by a group including Bulat Abilov, ex-governor
of the National Bank Oraz Kandosov and Altynbek Sarsenbayev, ex minister of
information, who had left Ak-Zhol Party of Alikzhan Baimenov criticizing it of
being puppets of the regime,[27]
and the Alga People’s Party, founded instead of disbanded DCK, participated and
formed a strong coalition.[28] The purposes of For a Just Kazakhstan
were democratization of the political system, election of the governors,
investigation of corruption cases including the family of Nazarbayev and the
fair distribution of the national wealth.[29]
Tuyakbai and his open challenge to the regime by
defending the business elite’s interests displayed his close link with the
oligarchs of the country. He seemed as the representative of business elite
that contradicted with the regime regarding distribution of wealth. For
example, Alikhan Baimenov rejected to participate in Tuyakbai’s bloc by stating
that “The party, Ak Zhol, does not want to be a toy of rich persons.”[30]
In 2005 elections, Nazarbayev became the winner with a tremendous vote
ratio. According to official numbers,
Nazarbayev took 91 percent of the vote and Tuyakbai only took 8 percent of the
vote. The bloc of For a Just Kazakhstan failed in 2005 elections but managed to
challenge the authoritarian regime for the first time in Kazakhstan. The intra
elite cleavage inside the ruling elite frightened the authoritarian regime of
Nazarbayev through that election race. On the other side, Tuyakbai continued
his way by founding a new party after facing so much suppression due to his
leadership of the common bloc, For a Just Kazakhstan. The All-National Social
Democratic Party was established by him and the party aimed to run for seats in
2007 elections. But both Tuyakbai and his supports were imposed to many unlucky
events and pressure before and after the election period.
“In
May, a group of men stormed a For a Just Kazakhstan meeting and threatened to
kill Tuyakbai, who escaped unharmed.”[31]
“In
November 2005, For a Just Kazakhstan member Zamanbek Nurkadilov was found shot
dead in his home, and two nephews of Naghyz Ak Zhol leader Altynbek Sarsenbayev
were beaten by off-duty police officers. As with other inspired political
movements this decade, For a Just Kazakhstan’s leadership suffered under
pressure and intimidation.”[32]
The
Characteristics and Features of Opposition Movements in Other Post-Soviet
Countries and Their Comparison with Kazakh Opposition
In Kyrgyzstan, the opposition emerged with the
spontaneous mass mobilization of dissidents and it developed independently and
outside the control of opposition leaders. Poverty, lack of economic growth,
corruption was basic beneficiary tools for the opposition to mobilize the
masses. In that perspective, Kazakh and Kyrgyz oppositions are different from
each other. Kazakh opposition is more
organized and is strengthened by the independent wealthy leadership which
manages to create a recognizable political platform. The Kazakh opposition has a political agenda
and program proposing a regulation of a new legislation and constitution.[33] Kyrgyz
opposition was constructed through a number of disorganized and competing
opposition camps which lacked a strong leadership. In addition, they do not
have any purpose or program for beyond the change of a regime. Because of
deriving from local scale interests of the regions, they cannot develop a wider
political agenda and the movement remained limited among local elites who merge
for tactical reasons.[34] The
only distinctive side of Kyrgyz opposition than Kazakh one is its success to
mobilize the large number of population and persuade them to demonstrate on the
streets.
There are some common points of the regime changes
which occurred in post-Soviet states: Rose Revolution (2003) in Georgia, Orange
Revolution (2004) in Ukraine, and Tulip Revolution (2005) in Kyrgyzstan. For
example, there were authoritarian regimes, development of civil society, a
major split within the ruling elite, popular discontent caused by
socio-economic factors, delegitimization of the authoritarian regimes in both
of these countries.[35]Some of these factors are valid for
Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states. For example, the existence of
authoritarian regimes and major split within the ruling elite are also valid
for Kazakhstan. The major split within the ruling elite is also dependent on
the existence of authoritarian regime. But, in Kazakhstan the major split within
the major elite is because of macroeconomic development and transition to
liberal economy and early privatization which caused the strengthening of
business elite. In Kazakhstan, there is not so much development of civil
society like in Ukraine and Georgia, and popular discontent because of socio
economic factors like in Kyrgyzstan. The only factor that questionizes the
authority in Kazakhstan is the unpleased business class, known as the
oligarchs.
