ISSN: 2158-7051 ==================== INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN STUDIES ==================== ISSUE NO. 4 ( 2015/2 ) |
RUSSO-BALTIC RELATIONS AFTER THE SOVIET UNION
RABİA ARABACI KARİMAN*
Summary
From the very beginning of the Soviet regime,
Baltic states had a different place and issue in the Russian agenda. They had
reacted harshly Soviet practices although they have some inevitable links with
Russia from the political, commercial, sociological points of views. Unlike
other Soviet republics, these states are members of NATO and the European
Union. These affiliations have added some new dynamics in the relationships
that are worthwhile to scrutinize. The study tries to trace the causes of concerns
and interests of the Russia- Baltic relations.
Keywords: Russia, Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Soviet Union,
Post-Soviet Era, European Union, NATO.
Introduction
I
prefer to study on this issue for tracing the legacies of the Soviet regime by
taking Baltic states that are on the verge of the Europe. Unlike Central Asian
republics under the Soviet rule, they were able to build their states and
nations in more accurate way. They did
not embrace strong political figure, in other terms, one-man rule, rather they
adopted parliamentary democracy after the fall of the Soviet Union. That’s why,
I think that Baltic states must be in detailed analysed in order to stabilize
and consolidate the Russian and Baltic transformation process.
The
article firstly and briefly overview the commonalities and differences of three
Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. At the same time, from the
sociological, economic and more importantly demographical points of views, it
gives some different tendencies among three Baltic states. Then, it is vital to
examine the short history of Baltic states from the very beginning of the
Soviet rule and German experience on the territory. Hre, it can be argued that
they declared their independence for a short time by taking the opportunity of
turmoil in the Soviet Union and Germany. In fact, the period determined the
following developments in the countries that pave the way for real independence
after the fall of the Soviet Union. These parts of the study can be regarded as
first phases of the maturation that would consolidate through the membership in
NATO and the European Union. In this stage, we must consider other elements in
the Russia- Baltic relations such as Russian minority in the Baltic, commercial
ties, administrative rearrangements thanks to European Union. The study will seek to cover all milestones
which have leave marks on the agenda in past and today, even future. And
finally, the study will combine all important data which are acquired in the
paper in an attempt to find out the facts in politics and attitudes.
Commonalities and Differences
There
were some remarkable peculiarities of the Baltic states as compared the other
Soviet republics. They were not exposed direct military attack or provocation
by Russia, more accurately, Russia’s eschewal from intervention in contrary to
as it did in some Soviet Union republics, such as Caucasus, Moldova
differentiates the Baltic countries from the others which had experienced the
Soviet period. Moreover, the three Baltic states have unique language and
culture, they had an interwar period of independence movements during the
Gorbachev period. Also they have advanced impressively toward strong
parliamentary democracy.[1]
Likewise, this peculiarity set apart the Baltic countries from other Soviet
republics which adopted strong presidential regime around a commanding
political figure in Central Asian states after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. For these reason, Russia has paid utmost importance to the region both
in past and future. It will be probable to attach importance to the region
future. These peculiarities and its geographical location on the verge of
Europe draw all attention towards three Baltic states.
Since
the very beginning of the emergence of the Soviet Rule, Baltic countries
followed a different path from the other components of the Soviet Union. Their
cultural values, nation-building structure and European dimensions are some of
the various aspects of the three Baltic countries. The three Baltic countries
and Poland were sticking point between Germany and the Soviet Union.
Today,
the stability of the region is vital for the Western Europe as well as Central
and Eastern Europe. As it was in the past, these states have experienced Soviet
tradition on one hand, European values on the other one. “In the recent stormy
years and perhaps even more so in recent months, the future of the three Baltic
Republics, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, has been causing deep concern to
those dealing with and responsible for the establishment of international
peace, lasting friendly relations, and collaboration at the end of this war
between the great western democracies, on one side, and the great Soviet
totalitarian State, on the other”[2].
The
Soviet legacy became a sensitive issue for these states for their future after
their independences. The point here is that as being components of the former
Soviet Union republics, the Baltic countries desire to keep themselves out of
the Russian control and they did not prefer to be member of the Commonwealth of
Independent States because of the hatred their Union-membership in Soviet
period. As the other hot issue in the Russia-Baltic relations, considering
remarkable number of native Russian people in Baltic countries, especially in
Estonia and Latvia obliged to Russia to protect them against titular people and
Russian political figures have claimed that they had naturally right to
interfere the ingenious policies on citizenship through the near abroad policy
which means major neighbour country Russia have still adopted the region as
sphere of influence. For Baltic countries,
this attitude is contrary to the desire of being independent from Russian
influence and hegemony.
