ISSN: 2158-7051 ==================== INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN STUDIES ==================== ISSUE NO. 4 ( 2015/2 ) |
Imperial Powers’ policy and nationalisms in the South Caucasus, 1917-1921
MAXIME GAUIN*
Summary
Caucasus is
traditionally an area disputed between Empires and presenting an exceptional
density of ethnic and national groups. However, in its contemporary history, the
period 1917-1921 presents a clear originality, especially for the South
Caucasus. Since the first decades of the 19th Century, the South
Caucasus was under Russian control,[1]
and served as a basis for the Tsar’s ambitions to the free seas, against the Ottoman
Empire and Iran, for instance during the war of 1877-1878, when Russia took
Batum, Kars and Ardahan to the Ottoman Empire.[2]
These ambitions were decisive in the outbreak of the First World War, as Sean
McMeekin conclusively demonstrated,[3]
but this war led to the collapse of the Tsarist regime,[4]
raising the national ambitions, particularly in the south Caucasus. This
parenthesis was closed by the re-conquest of this region by Communist Russians
in 1921. During this short but dense period, there is a particular articulation
between the emerging nation-states, who cannot achieve their goals of national
independence alone, and the imperial powers. Imperial policy is indeed far from
disappearing during this time, even is some actors are eliminated in 1918 (Germany),
if new ones appear (U.S.) and one changes of status (the Turks, who led an
Empire until 1918, became a nation-state during the war of independence).
The question
analyzed in this paper is: how and why the articulation between national
ambitions and imperial designs (except the one of Russia) failed—why did the
south Caucasus passed from White Russia to Red Russia?
The final Ottoman-Russian clash (1917-1918)
A) Russian ambitions
At the
beginning of 1917, Russian army was planning an offensive to Sivas and Ankara
and another one to Istanbul. They also asked, as they did in 1915 and 1916, a
landing from Cyprus to Iskenderun or Mersin. Since there was no available
troops from France or Britain, London asked Japan,[5]
but the Japanese government declined, as he did for virtually all the similar
demands in the past. Russians were encouraged by the capture of Bagdad by the
British army in March 1917. The Liberal revolution the same month was the
beginning of the end, but not everybody accepted this sudden change easily.
Pavel Miliukov, a leader of the Kadets, stated in March 1917 that it would be
“absurd and criminal to renounce to the biggest prize of the war […] in the
name of some humanitarian and cosmopolitan idea of international socialism.”
The new government himself continued the preparations to take Istanbul in
Spring and Summer 1917—but postponed the projects of offensive to Anatolia,
because of the mutinies and more generally the exhaustion of Russia. Even after
the Bolshevik revolution (who, at the very beginning, controlled only
St-Petersburg and Moscow), White Russians did not want to lose the Caucasus.[6]
As we will see, it diminished the capacity of the new independent Republics to
resist the Communists.
Precisely,
the Bolsheviks themselves, if they officially repudiated the “imperialistic
claims,” if they took power largely because of their proclaimed aim to end the
war quickly, and if they actually postponed to undetermined future to conquest
of Istanbul, they were not quite excited by the perspective of giving back the
parts of eastern Anatolia conquered by the Tzar’s army 1915-16—still less
Batum, Kars and Ardahan—to the Turks or Georgia to the Mensheviks. And above
all, the Russian Communists, not unlike White Russians, did not want to lose
the oil fields of Baku. Oil only gained importance during the war, including in
Russia, where the shortage of coal led many companies to pass to oil. That is
why they played the Armenian card against both Turks in eastern Anatolia (especially
by a decree guarantying the “right of self-determination” for the Turkish
Armenians and allowing the formation of an Armenian militia) and Azeris in Baku,
not unlike the Tsar. However, unlike the Tsar, the Bolsheviks were aware of the
weakness of their regime and were ready to use territories in exchange of peace
if they had no other choice. Indeed, the German advance in Russia itself and
Ukraine, especially the German troops dangerously close to St-Petersburg, and
also the eventual Ottoman advance in 1918, led the Communist Russians to
certain prudence[7]—even
more after the Entente’s interventions, in Autumn 1918.[8]
For the short term, the survival of the “proletarian revolution” was their top
priority.
B) Armenian ambitions
The Armenian
nationalists claimed an “Integral Armenia,” from the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean Sea, at least since 1915.[9]
Such dreams were against all the demographic realities: indeed, the large
majority of the population in each vilayet was Muslim (Turkish, Kurdish);[10]
most of the territories claimed in the South Caucasus itself had an Azeri
majority.[11]
That is why, as early as the end of 1914, and even more during the years 1915
and 1916, the Armenian volunteers of the Russian army practiced ethnic
cleansing against Turks and other Muslims. For example, Prince Vasilii
Gadzhemukov, slammed the indiscriminate slaughter of Muslims at Van: ‘the
Armenians themselves’ had given the ‘signal of the barbaric destruction of the
Armenian nation in Turkey’. “And although that destruction left ‘the positive
result that Turkey has left us Armenia without Armenians’, the legacy of Van
had stiffened Muslim resistance to Russian arms ‘for fear of falling into
Armenian hands’.”[12]
However, for pragmatic reasons more than for humanitarian concerns, some
Russian officers punished a part of these Armenian war criminals, who were
either fired from the army, especially in December 1915 (when Armenian
volunteers units were officially disbanded),[13]
either sentenced by martial-courts, including a certain number of death
sentences.[14]
Such a
repression became more difficult after the first Russian revolution and
virtually impossible after the Bolshevik one, by simple lack of Russian
soldiers and officers. As a result, in 1917-1918, the Armenian plans of ethnic
cleansing were carried out in north-eastern Anatolia and then in the Caucasus
with all its radicalism. Only the arrival of the Ottoman troops prevented a
full implantation of this project. In his notes written in April 1918 (and
based on the war diary of his regiment), lieutenant-colonel Tverdokhlebov, who
commanded the second regiment of fortress artillery in Erzurum, explained the
efforts and failure of the Russian command to prevent the slaughter of
thousands Turks between Erzincan and Erzurum, then of thousands others in
Erzurum itself.[15]
A Turkish investigation carried out in 1921 showed that thousands others were
exterminated at the beginning of 1918, between Erzurum and Van. In the village
of Söylemez, the victims were burned alive.[16]
More
generally, as observed the two American investigators sent in 1919 in this part
of Anatolia, “During their occupation, the Russians made many improvements in
the way of communications, building roads and railroads. On the Russian
retirement, however, the Armenians destroyed many of the Russian improvements
and most of the Musulman villages, they massacred the Musulman inhabitants and
retired leaving the country in a complete state of desolation.”[17]
These crimes must be connected to the openly racist ideology developed in the
1910s-1920s by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsoutiun—the “Aryan
race” opposed to the “Turko-Mongol race.”[18]
As early as
March 1918, the ARF, in power in Erevan, sided with the Bolsheviks in Baku and
attacked the Azeri civilian population. According to Firuz Kazemzadeh, “the
Soviet provoked the ‘civil war’ in the hope of breaking the power of its most
formidable rival, the Musavat,” the main Azerbaijani political party, which
advocated independence and anti-Communism. Anyway, thousands of Azeris were
killed in Baku and thousands others in the western part of Azerbaijan, without
distinction of age or sex.[19]
Lenin backed without ambiguity his comrade Shaumyan, the Bolshevik Armenian
leader of Baku, considering that “We must invade Azerbaijan the land of black
gold, in order to help communism to flourish.”[20]
Lenin’s choice is even more understandable in considering that in addition to
oil—in itself sufficient to explain the Bolshevik design of reconquest—, the
south Caucasus furnished, before 1917, three quarter of the manganese and one
quarter of the copper consumed in Russia.[21]
According to