When we look at the situation in Uzbekistan and the
socio-economic situation in Uzbekistan, it is a bit different from Kazakhstan.
For example, the uprising in Andijon in Uzbekistan is more related to local
economic relations and contradictions in the region rather than politico-
ideological reasons (increase of radical Islam in the region). The growing
wealth of local business class in Fergana region and their rejection to involve
in the system through sharing their wealth with government officials and police
is the basic factor that caused the conflict in the region. The basic features
of the conflict in Uzbekistan is being more local scale and increasing power of
entrepreneurs which were seen as a threat to the monopoly of groups who are
allied with the government in the region. Since national level elites in Uzbekistan
is characterized by their Soviet style homogeneity, the local level increasing
business class was not welcomed well and accepted by the ruling elite. The
distinction between Kazakh opposition backed by macroeconomic level elites and
Uzbek opposition backed by local level elites is that the scale of elite
cleavage in Uzbekistan is local, on the other hand, in Kazakhstan; there is a
conflict among the ruling class and in macroeconomic level. In addition, while
there is an organized political opposition which can make pressure over the
system for systemic democratic reform both in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,
opposition is so weak, popular, spontaneous, disorganized and without a strong
leadership.[36]
In Uzbekistan, there were not any developments about
the government’s attempt for transition to economic liberalization therefore it
seems difficult for a strong opposition to emerge from elite cleavage linking
to macroeconomic reasons.[37] In
comparison with other Central Asian states like Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan is the most developed in the region in terms of political
opposition. However, Kazakh opposition is less lucky than Ukrainian, Georgian
and Kyrgyz oppositions because of not being able to mobilize masses and
demonstrations, in addition, being incapable to take public support. There is
also important deficiency in Kazakh opposition: the absence of NGOs’ influence
in the emergence of opposition. In Georgia and Ukraine, oppositions were backed
by a high level NGO support and Western organizations. The NGO activities and
NGO network is common and strong in Ukraine and Georgia unlike Central Asian
states. Both in Ukraine and Georgia, NGOs, Western influence such as EU or US funding
since the 1990s in these states, dissident TV networks and an elite cleavage in
Ukraine and also lame duck syndrome in their ruling governments directly
influenced the emergence, increase and success of the oppositions. In Kazakh
government, there has not been any lame duck syndrome yet, instead, there is a
strong leadership and powerful ruling circle around him. Foreign influence and
NGO tradition is almost absent and ineffective here.
In terms of the emergence of opposition, the Tajik
opposition[38]
is a bit different from the others in the region. Maybe the Tajik model is the
unique one among others in terms of its characteristics, because it is the most
ideology oriented and legitimizes itself with the ideas of which it is
consisted instead of relying on its legitimacy to wealthy personalities like in
Kazakhstan. It is also within the system officially and was approved by the
ruling government as a legitimate political player in the country.
“Looking
generally at Central Asia, successful opposition parties are few and
far-between. One that may have evolved into more of an idea party rather than
one relying on personalities is the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan
(IRPT). It should be immediately noted that, however, that this party is the
only one of its kind in Central Asia; nowhere else are religion based political
parties allowed to register.”[39]
Nazarbayev’s good relations with Russia through the
CIS and CSTO and with China through SCO help him sustain his regime. His
successful performance regarding his country’s macroeconomic development also
provides him a good deal of credit in the public opinion. The large underground
resources of the country, banking sector, and privatization policies enabled
development and liberalization in economy and this caused the business elite to
begin demanding more fair distribution of wealth and more competitive economic
market and this process directed the business elite to seek their rights and
demands through establishing oppositional movements and challenging the
President and his circle. In Kazakhstan as a prominent state in Central Asia, the
different types of equation emerge in its socio-politic and economic structure.
The liberalization in economy triggers the developments in democracy and
enables the creation of political opposition against the ruling regime. This is
related to the conditions of the country that have formed since its
independence, to the heritage taken from the Soviet era. The system and regime
has been governed and controlled by a group of elite in both bureaucracy and
business. Under these shaped conditions, the only challenge increasing within
the existent system is inside this ruling class. Diversifying economic factors,
disagreement over economic share and demand for more fair economic distribution
are basic determinative factors in the emergence of the split inside the ruling
regime. The opposing element is also a part of the existed ruling system. The
opposition emerges by separating from the ruling system.