There
have been some outcrying issues in the relations between Russia and Baltic
countries, the installation of Russian troops and Russian authority regards the
withdrawal of these troops as a bargaining chip in order to get greater
political rights for the Russian minority in the Baltics.[3] Likewise, after the fall of the Soviet Union,
two Baltic countries in which most Russian minority have resided passed
important legislative acts favouring rights of homeland-titular nations rather
than those of the Russian. I mean that they introduced political and electoral
rights stipulating proficiency in state language policies.[4] It
can be claimed that these policies were against the Russian people in Estonia
and Latvia. Particularly, for most Estonians, the collapse of the Soviet Union
brought an opportunity to restore and secure the linkage between their cultural
identity and the state, that is, an opportunity to ‘Estonise’ the state they
live in by means of citizenship and language policies.[5] More accurately, the policies serve the
purpose of excluding Russian people who have resided in Baltic countries since
the Soviet era and depriving them from citizenship and electoral rights as an
indication of feeling of mistrust. These problematic issues heightened the
tension and antagonism against Russian hegemonic desire on the Baltic
population. Especially after the Soviet occupation on the Baltics in 1940-1991,
they began to build their national identities on rejection of Russian dominance
and humiliation of Russia as “non-European state which has repeatedly colonized
its weaker European neighbours”[6] They
have fostered to form their identities around common Russian opposition but
common values around Europeanness. In spite of all differences in three states,
all of them achieved to form common identity around Western values and norms.
In the wake of greater enlargement of the European Union in 2004, the identity
formed around Europeanness and dynamics of the relations with Russia will be in
detailed scrutinized in the following parts of my study as member of the
European Union.
After
the Communist rule, the Baltic states content with some hardships such as
lacking their own political, economic, diplomatic institutions inherited by the
Soviet administrative apparatus. In fact, they had lacked their own
institutions as a constituent of Soviet Union, but these institutions were orchestrated
by the Moscow as departments of the ‘All Union’ ministries were solely
appendage of the real conductor. For that reason, each institution had to be
constructed largely from scratch.[7] This
administrative system will have converted into new management model as I will
examine in the following part of my study.
Meanwhile,
Russian government could not far away from the transformation process of the
Baltic states via European Neighbourhood Policy. As for the identity formation
around the triangle of European, Baltics and Russian formations, it can be
argued that European Neighbourhood Policy which aims at creating and promoting
prosperity and stability and clinging to European values in the eastern part of
the Union converged on the Baltics with Russian “Near Abroad Policy” which connotes
prolonged Russian influence by regarding Russian minority in other countries as
Russian political appendage. Within the Soviet period, Russian-speaking
minorities in Estonia and Latvia were so high that forty-eight percent of the
Latvian population and forty percent of Estonian population were non-titular
population[8] while
this ratio was not so high in Lithuania according to census conducted in 1989.
In this respect, although Russians live all around the world, the Russians
living in the post-Soviet space are singled out and they are the ones who need
to be defended.[9]
Between two different path followed by two different international actor as the
European Union on the one hand and the Russian Federation on the other, the
Baltic countries led to a stalemate. But, in reality, as I have mentioned before,
Russia has adopted different attitude towards the three Baltic countries by
being solemn for Baltic policies. But, it different manner of attitude does not
show the inferiority of them on Russian political agenda, on the contrary, it
asserted the inevitable place of them in burning problems in today’s Russian
political and military security.
Frankly,
it prioritizes the strategic location of the countries since they are seen as
exit point to Baltic Sea and gates towards to the core of the Europe. For that
reason, Russia preferred to take initiative in Baltic affairs by declaring its
concerns on energy, security policies and minority issues in an attempt to
impede the accession process of these states in international organizations
that would pose worrisome threats against Russian sphere of influence. By and
large, one of the fundamental underlying causes of the Russia-Baltic states is
the overdependence of the Baltics on Russian economic inputs and Russian gas as
in the case of the European Union, today. Yet, I will not deeply examine the
economic dependency of Russo-Baltic relations so that not get off the general
course. Rather I will convey some general situation about energy and economy
field since these are far-reaching issues that must be in detailed handled
separately in other study. For that reason, I would like to narrow my focus on
heated topics such as minority issues, the European Union and NATO enlargement
and their repercussions on Russia-Baltic relations.