British Intelligence agent Leslie Urquhart, “over 8,000 Tatars were killed in
Baku, over 18,000 unarmed Tatars ruthlessly murdered in Elizavethpol mainly by
Armenian rebels […] Armenians have restarted their blood feud with Tatars
instead of continuing to fight the Turks.”[22]
Interestingly, a former Armenian soldier
gave a similar estimation to an American relief worker: 25,000 “Tatars”
massacred.[23]
Almost two years later, the acting chief of the French military mission in the
Caucasus, Colonel Bertren, remembered having seen “the Armenians at work in
Baku, when, allied to the Bolsheviks, they massacred the Muslims.”[24]
In short, it was actually “a general massacre” in eastern Anatolia and Azerbaijan.[25]
However,
during the spring and summer 1918, the Ottoman forces continued to advance
though eastern Anatolia and Caucasus, forcing the Dashnak-dominated government
to change its policy dramatically. On June 4, 1918, Erevan had to sign the
treaty of Batum, confirming the Ottoman administration of Kars and Ardahan. The
Armenian minister of Foreign Affairs even stated that the relations with the
Ottomans were now “excellent” and that keeping them as such was “an essential
point of program pursued by the Armenian cabinet.” On 28 June 1918, Hairenik blamed Russia for the bloodbath
and considered the Turkish-Armenian issue as “solved.”[26]
Of course, such statements did not please the Entente.[27]
And it was not only statements: in June 1918, General Nazarbekov (Nazarbekian)
sent a telegram to the Armenian commission of Gümrü, announcing that Antranik
Ozanian had actually committed a lot of atrocities, and was recently fired from
the Armenian army as a result of these war crimes.[28]
C) Ottoman and German ambitions
The Ottoman
army, whose effectiveness has often been underestimated, pushed in summer 1918,
took Baku on 15 September 1918 and continued to the North Caucasus in October.[29]
The Russian collapse and this advance revealed, once again, the weaknesses of
the Ottoman-German alliance,[30]
but before studying these tensions, it is necessary to know the actual
intentions of the CUP cabinets. These intentions have been obscured for decades
by an enduring legend, present even in high-quality academic publications: the
CUP, and especially Enver, was supposed to have developed a pan-Turanist
policy, if not in 1914, at least in 1917-1918, to replace the lost Arab
provinces by Turkic lands of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Such a theory is
wrong.
In fact,
pan-Turanism, whose proponents were repressed by the CUP in 1913,[31]
did not seduce the main Unionist leaders in 1917-1918. Even Enver, as long as
he was the Ottoman minister of War, did not promote a pan-Turanist policy.
During most of the year 1917, Enver did not even give the priority to the
Caucasus. After the Bolshevik revolution and, even more, after having concluded
that the Communists were reluctant to give back any territory (those annexed in
1878 or even those occupied since 1915), Talat and Enver promoted a more
aggressive tactic but rejected the proposals of some Azeris to annex Azerbaijan
and never prepared anything to invade Central Asia from Baku. Their only
territorial claims were on Batum, Kars and Ardahan, above all for security
reasons: the Ottomans were more in safety with these districts than without.
Correspondingly, Azerbaijan, not unlike the Muslims of North Caucasus or
Ukraine, was seen as a buffer state against Russia, in the CUP plans. Especially,
Enver urged the Caucasian Republics to be represented at the negotiations of
Brest-Litovsk and so secure a formal independence from Russia, promising
assistance “in every way” if the Caucasians desired it.[32]
That having
been said, it is obvious that the oil fields of Baku did not leave Enver, or
any other CUP leader, indifferent. If they did not desire to annex Azerbaijan,
they preferred a Turko-Azerbaijani control on the oil to a Russian (or German)
one. The Germans had, not surprisingly, exactly the opposite ideas. They wanted
to secure their own political and economic preponderance in the Caucasus,
especially as far as oil was concerned. To counter the Ottoman plans, the
Germans used Georgia. The Georgian leaders did not develop any anti-Turkish racism,[33]
unlike the Dashnaks, but opposed the attribution of Batum to the Ottomans and
Germany war much farer than the Turks, so a German alliance seemed more in
conformity with their national interests. In particular, Germany encouraged the
dislocation of the Federative Republic of Transcaucasia, to deal with Georgian
leaders directly—even if it was not without some tensions, because the German
conservatives had limited affinities with the Georgian social-democrats. More
seriously, there were clashes between Ottoman and German troops as early as
June 1918 and Berlin secretly dealt with the Bolshevik to slow down the Ottoman
advance to Baku. The CUP cabinet was furious.[34]
Regardless, these
attempts were largely in vain since, as explained before, Baku was captured by
the Ottoman forces on 15 September 1918. There was a British military mission,
arrived in August, and who even convinced the Baku Commune to accept the help
from London against the Turks, but this unit evacuated the day before the
capture, apparently because the local Armenians did not show any willingness to
fight.[35]
According to
another myth regarding the Ottoman policy at the end of the war, the commander
Nuri Paşa was responsible for the reprisals against Armenians (in retaliation
for the massacres of March-April 1918).[36]
In an interview with a British representative, Nuri explained that he prevented
the Azeri volunteers to enter the city, leaving only Turkish regulars, well
disciplined and whose families were not subjected to the crimes of Armenian
nationalists. After having noticed that the civilian population herself was
ready to take revenge by killing Armenians, Nuri ordered to shot any plunderer
or murderer caught in act. There were around sixty summary executions and fifty
after a trial.[37]
Not only the British did not find anything against the version of Nuri, but the
General had previously affirmed, in a letter to his brother Enver, that he
ordered the hanging of around one hundred Muslims in Baku because they could
not refrain from retaliating.[38]
The Intelligence Service of the French Navy made an investigation on Nuri at
the beginning of 1919, and did not find any evidence involving him in any
massacre.[39]
National dreams (1918-1919)
A) “Armenian Megalomaniacs”
In the words
of Hovannes Katchaznouni, Armenian Prime minister from 1918 to 1919, “there was
no Parliament; it was an empty form without content. […] There was no
government either.” All the important decisions were discussed and taken solely
by the bureau of the ARF.[40]
This dictatorship never refrained from murdering opponents. For example, in
1918, the ARF assassinated Hampartzoum Arakelian in his bed, a 70-years old
journalist from Tbilisi, because of his numerous articles criticizing the
Dashnaks. Even Kartchikian (Garjigian), a member of the Dashnak-dominated
government of Erevan, was also murdered, for reasons which remain unclear, but
may be due to internal dissensions within the ARF.[41]
According to Firuz Kazemzadeh,
“The victory which had come to Armenians [in Fall 1918] after so much
sufferings turned the heads of her leaders. They visualized a Greater Armenia,
a country stretching from Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea, and from the
Black Sea to the Caspian. They claimed not only the six vilayets of Anatolia, but
also Cilicia as well. They even claimed a part of the Persian Azerbaijan,
though Persia had not been belligerent.”[42]
Armenia also
attacked Georgia in December 1918, losing any possibilities, if any remained,
to present a joint front with the Georgians at the forthcoming Paris peace
conference.[43]
Not only the Armenian representatives introduced unrealistic territorial
claims, but also asked:
“That the
aiding Power be charged with the following mandate:
(a)
To
bring about the evacuation of the Turks, Tartars and others [sic] of all the
Armenian territories
[…]
(d) To expel
from the country all the disturbing elements and the lawless nomadic tribes;
(e) To return to their homes all the
Mouhajirs, (Moslem colonies) who have been brought into the country during the
Hamidian regime and by the Young Turks.”[44]
Correspondingly,
they expressed bitter critiques against the conditions of the armistice of
Moudros, because eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus were not supposed to be
occupied by armies of the Entente.[45]
In fact, most of the Armenian nationalist hopes were placed in the U.S.
