ISSN: 2158-7051 ==================== INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN STUDIES ==================== ISSUE NO. 1 ( 2012/2 ) |
THE RISE OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM – FOOTSTEPS OF THE SLAVOPHILES ? : UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF NATIONALISM AS A STATE POLICY
IN RUSSIA
ANIL ÇİÇEK*
Summary
This paper
argues that nationalism is
gaining strength in Russia. The recent demonstrations in Moscow and in various
cities are revealing the fact that the growing nationalist tendencies in Russia
are now deviating into a racist and xenophobic character. The paper defines Kremlin’s policies to use
nationalist ideas as tools to reconfigure general political discourse as being
one of the most important factors in nationalism’s recent resurgence in Russia.
Thus, in an attempt to explore the main ideologies and concepts which shape
Kremlin’s nationalist doctrine, the paper takes a brief look into the
development of the Russian idea, National identity and nationalism in Russia.
Finally, the paper tries to make a clear definition of the ideology of state
nationalism in Russia under Putin administration.
Key Words:
Nationalism, Racism,
Xenophobia, Russian Idea, Official Nationalism, Slavophilism, Pan-Slavism,
Eurasianism, neo-Official Nationalism, Imperial nostalgia.
Introduction
Since the beginning of December 2010, a series of events have taken
place in Russia demonstrating the increase in xenophobic feelings and
nationalist tendencies among the Russian public. One of the most recent
examples of those incidents have been the December protests in Moscow and in
several other cities in Russia which were realized with a vast participation.
The demonstrators were provoked by the death of a football fan during a fight
with people coming from the North Caucasus republics.
The December demonstrations were extremely nationalist in nature. The
demonstrators often used the slogan of “Russia for the Russians” and they urged
the Russian government to deport the people with Caucasian origin. Some of the
demonstrations turned into riots and were accompanied by attacks on persons who
were “of non-Slavic appearance”. Successive demonstrations by football
supporters and nationalists have taken place in January.
The massive and landslide response that a single violent incident has
created demonstrated the grave dangers that the growing aggressive sort of
nationalism, hatred and xenophobia pose to the stability and security of
Russian public. Between the period of December 2010 and the first week of
January, more than 100 people have been victims of racist attacks, three of
whom have been killed and, 11 wounded or beaten.
After the first demonstration on 11 December, the Russian government
tried to appease the angry crowds by releasing without charge several dozen of
aggressive participants who were arrested. It was only when the protests
started to gather strength that the organisers were arrested, and President
Dmitri Medvedev publicly ordered their harsh punishment. In fear of nationalist
incidents on the occasion of the New Year celebrations in the Red Square, the
police arrested several hundred people from the Caucasus and Asia, some of whom
were removed to the city limits.
During a session of the Russian Council of State on 27 December 2010,
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called for tougher regulations on residency
registration, and the introduction of criminal liability for any failure to
register residence. At a session of the Board of the FSS on 25 January,
Medvedev called xenophobia and ethnic violence a threat to the state, and called
upon the state services to prevent any manifestations of this threat.
Following the nationalist demonstrations, the suicide
attack on the arrivals area of Domodedovo international airport of Moscow on 24
January which left 36 people dead and 180 injured, created a new wave of
nationalist anger and hatred, making the situation even more tensed. The demonstration which was planned by the
nationalists on 25 January to condemn the bomb attack on Domodedovo airport was
banned by preventative measures.
Today, we are witnessing
the “re-emergence” of Russian nationalism at a time Russian Federation is
trying to restore its place as a super power in global politics. Since the
collapse of the former Soviet Union, there have been important developments
fuelling the rise of nationalism in Russia. The war in Chechnya resulting in the deaths of over ten
thousand Russian soldiers, the steady eastward advancement of the US-led NATO
military alliance along Russia’s brittle western borders, the American military
bases in Central Asia, the orange revolutions liberating ex-Soviet countries
from Moscow’s orbit, Washington’s missile defence shield project that includes
some central and eastern European countries, the violent terrorist attacks of
Chechnian radicals in various Russian cities, the war in Georgia and most
recently the incidents of December 2010 played an important role in the rise
of Russian nationalism. These factors,
coupled with the loss of prestige, power and a plummeting standard of living in
the early post-Soviet days, has invigorated the re-emergence of Russian
nationalism both within the Kremlin and in Russia’s governing assembly “State
Duma”. Parties with strong nationalistic platforms based on racial or cultural
views of Slavic superiority strengthened their position in Duma. The extreme
nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky became third in the presidential elections of
1991. In 1996 presidential elections, he was placed fifth with a 5.7 % share in
the first round of the voting. His Liberal Democratic Party[1] received 23% of the vote
in the 1993 Duma elections. In the
latest elections in
2007,
the party received 8.14% of the vote, acquiring 40 of the 450 seats in the State Duma.
It goes without saying,
that one of the most important factors in nationalism’s recent resurgence is,
that the Kremlin’s political technologists have discovered nationalist ideas as
tools to reconfigure general political discourse. Following the example of
nationalist parties, some new youth parties and groups have also emerged
stressing Russian unity and homogeny which were openly backed by the Putin
Administration and by some business circles that had close ties with Kremlin.
The Ukrainian Orange revolution had a profound impact on Russian youth,
primarily university and college students. The educated Russian youth began
organizing a patriotic front. The “Idushchiye Vmeste” (Walking Together)
movement which was created by Vasily Yakimenko in 2000 was deviated into a
second group on 1 March 2005 known as “Nashi” (Ours) as a reaction to the
orange revolution in Ukraine. The movement became very popular among Russian
youth which grew in size to some 120,000 members.