Up
to now, the article tried to briefly evaluate the lingering agonies in the
Russia- Baltic relations. Before coming to the point, it is vital to look at the
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and taking the facts into account from the historical
point of view.
Three
Baltic Countries: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
History
in Brief
Up
to 1918, three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, were parts of the
Russian Empire, then they became a part of the Russia in 1940. The invasion can
be seen as the first Soviet invasion. In fact, they were exposed to Russian
invasion for two times and German invasion for ones. For three Baltic
countries, the year of 1917 signalled an opportunity for independence. I mean
that Russia strove hard to consolidate power after the Bolshevik rule and
German defeat in the World War I granted the opportunity for the Baltic
countries. The international arena was suitable and fruitful for such an act.
They
were able to manage putting some concrete steps in internal affairs.Although
they were able to make progress in some fields such as land distribution,
education cultural autonomy for minorities, they were not able to manage to
find effective solution for their nations’ security.[10] By
1920, a "cordon sanitaire," as established by the Western Powers[11] in
order to draw a line and hinder the expansion of the Soviet Communism through
the Eastern and Central Asia.
Another
important date for them was the August 23, 1939 when Ribbentrop- Molotov Pact
was signed by the Russia and Germany. The
world was stunned by the announcement of a Soviet-Nazi pact of "neutrality
and non-aggression" on August 23.[12]
In line with this Pact, two parties would be neutral in case of an
attack or threat posed against one of two countries. And more strikingly the
eastern half of Poland and the three Baltic Republics, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia were under the influence of the Soviet Union. By doing so, Poland,
Finland and three Baltic states were divided between two major powers. Before
Soviet Russia was forced into this war by Hitler's unprovoked attack, the
Soviet Russia had converged on the division of the region with Germany by which
Germany recognized Soviet Russia's annexation of the Baltic States and the
eastern part of Poland, while Soviet Russia recognized Germany's incorporation
of Memel into the Reich and the annexation of the remaining part of Poland[13] Through this Pact, Soviet Russian was granted some
important opportunities what it wanted to do in the region. Furthermore,
important privileges of Russian deployment on garrisons and air bases were given
to Soviet Russia through a series of treaties with the Baltic States. In 1940, pro-Soviet governments were
installed and as part of the Soviet Union, newly-elected parliaments of three
Baltic countries applied for becoming parts of the Union as Estonian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic and Lithuanian Soviet
Socialist Republic. Yet, Nazi Germany could not prepare to sacrifice the Baltic
States to the Soviet rule. For that reason, the region was under the Nazi
invasion between 1941-1944. But three countries were preoccupied by the Soviet
Union in 1944. From then on, they were ruled by the Moscow rule to their
independences.
The Baltic States as Soviet Republics
The
brief scrutiny on the history of the Baltic states prove us the importance of
the Baltic states for major powers. The geography have witnessed the fervent
ambitions of Germany and the Soviet Union. Especially, the Soviet experience
made mark on the past and fate of three states. In this part, the article will
handle some of the Soviet practices by taking some outstanding political
figures both in Moscow rule and Baltic states. It will seek to find out to what
extent the Communist rule could manage to consolidate its regime and by which
means local people reacted against them.
