ISSN: 2158-7051 ==================== INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN STUDIES ==================== ISSUE NO. 4 ( 2015/2 ) |
THE 2011-2012 ELECTION-RELATED PROTEST MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA AND ITS FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
MAZHID KAT*
Summary
The
2011-2012 protests in Russia were a landmark event. Firstly, these
demonstrations signalized the emergence of a more unified civil society.
Secondly, the Internet was a primary platform for cooperation and coordination among
protesters. Finally, this movement established ties, which can serve as a
network for future mobilization. That is why the Duma related protests had a
great significance. They set up the framework, which will force people to
express disapproval publically in case of future injustice.
Keywords: Russia, protest movement, civil society, the Snow
Revolution.
Introduction
In
December 2011, thousands of people crowded the Bolotnaya square in Moscow. So
did citizens of many other Russian regions. They protested against electoral
fraud during the parliamentary elections held in the same month. This meeting
boosted a popular uprising in Russia, which led to further rallies during the
presidential elections in 2012. These protests, at first glance, were aimed
against vote rigging. However, broadly the main cause of the 2011-2012 meetings
was Putin’s and Medvedev’s second castling. A lot of people disagreed with the cyclical
impasse of the Russian political system development, which is characterized by
a one-party dominated parliament and the unchangeable leadership of Putin.
One of
the underlying reasons for the protest was dissatisfaction with the electoral
system in Russia. In theory, the mechanism of elections is a democratic
feature, used to change the power structure peacefully. However, in Russia the
elective practices are employed not as rules for competition, but as tools of
preserving power by the current authorities (Gel’man,
2012). Elections in Russia became an informal institution of ‘electoral authoritarianism’
(Gel’man, 2012). Therefore, the 2011-2012
demonstrations were addressing the problem of elections and the overall
stagnation of the political rule.
Although
the 2011-2012 movement was the largest in post-Soviet Russia, it disappeared
rapidly after Putin’s re-election. Understanding of its causes and consequences
may show the recent changes in the Russian society and explain how the
contemporary Russian economic and foreign policy crises will change the social
landscape.
The considered election-related movement was a very distinct process
from the previous protest models in Russia, which were characterized by a more
individualized behavior. Except for the 2005 pensioners’ demonstrations against
social benefits being monetized, political participation in Russia has been
characterized by personal grievances and not organized collective actions
(Henry, 2012). Such a model of disapproval expression is quite suitable for the
Russian government because it makes the degree of the social unrest observable.
For example, people address their day-to-day problems directly through the
“Direct Line with Vladimir Putin”. It is an annual TV show where Putin answers
questions from the public spending about 4 hours. This populist type of program
was broadcasted even when Putin was the Prime Minister of Russia.
However, the Bolotnaya and Sakharova squares rallies interrupted such a
conduct. The reason for that is that complaint-making serves as a response to
routine individual injustice, which is relatively low-scaled. At the same
moment, vast demonstrations need people with shared identities that are very
important for social mobilization. Shared identity is a necessary element of
social movements. Collective identities usually arise in the result of shared
perceptions, which underlie social activities and it is not the same as common
ideological commitment (Polletta
& Jasper, 2001). Hence, the 2011-2012 movement was created by a
common affinity on the problem of electoral manipulations, which consolidated
representatives of various political wings: from communists to nationalist (Barry, 2011). Deeper understanding
of identities was suggested by William Gamson who emphasized that social
movements come up in response to injustice frames (Gamson, 1992). Injustice
itself, even if it does not affect people directly, is like a red rag to a
bull. Personal linkage with a particular collectivity is the result of this
group being wronged by the observable object, which can be blamed. Therefore,
collective actions frames are important elements of political consciousness.
The Russian election-related demonstrations in this context attracted lots of
people because electoral fraud was seen as a significant abuse of power by the
top politicians in Russia.
Moreover, Gamson indicated the role of experiential knowledge in linking
perception of injustice and participation in the social movement. Background in
previous protests can make a person more willing to attend new social
movements. In addition, media helps to transfer experiential knowledge from one
individual to another without personal contact making it shared by a larger
amount of people. This idea answers a very important question: why did not mass
protests appeared in Russia before in the same circumstances of injustice. The
explanation is the emergence of new media and different type of protesters in Russia.
