INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
ISSUE NO. 1 ( 2012/2 )
SOVIET POLICY OF FORCIBLE REFORMING AGRICULTURE IN UZBEKISTAN (1925-1933)
renders the analysis of complex and dramatic events, which took place
in agriculture of
Keywords: The Soviet power, Bolsheviks, agriculture, land-and-water reform, confiscation, dispossession the kulaks, class struggle, collectivization.
The essence of totalitarianism of Soviet power was clearly displayed in
the first years of its existence. The repressive policy of Soviet power in
Land-and-water reform was the first stage in accomplishing the Bolshevist strategy
in agriculture. According to the Bolshevik administration, feudal relations
that were represented in small groups of landowners and bay-kulak (large and medium landowners), which represented one
third of all cultivated lands, were not liquidated in kishlaks (village, countryside) yet. As the Soviets addressed this
problem, they “severely exploited” the lower and middle classes of society.
Therefore, these circumstances put forward the next tasks before the Bolshevist
party and Soviet power – entering upon the implementation of land and water
In the beginning of the 1920s, the policy of stimulating the development
of commodity-money relations was carried out. However, for the Bolshevist leaders,
this policy resulted in double consequences; on the one hand, it inspired the
accumulation of “socialist elements” in Soviet economy through the
amplification of positions of state-owned capital, while on the other, it
provided the opportunity for the strengthening of private capital through its
coupling with minor land owners (smallholders) - the dehqonlar (in Uzbek), dekhkane or dekhkanstvo
(in Russian). Private trading capital witnessed its greatest development
and retail trade was completely in its hands”. For the Bolshevist
party with its strategic goal to build
socialism, that should lack “antagonistic classes and exploiters”, the policy unwittingly represented such “danger” as a real “threat” to
accomplishing of those objectives. The party of the Bolsheviks considered that
the basic preconditions for carrying out the agrarian reform in
Land-and-water reform should have become the first important step in radical, forced breakage of old land relations functioning during several centuries in agricultural
Land-and-water reform as the first stage of forced reorganization of agriculture in
Prior to land-and-water
reform, land measuring works that accounted the amount and size of the economies, irrigated
lands, draught cattle and implements were conducted. Thus, on 2 December 1925,
at the Emergency session of the Central Executive Committee (Tsentralnyi
Ispolnitelnyi Komitet, hereinafter TsIK) of the Soviets (Councils) of the Uzbek
Soviet Socialist Republic (hereinafter UzSSR) decrees were adopted “On nationalization of
land and water resources”, “On land-and-water
reform”. The given normative
documents became the basis for accomplishing the land-and-water reform by compulsory-repressive methods. The Bolshevist political
leadership provided carrying out the land-and-water
reform in two stages. At the first
stage it was accomplished in the
Soon, after adoption of these documents by the Central Executive Committee of UzSSR, the Communist Party (hereinafter CP) of Uzbekistan issued a circular on the tasks of the party organizations in connection with carrying out the land-and-water reform in which it was specified that success of the reform depends on simultaneously solving such problems, as “complete liquidation of feudal relations and the nationalization of land and water and allotted them to workers in the probably shortest terms”. Therefore the command - administrative and mass principles have been laid as a basis of reforms being accomplished. Thus, it has been emphasized that “carrying out the land-and-water reform should be rapid, and by spring of 1926 it is necessary to finish it as extension of terms is associated with the general decline in agriculture and cotton-growing, first of all … the sluggishness and hesitation can cause a number of political complications in kishlaks, and kindle mass struggle (noted by - Bakhodir Pasilov).
Yet, the rapidity that the reform was carried out caused many negative
phenomena in development of agriculture of
The command - administrative and repressive methods of carrying out of
land reform stirred dissatisfaction not only among large landowners, but also
clergy and middle
class peasants. As we stated
above, the political leadership of
In this oblast, first of all, they liquidated large-scale households and
34 regional Soviet workers were engaged in that. The given work was implemented
so quickly that some of the owners had no time to read the decree on the land
reform. This certainly provoked some resistance to
the decree. However, these facts were considered by Communist party of
Proceeding from such estimation of the political situation, the Party and Soviet organs of the republic resorted to repressive measures in order to suppress the resistance of large owners, clergy, and in some cases, and the middle class peasants. These measures resulted in “…open suits at law versus "terrorists" (-B.P.) and their inspirers, as well as everybody hiding land and agricultural implements, equipment from confiscation as well as waging anti-soviet propaganda”.