The
Baltic region was located on the target path of the Soviet expansion by
spreading the Russian Revolution through the Western countries. Likewise, the
Baltic was seen as barrier against Soviet expansion through the core of the
Europe. Under the auspices of some pro-Soviet spear heads, such as Colonel
Jukums Vācietis, Pēteris Stučka, Jēkabs Peters, Augusts Voss from Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania formed the backbones of the Soviet repercussions in three
Baltic countries in addition that they tried to lay the foundations Bolshevik
regime in Russia. These political figures held the authority and carried out
the orders of the Moscow rule as each of them to be loyal to Russification
policy in Baltic countries for a long time. Alongside of the Russification
process as it did in other Union republics, linguistic policies were tried to
be carried out although the Baltic countries were unduly attached to their own
traditions and language. As Augusts Voss, Communist Party first secretary,
stated: “ Everywhere people very much strive for mastering for Russian
language, and this striving manifests itself more and more widely. Therefore
the party organizations and Soviet bodies constantly have to see to it that all
conditions are created to satisfy the wish, which in our country is caused by
the objective logic of the building of communism.”[14]
As
for the Soviet policies on the Baltic region, it is vital to grasp the extent
and impact on the local peoples. Frankly, confiscation of lands and restricted
lands to be left for private ownership was directly contrary to the Baltic
dream of every peasant owning his own family farm.[15] This
agrarian policy induced the low level of production, but in the aftermath of
Stalin rule, economic central structure was loosened through the political thaw
and this policy resulted in increase in agricultural production in the Baltic
countries even if Union republics had to adhere to rules of the Moscow based
State Planning Committee. In fact, this economic thaw for farmers was not only
vital for their survival, but also creates an autonomous space for them in the
Soviet system.[16]
The
Communist reality in the Baltic countries entered a new period with
Khrushchev’s authority in the center after the suffocating practices of Stalin.
Concretely, nationalized banks and industry, Soviet practices on monetary
policies of the Baltic states in the very beginning of the Soviet rule.
However, Khrushchev period was associated with the Sovnarkhoz system that
brought about territory-based economic management. Henceforth, for instance,
control of 80 percent of Estonia’s industry passed to a Regional Economic
Council, whereas previously three quarters of enterprises had been in the hands
of sectoral ministries in Moscow.[17] That
course reversed again by Brezhnev in 1964. The Moscow rule continued to regard
the Baltic countries as laboratory for their economic experiments, by the end
of 1960s, it paved the way for increasing income for the Baltic countries than
other Soviet countries.
According to
western authors, Baltic countries were” helpless victims of Soviet expansionism
...which ...had no alternative but to submit.”[18]
In
sociological terms, the first years of the Soviet rule marked a quiet number of
deportations of people suspected of being opponent to Soviet rule. Roughly,
39.000 Lithuanian, 35.000 Latvian and 61.000 Estonian citizens were deported in
1940-1941. These numbers did not cover those of imprisoned people.[19] Although
imprisonment on political grounds continued until the 1980s, the number of
arrests was on a much diminished scale: tens of individuals annually in each
Baltic republic, rather than thousand arrests.[20]
However, within the thaw period of Khrushchev those deported people were
allowed to go back even if they were not able to return their home in 1950s.
All
in all, these states were imposed by the Soviet regime, but their Soviet legacy
has not easily lost its influence. For the statements by the Russian
government, the current dispute between Russia and the Baltic states is whether
the Baltic countries voluntarily joined the Soviet Union or not in 1940s.
According to Russian government, these states invited Soviet troops to occupy
their territory at the beginning of the I940s. On the other hand, three states
blamed on Russian government since it did not apologize for the crimes in the
Soviet periods as a successor of the Soviet Union. Yet, Moscow did not come to
terms with any responsibility for that period. They declared that post-Soviet
Russia should not be held accountable for the crimes of the Soviet regime.[21]
Post-Soviet
Era, New Tendencies towards the European Union
In
this part of the study, it will seek to find to find path followed by the three
Baltic countries towards the European Union as democratic league after the
coercive and central Soviet regime. It will try to cover to what extent the
dynamics of the legacies of the Soviet regime had stamp its imprint on the
region and to what aspects these mixture of legacies will play important role
in the fate of three countries. Naturally, it will be paid utmost attention to
Russia-Baltic relations regarding Western affiliations of these countries. The
part will firstly cover the changing atmosphere in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania within the European Union. Administrative reform process and breaking
old structure will be examined by regarding commonalities and differences in
that process. Concomitantly, in what aspects these changing dynamics have left
its mark on Russia-Baltic relations.