Increasing involvement of the Russian Orthodox Church
into politics has also played an important role in the rise of nationalism. The
Russian Orthodox Church, excluding the Soviet era, has always been the defining
factor as to what is “Russian” and what is not. Orthodoxy has been the
indispensable part of the “Russian soul” and the consciousness of being
Russian. There is an enormous resurgence within the Russian Orthodox Church in
which to be a member of the Church is synonymous with national identity. The
Putin Administration, which has increased its strength by getting the open
support of the Orthodox Church, passed a legislation limiting the influence of
other religions and various Christian denominations such as the Evangelical,
Protestant, and Catholic movements. The Russian Orthodox Church, with several
declarations, has warned of the dangers of the orange revolutions around Russia
which might lead to bloodshed, echoing Putin’s nightmare of a break up of
Russia into smaller states.
The influence of the nationalist circles inside
Kremlin has no doubt played a defining role in the creation of the above
mentioned “state sponsored” nationalism. Putin, with a cautious personality
from his KGB background, has a circle of advisers comprised of two tiny groups
with strong nationalist ideology: first group which is dealing with issues of
national security and international affairs is referred to as the “siloviki”
(men of power) and the second group is “liberals” who provide consultancy on
issues of national economy. The “siloviki” are
mostly officials with military or KGB background who dominate the
country's security and intelligence ministries and believe in the absolute
state control on economic, political, and social life in Russia. The liberals,
albeit believing in free market economy, do not have pluralistic democracy and
human rights as priority topics in their agenda.
Russian nationalism, albeit in rise, cannot be
perceived as the same notion that prevailed in the early years of post-Soviet
Russia. In the period of Boris Yeltsin, nationalism was assorted with other
ideologies such as communism. Today, Russian nationalism is mostly focused on a
patriotic rhetoric and strengthening opposition against the moral and spiritual
decay of Russian values. It has deviated into a multifaceted phenomenon,
ranging from moderate displays of national unity to those extremist
organizations that advocate intolerance and racism against those of non-Slavic
origin. The Russian Orthodox Church is actively involved in the “state
sponsored” new nationalism to preserve “Russian values” against foreign and
domestic threats.
Whatever we think of the Russian state, there is no
doubt that it has undergone a remarkable recovery under Vladimir Putin’s
leadership. Since coming to power in 1999, Putin has purposefully employed
Russian imperial nostalgia and ethnocentric thinking for the restoration of the
Russian national pride. By appealing to Russian
nationalism and the past glories of both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet
Union, Putin administration has been very successful in boosting the morale
among Russians. The results of a poll[2] published by the
All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Studies demonstrated that the supporters
of the slogan "Russia for Russians"[3] rose from 46% in 1998 to
58% in 2005. Currently it seems that the number of supporters of this slogan is
even above the number indicated by this poll. These figures show that the
“state sponsored nationalism” introduced by Putin administration is prevalently
supported and cherished by the Russians.
For a better understanding of the dynamics under the
resurgence of nationalist tendencies in today’s Russia, it would be appropriate
to briefly examine the foundations of the “Russian Idea” and the emergence of
the early ideas of nationalism in Russia. This will enable us to make a
comparison between the current nationalism in Russia and the one which
prevailed in different forms and concepts in the past. Such a brief analysis
may give us clues for a better definition of current nationalist tendencies.
The
Foundations of “Russian Idea”
Throughout its history, Russia has been estranged from
European dynamics. Its nationalism and national ideology are marked by a double
game of attraction and revulsion towards Europe in particular and the West in
general.[4] From the 10th to the 13th
centuries, the Kievan Rus’[5] (Russia of Kiev) was
well-integrated into the medieval economic system. However, the Tartar invasion
which resumed in 1237 and lasted more than 250 years, tore Russia away from the
West. The invasion, facilitated by the breakup of Kievan
Rus’ which was followed by the division of
the East Slavic people into three separate nations : modern day Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Despite having devastating consequences
for the Kievan Rus’, the Tartar rule played an important role in the rise of
Moscow and subsequently the Russian
Empire. When the Principality of Moscow
reorganized itself and rolled back the Tartar invaders, a new Russia was born
which considered itself as the heir of Orthodox Byzantium, different from the
Catholic and Protestant West. The victory of Moscow began the Russian drive towards
the Siberian vastness.
The rise of Peter the Great has marked a turning point
in Russian History. The great reforms and westernization process initiated by
Peter the Great is described as “the Petrine revolution”[6] by Sergei Mihailovic
Solov’ev, who is probably the greatest Russian historian of all times.
Solov’ev, in his famous work History of
Russia from the Earliest Times, argued that the transformations
(preobrazovanija) of Muscovite state and society undertaken by Peter were both
necessary and unavoidable. The Westernization process of Peter liberated Russia
from her medieval “clannishness” and oriented her to Europe. The instrument
used to give momentum to this process was “civilization”.
The emancipation of nobles by Peter from obligatory
state service in 1762 has started a period of journeys by the Russian
aristocracy to the Western capitals such as Paris, London, Amsterdam and
Vienna. This period is coined by Orlando Figes with the term “The Grand Tour”[7]. The travel literature
that accompanied this traffic played a vital role in shaping Russia’s
self-perception vis-à-vis the West. Famous writer, poet and
historian Nikolai Karamzin, after travelling around Europe, came to the
conclusion that European people had a different way of thinking than
Russians.
Karamzin’s doubts were shared by many educated
Russians as they struggled to define their “Europeanness”. Europe was described
as “corrupt”, “decadent”, “false” and “superficial”, “materialist” and
“egoistical” by famous writers such as Fanvizin, Herzen and Dostoevsky. The constant repetition of these epithets
signalled the emergence of an ideology – a distinctive view of Russia in the
mirror of the West. The idea that the West was morally corrupt was echoed by
virtually every writer from Pushkin to the Slavophiles. Herzen and Dostoevsky
placed it at the heart of their messianic visions of Russia’s destiny to save
the fallen West.[8]
Russia, under Peter the Great, sought Europe’s
approval and wanted to be recognized as equals by it. However, she was also uncertain
about her place in Europe. Did Russia belong to West or East? Russia’s educated
élites were aware that Russia was not “Europe”. If Russia could not become a
part of “Europe”, it should take more pride in being “different”. In this
nationalist mythology the “Russian soul” was awarded a higher moral value than
the material achievements of the West. It had a Christian mission to save the
world.[9]
The French Revolution of 1789 and the following
Jacobin reign of terror badly shook the belief among Russia’s educated élites
that Europe was the source of progress and enlightenment. The Russian
aristocracy which was immersed in French culture, became opponents of France
and Europe when Russia went to war with France under Napoleon.