On December 16, 1926, the TsIK of Councils and the SNK UzSSR adopted the decree “On land-and-water reform in the Zerafshanoblast” that planned to carry out land-and-water reform in this oblast on the following grounds:
To make complete withdrawal and transfer to the state land fund the following categories of lands:
а) the households having in use the area of the irrigation land 35 desyatines and above, regarding as large - bay households, irrespective of the place of stay of their owners;
households belonging to former emir’s top officials (the
1) in the central administration - koshbegi (prime minister), qozi kalon (the chief judge), lashkar-boshi (the commander of emir’s armies), mirshab (the chief of police), divan - begi (the chief clerk of office), emir’s advisers (djamoa), etc.;
2) in viloyat (regional) administration – bek (heads of local administration), zakatchi (officials of tax administration), qozi (judge), rais and mirshab (policeman), etc.
In addition to the large-scale estates and the emir’s land and property, the owners of the households who were not residing in a kishlak and not processing the land by their own forces were liable to complete withdrawal of land, and the entire work cattle was to be sold out compulsively.
The provisions of the present document clearly show that land-and-water reform was carried out according to class principles. In spite of this, such categories of citizens as Red Army-men, the officials of the Soviet and Party (Bolshevist) machinery, etc. did not cultivate their lands themselves or neither did the members of their family, their landed property was not confiscated.
Summing up the land-and-water reforming in the Zerafshan oblast, the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist party (of Bolsheviks) of Uzbekistan emphasized that “the reform, in practice setting farm workers and the poor peasants jointly with middle peasants against the bays “having unleashed class struggle” (-B.P.) in the kishlak, and created the basic preconditions to final Sovietization.
During the period of enacting reform in the Zeravshan okrug (region), many categories of land, households, and property were liquidated:
1) 11 large-scale households with an area of
3677.75 tanap (the local land measure, 1 tanap is equal
2) 56 “non-labor” (-B.P.) households that consisted of75 tanap of lands of merchants (traders) and the other townspeople, and from them there was “compulsorily bought out” (read it is forcedly taken away - B.P.): 43 bulls, 13 horses, and 4 donkeys;
3) 32 “non-labor” households with an area of 889.5 tanap from which there was “compulsorily bought out”: 34 bulls, 12 horses, and 1 donkey;
4) households (of former emir’s officials) with an area of 287.5 tanap, as well as 10 bulls, 7 horses, 9 donkeys and agricultural stock;
5) from 603 households11504.65 tanap of land was confiscated, and there were “compulsorily bought out”: 351 bulls, 182 horses, and 6 donkeys.
The analysis of the specified facts has shown that the Soviet power through confiscation of not only the lands, but even agricultural stock (including the small implements), as well as work cattle completely deprived the large-scale households from opportunity to cultivate the lands, and thereby it tried “to break class resistance of bay-and-exploitative elements”. And the compulsory purchasing was the latent form of confiscation of property from large-scale households.
The final stage of land-and-water
reform carried out in the
Surkhan-Darya, Kashkadarya and Khorezm okrugs
(regions). The question of land-and-water
reform in these districts was
considered and approved by the Third Congress of the Communist party of
It is necessary to note that the resistance of
former landowners was regarded by the Soviet power as “the resistance of class
enemies and conceptualized as a to revival of the movement "Basmachestvo" (from Uzbek basmachi
which means ‘thief or robber’ .This appellation comes
fromSoviet historiography who mischaracterized the reaction to land-water
reform as an armed resistance of local population against the Soviet power in
Central Asia, which occurred in 1918 - 1933, and its active phase fell on 1918
to 1924 (B.P.); For details see: Radzhabov K.K.
Armed movement in the Turkestani territory against the Soviet regime
(1918-1924). Synopsis of the thesis on
the scientific degree competition of the Doctor of Historical Science.
After completion of statistical-economic inspection in April 1928, the political commissions were formed to direct activities on implementation of land-and-water reform in the Kashkadarya and Surkhan-Darya districts. Work of the commission became the reason of open disobedience in the Khorezm district, where mass dehqon riots alongside with cases of hiding land, cattle, stock, etc. were observed. Other commissions were created by the totalitarian Soviet power "to liquidate" such protest.