Membership
negotiations were began with firstly Estonia, and then with Latvia and Lithuania
and completed in 2002. Moreover, all three Baltic states gradually continued to
adapt the European legal and political system in that process. As for the
reactions from Russia on this new enlargement process, one can claim that the
European Union was considered as economic union rather than security
organization that would pose threat to Russia as in the case of NATO. Along these lines, Russian thought that the
circumstances of the Russian-speaking people residing in the Baltic countries
would be altered and ameliorated through regulations on language and
citizenship issues. In fact, the Russian-speaking people were more enthusiastic
for the European Union membership as compared to titular people in the Baltic. The
Baltic states can thus become some kind of bridge between Europe and Russia, contributing
to the integration of Russia with Russia.[22]
Although
Russian political figures declare that they have right to protect the Russian
people in the Baltic states through near abroad policy, the underlying cause of
this interventionist declarations demonstrate that they have still see the
region as Russia’s sphere of influence. Furthermore, hawkish declarations on
NATO enlargement towards the Baltics by Russian politicians have been issued in
mid-1990s. In a similar vein, same political stance has been continued ever
since through the National Security Concept in 2000. On the other hand, threat
perception calmed when presumptive membership to the European Union and the NATO.
As in Eastern Europe countries, the Baltic countries regarded this improvement
as “return to the West”. EU referendum conducted in 2003 forced people to
prefer one of these two options, namely being members of the Western organizations,
affiliation to these Western organizations or being perpetually dependent on
Russia.[23]
All
three states desire to get rid of the Soviet legacy and alter their courses
towards the Western world. Three Baltic countries have disposed to realize
reforms somewhat similar ways. In line with this aim, they began to change
their public administrative structure in the second half of the 1990s. It means
to get rid of entrenched Communist nomenclature in the system. They have
themselves to New Public Management (NPM) Movement and also established
institutions for new system rather than old Soviet bureaucracy. In spite of all
efforts, some realities cannot be underestimated in order to fully cover the
issue. Namely, for instance in Lithuanian case, new direction towards to the
European Union cannot be easily determined because of the high-dependency on
Russian energy, trade and also it had to struggle against corruption in living
up the requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria. With a view to overcome this problem,
Lithuania cooperated with Poland which has important links with the major
European countries, such as French and Germany. Like in the Lithuanian case,
Latvia, which was the most industrialized republic in the Soviet Union,
unfortunately highly depended on Russia trade and raw materials. As for the
Estonian case, it enthusiastically tried to apply European rule in transforming
its public administrative and economical sector unlike other two Baltic
countries did because it seemed more eager to adapt the European Union against
probable threat posed by Russia.[24]
As
for Russia-Baltic relations, one can argue that Russia had to change its
course, the policies towards the Baltic countries after their independence and
their affiliations to key international organizations and also as Russia loses
its superior power and being a regional power, it has become an obligation
rather than a preference. Yet Russia acquired something vital for Baltic
policies and European Union. Blatantly, energy issue has been used as a trump
card by Russia against Baltic countries and accordingly against the European
Union. By doing so, increasing the dependence of the Baltic on Russia would be
useful for Russian ambitions on Baltic and bargaining power in world politics.
Overtly, Russia regards the countries as pawn and agent in the Euro-Atlantic
institutions leaving the Baltic states weak, isolated and subservient
neighbours, maintained as peripheral players inside NATO and the European
Union.[25] What
the membership of the Baltic countries accounts for Russia? In practical terms,
rules and regulation of the European Union would put some restrictions on
Russian influence on the region regarding trade because of EU market
regulations and visa requirements for Russian people.
Whatever the future path taken, Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania have experienced a more profound process of
democratization and are, since May 2004, members of the European Union.[26]
Post-Soviet
Era, New Tendencies towards the NATO
Here,
the article will try to elaborate the NATO expansion in the Baltic countries
and by which means and what aspects this issue forms one of the backbones of
Russia- Baltic relations. To attain this aim, it will handle the accession
process of these three states into the organization as a security union. This
part explores the impacts of Baltic membership in NATO.
The
scheduled withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Baltic expedited the
normalization process in the region after the Soviet rule. As in the case of
European Union, they had to modernize their militaristic capacities from the
scratch to live up to standards of NATO forces. As I mentioned before, they had
no capacity for military or police apparatus since the Soviet period.