At the height of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in
1812, many officers discovered that it was the peasants and the serfs who were
the real patriots. These officers later would stand up for the “nation” and the
“people’s cause”, in what would become known as the Decembrist[10] uprising on 14 December
1825.
The young Decembrist leader, Colonel Pavel Ivanovish
Pestel, envisaged a nation state ruling in the interests of the Great Russians.
The other national groups - the Finns, the Georgians, the Ukrainians, and so on
- would be forced to dissolve their differences and “become Russian”. Only the
Jews were beyond assimilation and, Pestel thought, should be expelled from
Russia. Such attitudes were commonplace among the Decembrists as they struggled
in their minds to reform the Russian Empire on the model of the European
national states.[11]
Despite being an unsuccessful attempt to re-shape the political structure of
Russia, the Decembrist uprising had indispensable contributions to the
development of the idea of “Russian superiority” over the non-Russian
communities and constituted an important milestone in the awakening of the
“Russian consciousness and identity”.
The victory of 1812 promoted a new interest and pride
in Russia’s past. The masterpiece of Nikolai Karamzin, History of the Russian State, which was published in 1818 was
considered as the re-discovery of the Russian history and the Russian pride.
The common conviction among the educated élites that Russia’s history started
with the process of Westernization under the reign of Peter the Great rapidly
faded away. The distant past of Russia became a valuable source, where the
answers to the questions about the country’s nature and destiny were searched.
Official
Nationalism
In the 1830s and 1840s, during the reign of Nicholas
I, the Russian government, for the first and only time until the Bolsheviks
seized power, formulated an official ideology. This ideology, later labelled
Official Nationalism, was promulgated by an array of conservative scholars and
publicist with the support of the crown. It had some points in common with the
Slavophile doctrine, except that, while extolling Russia’s unique virtues, it
was not anti-Western: Peter the Great, anathema of the Slavophiles, was the
doctrine’s idol.[12]
The Official Nationality ideology had its origins in a
statement which was made in March 1832 by Count Sergei Uvarov (1786 – 1855) to
Nicholas I. His ideology was based on three concepts: orthodoxy, autocracy and
nationality. Orthodoxy meant devotion to Russian Orthodox Church and the return
to the spiritual roots of pre-Petrine Russia. The affirmation of the principle
of autocracy meant a return to the old Muscovite notion of autocracy as the
basic and permanent feature of Russian statehood. Finally, nationality was
interpreted by Uvarov as devotion to the Russian national heritage and
spiritual make-up of the people, a refusal to trust Western Europe as a model
for Russia, or Western European theories as at all relevant for Russia.[13]
The ideology of Official Nationalism prevailed as the
official political doctrine until February 1917. The successor of Nicolas I,
Alexander II was the only Tsar who did not strictly followed the ideology.
However, it was faithfully adhered to by the two last Emperors, Alexander III
and Nicholas II.
Slavophilism
The etymological meaning of “Slavophilism” is “love of
Slavs”. However, this term was used to define a group of ideologists who formed
a romantic and nationalist group of opposition to the trend known as
“Westernism” (zapadnichestvo).
Slavophilism first emerged in Poland in the very
beginning of the 17th century. The earliest repercussions of this
ideology in Russia occurred in 1820s among intellectual circles organized by
young idealists such as Vladimir Fyodorovich Odoyevsky. However, the ideology
strongly appeared as a response to Peter Chadeev’s famous work First Philosophical Letter which was
published in 1836. In his brief essays, Chadeev raised the question of Russia’s
place in the world history. The discussion launched by Chadeev created a
controversy between the Slavophiles and Westerners which dominated the Russian
political thought until the modern times.
The classical Slavophiles were a remarkably
homogeneous group who were members of a small number of noble families. The
most outstanding thinkers of Slavophilism were Ivan Kireevsky (1806 – 56),
Aleksei Khomiakov (1804 – 60), Konstantin Aksakov (1817 – 60) and Yury Samarin
(1819 – 76). Their intellectual home was Moscow, where they had their
education. They considered St. Petersburg as a symbol of corruption of the
Russian life by the hostile West.
The central issue of the Slavophile ideology was
Russia’s relationship with Western Europe. According to the Slavophiles,
Russia’s exclusion from the Roman Heritage was the essential feature
distinguishing her from Europe. Russia had been spared this fatal heritage and
was therefore, established on purely Christian principles that were in complete
harmony with the spirit of the Slavic peasant commune. The West was poisoned by
shallow rationalism and racked by class antagonism from which Russia was saved
by her Byzantine heritage and Slavic spirit.
The greatest difficulty faced by the Slavophiles in
their interpretation of Russian history was to find an adequate explanation for
the Petrine reforms. The Petrine reforms, according to the Slavophiles, cut the
links between upper strata and the common people and created an insurmountable
gap between the people (narod) and the enlightened elite (obshchestvo) that had
adopted Western ways. The return of the enlightened sections of the society to
the fold of Orthodoxy and the “native principles” preserved in the village
commune seemed to offer the only hope of a cure for Russia.[14]
The Slavophile ideology has no doubt occupies an
important place in the process of the development of national identity and
nationalism in Russia. Its contribution to the awakening of self-awareness
among the Russian nation with its distinctions and individualities is indisputable.
The repercussions of the Slavophile doctrine, in fact, can still be seen in
current Russia where the long lasting debate whether Russia is European or
Eastern is increasingly lively.