Later, on 2 December 1928, the Presidium of the TsIK of Councils of the Uzbek SSR adopted the Decree “On liquidation of large non-labor land tenure in the Khorezm district”. Hence, land-and-water reform was conducted on the basis of Bolshevist strategy “establishment of communistic relations” in the kishlak, therefore, it pursued to liquidate:
· the households which are not cultivating the lands on their own or by work of members of their families;
· the households belonging to the former emir’s top officials, the high-rank clergy, former tsarist officials, emir’s family members, irrespective of the sizes of their land tenure. (Decree on the Khorezm district enlisted the households belonging to khan’s officials and khan’s family members).
Thus, the Soviet totalitarian authority started the liquidation of large-scale households by forced alienation; this was the underlying cause of social structure upheaval of the Uzbek kishlak.
The land commissions, in charge of the implementation of land and water reform, “were overzealous”, and liquidated households and land areas in excess numbers, contradicting those set by the Soviet normative documents.
For example, in the Surkhan-Darya district, the decree of the Soviet government
It appeared that not only large-scale households were confiscated, but also the landholdings of middle peasants. These actions provoked their open protest against the members of the land commissions. Thus, the Komsomol member Hakniyazov who participated in work of the commission was killed by the middle peasants.
Different forms of reprisals were applied in relation to those who showed resistance against land-and-water reforms. For example, the summary records of the session of the presidium of the city council authorized the decision of the Karshi regional land commission about the H.Khatamov's dispatch outside the limits of the district. The decision specified that H.Khatamov waged anti-propaganda against government actions. The district executive committee petitioned before TsIK of the UzSSR for the urgent validation of their decision to dispatch Khatamov, as “especially detrimental element”, on the ground of the farm laborers’ appeals.
Examination of the results of reforming in other districts, such as Khorezm and Kashkadarya, has shown the following:
In total, 532 households were liquidated, of them 200 belonged to
officials, 128 to bays, 52 to
representatives of clergy, 141 to merchants, etc. In total,
However, confiscation fell on some groups of households, which according to their structure should not be liquidated. From the liquidated households, in addition to the land 180 mills, 45 rice scourers, 146 creameries, 313 constructions, 448 heads of work cattle, 154 dray-carts and etc. were confiscated.
In the Kashkadarya district 989 households were liquidated, among them the 339 households belonging to bays, to 195 officials, and to 174 clergy, etc.
After accomplishing liquidation of large-scale households the TsIK in January 1929 issued in addition to available normative documents one more decision; “On additional liquidation of the pomeshchichie (landlord-owned) and large-scale kulak households survived during the land reforming”. The Soviet totalitarian power in motivating the reasons of the given document specified that actions for land-and-water reform were “entirely supported by labor dehqons, and with their active participation were successfully put into life. Nevertheless, in view of "concealment" of their lands by some of owners of large-scale households and landlords during the land reforms, and insufficiently proper work of the regional land commissions, “insufficient activity” almost in all areas “it is found out the existence of certain households according to their characteristics as belonging to the category of non-labor land tenure”.
Therefore, the totalitarian Soviet power whose agrarian policy consisted of forced breakage of centuries old land relations and patterns of ownership in the Uzbek kishlak (countryside), decided to also confiscate the "non-labor" (B.P.) households of pomeshchik (agricultural landlord) type and large-scale kulak landholdings because they were inadmissible and broke the main principles of the Decree of the TsIK of the UzSSR of 2 December 1925 “On nationalization of the land and water”. Hence, it was necessary to accomplish the following tasks: To carry out in the districts of Samarkand, Fergana, Tashkent, Zerafshan and Andizhan complete withdrawal to the state fund of the land plots of the households having in use the areas of the irrigation lands exceeding the norms established by decrees on land-and-water reforming and by instructions issued for promotion of those decrees, with confiscation of property and stock. It is necessary to accomplish the above stated in the order adopted by decrees, decisions and instructions, i.e. to implement complete withdrawal of the lands with confiscation of property and stock from "non-labor" (-B.P.) households and other categories.
As it was seen earlier, these forced measures of the Soviet power generated rightful indignation and resistance of the population. Thus in the Balykchi district I.Azimbaev was killed by K.Amanbaev, a middle peasant. I.Azimbaev was an active participant of the commission on additional curtailing the lands, “concealed from land reform”.