With
regard the attitudes of the people of Baltic states, public support for NATO
membership is also strong in all three countries. In Latvia, a poll taken in December 2002 showed
that 68.5 percent of the population supported membership in NATO. Polls in Estonia consistently show support
for NATO running about 70 percent, while those in Lithuania indicate that over
75 percent of the population support Lithuania’s membership in NATO.[27]
The first thing to say is Russia did not
assess and look optimistically the NATO expansion towards the Baltic as it did
in European Union enlargement. For Russia, NATO was found against Russia and
suspicious attitude toward this organization may continue to occupy the agenda
in Russia-the West relations and Russia-the Baltic states relations unless it
convert into a political organization rather than a security one. In that vein, according to some authors, accession
of the Baltic states to NATO should be a step for both the Europe and Russia
for transformation, promotion of democracy and it may pave the way for
conversion into political organization from a security organization. The delicate
process has to be run by the Western authority. In attain to this aim and in
order to create more stable foreign policy in Baltic and narrow the Russia’s
maneuver, it would be plausible to invite all three Baltic states together to
be new members in the 2002 summit in Prague.[28]
In
fact, NATO was reluctant for the Baltic states to be members of the
organization because of the fear of touching the interests of Russia in the
region. However, the security and entry into the organization had to be
prioritized by the Western authorities regardless of the Russian concerns. But,
as the time went on, NATO and Baltic states launched some attempts with a view
to calm Russian concern. Namely, they declared that it would not deployed any
nuclear weapons or troops in the region unless there is threat perception in
Baltic region.
At
the end of the day, three Baltic states affiliated NATO on the March 29, 2004.
This development has a broad repercussion in Russian government. I mean that
some governmental authorities state that they have to rethink the Russian foreign
policy and deploy Russian troops in the region in order to assure the security
of the Russian borders. In fact, Russia would use its card against especially
Estonia and Latvia in which host quite number of Russian minority by putting
their minority rights forward on the NATO-Baltic relations as in the European
Union-Baltic relations. In that sense, it can be said that Russia did not admit
the entry of Baltic states in NATO, yet it took the advantage of blackmailing
these states. However, today, three Baltic states have been able to adapt their
electoral and citizenship laws in accordance with the European Union
norms. Again, today, what is more to the
point here is that Russian minority see their future in European Union and
NATO, rather than under the surveillance of Russia. It fetters the Russian
ability to use Russian minority issue in Baltic agenda.
Indeed, one
cannot deny the inevitability of the Baltic states in European and Russian
security in case of probable insecurity would pose threat against other littoral
states in the region and whole Europe. For that reason, Russia and three states
share a responsibility in protecting stability.[29]
“Conversely, the
preservation of their non-bloc status (and this does not necessarily mean
neutrality) would be able to create a basis for bilateral and unilateral steps,
and quite concrete ones, capable of dispelling the apprehension for security
which is still lingering in the Baltic states.”[30]
In
a nutshell, the Baltic states have determined their path toward the West by
affiliating NATO in 2003, and the European Union in 2004. Although, Russian
concerns and desire of influence cause some disturbances on three states, they
are able to make progress in their administrative and militaristic apparatus.
These positive developments have brought about a variety of alleviations of
violations in minority rights and also transformation in public administrative
and legal system.
Conclusion
Nowadays,
the Baltic states think that they have returned the home as the other Eastern
bloc countries did. They see the Soviet period as scourge of God for two times.
In contrast, Russian governmental authorities declared in some statements as if
they are still under Russian sphere of influence. Furthermore, as I mentioned
in my study, they expressed that Soviet invasion was voluntarily invited by the
Baltic states. In fact, this contradiction show us the desire of independence
of the Baltic states from the very beginning of the Russian Empire and the
Soviet rule. And it also shows the stubbornness of the Russian authority in
foreign policy for the Baltic states. Russia adopts plausible policies against
trends in which Russia itself does not involve. Namely, for Russia, whatever
and whoever plays his card on the region, Russia gets suspicious about
different political configurations. These obsessive attitudes pave the way for
taking Russian concerns into account by the European Union and more importantly
for NATO. Under these circumstances, one cannot imagine unilateral foreign
policy in the region. Rather, it is plausible to foresee and conduct
multilateral foreign policy by involving Baltic states, the European Union,
NATO, and surely Russia. Recent developments in the region have demonstrated
the concerns of Russia as in the case of deployment of the missile shield on
the verge of Europe neighbouring Russia. This is just one of numerous examples
in that issue.
Even
if Baltic states do not remind the Soviet past, relationship between Russia and
Baltic states have been on the brink of transformation and two parties can not
sacrifice and ignore the interests of each other. All they need to do is to
draw the priorities of their foreign policy titles and keeping the stability of
their region for their mutual aim.