Such pro-opposition news resources as the Dozhd channel, Lenta.ru, Slon.ru and
a plenty of Internet bloggers made an important contribution in covering Alexey
Navalny’s and Yevgenia Chirikova’s activities against corruption and authority
abuse in Russia (Osborn, 2011).
To sum up, the 2011-2012 protest movement is a
landmark process because it is the first campaign, which attracted so many
people to public opposition for the government. Unlike pensioners’ movement in
2005, the 2011 Duma related demonstrations were equally composed of different
social groups’ representatives in terms of age, political preferences and
material status (Volkov, 2012).
And most of all, people shared the feeling of being cheated by the government
what determined their identity. This common solidarity served as the basis for
participation of individuals who did not even experience any personal
sacrifices from the 2011-2012 electoral fraud. It reflects one further
difference of the ‘Snow Revolution’ from the previous grievances. In the 1990’s
protests were characterized by material incentives: wages, pensions, social
benefits, student funding. 2000’s – 2010’s demonstrations after major economic
improvements were aimed at issues that are more moral: civil rights,
independent media, freedom of speech. The last protests became more symbolic in
nature and more rights-oriented. The reason for that is the sense of affinity
with other people attending meetings after the parliamentary and presidential
elections. The injustice frames were facilitated by the experiential knowledge
of previous issue or area oriented protesters who established ties empowering
the 2011-2012 anti-fraud movement by the means of new media. Exactly these
connections are the subject for consideration in the next part.
The
importance of experiential knowledge in creating ties expressed by Gamson has
been studied before by some scholars. One of the deepest analysis on this topic
has been done by Mark Granovetter in his article “The Strength of Weak Ties” (Granovetter, 1973). He indicated that the
personal experience on the micro level underlies macro level social activities.
The basis for this interdependence consists of ties between people. Granovetter
distinguished such linkages in strong ties and weak ties. By strong ties is
meant personal contact while weak ties are indirect communication through the
individuals with strong ties. Moreover, weak ties are more important than
strong ties in integrating people into large communities.
In the
context of 2011-2012 protests, these findings bring the idea that many people
gathered on the squares because they were mobilized through weak ties. A wide
range of bloggers in Russia, such as Navalny, Chirikova, Akunin, Kashin, Bykov
and others, have their own communities of supports and followers in different
blogs (Twitter, LiveJournal) and social-network systems (Facebook, Vkontakte). This
core of activists urged their proponents to take part in manifestations against
vote fraud and united them into a larger group, which was the basis for the
election-related social movement. Thus, weak ties played a crucial role in
creating homophily among protesters and establishing a common identity. The
Levada Center report about the 2011-2012 protest movement outlines the existence
of connections and previous experience of interaction between opposition
politicians, civic activists, journalists and cultural figures (Volkov, 2012). It took a long time until these
people established contacts with the wider public and among themselves. That is
an explanation why previous lawlessness in Russia did not attract such a
popular concern.
Overall,
the 2011-2012 campaign was one of the first mass Internet-based protests in
Russia. In this sense, the Arab Spring and the ‘Snow Revolution’ in Russia were
similar in their degree of social mobilization online. The main driving force
of the movement were people from the Runet (Russian Internet) who used their
experiential knowledge and networks of followers to bring together people who
shared the same feeling of being cheated on the elections into public places.
Although the Russian protests in winter and some subsequent
manifestations were significant in scale, they disappeared rapidly from the
political landscape. The reason for that can be explained from different
perspectives. Sidney Tarrow indicated that demobilization of the protest could
be the result of both or either repression and facilitation (Tarrow, 2011).
In such terms, the Russian government reacted by imprisoning some of the
protesters and imposing restrictions on the right for assembly (Balmforth, 2011). Furthermore, the
new regulation of NGOs foreign funding and the Internet censorship was accepted
(Robertson, 2013). At the
same time, some of the protesters’ demands were satisfied. This includes
resignations of Surkov and Gryzlov from their previous positions of the Kremlin
Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the State Duma accordingly. Moreover, the
new extremely liberal legislation on political parties’ registration was
adopted. In addition, regional governors became elected and not appointed by the
President (Robertson, 2013).