Pan-Slavism
The ideology of Pan-Slavism played almost no role
during the Middle Ages and Muscovite period. An echo of Pan-Slavic idea was
seen in the manifesto of Peter the Great to the Balkan Slavs which was issued
during his war against the Ottoman Empire. Modern Pan-Slavism also was not born
in Russia. It originated among the southern and western Slavs in the first half
of nineteenth century. However it gradually found reflections in Russia. The
first significant group of adherents were one of the Decembrists organizations,
the Society of United Slavs. They envisaged the liberation of western and
southern Slavs and the creation of a Slavic federation in which Russia would be
an equal member. After the failure of the Decembrists, the Pan-Slavic idea was
picked up by the conservative Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin. He became the chairman
of the main Pan-Slavic organization the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society.[15]
Unlike the Slavophiles, the Pan-Slavic group was
rather loose and heterogeneous. The group assumed a pivotal role in championing
the cause of Balkan Slavs during the Balkan wars of 1875-78. During those
years, the influence of the Pan-Slavic group reached its climax and gained a
considerable public support. Finally, the liberation of the southern Slavs from
Turkish rule was accepted by the government as an official policy by Alexander
II.
Nikolai Yakovlevich Danilevsky was the advocate of a
more extreme sort of Pan-Slavism.
According to him Slavs had the potential to produce great civilization
similar to the Western. He argued that under the direction of Russia, the Slavs
must seize Constantinople, re-assume the role of Byzantium, and build an
imperishable empire. However, in order to realize this aim, the Slavs had to
liberate themselves from their German and Turkish rulers and to join to Russia.
Against Danilevsky’s program, the philosopher
Konstantin Leontiev wanted an alliance between Islam and Orthodoxy against the
liberal ferment of dissolution from the West. He opposed all conflict between
Russians and Ottomans in the Balkans. The enemy was above all Anglo-Saxon.
Leontiev’s vision still appeals to many Russians today.
The Pan-Slavic ideology based on the superiority of
the Slavs and the utopia to bring them together has been an important milestone
in the overall process of the development of Russian nationalism.
The
Impact of Russian Literature on the Development of Russian National
Awareness
In addition to the theories developed by political
thinkers and philosophers, Russian literature and the works of great writers
played a very important role in the awakening of national awareness and the
fledgling of nationalist sentiments in Russia. Their works reached to millions
– especially to common people – and thus, were in many ways more effective than
the official ideologies or the nationalist doctrines of the educated élites.
Pushkin, most probably the greatest poet and writer of
Russia, has always been a source of national pride for Russians. He is among
the leading writers who have reflected the “Russian soul” and “Russian folk” in
their works. Pushkin had a strong European type of education and this European
heritage was seen in his early works. Yet, for all Western inclinations,
Pushkin was a poet with a Russian voice. He was practically brought up by his
peasant nurse, whose tales and songs became a lifelong inspiration for his
verse.[16]
He strongly felt the obligation to develop a language
that could be understood by every Russian citizen. Pushkin is often considered
as the first writer who established a link between the educated higher strata
and the common Russian people. He used a simple and comprehensible Russian
tongue which reached from the simplest peasant to the highest prince. Love to
the motherland, the search for the Russian soul, solidarity and brotherhood
among Russians were themes which Pushkin used in his works to awaken and
distinguish the Russian identity and the patriotic feelings.
Young Dostoevsky was a member of Petrashevsky Circle
and he was condemned to death by the Tsar for his activities against the
government. His death penalty was changed to hard labour in Siberia with a last
minute reprieve. His hard labour work in Omsk was a turning point in the
writer’s life. After being released, he returned writing with completely
different ideas. He called for “a return to the soil” and opposed the ideas of
the radical intelligentsia. He argued that the true way was to return to the
“purely national” and truly Christian values of the Russian people. The
ordinary Russian people with simple origins who have been his companion
throughout his hard labour penalty have played an important role in
Dostoevsky’s metamorphosis. During those years he realized the difference
dividing the common Russian people from the Westernized intelligentsia.
Against the rational egoism of European capitalism
Dostoevsky set the ideal of the authentic fraternal community preserved in
Orthodoxy and Russian folk traditions.[17] With his strong
opposition to socialism, his devotion to Russian Orthodox Church and his
attachment to the Russian values and traditions, Dostoevsky has no doubt been a
follower of the Slavophiles. However, the “universally human mission of the
Russian people” was much stronger in Dostoevsky than in classical Slavophilism.
He played an important role in the resurgence of interest in religion (the
so-called “religious renaissance”) among many educated Russians in the 20th
century. Dostoevsky also believed that the liberation of Slavic people from
Turkish rule and the conquest of “Constantinople” were Russia’s mission. These
views demonstrate Dostoevsky’s belief in the ideology of Pan-Slavism as well.
Nikolai Gogol, who was in fact a Ukrainian, fell in
love with local peasantry and with their simple life style and traditions.
Gogol’s divine vision was inspired by his champions, the Slavophiles, whose
fantasy of Russia as a holy union of Christian souls. In his famous novel “Dead Souls”, Gogol tried to picture the
“Russian soul” which would save the Christian world. The concept of a national
soul or essence was commonplace in the Romantic age, though Gogol was the first
to give the “Russian soul” this messianic turn. The “Russian principle” of Christian
love, to be revealed by Gogol would save the humanity from the selfish
individualism of the West.[18]
There are numerous works of various writers on the
themes of the search for the Russian soul, Russian identity and patriotism.
However, in this paper, I wanted to give examples form the most famous Russian
writers who set their seal not only to Russian literature but Russian political
thought as well.
Eurasianism
Historical Eurasianism
is multi-faceted phenomenon and has changed over time. The term “Eurasia” was
first used by Western geographers in the 19th century. When the term entered
into the Russian intellectual discourse, however, it acquired a new cultural and
geopolitical meaning. The Russian interpretation of Eurasianism was actually a
manifestation of late Tsarist Russia's imperial ambitions.