Summing up the land-and-water
reform results carried out in
Stipulated by the totalitarian Soviet power, the land-and-water reform was implemented, “on the basis of demands of broad masses of workers and in interests of farm laborers and poor and middle layers of the population” completely destroyed large-scale - bay-owned households and households of landlord-owned-type”, also hurt “strong bays and kulaks”, “considerably accelerated development of agriculture, in particular, of cotton-growing, and, thus, created conditions for the accelerated reorganization (noted by B.P.) and forced collectivization of agriculture of Uzbekistan.
According to the Bolshevist strategy, only complete liquidation of large, in some cases even close to middle households, would allow them to create the bases of socialist relations in agriculture. Therefore, even after implementation of land-and-water reform on the basis of the additional decision of the TsIK of Councils of the republic they waged the policy of “additional liquidation and additional cuts of the categories of households regarded as owned by the landlords and kulaks, and other of non-labor households” , and it corresponded to the Bolsheviks’ explanation of the class principle of existing state of affairs, hence, those measures have allowed them to limit “exploitative possibilities” of non-labor households belonging to landlords and kulaks”.
Unpreparedness of regional authorities, “insufficiency of supervising work of district authorities, hastiness, and forced methods of carrying out the land-and-water reform and its class character in practice resulted in distortion of even the Bolshevist laws having the forced administrative character, as well as in their accomplishing, outrage mistake were committed in relation to the middle households.
Because of the mass protest of dehqons against carrying out the land and water reforms, the Soviet power had to confess that instead of liquidating the large landowners, middle peasant and in some cases poor peasant’s households were liquidated by Bolsheviks.
Despite the fact that the principal causes of the committed mistakes were hastiness, and unpreparedness of both the population and official organs in relation to this reform, the liquidation of privately held lands and materials continued to be the main objective of the land-water reform policy. The Second Session of the TsIK of Councils put before the People’s Land Commissariat (Narkomzem) of the republic a task “in every possible way to force the implementation of continuous land management in the entire territory of the UzSSR, to reduce as much as possible and in the near future to liquidate completely (noted by B.P.) any non-labor use of the land”, and instead of it to introduce “in mass scale labor land tenure”, thereby to regulate the system of land-and-water relations definitively according to the “socialist reorganization” of agriculture in Uzbekistan.
Policy of liquidation of the kulaks and accomplishing of collectivization: spreading the communal (socialist) pattern of ownership in agriculture of 1929-1933)
The following stage of reprisals and violence in agriculture was associated with a repressive policy of the Soviet power “liquidation of prosperous, rich peasants - owners - kulachestvo or kulaks (in Russian kulak means fist) as a class on the basis of overall collectivization”. However, before its accomplishing the Soviet power had “a corresponding and certain experience” in the organization of collective farms. For example, the initial organization of collective farms – kolkhozes- can be dated 1922. Then collective farms were served by the association " Koshchi " in the organizational aspect, and by Narkomzem (the People’s Commissariat on Land Management) concerning the agrotechnical help, and supply by means was made by the district rural unions through cooperative societies - shirkats. The quantitative growth in number of collective farms as per years is as follows:
1922 - 2;
1923 - 24;
1924 - 64;
1925 - 24;
1925 - 110;
1926 - 345;
1927 - 864.
However, after the strengthening of collective farms the verified data made 822. “The certain experience” of the totalitarian Soviet power during the initial organization period consisted in that even then the forced involving of dehqon masses in the collective organizations took place; such errors were committed by both the particular groups, and by the collective organizations with full connivance of the local Soviet organizations. Besides, such actions were carried out in the atmosphere of assistance to collective construction. For example, there were issued the instructions of the Soviet administrative organs to organize the particular number of collective farms without any account of social and economic preconditions (such case took place in Burkhart). Sometimes, the Narkomzem organized collective farms only by means of blandishments and giving promises (which were not to be fulfilled) to the future members of collective farms. Female artels (cooperative societies) were created more often according to the orders of the Bolshevist authorities, without taking into account preconditions to their organization; the members were hired casually, from different kishlaks, sometimes almost by way of compulsion, sometimes organized from wives of executive Soviet workers and as a result such pseudo kolkhozes disintegrated after a little while.
Some districts arranged a contest among themselves in creation of new collective farms; because one district tried to outdo another in number of created collective farms, many of the created entities were actually fictitious.
For the defense of such actions of Soviet and party organizations, the administrative organs indicated in instructions that “they have insufficiently correctly acquired the slogan of the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist party on collectivization of agriculture”.