[1]Garnett, Sherman W., “Europe’s Crossroads: Russia and the West in the New
Borderlands”, The New Russian Foreign Policy, Ed. Michael Mandelbaum, New York;
Council on Foreign Relations , 1998, pp. 79
[2]Rabinavicius,
Henrikas., “The Fate of the Baltic Nations”, Russian
Review, vol.3, no.1, 1943, pp.34
[3]Donaldson , Robert H., Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring
Interests.New York: M.E.Sharpe. 2005, pp. 223-224
[4]Smith,
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[5]Aalto,
Pami., Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia, London and New York;
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[6]Sacevskis , K., “Towards a Post-Colonial Perspective on the Baltic States”, Journal of Baltic Studies, vol.33, no.
1, pp.37-56
[7]Lieven,
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[8]Pikayev, Alexander A., “Russia and the Baltic States: Challenges and
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[9]Fofanova, Elena and Viatcheslav Morozov., “Imperial Legacy and the
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[11]Vakar,
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[12]Chamberlin, William Henry., “Seven Phases of Soviet Foreign Policy”, Russian Review, vol.15, no. 2, 1956,
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[13]Rutenberg, Gregory., “the Baltic States and the Soviet Union”, The American Journal of International Law,
vol.29, no. 4, 1935, pp. 598
[14]Bleiere,
Diana., et al., History of Latvia: the
Twentieth Century, Riga; Jumava, 2006, pp. 526
[15]Kasekamp, Andreas., A History of the Baltic
States, New York; Palgrave Macmillan,2010, pp.101
[16]Mincyte, Diana., “ Everyday Environmentalism: The Practice, Politics, and Nature
of Subsidiary Farming in Stalin’s Lithuania”, Slavic Review, vol.68, no. 1,
2009, pp.31-49
[17]Smith, David J., Artis Pabriks, Aldis Purs and Thomas Lane. The Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, London; New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 38-39
[18]Lehti,
Marko., A Baltic League as a Construct of the New Europe, Envisioning
a Baltic Region and Small State Sovereignty in the Aftermath of the First World
War, Frankfurt: European University Studies, 1999, pp. 141
[19]Misiunas, Romuald J., Rein Taagepera. The Baltic States, Years of
Independence 1940-1980, Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1983, pp. 41
[20]Pabriks, Artis; Purs, Aldis. Latvia: The Challenges of Change.London;
New York: Routledge, 2001, pp.36-40
[21]Kramer,
Mark., NATO, the Baltic States and Russia: A Framework for Sustainable
Enlargement, International Affairs,
vol.78, no.4, pp. 731-756
[22]Oldberg, Ingmar, “Russia’s Baltic Policy in an Era of EU Integration”, Security
Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc , Ed. Graeme P. Herd and Jennifer D.P.
Moroney, London and New York; Routledge, 2003, pp. 58
[23]Budryte, Dovile., Taming Nationalism? Political Community Building in the Post-Soviet
Baltic States, Burlington; Ashgate, 2005, pp. 88
[24]Granqvist, Eva and Emma Wallin., “Opening up for Change: modernizing public
administration in the Baltic states”, The Euroepan Union and the Baltic States;
Changing forms of governance. Ed. Bengt Jacobsson, London and New York; Routledge, 94-95
[25]Sleivyte, Janina., Russia’s European Agenda and the Baltic States, London and
New York; Routledge, 2010, pp.196
[26]Uhlin,
Anders., Post-Soviet Civil Society; Democratization in Russia and the Baltic
States, London and New York; Routledge, 2006, pp. 1
[27]Testimony
presented to the United States Senate Committe on Foreign Relationson April 3,
2003
Larrabee, Stephen F., “The Baltic States and NATO
Membership”
[28]Mihkelson, Marko, “Russia’s Policy toward Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the
Baltic States”, Toward an Understanding of Russia; New European Perspectives,
Ed. Janusz Bugajski, New York; The Concil on Foreign Relations, 2002, pp. 113
[29]Blank, Stephen., “Russia, NATO Enlargement, and the Baltic States”, World Affairs, vol.160, no. 3, 1998, pp. 116
[30]Ibid,
pp. 118
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*Rabia Arabaci Kariman - Graduate Student in Eurasian Studies at Middle East Technical University (TURKEY), Assistant Legislative Expert at Turkish Grand National Assembly e mail: Rabiaarabaci86@gmail.com
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