The equation for the formation of the opposition:
Conclusion
The method of the development of the opposition and
through that way the development of democracy in Kazakhstan, on the other side,
might be a good model for probable developments and formations of oppositions
in the neighboring countries in Central Asia. Central Asian countries which
have owned their independence for twenty years are new and inexperienced about
both state building and nation building; moreover do not have any idea about
democracy building. Their own conditions somehow enable to create their own
structures. The authoritarian regimes of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan cannot
risk adapting to economic liberalization policies and avoid implementing policies
for transition to macroeconomic level. In that manner, Kazakhstan seems a good
model for both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan which are extremely similar to
Kazakhstan in socio-economic realm.
[1]Antony Clive Bowyer,
“Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008:13.
[2]Ryan
Kennedy, A Colorless Election, The 2005 Presidential Election in Kazakhstan,
and What It Means for the Future of the Opposition, Problems of Post-Communism,
2006:48.
[3]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political
Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies
Program, 2008: 12.
[4]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political
Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies
Program, 2008: 30.
[5]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political Parties in
Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program,
2008: 31.
[6]Barbara Junisbai and
Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic
Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005:
380.
[7]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization,
Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005, 374.
[8]Barbara Junisbai and
Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic
Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”,
DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2005:374.
[9]Ibid,
381.
[10]Ibid, 376.
[11]Ibid, 377.
[12]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization,
Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2005: 383.
[13]Ibid, 383.
[14]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization,
Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005:, 377.
[15]Ibid, 383.
[16]Ibid, 384.
[17]He was
husband of Dariga Nazerbayeva, the daughter of Nazaerbayev. He and his wife
controlled many of the various sectors in Kazakhstan. But, he contradicted with
his father in law. He was accused of being behind a coup plot against
Nazarbayev and he was sent to exile in 2007 and made divorce from his wife. He now
lives in exile in Malta and continues to oppose to his father in law by
criticizing Kazakhstan of human rights violations. His official site is
http://www.rakhat.org/.
[18]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization,
Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2005: 384.
[19]Barbara Junisbai and
Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic
Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”,
DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005: 384.
[20]Barbara Junisbai and
Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic
Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”,
DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2005: 384.
[21]Ibid, 382.
[22]Ibid, 375.
[23]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”,
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008:29.
[25]Barbara Junisbai and
Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic
Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005:
374.
[26]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization,
Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2005: 387.
[27]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political
Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies
Program, 2008: 26.
[28]Ryan Kennedy, A Colorless Election The 2005
Presidential Election in Kazakhstan, and What It Means for the Future of the
Opposition, Problems of Post-Communism, 2006: 48.
[29]Antony Clive Bowyer,
“Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008: 33-34.
[30]Ryan Kennedy, A Colorless Election The 2005
Presidential Election in Kazakhstan, and What It Means for the Future of the
Opposition, Problems of Post-Communism, 2006: 48.
[31]Antony Clive Bowyer, “Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008: 34
[32]Antony Clive Bowyer,
“Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008: 34.
[33]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization,
Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005: 387.
[34]Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, “The
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization,
Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005: 388.
[35]Theodor Tudoroiu, “Rose,
Orange and Tulip: The failed post-Soviet revolutions”, Communist and
Post-Communist Studies, 2007: 336.
[36]Barbara Junisbai and
Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic
Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”,
DEMOKRATIZATSIYA,2005: 388.
[37]Ibid, 389.
[38]Islamic Renaissance Party
of Tajikistan.
[39]Antony Clive Bowyer,
“Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008: 37.
Bibliography
Antony Clive
Bowyer, “Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan”, Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008.
Barbara Junisbai
and Azamat Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in
Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition”,
DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2005.
Ryan Kennedy, A Colorless
Election The 2005 Presidential Election in Kazakhstan, and What It Means for
the Future of the Opposition, Problems of Post-Communism, 2006.
Theodor
Tudoroiu, “Rose, Orange and Tulip: The failed post-Soviet revolutions”,
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2007.
http://www.choicesforkazakhstan.com/2011/11/kazakhstan-made-its-choice-ten-years-ago/
*
Selim Ozturk - Specialist, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities
© 2010, IJORS - INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN STUDIES