Similar arguments for justification of forced and repressive methods of collectivization carried out in 1930-1931, will be used even later, explaining that supposedly it was the fault of the local party and Soviet organizations, instead of the central authorities.
The land-and-water reform which was carried out in Uzbekistan in two stages in 1925-1927, 1927-1929, became the first stage in mass forced change of the “class structure” of the kishlak, but the “socialist reconstruction”, i.e. liquidation of “the kulaks as a class” and accomplishing the total collectivization meant “the in-depth revolution” in life of the kishlak. This process is of course connected to the transition of “socialism omitting capitalism”. Thus, the basis of this revolution was made with forced transformation of the dehqons’ private ownership of the means of production into the communal property.
In the beginning of January 1930, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan issued an instruction to forbid the inclusion of kulaks into collective farms. This decision followed the new line of the Bolshevist policy in relation to kulaks, which was put forward in December 1929, at the All-Union Conference of agrarian-Marxists and the Central Committee of All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks) (hereinafter the VCP (B) Central Committee) confirmed it in its Resolution of January, 5, 1930 “On collectivization rates and measures of the state assistance to collective-farm construction”.
The Resolution stipulated the rates and terms of carrying out the collectivization specified for various districts. Its decisions and the instruction had a class character as it determined, as the basic line of the Bolshevist policy in agriculture, that it was necessary to pass from the policy of restriction of the “exploitative tendencies of the kulaks” to the policy of liquidation of the kulaks as a class.
As is known, the collectivization policy was adopted yet in the Fifteenth Congress of VCP (B). It was planned to collectivize 20 % of the land area under crops toward the end of the first Five-Year Plan, i.e. by 1933.
However, the decision of the VCP (B) Central Committee reconsidered the initial term, “… instead of collectivization of 20 % of arable lands under crops stipulated by the Five-Year Plan, we can solve the problem of collectivization of the vast majority (noted by - B.P.) of peasants’ households, at that the collectivization of such important grain-growing districts … can be principally accomplished by autumn of 1930 or … in the spring of 1932. As is seen from the given project, the totalitarian center “lead the way” in changing the terms of implementing collectivization toward acceleration of its rates; but when such steps were undertaken by the political management of Uzbekistan they were rebuked that “transfer of the accelerated rates of collectivization from the center of the USSR into districts of Central Asia we regard unreasonable”.
As for the term established by the center about the completion of
Prior to the above mentioned Decision, the Plenum of the Executive
Bureau of the Central Committee on 14 December 1929 and on 21 January 1930
adopted the Decision on declaring the Fergana and Andizhan districts as the
districts of overall collectivization and the completion of collectivization in
these districts in 1930/1931. Also, following the January Plenum decisions, on
11 February 1930 seventeen more districts were declared as districts of overall
collectivization. Thus, the Bolshevist leaders of
Local party organs also tended "not to lag behind" in
acceleration of rates of collectivization in their districts. For example, the
Excessive haste and pursuit of high rates of collectivization in January - February 1930 assumed a kind of mass character. The principle of voluntariness was violated. Instead of “attacks on kulaks”, as it was proclaimed by the Soviet political leaders, a number of the organizations “slipped down” onto the way of struggle with middle peasants, forcedly “registering” and incorporating them in collective farms. Some administrative organs carried out the policy of “liquidation the kulaks as a class” by the Bolshevist methods - immediate universal liquidation of the kulak households, everywhere, and in the shortest terms”.
The repressive and forced policy of the Soviet power toward dehqonstvo resulted in anti-soviet riots and even in armed uprising not only in
1) the apparatus of local officials conducting collectivization is extremely weak, almost none of the district org-men knows what a collective farm is and how it is necessary to organize it.
2) the decision on transition to overall collectivization was made exclusively on the basis of the decision of the local apparatus in the district and at the meeting of the body of active kishlak functionaries. The dehqon gatherings were informed of the decisions, and offered to elect the board of collective farms.
explanations given to the peasants about collective-farm construction, were
reduced simple documentation such as,
“to enter the name in collective farms necessarily, those failed to be
written (not enrolled) would be deprived of water, imposed with large taxes,
and taken off from the state supply and deported outside boundaries of
4) During the organization of collective farms the following took place: attributing the middle peasants to the category of bays (noted by - B.P.), house-to-house searches, etc.