The “Eurasian”
ideologists such as Nikolai Trubetskoi and Pyotr Savitski argued that Russia
has a unique identity and should thus embark on a development course apart from
the West. They saw Russia and Eurasia as sharply separated both from the rest
of Europe and from Asia. In a way, these Eurasianists returned to visions of
Russia that were prevalent in the 16th and 17th centuries. It was an
isolationist philosophy which saw Orthodoxy as a religious ideology that would
serve as a guiding influence for the world.[19]
According to the
Eurasiansits, Russia is not an Eastern part of Europe but a continent in
itself, which occupies the centre of the Eurasian “Heartland” extending from
Moscow to the Urals and the Urals to the Trans-Baikal, This vast and inaccessible “Heartland” should be under
control of Russia including Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Eurasianist thinking played
a definitive role in the Soviet policies of the Cold War era which aimed to
make the Russo-Siberian centre of the USSR inaccessible and unreachable. Eurasianism albeit implicitly present in
Soviet ideology, has never become the official ideology. However, the
“sanctuarization” of the Soviet “Heartland” has been the semi-official ideology
of the Red Army from Stalin to Brezhnev.
Gorbachev and Yeltsin
have been target the of strong criticism of the imperial neo-nationalists, the
national-Communists, patriots and above all, Eurasianists who opposed the
Russian withdrawal from the Eastern-European, Ukrainian, Baltic, and
central-Asian glacis of this “Heartland.”
Nationalism in the Soviet Union
Following the October
Revolution and collapse of the Russian empire there was an increase in national
movements among different nationalities that lived in the country. The
Bolshevik government based its nationalities policy on the principles of
Marxist-Leninist ideology. According to these principles, the new Soviet State
would be based on the “friendship of nations”, all nations should disappear
with time, and nationalism was considered a bourgeois ideology. These principles were reflected in the Declaration of the
Rights of the People of Russia, proclaimed one month after the October
Revolution on 21 November 1917.
However, the Soviet government showed reluctance in following these
ideals. Only Poland, Finland and Baltic countries were able to receive
independence after the October Revolution. When Ukraine declared independence
in 1918, the response of the Soviet Union was severe. The resulting civil war
in Ukraine continued for more than three years and ended with the annexation of
Ukraine by Russia. The resistance of the Central Asian nations against the
Soviet regime continued until the middle of the 1920s and ended with a defeat.
Baltic countries remained independent only until 1940, when the Soviet Army
occupied their territory.
The Soviet Union was
formally established on December 30, 1922. With the understanding of
“internationalism”, the Soviet leadership supported the development of national
language and cultures from 1920s until half of 1930s. In that way, the Soviet
rulers expected to receive the support of non-Russian nationalities to the
Soviet regime. The plan had some limited success. National minorities who were
poorly treated during the Russian Empire, favoured the ideology of internationalism
and national equality in the Soviet Union. However this situation changed from
the second half of the 1930s. The Soviet leadership took steps to enhance the
role of the Russian nation among other nationalities. During this period many
nationalities became the victims of Sovietization. The collectivization of
lands and the deportation of rich peasants to Siberia had devastating results
in the Ukraine where six to seven million people have died of starvation in
1932 – 1933. Religious institutions were devastated, and national literatures,
music, and art were forbidden. The Jewish community was also target of the
Soviet government. By the end of the 1930s almost all Jews were dismissed from
leading positions in the Communist Party and mostly deported to hard labour
camps in Siberia.
By the beginning of the
1940s, the term "unreliable" nationalities
appeared in the official Soviet ideology. The Volga Germans, Chechens, Crimean
Tartars and dozens of smaller nationalities were subject of mass deportation
and collective punishment, based on allegations of collaboration with the
Nazis. The number of deported people under Stalin is estimated to reach 3.5
million. During the hard conditions of World War II, the Soviet leadership felt
the necessity to encourage Russian nationalism. In his victory speech, Josef
Stalin talked about the special qualities of the Russian people. The new Soviet
national anthem praised the role of the Great Russia[20] in the creation of the
Soviet Union.
The
term of Nikita Khrushchev was a period of rehabilitation for the repressed
nationalities. Most of them were allowed to return to their original homes.
However, Crimean Tartars and Volga Germans remained the exception of this
rehabilitation, since their lands had been taken over by Russians and
Ukrainians. Another stunning step of Khrushchev was the presentation of the
Crimea as a “gift” to Ukraine in 1954 despite the fact that the majority its
population was Russian.
During Leonid Brezhnev's
leadership the old slogan, “Friendship of Nations” was accepted as the main
policy towards nationalities question. Nationalism continued to be considered
as a bourgeois ideology and was not tolerated. However, there existed a double
standard toward Russian nationalism. Slogans on the superiority of Russians
over other nations were permitted where as any sort of nationalist slogan was
strictly forbidden for the other nations of the Soviet Union.
There have been
anti-Russian and anti-Soviet sentiments in Baltic republics, where active
nationalists were imprisoned and sent to exile. The Soviet leadership, in an
attempt to appease these nationalist tendencies and dissatisfaction, made
larger investments in Baltic countries compared with those of the other
national republics. However, Russians were considered as occupiers in Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia and thus the Baltic countries were the first to declare
their independence during the time of “perestroika” (1985 - 1991). The Soviet Union finally collapsed in December 1991 and
many nations of the former union began a new chapter in their history as
independent countries.
The Current Situation
According to Prof. B.I.