government, because President W. Wilson generally supported their claims and
also because of the virulent American Committee for Independence of Armenia.
America was supposed to accept a mandate on the “Integral Armenia.”[46]
However,
these hopes were quickly disappointed. President Wilson assigned an
investigative commission to eastern Anatolia, led by Major General James G.
Harbord. If Harbord was a friend of the Armenian people all his life, he was
not deprived of some lucidity and sense of the American national interest. He
concluded that there were at least as much arguments against the American
mandate as arguments in favor. Worse for the Dashnak government of Erevan,
Harbord wrote that the Armenian war crimes of 1916 and 1917-1918
“unquestionably rivaled the Turks in their inhumanity,” and he did not hide his
distrust for the ARF: “It is probable, that the Dashnagtzoutune still employs terroristic
methods, and undeniable that it is now a source of danger, owing to its
liability to precipitate conflicts.” In short, argued Harbord, “A single
mandatory for the Turkish Empire and Transcaucasus would be the most economical
solution.”[47]
In addition
to Harbord’s reluctance, the American High Commissioner in Istanbul, Admiral
Mark L. Bristol, radically opposed an American mandate for Armenian
specifically, preferring a mandate on the whole Ottoman Empire or no
intervention.[48]
“The Armenian government has contributed to a great extent to the
aggravation between the races in Armenia by forcing the Tatars to leave their
villages which were sacked and burned and there are a great many Tatar refugees
in a deplorable state of starvation which made it necessary to force the
Armenian government to permit supplies and medical assistance for these
refugees. The Armenians are also very much to blame for making the work of our
relief workers more difficult especially with the present impossible
conditions. The various foreign missions in the Caucasus are working without
any coordination whatsoever and often with antagonistic aims.”
Another
argument of Bristol was the preference of the Armenian government in Erevan for
a Russian protectorate to an American mandate[49]—an
accusation based on a real support of the Dashnaks for Denikin in 1919.[50]
The Armenians
nationalists began to think to France as an alternative, at the end of 1919,
but this move took place after one year of tensions with Paris, especially
regarding the occupation of Cilicia and the violence of the Armenian Legion,[51]
that is why the reaction of Georges Clemenceau was: “We are tired of the
Armenians! (Nous en avons assez des
Arméniens !).”[52] Even before Clemenceau’s ire, in October
1919, the “Integral Armenia” was referred to as the fantasy of “Armenian
megalomaniacs” by the relatively pro-Armenian Colonel Chardigny, a member of
the French military mission in the Caucasus.[53]
The dreams of an “Integral Armenia” were buried by the San Remo conference and the
Sèvres treaty.[54]
B) Building a secular Muslim democracy
When the
Azerbaijani leaders proclaimed independence in 1918, they inherited a country
presenting a dichotomy between the capital city, Baku (retaken in September),
one of the main centers of oil production in the world (for the year 1898, the
production even surpassed the one of the U.S.), and the rest of Azerbaijan,
predominantly rural, with a few towns not quite concerned yet by the industrial
revolution.[55]
For the first time, Azerbaijan was not only a word of physical and
administrative geography, but an independent state, and “Azerbaijani” replaced,
at least officially, the words “Tatars,” “Caucasian Muslims” and “Caucasian
Turks.” This ethnic appellation led the new government to ease the suspicions
of Tehran about a possible Ottoman plan to create an Integral Azerbaijan,
including the province of Tabriz, under the protectorate of Istanbul—these
suspicions were substantiated by the occupation of this province by the Ottoman
troops at the end of the summer of 1918.[56]
From 1918 to
1920, Azerbaijan was almost constantly at war with Armenia and was also
threatened, until 1919, by the White Russian army of Denikin. In spite of all
these difficulties, its leaders established the first democratic Republic of
the Muslim world (if one excludes the short-lived attempt in Western Thrace,
during the Balkan wars) and the first secular state with a Muslim majority. The
declaration of independence and the Constitution stressed the democratic nature
of the new regime and the equality of all the citizens.[57]
The modernist ideas were partially inspired by Ahmet Ağaoğlu, one of the three
representatives of Azerbaijan to the peace conference and a prolific writer.[58]
In this
regard, one of the most remarkable achievements was the right to vote obtained
by the women in 1919. The same year, on September 1st, the
University of Baku was inaugurated. The arrival of British troops only
reinforced the democratic nature of the regime, but since the main political
party of Azerbaijan, the Musavat, never got an absolute majority at the
National Assembly, the country was ruled by a series of instable coalition
governments: five cabinets from May 1918 to April 1920. These cabinets, in the
name of realism, gave the priority to national security and preferred to stress
national identity instead of political pan-Turkism (by spreading education in
Azerbaijani instead of Russian). However, the domestic policy was much less
easier to define in economic and social terms. Indeed, the Musavat itself was
divided between the left- and right-wings on the agrarian issue, and more
exactly on the redistribution of land to the peasants. The economic
difficulties (loss of the Russian market for the oil, diminution of the
agricultural production, inflation, and unemployment) made the problem only
more acute, and the lack of experienced Azeri civil servants—which was direct
result of the Tzarist rule—did not ease the difficulties.[59]
In military
terms, they benefited first of the presence of the Ottoman army, and, after the
armistice of Moudros, of the arrival 30,000 British soldiers, including 2,000
in Baku. The chief of this mission accepted the Azerbaijani government as “the
only legitimate authority” and even called the Azerbaijani Prime Minister “one
of the ablest men in Baku” However, this presence ended after for some months
only. Indeed, back in November 1918, the British left during the year 1919, as
a result of a decision of Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who did not want
the British army being involved anymore in the Russian civil war. In fact, this
is not until the beginning of 1920, after the final failure of Denikin, that
the Lloyd George government seriously considered the Republic of Azerbaijan as
a buffer state against the contamination of Communism to India and eastern Mediterranean
countries. In this regard, there was a shift between Lloyd George and the
military mission in Azerbaijan, who was favorable since 1919 to an alliance
with Baku against Communism, eased the pressure of the Whites and even
supported the Azerbaijani point of view on the Karabakh issue.[60]
This shift is even more remarkable since the financial issue can hardly explain
the decision of London: indeed, the Azerbaijani government, like his Georgian
counterpart, asked, in mid-1919, to maintain the British military presence and
offered to pay the costs of these troops.[61]
A possible explanation is the primary interest of the British cabinet for the
Middle East, especially the oil fields of Iran and Iraq.[62]
Azerbaijan
presented some absurd claims at the beginning of the Paris Peace conference
(even demanding Batum), but after a few month, Baku moved to a much more
realistic policy, securing an alliance with Georgia and the mountaineers
against the White Russians and the Bolsheviks: on 16 June 1919, an
Georgian-Azerbaijani alliance was signed, including a military assistance and a
joint diplomatic action.[63]
Correspondingly, the national army attained 30,000 men in mid-1919.