The similar sort of bureaucratic administering, violence and repressive
methods toward dehqons were allowed in other districts of
As operative report OGPU testifies to that during 15-20 February
As we stated above, the most mass-volume actions of dehqons’ against collectivization occurred in the
Thus in the Mitan district of Samarkand province, the Soviet power representatives who came with purpose of organizing collective farms, carried out explanatory work in Russian by way of sending out of advertisements. The lists of the cattlemen "who entered" into collective farms were also made without their consent. In the Zamin district at the assemblies concerning the organization of collective farms the functionaries "had explained": “to be enrolled in the collective farm literally means to have a common cauldron (pool), a common cup and a common bed”. In some kishlaks the organization of collective farms was carried out by the administrative, compulsory order: the lists were made in absentia and those enlisted were declared collective farmers.
Active participants of anti-kolkhoz movement were women as well. For
example in the beginning of February
Wide scope of anti-Soviet and anti-kolkhoz actions compelled the
political leaders of the republic to admit as “politically erroneous”
application by party organs of forced, repressive methods in carrying out the
collectivization. Thus, on 11 February 1930, an Executive Bureau of the Central
Committee of CP of Uzbekistan discussed the question on the Mirzachul district,
in which the Soviet administrative organs wanted within one night (noted
by - B.P.) to
dispossess all the bays. As it was stated in the Central Committee’s
Resolution “rough distortion of the Party policy in liquidation of the kulaks as
class in work of the local organizations (Mirzachul, Yangiyul, the
а) replacement and substitution by administrating the self-activity of farm-laborer's and poor-and-middle peasants in liquidation of the kulaks;
b) applying the actions which the party carries out against the kulaks to the middle peasants;
c) carrying out dekulakization by methods of 1918-1920, i.e. when the kulak-owned lands, the stock, and property were to be distributed among the poor and the middle peasants;
d) Practical raising a question and carrying out dekulakization outside the districts of overall collectivization.
Therefore, the political leaders of the republic proposed “to intensify the struggle” against any attempts “to separate dekulakization from carrying out the overall collectivization and, moreover, to replace overall collectivization by dekulakization”.
In April 1930, the Fifth Plenum of the CP (B) Central Committee of Uzbekistan was held. Its Resolutions stated that in particular districts there were continuing attempts to reduce the struggle against kulachestvo only to administrative - repressive measures. This plenum also emphasized the necessity to intensify the political work among the middle peasants, to check scrupulously the performance of party instructions regarding the struggle against excesses toward the middle peasants (wrong disfranchisement, imposition of an individual tax, crediting, etc.)
The Plenum suggested all local party organs to check up and provide performance of the decision of the center on prohibition of the markets closing and restoration of markets, on interdicting the sale their products in the markets by peasants, including collective farmers.
In accordance with the spirit of that time and methods of struggle of the Soviet totalitarian power against their ideological opponents, the Bolshevist leaders admitted that “rough distortions in the party policy toward the middle peasants, taken place during the collectivization objectively helped our class enemies (emphasis added - B.P.)
Despite the numerous protests of the local population sometimes passed to the armed revolt against the Soviet policy of forced collectivization, the Bolsheviks continued this policy. However, they were compelled to take into consideration the developed state of affairs. They had to insert some corrections. On 2 March 1930, the I. Stalin’s article "Dizziness from successes" was published, where the leader of the Bolshevist party explained “the party policy in collective-farm construction and focused the party political cadres on correction of the faults in the collective-farm movement, on consolidating the "successes" (-B.P.) of collectivization”.
In such a way, the Soviet power through the methods of reprisals of owners and confiscation of their property by 1933 had managed to destroy private property in agriculture and carry out the total collectivization which was estimated by the Bolsheviks as the victory of socialism in the countryside. Thus the dehqons were put under the total control of the Soviet totalitarian authority.
1. Taken as a whole, the land-and-water
reform became the first and
significant step of the totalitarian Soviet power in liquidation of large
private property in land, which within many centuries determined the level of
development of agriculture in
2. The change of the form of ownership in agriculture, i.e. liquidation
of private property in land and the forced establishment of the collective
(communal, collective-farm) property was a leitmotif of the agrarian policy of
the Bolsheviks. Because in accordance with their general concept for
construction of socialism in the
Thus, the second half of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s became the critical periods in social and economic life of the dehqons. The forced methods of transformations in the following years exerted very strong influence on transformation of society, on mentality of people, who became objects of the Bolshevist experiment with the name “construction of socialism in the backward, separately taken country”. Those changes were linked with both positive socio-economic aspects as well as negative, but at times even with tragic moments of history.