Cherny, the situation of economic and social chaos following the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the swift decay in social values and traditions played an
important role in the strengthening of nationalist tendencies. However, Cherny
argues that the most important factor which fuelled nationalism in Russia was
the anti-Russian nationalism which appeared in the ex-Soviet republics like
Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Georgia and in some newly emerged independent
states in Central Asia. With the new geopolitical situation following the
fragmentation of Soviet Union, about 25 million of ethnic Russians has
discovered themselves in a situation of minorities. Those ethnic Russians who
remained in various newly emerged independent states have been the target of
racial discrimination and humiliation and this brought the issue of “Russian
diaspora” in a centre of political discourse. Anti-Russian acts in ex-Soviet
republics had a fuelling effect on the growth of Russian nationalism and
neo-imperial tendencies in Russia.[21]
Today we observe
different opinions among political analysts and writers on the categorization
of the existing nationalist currents in Russia. These currents seem to be
fragmented from a populist-Slavophile pole to an extremist xenophobic pole.
However, it seems possible to make a general categorization by dividing the
national nationalist currents into four main groups: the neo-Slavophiles,
Eurasianists, national-Communists, and ethnic nationalists.
The neo-Slavophiles are
considered as the supporters of the theses of Russian novelist and historian
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (1918 – 2008). Solzhenitsyn directed strong criticism to
the newly emerged oligarchic classes of post-Soviet Russia. Meanwhile, he was
an opponent of any sort of nostalgia for Soviet Communism. Opposing to all
sorts of extremist nationalism, he defended a new and moderate patriotism.
Expressing his concerns about the fate of the 25 million ethnic Russians in the
“near abroad” of the former Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn advocated the protection and
development of the national character of the Russian Orthodox Church. In his
great work Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and Tentative Proposals, Solzhenitsyn argued that Russia has to leave the burden of all non-Slav
republics, which he claimed were slowing the development and weakening the
Russian nation. The Nobel Peace Prize owner recommended the creation of a
federation of three Slavic nations namely, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
Solzhenitsyn was criticized for advocating a neo-imperial nostalgia and utopia.
The Eurasianists seem to
be widespread and more influential in the current Russian political arena. They
are inspired by the ideas of famous Russian philosopher, historian and
anthropologist, Lev Gumilev (1912 – 1992). Studying the works of Konstantin Leontyev and Nikolay Danilevsky, Gumilev developed his theory in which he regarded
Russians as a "super-ethnos", kindred to Turkic peoples of the
Eurasian steppe. This common heritage binds Russians with the nations of
Central Asia and necessitates them to develop solidarity against the
destructive influences of the West. According to Gumilev, new Russia must
respect the principle of ethnic pluralism and it should consider the nations of
its periphery as potential allies against the Western influences. In order to
achieve that goal, Russians and the Turkish-speaking peoples of Central Asia
have to unite for a common cause and set aside their religious differences.
Today, the heritage of
Gumilev is cherished not only by leading national-patriotic writers and
journalists but also by politicians, bureaucrats, military officials and
Russian intelligentsia. Aleksandr Dugin is perhaps the best known follower of
Gumilev. Known as the most popular ideologist of Russian expansionism and
nationalism, Dugin has played a leading role in the foundation of the Eurasia
Party which was officially recognized by the Ministry of Justice on 31 May
2001, and is alleged to enjoy the support of the presidential office. His
political activities are focused on the restoration of the Russian Empire in Eurasian sphere. This, according to Dugin, should be done through separation of the former Soviet
republics, such as Georgia and Ukraine, and the
Russian-speaking territories in these countries, especially Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, should be unified with
Russia. His ideas on the establishment of a “Turkic-Slavic” alliance in the Eurasian sphere have recently become
very popular among certain nationalistic circles.
Despite its declining
popularity especially among the youth, the national-Communist movement is still
a force in Russian politics. The national-Communists dream for the continuation
of the Soviet State. However, they are also aware of the reality that the
communist ideology does no longer exist in Russia. The leading figure
representing the national-Communist ideology is Gennady Zyuganov who is the
First Secretary of the Communist Party since 1993. The political propagandas of
Zyuganov’s Communist Party mainly focus on the decline in living standards
following the collapse of Soviet socialism. Communist Party is also a strong
opponent of newly emerged Russian oligarchy who controls most of the economic
assets of the country. According to Zyuganov, increase in violent crime and
ethnic demands to win autonomy are all consequences of the disappearance of
socialism. Thus, the Communist Party advocates a new sort of “socialism” based
on a strong central government guaranteeing personal and economic security of
Russians. Zyuganov has been successful in combining his socialist ideology with
Russian nationalism and his Communist Party became allies with numerous
other left-wing and right-wing nationalist forces, forming a common
“national-patriotic alliance.”[22]
The ethnic nationalists
are the representatives of extreme right in Russia whose goal is to achieve
“ethnic purity” of Russia based on Slavic origin. They are extremely racist,
xenophobic and populist. They advocate the deployment of all people of non-Slavic
origin, especially people from the Caucasus whom they consider as the reason of
the increase in crime and public disorder. They are anti-Semitic and loyal
defenders of the slogan “Russia for Russians”. Today Russian nationalist
intellectuals are mostly gathered around the literary journal Nash
Sovremennik, a periodical with a
nationalist and patriotic content. The articles issued in the said journal vary
from a neo-Orthodox, conservative, neo-nationalist approach to xenophobic and
racist ideologies.
The Ideology of State Nationalism Under Putin
By examining the roots
of national identity and nationalism in Russia, this paper tried to demonstrate
the evolutionary process that the Russian nationalism has passed through since
from the very beginning until the current day. It is that historical
perspective which might give clues about the official state ideology of Russia
under Putin administration in terms of nationalism and national identity.
Since the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian academics, policy-makers, philosophers and
bureaucracy have struggled to develop a new concept that could play a guiding
role in building a new and powerful Russia reminiscent of the imperial past. In
the current debate on how to accomplish the revival of Russia as a great power,
it is obvious that the Westernizers and Eurasianists are playing the most
prominent roles.