C) The Georgian resistance
Georgia, too,
had to fight on multiple fronts. The country was a stronghold for the
Mensheviks, who took 109 out of 130 seats at the National Assembly after the
democratic elections of January 1919. Their absence of interest for
ethnic-based nationalism was indeed congruent with the ethnic diversity of the
country and their diplomacy was pragmatic: after the defeat of Germany,
Tbilissi secured an alliance with Great Britain, which saw Georgia as a transit
country to Azerbaijan and its oil. Regardless, Georgia was subjected to
attempts of destabilization by Bolsheviks, as early as 1919, and to a blockade
by the White Army of Anton Denikin in November of the same year. As a result,
half of the national budget was devoted to defense in 1919.[64]
The army
attained 50,000 men this year, and it was not without reasons. In addition the
ambitions of Denikin and the fear of a military invasion by Red Russia, the
Communists established a new committee in Tbilissi and cells in other cities of
Georgia, as early as 1919. As early as January of this year, the Communist
leadership of Russia openly advocated the overthrow of the Menshevik regime.[65]
Caucasian failures, Turkish recovery, Russian re-conquest (1920-1921)
A)
The Conquest of Azerbaijan and its
consequences
For Lenin at
the beginning of 1920, “the taking of Baku is absolutely, absolutely
essential.”[66]
At the end of March 1920, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict increased. The
Soviets took profit of the situation: most of the Azerbaijani army being in the
western part of the country, she could not protect Baku from the north. Red
Russians also misled the Azeris, announcing that they were not invading the
country, but simply passing to support the Kemalists in eastern Anatolia. At
the eve of 27 April, the Communists took the control of all the vital points of
Baku, to create a fait accompli. Georgia was surprised and the Kemalists had no
desire to prevent the invasion, even if they if they regretted it, both for
sentimental and very pragmatic reasons: they were themselves in a difficult
situation, fighting the Greeks and the “Caliphate Army” on the west, the French
on the south and concerned by Armenia irredentism on the north-east. They also
depended on Soviet help to pursue the war of liberation. Red Russia was not the
only power to provide weapons and goods to Kemalist Turkey (Italy did so as
early as 1919), but this contribution was indispensable.[67]
The Tcheka
immediately opened branches in Azerbaijan and the classical Soviet repression
took place. The Sovietization paradoxically took place without Soviets, except
in Baku, because the voters, even the poorest ones, were considered as
unreliable. All the local leaders, outside the capital city, were chosen by the
conquerors. As a result, there was a mutiny in May 1920, drowned in blood by
the Communists: 79 persons were shot to death preventively the next day and
hundreds others were executed during the following weeks. Similarly, the
insurrection of Shusha, led by General Nuri Paşa, was crushed in ten days, but
the guerilla in the west of the country, beginning in September 1920, was not
suppressed by the Bolsheviks until 1921. The last insurgents were eliminated in
1924 only. To prevent the extension of the insurrectional movements, the
population was disarmed, those who kept weapons secretly facing immediate
execution. In addition to the merciless nature of the Soviet regime, the main
weakness of the rebels was their lack of coordination.[68]
Indeed, Communism was particularly unpopular among the Azeris: as late as 1925,
in spite of the Soviet efforts, more than 50% of the members of the Azerbaijan
Communist Party were ethnic Russians of Armenians.[69]
In addition to Ağaoğlu, arrested by the British in 1919 and released in 1921,
several Azeris leaders fled to Turkey, where they developed modernist and
anti-Communist ideas.[70]
The collapse
of Azerbaijan led to the withdrawal of the British troops from Georgia as early
as July 1920, this country having lost its main advantage in the eyes of London
(transit to Baku oil fields).[71]
The Communist conquest also opened the way to Armenia.
B)
The failure of Armenia
In summer
1920, the Armenian government asked weapons and military support to occupy
eastern Anatolia. Requested to suggest an answer, the French High Commissioner
in Tbilissi Damien de Martel did not say yes or no by his letter dated July 20,
1920, but presented a very critical appreciation of the Dashnak cabinet,
especially regarding the ethnic cleansing against the Azeris. Damien de Martel
explicitly referred to the physical elimination of 40,000 “Tatars” in the south
of Erevan in June 1920, including 4,000 killed (without exemption for women and
children) and 36,000 expelled “by canon shots” to Turkey.[72]
No weapons were sent and no troops were landed in Trabzon, and both British and
American representatives—as well as Azerbaijani ones—expressed similar
grievances in 1920,[73]
but the ethnic cleansing continued during the summer of this year. Minister of Interior
Rupen Ter Minassian, the main person in charge of this program, called it a
“ferocious plan.”[74]>
Added to the
massacres and expulsions in Kars since 1919[75]
and the territorial claims against Turkey (these claims extended until Adana
and there were attempts to eliminate the Muslim majority of the city, especially
in mid-1920),[76]
these actions shaped an aggressive and expansionist policy that could be only
perceived as extremely provocative by the Kemalists. Without explicitly mentioning
the practice of ethnic cleansing, H. Katchaznouni yet notices:
“Despite these hypotheses there remains an irrefutable fact. That we had
not done all that was necessary for us to have done to evade war. We ought to
have used peaceful language with the Turks whether we succeeded or not, and we
did not do it. […] With the carelessness of inexperienced and ignorant men we
did not know what forces Turkey had mustered on our frontiers. When the
skirmishes had started the Turks proposed that we meet and confer. We did not
do so and defied them.”[77]
The Russian
re-conquest of Azerbaijan, the Bolshevik insurrection in Armenia itself in May
1920 and the increase of Kemalist power in Anatolia should have left no
illusion to Erevan, but the expansionist ideology and the traditional
Russophilia (direct result of the Turkophobia) prevailed. On August 10, 1920,
the Dashnak dictatorship signed an agreement with Soviet Russia. Without
surprise, Damien de Martel, considered this agreement a “defection”[78]
and warned Erevan that “we would not tolerate that the Armenian question would
be settled by the Bolsheviks only.”[79]
The British representative in Tbilisi was equally “furious.”[80]
As a result, if any hope of Western support remained, this rapprochement with
Soviet Russia eliminated it, and, far from inciting the Soviet to accommodation
with the Dashnaks, they considered this diplomatic opening as a proof of
weakness and isolation.