Kommunisticheskaya partiya Uzbekistana v
rezolyutsiyah i resheniyah s`ezdov i plenumov TsK (1925-1986). In four volumes.
Kommunisticheskaya partiya Uzbekistana v rezolyutsiyah... Vol. I. p. 19
Socialisticheskoe pereustroystvo sel'skogo
hozyaystva v Uzbekistane (1917-1926 gg.). Sbornik dokumentov. -
Socialisticheskoe pereustroystvo sel'skogo hozyaystva v Uzbekistane... p. 249-250.
Ibid. p. 250.
Ibid. p. 279.
Tsentral'niy Gosudarstvenniy Arkhiv Respubliki
Socialisticheskoe pereustroystvo … p. 257.
Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii
TsGA RUz, f. Р-225, op. 1, d.
TsGA RUz, f. Р-225, op. 1, d.
Podgotovka usloviy sploshnoy kollektivizatsii
v Uzbekistane (1927-1929). Sbornik dokumentov.
TsGA RUz, f. Р-837, op. 26, d.
Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii … p. 249
Podgotovka usloviy sploshnoy kollektivizatsii … p. 83-84.
Ibid. p. 84
TsGA RUz, f. Р-86, op. 1, d.
Podgotovka usloviy sploshnoy kollektivizatsii … p. 91.
Ibid. p. 96-97.
Ibid. p. 91.
Podgotovka usloviy sploshnoy kollektivizatsii... p. 98.
TsGA RUz, f. Р-86, op. 1, d.
Ibid l. 143.
TsGA RUz, f. Р-86, op. 1, d.
Ibid, l. 144.
Uzbekskaya pravda. 1929, 17 aprelya (№ 45).
Podgotovka usloviy sploshnoy kollektivizatsii … p. 102.
Ibid. p. 103.
Podgotovka usloviy sploshnoy kollektivizatsii p. 105.
Ibid. p. 318.
Ibid. p. 319.
Ibid. p. 329.
Podgotovka usloviy sploshnoy kollektivizatsii... p. 346.
See. Tragediya sredneaziatskogo kishlaka: kollektivizaciya,
raskulachivanie, ssilka. 1925- 1955. Dokumenti i materiali. Vol. 1.
Tragediya sredneaziatskogo kishlaka … Vol. I. p. 53.
Ibid p. 57.
Kommunisticheskaya partiya Uzbekistana v
rezolyuciyah s`ezdov i plenumov TsK (1925-1981). In four volumes. Vol.1.
Tragediya sredneaziatskogo kishlaka … Vol. 1. p. 53-56.
Kommunisticheskaya partiya Uzbekistana v rezolyuciyah … Vol. 1. p. 513.
Kommunisticheskaya partiya Uzbekistana v rezolyuciyah. p. 58.
Tragediya sredneaziatskogo kishlaka … Vol. 1. p. 58.
Ibid. p. 79-80.
Tragediya sredneaziatskogo kishlaka … Vol. 1. p.80.
Ibid. p. 169.
Ibid. p. 91.
Tragediya sredneaziatskogo kishlaka. p. 60.
Arkhiv Apparata Prezidenta Uzbekistana. (AAP RUz.) f. 58, op. 5, d. 47, ll. 85-88.
Kommunisticheskaya partiya v rezolyuciyah i resheniyah s`ezdov … Vol. 1. p. 521.
Ibid. p. 522.
Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. М. 1959.p. 423-424.
Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi partii …p.427.
Arkhiv Apparata Prezidenta Uzbekistana. (AAP RUz.) Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, М. 1959
partiya Uzbekistana v rezolyuciyah s`ezdov i plenumov TsK (1925-1981). In four
volumes. Vol.1. 1925-1937.
sploshnoy kollektivizatsii v Uzbekistane (1927-1929). Sbornik dokumentov.
pereustroystvo sel'skogo hozyaystva v Uzbekistane (1917-1926 gg.). Sbornik
Gosudarstvenniy Arkhiv Respubliki
Tragediya sredneaziatskogo kishlaka
Uzbekskaya pravda. 1929, 17 aprelya (№ 45).
*B. Pasilov - PhD., Senior research fellow,
Institute of the History,
© 2010, IJORS - INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN STUDIES