Looking at the
nationalist currents in Russia’s history and making a comparison with Putin’s
current policies might help us to define which doctrine is adopted by the
Russian state. “Official Nationalism”
which was introduced by Nicholas I in the 1830s as an official ideology has
surprisingly common features with Putin’s state nationalism. As to recall, the
ideology of Official Nationalism was based on three concepts: orthodoxy,
autocracy and nationality. The repercussions of these three concepts are
visible in Putin’s interpretation of state nationalism. Putin administration
has open support of the Orthodox Church and there has been an apparent revival
of orthodoxy in politics since the beginning of Putin’s presidency. Autocracy
is another undeniable aspect of Putin’s government. Russia has witnessed a
sharp autocratic turn with Putin’s immense centralization of power. His
policies to neuter the Russian Duma, intimidate the press and manipulate the
levers of Russian economy have gained the support of the Russian nation since
his popularity among Russians has never declined. Nationality, albeit not in a
discriminative character, is also another concept the state nationalism under
Putin. An emphasis to national pride and national identity are often seen in
speeches of Putin. Despite the fact that Putin has always been careful in
underlining the importance of the peaceful co-existence and solidarity of
different nationalities under a single motherland and flag, the superiority of
Russians on the other nationalities has also been implicitly imposed during
Putin’s presidency.
Putin’s state nationalism cannot be put under the category of classic
Slavophile ideology which cherished the Slavic peasant commune and was very
antagonistic to the West. Russia under Putin’s government, despite being
cautious in relations with the West, has never adopted an openly hostile stance
towards Western powers as the Slavophiles did. A limited influence of
neo-Slavophile ideology however, can be seen in the policies of Putin.
Protection and development of the national character of the Russian Orthodox
Church, attempts to avert the departure of two Slavic countries, namely the
Ukraine and Belarus, from the orbit of Moscow can be interpreted as factors
reflecting the neo-Slavophile character of Putin’s state nationalism. In 2007,
Putin granted Solzhenitsyn, the hero of neo-Slavophiles, a State Award for
humanitarian achievement which explicitly demonstrated his sympathy to this
ideology.
The Eurasianists had
high hopes when Putin came to power in 1999. Putin’s decisive and to some
extent brutal policies in Chechnya strengthened Eurasianist hopes. However, the
expectations that Putin administration would lead Russia in a Eurasian
discourse faded away swiftly in the early years of Putin. Especially following
the September 11 attacks, Putin pursued a moderate and pragmatic policy based
on cooperation with the United States and with the European Union. In those
years, there has been a rapid US “expansion” in Central Asian countries with
the opening of US military bases. This situation started to change as of 2005
when the US experienced a sudden geopolitical reversal in Central Asia, with
regional leaders becoming suspicious of the US presence. The decline of US’s
presence commenced with Uzbekistan's decision in July 2005 to evict US military
forces from an air base at Karshi-Khanabad.
Putin administration
swiftly moved to fill the political gap which occurred with the US withdrawal.
Russia strengthened the loosened ties not only with Uzbekistan but also with
other Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kirghizstan and
Azerbaijan. This new pro-active stance and diplomatic success received a warm
welcome from the Eurasianist camp. Putin, by publicly praising Lev Gumilev,
founder of modern Eurasianist movement, demonstrated his belief in the Eurasianist
ideology. The consolidation of Russia’s influence in the near neighbourhood
through regional organizations such as Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (CACO), Eurasian Economic
Community (EAEC), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) also confirmed
Putin’s Eurasianist discourse. It seems clear that Eurasianist influence
remains strong, if not predominant to this day within the Russian policy-making
establishment. Nevertheless, it would also be wrong to claim that Putin
administration is guided entirely by Eurasianist thinking.
Regarding ethnic
nationalism, the views of Kremlin seems to be very clear. On 16 December 2010,
Putin answered the questions of Russian people during a call-in show. In the
said TV show, while answering a question Putin said that;
“Any display of
extremism must be cut short immediately. People from all parts of Russia,
whether they are from the North Caucasus, Far East, Siberia or central Russia,
should feel comfortable regardless of where they live. The state, local
authorities, NGOs and most importantly all Russian citizens themselves,
regardless of their ethnic origin and religious beliefs, should realize that we
are children of one country and feel comfortable in any part of this country”.
In his speech, defining
ethnic nationalism and radicalism as a virus, Putin underlined;
“Radicalism has
always been present in society. Just like viruses: They are present in almost
every person, but if you have a good immune system, then you’re not affected by
those viruses. Similarly with society – if it is mature then these viruses of
radicalism and extremism are just present there somewhere in your cells, they
can’t do anything. But as soon as society becomes weak, your immune system goes
down, then diseases start to develop”.
Finding an appropriate
answer to the question under which category, Putin’s ideology of nationalism
can be placed necessitates a comprehensive analysis of the process of
nationalism in Russia and the concepts that shaped the current nationalist
tendencies of different character. The previous parts of this paper tried to
take a brief look to the process of evolution of nationalism, which mainly
shaped today’s nationalist ideologies in Russia. This short voyage to the past
gave us a reliable and valuable source to understand and make a definition of
Putin’s ideology of state nationalism.
Thus, this paper comes
to the conclusion that the nationalist ideology of Putin Administration can be
defined as a “neo-Official Nationalism” reminding the days of Nicholas I who
tried to develop a new ideology of nationalism to dominate the domestic and
foreign affairs of Imperial Russia. This neo-Official Nationalism is based on
Orthodoxy, autocracy and national pride and is strengthened with a Eurasianist,
and to a certain extent, Slavophile influence. It is dressed with an imperial
nostalgia and a strong rhetoric of “peaceful co-existence of different
nationalities under one flag and motherland”. Putin cannot be defined as an
anti-Western as were the Slavophiles. His policy towards the west and
particularly to the US is shaped by pragmatism and cautiousness. Putin’s
neo-Official Nationalism seems to be deprived of irredentist and expansionist
policies or territorial claims. However, it can adopt an aggressive tone and
hostility when the question comes to the ethnic Russians living in the
periphery of Russia. The issue of the “protection” of this Russian diaspora is
used as a strong policy tool to manipulate the domestic politics as well as
foreign relations with those countries who are hosting the ethnic Russians. The
latest example of this was seen during the crisis with Georgia. Putin’s
neo-Official Nationalism strongly rejects ethnic discrimination, racism and
xenophobia, albeit it implicitly imposes the superiority of Russians over the
other nationalities. It aims to plant the seeds of national pride among all
nationalities of being citizens of a “great power”. Feeling the protection of
the state, these citizens, in return, are expected to cast aside all sorts of
“dreams” of self-determination or independence.