After the
heavy defeat of the Armenian army against the Turkish one and the occupation of
Erevan by the Communist forces, at the end of 1920, two myths emerged and are
still frequently believed: first, a “plot” between Ankara and Moscow to destroy
the independent Armenia; and secondly a “massacre” of the Armenians in Kars and
Ardahan.[81]
In fact, even Armenian historian Serge Afanasyan conclusively demonstrated,
with primary sources, that the relations between Ankara and Moscow deteriorated
during the months preceding the Turkish offensive against Armenia and that this
offensive, far from having been coordinated with Moscow, was a way to force
both the Dashnaks and the Soviets to accept the Turkish-Armenian boundary
wished by the Turkish national movement. The Bolsheviks were less than happy by
the Kemalist offensive and did not choose immediately to reply by an invasion
of Armenia, preferring, as a first step, to be mediators.[82]
The myth of
the “massacre” in Kars was crushed more than thirty years ago by Heath Lowry,
relying on the testimonies of the American Relief workers who were in this
city. On October 31, 1920, Edward Fox, district commander of the Near East
Relief in Kars, sent a telegram to Admiral Bristol, saying: “The Turkish
soldiers are well disciplined and there have been no massacres.” Fox repeatedly
told Bristol there was no massacre—except in two villages where a part of the
inhabitants had attacked the Turkish soldiers (about fifty Armenians were
killed). The testimony of Fox is totally confirmed by the one of his associate
George White, who spoke with Admiral Bristol on May 3, 1921.[83]
Having
checked the sources of Prof. Lowry, I have only one critique to present: he did
not mention that White spoke Turkish[84]—but
of course, this precision, far from undermining Heath Lowry’s conclusions,
reinforces them. Verification in the French archives also confirms these
findings in the U.S. ones. Indeed, Edward Fox (previously cited) told a French
representative on “the perfect order, the organization and the conduct of the
Turks” in Kars and Alexandropol (Gümrü in Turkish, Gyumri in Armenian). Even
more strikingly, past Prime Minister Alexander Khatissian expressed his
satisfaction about the “disciplined” Turkish army[85]
and “the Armenian runaways themselves admit the Turkish troops did not commit
atrocities this time.”[86]
Such myths are
useful to hide the reality: Dashnak Armenia was collapsing and did not actually
resist the Turkish offensive. The country offered “scenes of pandemonium.”[87]
A completely exhausted country, deeply divided between those who preferred the
Turks to the Reds and those who preferred the reverse, signed peace with the
Turks on December 3, 1920, becoming the first country to recognize de jure the
government of Ankara.[88]
C)
The last desperate attempts of
Georgia and the Sovietization
Understanding
well the Soviet danger, the Georgian government tried to attract European
support by establishing a kind of lobby of Socialists (French, Belgian, British
and even German) in 1920. For the social-democrats, Georgia was the first
democratic Socialist country in the world, a counter-model against the
totalitarian Communism imposed by Lenin. Indeed, at that time, the Scandinavian
experiences did not begin yet, and if the kibbutzim already existed, the state
of Israel was still merely a project. However, since no social-democrat party
was leading any government of a major power in 1920-1921, the effect of this
lobby, in spite all of the efforts of its members remained limited.[89]
Pragmatically,
the Republic of Georgia also established diplomatic relations with the Ankara
government in spring 1920,[90]
but, as it was seen in the case of Azerbaijan, it was not a strong guarantee
against the Soviet Russia. There were some projects of a joint Turkish-Georgian
action against the Bolsheviks, and even a Georgian proposal for a confederation
with Turkey, but the situation of the Kemalists was not yet sufficiently stable
to break the ties with the Soviets, still less to fight them. Indeed, the
reconciliation with the French was formally signed only in October 1921 and the
Italians did not leave Anatolia until this year.[91]
Tbilisi
signed a treaty in May 1920 with Red Russia, guarantying Georgian integrity and
neutrality but Georgians know what a treaty means for Russia. Until the
invasion of February 1921, the Georgian military intelligence service supported
insurgents of Dagestan and Tchetchenya, including Saïd Chamil, the grandson of
Imam Chamil. In January, a joint committee of Azerbaijani and North-Caucasians
was established in Tbilissi.[92]
Regardless, these guerillas, albeit problematic for the Bolsheviks, did not
represent threat able to block a military offensive. After the Red Army took
the control of Armenia, in December 1920, the League of Nations rejected the
demand of Georgia to be a member state. It was the final failure of the Western
powers that paved the way to the invasion of Georgia in February 1921.[93]
According to the French Navy’s Intelligence service, the Georgian army was not
effective and its collapse had been announced at the beginning of December
1920.[94]
Regardless, the only help for Georgia at the beginning of 1921 went from
France: its ships bombarded the Bolshevik positions from the Black sea; weapons
and ammunitions from the stocks of Wrangel in Istanbul were also provided.[95]
When the
Russian army invaded the country, the Turkish army, led by Kazım Karabekir,
took Ardahan as a fait accompli and
even tried to take Batumi, to force the Bolsheviks to accept the pre-1878
boundary. Actually, the Georgian government himself asked the Turks to do so,
to avoid a complete occupation by Communists.[96]
There were indeed increasing tensions, at the beginning of 1921, between the
Kemalists and the Bolsheviks, regarding precisely the boundary with Georgia and
Armenia (and the mysterious death of the Turkish Communist leader Mustafa
Suphi), but Moscow eventually preferred conciliation and signed a treaty of
Friendship and Help with Ankara in March. In spite of new problems (such as the
occupation of Gümrü by the Turkish army until April 23, 1921), Moscow and
Ankara reached a final peace treaty in Kars in October, after the victories of
the Kemalists against the Greeks in August—not unlike the French, who signed a
draft of agreement in London in March 1921 and the real agreement in Ankara in
October; interestingly, in March, the Turks signed peace outside, but in
October, inside. The relations, however, deteriorated again as early as 1922.[97]
At the same
time, the brutality of the Russian occupation exasperated a part of the
population (as even the Soviet historian B. A. Borian admitted), leading to the
Dashnak insurrection in Erevan in February 1921, but this insurrection was
crushed for good by the Communists as early as April 2, 1921. Simon Vratsian,
the leader of the insurrection, who prepared the treaty of Gümrü with the Kemalists,
used it as an argument to ask for Kemalist help, but this demand was left
unanswered.[98]
The Dashnaks continued to control the Zanguezour for a few months, but they
hardly retook credibility in the eyes of the Western powers. Especially, as
late as July 5, 1921, they pretended to control “one third” of Armenia and even
claimed the application of the dead-born Sèvres treaty,[99]
but in fact, eleven days later it was their final defeat. Their leaders and
fighters fled in Iran.[100]
The final failure was the abandonment of the project of “Armenian National
home” in Turkey during the conference of Lausanne (1922-1923).