An important approach to the analysis of the social movements’
limitations is political opportunity structures. It emphasizes that
institutional system of a particular government and historical constraints
serve as a restricting regulator of the social environment (Kitschelt, 1986). That is why the
ability of social movements to change the structure affects their strategies
and prospects. In case of the Russian protests, this analytical concept may be
used in describing the state’s response to the mass rallies. The government reacted with a crackdown what
reflected the political opportunity structure in Russia. Abuse of power by all
the authorities, including police, was one of the reasons of the protest
movement’s slump. People simply did not believe they could significantly change
the situation due to the ‘Power Vertical’ of Putin, i.e. direct hierarchy of
accountability of all the officials to the President.
Besides, the decline of the 2011-2012 protests can be associated with
the dynamics of international migration in Russia. The important paper on the
similar subject has been written by Albert Hirschman: “Exit, Voice, and the
Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History” (Hirschman, 1993). He argued that
the degree of international migration outflows is interdependent with the
public expression of discontent. Apparently, it seems that the absence of
changes and positive responses to demonstrations can make people more willing
to leave the country. Hirschman modified this idea and added that in GDR in 1980’s
the diminishing pressure on Exit was a signal that the state was becoming less
tough in its responses and facilitated Voice.
However, such a conclusion was relevant to the study of the political
transition from authoritarianism to democracy. That is why such a correlation
is not quite applicable in the framework of the Russian protests. The argument
in favor of such an idea is the data on the international migration in Russia.
The amount of people leaving the country after a gradual fall during the 2000’s
was followed by a significant increase from 2011 to 2013 reaching the peak in
2014 (Federal State Statistics Service). In the absence of other noticeable
explanations, such as unemployment, which has decreased for the last 5 years,
emigration can be considered as an answer for the protest movement weakening and
a direct numerical interdependence proves it (Trading Economics).
The explanation of protests appearance lies in the sense of injustice on
the issue of electoral fraud during the 2011 Duma elections and subsequent
political developments, which include Putin’s come back. Nevertheless, the
feeling of unfair treatment itself is not enough to bring people to the
streets. That is why the role of experiential knowledge and new media is worth
considering. The background of previous movements and the network of weak ties by
the means of social media facilitated participation in the election-related
movement.
Although the manifestations were significant in scale, their influence
on the Russian political system was minor. This outcome can be described from
different viewpoints. Firstly, the structure of power distribution in Russia is
characterized by the unlimited authority of ‘siloviki’ and the President who
appoints all the high-level judges in Russia (The Constitution of the Russian
Federation, Article 128). Such a governmental system retains little space for
changes and a few political opportunities for social movements. That is why the
anticipated reaction of the Russian political regime was repression. Increased
constraints forced many people to leave the country what is indicated by
significantly growing emigration from Russia.
Another problem of the 2011-2012 protests is that they were not
supported by larger masses of people. The image of the 1917 revolution and 1991
collapse of the USSR is successfully used by the Russian officials in forming
the public mind against major transformations of the current social status quo.
The contemporary social contract in Russia has been based on the non-interference
of large masses into the sphere of politics in exchange for material prosperity.
Such a trade-off can be describe by a phrase: who cares if they cheat, life is
getting better. This informal agreement characterized the first reign of Putin
and worked in cooling down the 2011-2012 waves of discontent. However, the
worsening economic situation in Russia can make more citizens wiling to protest
because the degree of corruption and inefficiency of government instructions
will be more noticeable.
To cut it short, the year
2011 was a turning point in the Russian protest life. Unprecedented before
developments were a signal that the society has changed and there is no way
back. The established network of protesters can make sure that further issues
will not be neglected. Therefore, it represents an unparalleled challenge for
the Russian government. The election-related protests were only the first step
in the long way. Before authoritarian regimes are overthrown, a number of
failed attempts should be carried out (Bunce, &
Wolchik, 2011).
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*Mazhid
Kat - is an MA student in International Political Economy
at King’s College London. His research interests include the political economy
of the Middle East and the Post-Soviet region e mail: maxkat66@gmail.com
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