[1]The Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) was founded by Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Vladimir Bogachev in 1990. It has been the second registered party in the Soviet Union.
[2]Russian Public Opinion Research Center, Левада:
58% россиян – националисты, 16.08.2005,
http://wciom.com/archives/thematic-archive/info-material/single/1618.html
[3]“Russia is for Russians” is a political
slogan and nationalist doctrine, which originated
in the Russian Empire in
the second half of the 19th century. The original “Russia for Russians” idea
has variably been ascribed to a Black Hundreds
ideologue Vladimir Gringmut, General Mikhail Skobelev, or
Tsar Alexander III of Russia.
[4] Robert Steuckers, Foundations of Russian Nationalism, 20 June 2010,
http://www.eurorus.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6604%3Afoundations-of-russian-nationalism&catid=3%3Aanalysis&Itemid=92&lang=en
[5]Kievan Rus' (Russian: Ки́евская Русь), is the name used by Russian historian Nikolai Karamzin for the Medieval state of Rus. The state existed from approximately 880 to sometime in the middle of the 13th century when it disintegrated. It was founded by East Slavic Tribes and Scandinavian traders (Varangians) called "Rus'" and centered in Novgorod. The state later included territories stretching south to the Black Sea, east to Volga, and west to the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
[6]See Сергей Михайлович Соловьев, История России с древнейших времен, Publisher: Oleg E. Kolesnikov (Русская история в Библиотеке Магистра, http://www.lib.ru/HISTORY/SOLOVIEV/solv01.txt
[7]Orlando Figes,
Natasha’s Dance A Cultural History of Russia, New York, 2002, p.62
[8]Figes,
Natasha’s Dance A Cultural History of Russia, p.65
[9] Figes,
Natasha’s Dance A Cultural History of Russia, p.66
[10]They are often referred to as Decembrists.
[11]Figes,
Natasha’s Dance A Cultural History of Russia, p.86
[12]Richard Pipes, Russian Conservatism and Its Critics A
Study in Political Culture, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2005,
p.98
[13]Sergei Vasilievich Utechin, Russian Political Thought,
London, 1963, p.72
[14]Andrzej Walicki, A history of Russian Thought From the
Enlightenment to Marxism, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 1979,
pp. 98-99
[15]Utechin, Russian Political Thought, London, 1963, p.85
[16]Figes,
Natasha’s Dance A Cultural History of Russia, p.83
[17]Walicki, A
history of Russian Thought From the Enlightenment to Marxism, p. 312
[18]Figes,
Natasha’s Dance A Cultural History of Russia, pp.313-315
[19]Dmitry Shlapentok, Russia’s Foreign Policy and Eurasianism, 1 September 2005, EURASIA NET.ORG,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav080205a.shtml
[20]Союз нерушимый республик свободных (Unbreakable
Union of freeborn Republics)
Сплотила навеки Великая Русь. (Great Russia
has welded forever to stand.)
Да здравствует созданный волей народов (Created in
struggle by will of the people)
Единый, могучий Советский Союз! (United and mighty, our Soviet land!)
[21]В.И.Черный, Национализм в России в конце XX – начале XXI веков, дипломная работа, Министерство образования и науки Российской Федерации, Государственное
образовательное учреждение высшего профессионального образования, http://5ka.su/ref/history/0_object8218.html, 2004, p.4
[22]Русский национальный собор"(РНС) (Russkii Nazional'ni Sobor - Russian National
Assembly) was founded on February 1992 by a group of Russian nationalist
leaders (A.Sterligov, B.Rasputin, G.Zyuganov, A.Makashov). It constituted a new
organisation as an “umbrella coalition”
of numerous groups and fractions. RNS declared itself as a “block of patriotic
parties and Russian national movements with a goal of unifying Russian and
other indigenous peoples of Russia for the sake of revival of united
Motherland, for defence of national-state interests, for preserving traditional
moral and religious values of Russia's citizens".
Bibliography
Figes, Orlando.
Natasha’s Dance A Cultural History of Russia, New York, 2002
Pipes, Richard. Russian Conservatism and Its Critics A
Study in Political Culture, Yale
Shlapentok, Dmitry. Russia’s Foreign Policy and Eurasianism, 1 September 2005, EURASIA
NET.ORG,
Steuckers, Robert. Foundations of Russian Nationalism, 20 June 2010,
Соловьев, Сергей Михайлович. История России с древнейших времен, Publisher: Oleg E. Kolesnikov (Русская история в Библиотеке Магистра) http://www.lib.ru/HISTORY/SOLOVIEV/solv01.txt
Utechin, Sergei Vasilievich. Russian Political Thought,
London, 1963
Walicki, Andrzej. A history of Russian Thought From
the Enlightenment to Marxism, Stanford
University
Press,Stanford California, 1979.
Черный, В.И. Национализм в России в конце XX – начале
веков, дипломная работа,
Министерство образования и науки Российской
Федерации, Государственное
образовательное учреждение высшего профессионального образования,
http://5ka.su/ref/history/0_object8218.html, 2004.
*Anıl Çiçek - Dr., Head of Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Completed his post-doctoral research studies at the University of
Latvia as a part of Jean Monnet Scholarship Program, achieved Russian language
certificate TRKI –III (Advanced level) of the University of St. Petersburg.
© 2010, IJORS - INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN STUDIES