The
Sovietization in Georgia was less violent than in Armenia or Azerbaijan because
there was no strong opposition in the countryside. According to the French
Navy’s Intelligence service, it was due to the kind of Soviets already
established by the Mensheviks, who accustomed the peasants to obedience.
Regarding the urban population, the example of the crimes committed by the
Bolsheviks in other parts of the Caucasus, in Russia and elsewhere was
particularly dissuasive. As a result, the Georgian communists avoided violence
and did not provoke insurrections. Lenin himself suggested moderation in a
telegram sent on March 20, 1921.[101]
When the
Bolsheviks terminated their conquest of the Caucasus (1921), Lenin was also
finishing the move of Soviet Russia to a rigid dictatorship, banning the
faction in the Communist Party itself, after having eliminated both rightist
and leftist opponents outside of the party.[102]
Theoretically independent in 1921, the Republics of southern Caucasus were
united in a federation in 1922 and integrated in 1923 in the newly created
USSR.[103]
Conclusion
Western
powers, especially Britain, did not know what they wanted. The Lloyd George
cabinet was anti-Communist, but abandoned Georgia in 1920. On Azerbaijan, the
shift between London and the mission in contact with the local realities led to
the victory of the Bolsheviks. Italy interested mostly in trade and did not
possess the financial ways of a strong military policy. The French presence was
too weak by lack of ways, because of the occupation of Germany and Cilicia as
well as because the virtual exhaustion of the population after more than four
years of a devastating war. The White Russians, heirs of the Tzars, failed to
understand that things had changed after the Bolshevik coup d’État and did not
respect the national aspirations, especially in Azerbaijan.
On the other
hand, Communists knew exactly what they wished, securing the neutrality of
Kemalist Turkey and attacking the Caucasian states one by one. Kemal Atatürk,
too, conducted a coherent policy, accepting simultaneously Italian and
Bolshevik help, signing peace at the same time with Red Russians and their
sworn enemy (the French government), sending Karabekir to retake Kars and
Ardahan but avoiding a pan-Turanist policy, especially regarding Azerbaijan—in
continuity, in fact, with what Enver himself had tried in 1917-1918.
[1]Charles King, The Ghost of Freedom. A History of the Caucasus, Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 39-141; Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile. The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922, Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995, pp. 31-58.
[2]Ömer Turan (ed.), The Ottoman-Rusian War of 1877-1878, Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 2007 (see especially the contributions of Ayten Kılıç and Nina Dyulgerova on Russian ambitions, pp. 1-33, and the one of Marija Pandevska on the Macedonian refuges, pp. 98-112); Hakan Yavuz and Peter Slugett (ed.), War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Berlin, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011 (see especially the contribution of Edward J. Erickson, pp. 351-381, on the Ottoman counter-insurgency practices, and the one of Justin McCarthy, pp. 429-448, on the demographic realities).
[3]Sean McMeekin, The Russian Origins of the First World War, Cambridge (Massachusetts)-London: Harvard University Press, 2011 (especially pp. 1-114).
[4]Marc Ferro, La Révolution de 1917,
Paris : Albin Michel, 1997 (English translation of the first, shorter version: October 1917 : a social history of the Russian revolution, London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, translated from French by Norman Stone).
[5]Also see Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia (1914-1923), Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010, pp. 51-75.
[6]Sean McMeekin, The Russian Origins…, pp. 214-227 (quote p. 214).
[7]Abdulhalûk Çay, “The March 31, 1918 Baku Massacre,” in The Eastern Question: Imperialism and the Armenian Community, Ankara: Institute for the Study of Turkish Culture, 1987, pp. 124-125 (full text of the “Armenian decree” p. 125, n. 8); Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks. Power and Identity under Russian Rule, Stanford (California): Hoover Institution Press, 1981, p. 75; Stéphane Yerasimos, « Caucase : la grande mêlée », Hérodote, n° 54-55, 4e trimestre 1989, p. 161-163.
[8]Marc Ferro, La Première Guerre mondiale, Paris : Gallimard, 1969, pp. 358-360.
[9]A. Tchobanian, Les aspirations arméniennes, 7 avril 1915, in Hasan Dilan (ed.), Fransız Diplomatik Belgelerinde Ermeni Olayları 1914-1918/Les Événements arméniens dans les documents diplomatiques français, 1914-1918, Ankara : TTK, 2005, volume II, pp. 152-167.
[10]Justin McCarthy, Muslims and Minorities, New York-London: New York University Press, 1983.
[11] Adil Baguirov, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Competing Legal, Historic and Economic Claims in Political, Academic and Media Discourses,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, XXII-2, 2012, pp. 145-146; Antoine Constant, L’Azerbaïdjan, Paris: Karthala, 2002, p. 286.
[12] Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires. The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908-1918, New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 157-158.
[13] Ibid., pp. 156-157.
[14] Twelve were sentenced to death and hanged in May 1916: see two Ottoman military reports dated 11 and 24 May 1916, in İnanç Atılgan and Garabet Moumdjian (ed.), Archival Documents of the Viennese Armenian-Turkish Platform, Klagenfurt-Vienna-Ljubjana-Sarajevo: Wieser Verlag, 2009, pp. 708-713. For full text of Russian documents, see Mehmet Perinçek (ed.), Rus Devlet Arşivlerinden. 100 Belgede Ermeni Meselesi, İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2007, pp. 68-103.
[15] Vladimir Tverdokhlebov, Notes of Superior Russian Officer on the Atrocities at Erzeroum, Istanbul, 1919. The notes were republished with a facsimile of the original: I Witnessed and Lived Through, Ankara: ATASE, 2007. The French translation included in this new edition is clearly less good than the one of 1919.
[16] Yusuf Sarınay (éd.), Ermeniler Tarafından Yapılan Katliam Belgeleri, Ankara, 2001, volume II, pp. 1039-1041.
[17] Justin McCarthy, “The Report of Niles and Sutherland,” XI. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara: TTK, 1994, volume V, p. 1842. See also pp. 1828-1830 and 1850.
[18] Jordi Tejel Gorgas, Le Mouvement kurde de Turquie en exil, Berne : Peter Lang, 2007, pp. 226-228 ; Mikael Varandian, L’Arménie et la question arménienne, Laval : Imprimerie moderne, 1917, pp. 23-30.
[19] Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, New York-Oxford: Philosophical Library/George Ronald Publisher, 1952, pp. 71-75 (quote p. 74); Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920, New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 105-119.
[20] Quoted in Abdulhalûk Çay, “The March 31, 1918…”, p. 127, n. 11.
[21] Vincent Monteil, Les Musulmans soviétiques, Paris: Le Seuil, 1982, p. 39.
[22] FO 371/3301/121685, quoted in Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile…, p. 248, n. 171.
[23] Leonard Ramsden Hartill, Men Are Like That, Londres-Indianapolis, John Lane/The Bobbs-Merrill C°, 1928, p.
[24] Compte-rendu des évènements politiques du Caucase, 12 décembre 1919, Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), 36 PO/1/3. Also see Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks…, p. 86 and Nadine Picaudou, La Décennie qui ébranla le Moyen-Orient : 1914-1923, Bruxelles : Complexe, 1992, p. 97.
[25] Stanford Jay Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, volume II, 1978, p. 325.
[26] Quoted in Kara Schemsi, Turcs et Arméniens devant l’histoire, Genève : Imprimerie nationale, 1919, pp. 31-32.
[27] Lettre de l’ambassadeur de France à Berne à Monsieur le ministre des Affaires étrangères, 17 juillet 1918, Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), microfilm P 16670.
[28] Documents on Ottoman Armenians, volume I, Ankara, 1982, document 79.
[29] Edward J. Erickson, Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I. A Comparative Study, London-New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 173-174.
[30] For an overview of this alliance and its difficulties: Frank G. Weber, Eagles on the Crescent. Germany, Austria and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance. 1914-1918, Ithaca (NY)-London: Cornell University Press, 1970.
[31] Paul Dumont, « Bolchevisme et Orient », Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, XVIII-4, octobre-décembre 1977, p. 379.
[32] Michael A. Reynolds, “Buffers, Not Brethren: Young Turk Military Policy in the First World War and the Myth of Panturanism,” Past and Present, n° 203, May 2009, pp. 137-178. Also see Ryan Gingeras, “The Sons of Two Fatherlands: Turkey and the North Caucasian Diaspora, 1914-1923,” European Journal of Turkish Studies, 2011, http://ejts.revues.org/4424
[33] This is not until 1940s that anti-Turkish prejudices emerged in Georgian intellectual publications, and only at the instigation of the Stalinist power: Thornike Gordadze, Géorgie : un nationalisme de frontière, Fonds d’analyse des sociétés politiques, 2005, volume I, pp. 162-164. Also see İnayetullah Cemal Özkaya, Le Peuple arménien et les tentatives de réduire le peuple turc en servitude, İstanbul: Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, 1971, pp. 248-250.
[34] David Fromkin, A Peace to end all Peace, New York: Owl Books, 2001, pp. 361-362; Georges Mamoulia, Les Combats indépendantistes…, p. 17; Michael A. Reynolds, “Buffers, Not Brethren…”, pp. 172-173; Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp. 127-128 and 133-135.
[35] Serge Afanasyan, L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et la Géorgie, de l’indépendance à l’instauration du pouvoir soviétique. 1917-1923, Paris : L’Harmattan, 1981, pp. 65-69; Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks…, pp. 91-92; David Fromkin, A Peace to End…, pp. 359-360; Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp. 137-139.
[36] In his History of the Armenian Genocide, Vahakn N. Dadrian even manages the exploit to speak about the vengeances of September without saying anything on the massacres of spring.
[37] FO 371/5089/E 1065.
[38] Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires…, p. 234.
[39] S.R. Marine, Turquie, n° 301, 12 février 1919, Service historique de la défense, Vincennes, 1 BB7 231. Also see William E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields. A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Borders, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953, p. 495. Serge Afanasyan (L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et…, p. 70) does not cite these Western sources on Nuri’s innocence but does not blame him personally.
[40] H. Katchaznouni, The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Has Nothing to Do Anymore, New York: Armenian Information Service, 1955, pp. 8-9, http://ia600602.us.archive.org/14/items/armenianrevolution00katc/armenianrevolution00katc.pdf.
[41] Serge Afanasyan, L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et…, p. 74 ; Kapriel Serope Papazian, Patriotism Perverted, Boston : Baikar Press, 1934, pp. 69-70.
[42] Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for…, p. 213.
[43] Ibid., p. 182; Georges Mamoulia, Les Combats indépendantistes…, p. 19. The Dashnak point of view is exposed by Mikael Varandian, Le Conflit arméno-géorgien et la guerre du Caucase, Paris: Imprimerie M. Flinikowski, 1918, http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5607240t.r=.langFR
[44] Avedis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar, The Armenian Question Before the Paris Peace Conference, Paris, 1919, p. 12. Aharonian and Nubar themselves were divided on the calendar of application of these demands: Serge Afanasyan, L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et…, p. 82.
[45]
Rapport de Camille Barrère, ambassadeur à Rome, à Stephen Pichon, ministre des
Affaires étrangères, 3 novembre 1918 ; télégramme de Mikael Varandian,
délégué de la Fédération révolutionnaire arménienne, à Stephen Pichon, 3
novembre 1918, Arthur Beylerian, Les
Grandes Puissances, l’Empire ottoman et les Arméniens dans les archives
françaises (1914-1918), Paris, 1983, pp. 707-709.
[46] James B. Gidney, A Mandate for Armenia, Kent (Ohio): Kent State University Press, 1967; Justin McCarthy, The Turk in America. The Creation of an Enduring Prejudice, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010, pp. 271-281.
[47] James G. Harbord, Conditions in the Near East. Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1920, pp. 9 and 16; Kapriel Serope Papazian, Patriotism Perverted…, p. 14.
[48] Mark Bristol, War diary, 4 March 1920, Library of Congress (LC), Bristol papers, container 1.
[49] Sent dispatch of Bristol to Paris, 21 November 1919, LC, Bristol papers, container 66.
[50] Georges Mamoulia, Les Combats indépendantistes…, p. 21.
[51] Maxime Gauin, “Logiques d’une rupture. Les relations entre la République française et les comités arméniens, de l’armistice de Moudros au traité de Lausanne”, First International Symposium on Turkish-Armenian Relations and Great Powers, Erzurum : Atatürk Üniversitesi, 2014, pp. 770-773.
[52] Houri Berberian, “The Delegation of Integral Armenia: From Greater Armenia to Lesser Armenia,” Armenian Review, XLIV-3, Fall 1991, p. 57.
[53] La question arménienne. 30 octobre 1919, Service historique de la défense (SHD), Vincennes, 16 N 3187, classeur 39.
[54] Houri Berberian, “The Delegation of…”, p. 39-64.
[55] Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…
[56] Ibid., pp. 129-130 and 139.
[57] Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks…, pp. 89-90.
[58] A. Holly Shissler, Between Two Empires. Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey, London-New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003, pp. 164-184 and passim.
[59] Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp. 144-150.
[60] Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks…, pp. 93-96 and 105-107; Georges Mamoulia, Les Combats indépendantistes…; Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp. 142-144 and 152-153.
[61] Serge Afanasyan, L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et…, p. 88.
[62] Revaz Gachechiladze, “Geopolitics and Foreign Powers in the Modern History of Georgia,” in Stephen F. Jones (ed.), The Making of Modern Georgia, London-New York: Routledge, 2014, p. 21.
[63] Georges Mamoulia, Les Combats indépendantistes…, pp. 19-21 ; Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp. 155 and 158. Armenia was invited to join the alliance, but declined, and the even nationalist elements of the Ottoman Armenians criticized this pro-Russian stance: Serge Afanasyan, L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et…, p. 85; Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks…
[64] Charles King, Ghosts of Freedom…, pp. 162-164.
[65] Serge Afanasyan, L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et…, pp. 75-76.
[66] Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks…, p. 97.
[67] Paul Dumont, Mustafa Kemal invente la Turquie moderne, Bruxelles : Complexe, 1997, pp. 64-88 ; by the same author, « L’axe Moscou-Ankara — Les relations turco-soviétiques de 1919 à 1922 », Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, XVIII-3, juillet-septembre 1977, pp. 165-193 ; Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp. 160-164; Stefanos (Stéphane) Yerasimos, Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1917-1923), Boyut Kitapları, 2000. On the Italian help to the Turkish national movement, see, among others, Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to Republic. The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918-1923, Ankara: TTK, 2000, volume III-2, pp. 1437-1443.
[68] Vincent Monteil, Les Musulmans soviétiques…, p. 40; Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp. 187-190.
[69] Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks…, p. 110.
[70] Zaur Gasimoz, “Anti-communism Imported? Azeri Emigrant Periodicals in Istanbul and Ankara (1920-1950s),” Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies, Fall 2012, VIII-16, pp. 3-18, http://www.ait.hacettepe.edu.tr/akademik/sayi16dergi.pdf; A. Holly Shissler, Between Two Empires…, pp. 185-214.
[71] Georges Mamoulia, Les Combats indépendantistes…, p. 22.
[72] AMAE, P 16674, https://www.scribd.com/doc/201815861/French-High-Commissioner-Report-from-1920-on-the-massacre-of-Azerbaijani-population-by-Armenian-army
[73] Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to…, volume III-2, pp. 1443-1453.
[74] Anahide Ter Minassian, La République d’Arménie, Bruxelles : Complexe, 2006, pp. 216-217.
[75] Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile…, pp. 211-214; Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to…, volume II, pp. 928-930.
[76] Paul Bernard, Six mois en Cilicie, Aix-en-Provence, éditions du Feu, 1929, pp. 59-60, 63-65, 72-73, 82-85, 87-89, 99-100, 107-108; Tommy Martin, Renseignements, n° 398, 13 octobre 1920, Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes, 1 SL/1V/222. Also see Jugement n° 165/280, 6 août 1920, SHD, 11 J 3202.
[77] H. Kachaznuni, The Armenian Revolutionary Federation…, pp. 9-10.
[78] Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, volume IV, 1996, pp. 95-97 (quote p. 97).
[79] Télégramme de Damien de Martel au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 12 août 1920, AMAE, P 16674. Also see Serge Afanasyan, L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et…, p. 108.
[80] Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to…, volume III-2, p. 1477.
[81] Christopher Walker, Armenia. The Survival of a Nation, London-New York: Routledge, 1990, pp. 309-312; Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris, New York: Perennial, 2004, p. 329.
[82] Serge Afanasyan, L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et…, pp. 128-140. Also see Georges Mamoulia, Les Combats indépendantistes…, p. 27; Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to…, volume III-2, pp. 1478-1487 and 1499-1502.
[83] Heath W. Lowry, “American Observers in Anatolia ca. 1920: The Bristol Papers,” in Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (1912-1926), Istanbul: Tasvir Press, 1984, pp. 42-58, http://www.h-net.org/~fisher/hst373/readings/lowry-bristol.html
[84] Admiral Mark Bristol, War Diary, 3 May 1921, LC, Bristol papers, container 2.
[85] Défaite de l’armée arménienne ; Résumé de la conversation entre Khatissian et le colonel Corbel, documents transmis au secrétaire général du ministère des Affaires étrangères le 6 janvier 1921 par Paul Lépissier, délégué à Trabzon du haut-commissaire français à İstanbul, AMAE, P 16675.
[86] La situation en Orient au 1er décembre 1920, SHD, 1 BB7 236.
[87] Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of…, volume IV, p. 258. Also see the French military report cited in the previous note on the ineffectiveness of the Armenian army; and Kapriel Serope Papazian, Patriotism Perverted…, p. 49.
[88] Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of…, volume IV, pp. 390-398 and passim; Anahide Ter-Minassian, La République d’Arménie…, pp. 226-234.
[89] Serge Afanasyan, L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et…, p. 182; Georges Mamoulia, Les Combats indépendantistes…, pp. 22-23.
[90] Revaz Gachechiladze, “Geopolitics and Foreign…”, p. 23.
[91] Serge Afanasyan, L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et…, pp. 165-167 ; Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to…, volume III-2, p. 1553 and passim.
[92] Georges Mamoulia, Les Combats indépendantistes…, pp. 23-24.
[93] Revaz Gachechiladze, “Geopolitics and Foreign…”, p. 23.
[94] La situation en Orient au 1er décembre 1920, SHD, 1 BB7 236.
[95] Georges Mamoulia, Les Combats indépendantistes…, p. 26.
[96] Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to…, volume III-2, p. 1553.
[97] Ibid., pp. 1542-1562 and 1567-1589.
[98] Serge Afanasyan, L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et…, pp. 167-171 ; Kapriel Serope Papazian, Patriotism Perverted…, pp. 50-51 and 77-78.
[99] Mémorandum de la Délégation de la République arménienne à Aristide Briand, 5 juillet 1921, AMAE, P 16676.
[100] Serge Afanasyan, L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et…, pp. 175-176.
[101] La situation en Orient au 15 avril 1921, SHD, 1 BB7 238.
[102] Leonard Schapiro The Origin of the Communist Autocracy. Political Opposition in the Soviet State, Cambridge (Massachusetts)-London, Harvard University Press, 1977.
[103] Serge Afanasyan, L’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan et…, pp. 189-242.
Unpublished archives
Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères, La Courneuve, microfilms
P 16670, P 16674, P 16675, P 16676.
Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes, 36
PO/1/3 ; 1 SL/1V/222.
Service historique de la défense, Vincennes, 1 BB7 231,
236, 238 ; 11 J 3202.
Library of Congress, Washington DC, Bristol papers, container
1, 2, 66.
Published archives
İnanç Atılgan and Garabet Moumdjian (ed.), Archival Documents of the Viennese
Armenian-Turkish Platform, Klagenfurt-Vienna-Ljubjana-Sarajevo: Wieser
Verlag, 2009.
Arthur Beylerian (ed.), Les
Grandes Puissances, l’Empire ottoman et les Arméniens dans les archives
françaises (1914-1918), Paris, 1983.
Hasan Dilan, Les
Événements arméniens dans les documents diplomatiques français,
Ankara : TTK, 2005.
Mehmet Perinçek (ed.), Rus
Devlet Arşivlerinden. 100 Belgede Ermeni Meselesi, İstanbul: Doğan Kitap,
2007.
Printed primary sources
Avedis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar, The Armenian Question Before the Paris Peace Conference, Paris,
1919.
Paul Bernard, Six mois
en Cilicie, Aix-en-Provence, éditions du Feu, 1929.
H. Katchaznouni, The
Armenian Revolutionary Federation Has Nothing to Do Anymore, New York:
Armenian Information Service, 1955, http://ia600602.us.archive.org/14/items/armenianrevolution00katc/armenianrevolution00katc.pdf.
Mikael Varandian, Le
Conflit arméno-géorgien et la guerre du Caucase, Paris: Imprimerie M.
Flinikowski, 1918, http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5607240t.r=.langFR
Mikael Varandian, L’Arménie
et la question arménienne, Laval : Imprimerie moderne, 1917.
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